From poverty to power - Oxfam-Québec
From poverty to power - Oxfam-Québec From poverty to power - Oxfam-Québec
2 POWER AND POLITICS I RULE, THEREFORE I AMPromote growth: All these states actively intervened in the economy,building infrastructure and directing credit and support to thoseindustries they deemed to be ‘winners’. Crucially, they were also ableto drop ‘losers’: if companies or sectors failed to perform, the statewithdrew support and let them founder. By promoting domestic savingsand investment, they were able to minimise their dependence on ficklesources of foreign capital.Start with equity: South Korea and Taiwan began their take-offs afterthe Second World War with ‘pre-distribution’ in the shape of radicalland reforms, Malaysia with an affirmative action programme infavour of the economically excluded ethnic Malay population.Integrate with the global economy, but discriminate in so doing:The tigers used trade to generate wealth, but protected fledglingindustries. Governments actively promoted national firms, engagingselectively with foreign investment rather than bowing to US andEuropean demands that they accord foreign companies the sametreatment as local ones. These economic development policies arediscussed in greater detail in Part 3.Guarantee health and education for all: Development is synonymouswith healthy and educated populations, not least because anindustrial economy requires a skilled and fit workforce. In recentdecades, many developing countries (not just in East Asia) have madeenormous advances in health and education.A study of East Asia’s successes also debunks some commonmyths: many economies grew despite high levels of corruption;countries such as China and Viet Nam have not guaranteed Westernstyle‘property rights’ deemed essential by the World Bank and others;and Malaysia and Viet Nam overcame the ‘resource curse’ of abundantmineral and agricultural wealth that is often seen as a death sentencefor developing countries.93
FROM POVERTY TO POWERBOX 2.2ARE EFFECTIVE STATES COMPATIBLE WITHACTIVE CITIZENS?The rise of strong states over the past two centuries is litteredwith famous names such as Napoleon (France), Cavour (Italy),Bismarck (Germany), Atatürk (Turkey), Mao Tse Tung (China),Stalin (USSR), Chiang Kai-shek (Taiwan), Jawarhalal Nehru(India), Jomo Kenyatta (Kenya), and Sukarno (Indonesia), as wellas some not so famous ones like Seretse Khama of Botswanaand Lázaro Cárdenas of Mexico.These leaders inspired a sense of national pride and identity,but their fame seldom stemmed from their commitment todemocracy. The most notorious among them sought to establishtotal state control by crushing any independent action by citizens.Effective states in East Asia and elsewhere have typically takenoff with little initial recognition of human rights or democracy,although this has often improved later on; in Latin America,active social movements and political organisations have rarelybeen accompanied by effective states. Are the two mutuallyexclusive? Or is this a case of ‘selection bias’ – those countriesthat have had both have already ceased to be poor, and sodisappear from the development radar? Many of the mostsuccessful transformations in the past century, such as thoseof Sweden and Finland, have been triggered by social pacts withina democracy, showing what the elusive combination of activecitizens and effective states can achieve. Data are limited andbeset with measurement problems, but seem to suggest apositive correlation between active citizenship and effectivestates. Although this does not prove which came first, it at leastsuggests that they are not mutually incompatible. 134In any case, backing authoritarianism in the hope that it coulddeliver economic growth was never a safe bet. For every LeeKuan Yew in Singapore or Chinese Communist Party, there havebeen dozens of autocrats who ignored both citizens and businessleaders and drove their economies into the ground. Moreover,the authoritarian road to development is getting harder. Thespread of democracy makes it much harder for today’s autocrats94
- Page 60 and 61: 2 POWER AND POLITICS I READ, THEREF
- Page 62 and 63: 2 POWER AND POLITICS I READ, THEREF
- Page 64 and 65: 2 POWER AND POLITICS I READ, THEREF
- Page 66 and 67: 2 POWER AND POLITICS I READ, THEREF
- Page 68 and 69: 2 POWER AND POLITICS I READ, THEREF
- Page 70 and 71: 2 POWER AND POLITICS I SURF, THEREF
- Page 72 and 73: 2 POWER AND POLITICS I SURF, THEREF
- Page 74 and 75: 2 POWER AND POLITICS I SURF, THEREF
- Page 76 and 77: 2 POWER AND POLITICS WE ORGANISE, T
- Page 78 and 79: 2 POWER AND POLITICS WE ORGANISE, T
- Page 80 and 81: 2 POWER AND POLITICS WE ORGANISE, T
- Page 82 and 83: 2 POWER AND POLITICS WE ORGANISE, T
- Page 84 and 85: 2 POWER AND POLITICS WE ORGANISE, T
- Page 86 and 87: 2 POWER AND POLITICS WE ORGANISE, T
- Page 88 and 89: 2 POWER AND POLITICS I OWN, THEREFO
- Page 90 and 91: 2 POWER AND POLITICS I OWN, THEREFO
- Page 92 and 93: 2 POWER AND POLITICS I OWN, THEREFO
- Page 94 and 95: 2 POWER AND POLITICS I OWN, THEREFO
- Page 96 and 97: I VOTE, THEREFORE I AMWhether in Fl
- Page 98 and 99: 2 POWER AND POLITICS I VOTE, THEREF
- Page 100 and 101: 2 POWER AND POLITICS I VOTE, THEREF
- Page 102 and 103: 2 POWER AND POLITICS I VOTE, THEREF
- Page 104 and 105: 2 POWER AND POLITICS I STEAL, THERE
- Page 106 and 107: 2 POWER AND POLITICS I STEAL, THERE
- Page 108 and 109: 2 POWER AND POLITICS I RULE, THEREF
- Page 112 and 113: 2 POWER AND POLITICS I RULE, THEREF
- Page 114 and 115: 2 POWER AND POLITICS I RULE, THEREF
- Page 116 and 117: 2 POWER AND POLITICS I RULE, THEREF
- Page 118 and 119: 2 POWER AND POLITICS I RULE, THEREF
- Page 120 and 121: 2 POWER AND POLITICS I RULE, THEREF
- Page 122 and 123: 2 POWER AND POLITICS FROM POVERTY T
- Page 124 and 125: PART THREEAn economics for the twen
- Page 126 and 127: 3 POVERTY AND WEALTH A TWENTY-FIRST
- Page 128 and 129: 3 POVERTY AND WEALTH A TWENTY-FIRST
- Page 130 and 131: 3 POVERTY AND WEALTH A TWENTY-FIRST
- Page 132 and 133: 3 POVERTY AND WEALTH A TWENTY-FIRST
- Page 134 and 135: 3 POVERTY AND WEALTH A TWENTY-FIRST
- Page 136 and 137: LIVING OFF THE LANDThe smoky, cold
- Page 138 and 139: 3 POVERTY AND WEALTH LIVING OFF THE
- Page 140 and 141: 3 POVERTY AND WEALTH LIVING OFF THE
- Page 142 and 143: 3 POVERTY AND WEALTH LIVING OFF THE
- Page 144 and 145: 3 POVERTY AND WEALTH LIVING OFF THE
- Page 146 and 147: 3 POVERTY AND WEALTH LIVING OFF THE
- Page 148 and 149: 3 POVERTY AND WEALTH LIVING OFF THE
- Page 150 and 151: 3 POVERTY AND WEALTH LIVING OFF THE
- Page 152 and 153: 3 POVERTY AND WEALTH LIVING OFF THE
- Page 154 and 155: 3 POVERTY AND WEALTH LIVING OFF THE
- Page 156 and 157: 3 POVERTY AND WEALTH LIVING OFF THE
- Page 158 and 159: 3 POVERTY AND WEALTH LIVING OFF THE
FROM POVERTY TO POWERBOX 2.2ARE EFFECTIVE STATES COMPATIBLE WITHACTIVE CITIZENS?The rise of strong states over the past two centuries is litteredwith famous names such as Napoleon (France), Cavour (Italy),Bismarck (Germany), Atatürk (Turkey), Mao Tse Tung (China),Stalin (USSR), Chiang Kai-shek (Taiwan), Jawarhalal Nehru(India), Jomo Kenyatta (Kenya), and Sukarno (Indonesia), as wellas some not so famous ones like Seretse Khama of Botswanaand Lázaro Cárdenas of Mexico.These leaders inspired a sense of national pride and identity,but their fame seldom stemmed from their commitment <strong>to</strong>democracy. The most no<strong>to</strong>rious among them sought <strong>to</strong> establish<strong>to</strong>tal state control by crushing any independent action by citizens.Effective states in East Asia and elsewhere have typically takenoff with little initial recognition of human rights or democracy,although this has often improved later on; in Latin America,active social movements and political organisations have rarelybeen accompanied by effective states. Are the two mutuallyexclusive? Or is this a case of ‘selection bias’ – those countriesthat have had both have already ceased <strong>to</strong> be poor, and sodisappear from the development radar? Many of the mostsuccessful transformations in the past century, such as thoseof Sweden and Finland, have been triggered by social pacts withina democracy, showing what the elusive combination of activecitizens and effective states can achieve. Data are limited andbeset with measurement problems, but seem <strong>to</strong> suggest apositive correlation between active citizenship and effectivestates. Although this does not prove which came first, it at leastsuggests that they are not mutually incompatible. 134In any case, backing authoritarianism in the hope that it coulddeliver economic growth was never a safe bet. For every LeeKuan Yew in Singapore or Chinese Communist Party, there havebeen dozens of au<strong>to</strong>crats who ignored both citizens and businessleaders and drove their economies in<strong>to</strong> the ground. Moreover,the authoritarian road <strong>to</strong> development is getting harder. Thespread of democracy makes it much harder for <strong>to</strong>day’s au<strong>to</strong>crats94
Change language