Naval Reserve Association

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S E A S C A P EThe seascape surrounding the Navy Reserve is, I believe, a bitmore clear than when I wrote a year ago. The PIM (plan ofintended movement for the aviators) is firming up. Is the NavyReserve in shoal waters? No, but we are certainly sailing intouncharted waters! There are two central issues: Is an operationalReserve, without strategic warfighting capability, the right NavyReserve for the country over the long haul? Can we sustain theoperational Reserve as it is being used today? I do not believe thatthere is anyone in Washington, DC, today who can answer thosequestions. That being the case, the nation is assuming risk.First the PIM. It is clear that we are moving to a Navy Reservewithout its own hardware. The signs are everywhere from theNavy budget to VADM Cotton’s Navy Reserve Strategic Plan 8 tothe units that have disappeared one by one. And, I believe, therewill be others that willdisappear as a resultof this year’s POMsubmission. Five C-40aircraft have movedfrom the funded list to ahigh priority unfundedrequirement. Nowherewill you find discussionabout retaining, increasing,or building warfightingcapability in the ReserveComponent. AdmiralCotton is very clear thatthere are no longer NavyReserve requirements,only Navy requirem e n t s .Equipment, from ships,to aircraft, to small boats,to bulldozers is absentC-40from the discussion. VADM Cotton has told me personally, onseveral occasions, that the Navy cannot, in general, afford tohave equipment in the Reserve and that certainly seems to bethe course that we are on. In this regard, the Navy is on adifferent PIM from the other five DoD Reserve Components. Itis perhaps fair to add that the Air Force Reserve and MarineCorps Reserve are on a course more parallel to ours thandivergent. But, let’s be absolutely clear, the Navy is cutting NavyReserve hardware units to save money, money to be spent for newNavy acquisitions.The other side of this coin is that no other Reserve Componentis as integrated as ours is today. That is an achievement worthy ofnote, and many of our Reservists are already benefiting from thatintegration. Reread our article last month on the Horn ofAfrica JTF and see how pleased our Reservists are with theirrole there. This is a big deal, and I don’t want to gloss over it.It isn’t a perfect story; and there are still cultural battles to befought, unfortunately, from the low end of the chain of commandall the way to the E-ring of the Pentagon. One cannot argue,however, that integration, where veteran Sailors add theirThe Navy Reserveexpertise on a regular basis to the Active Component and arethemselves kept up to date, is a bad thing. The problem is notthe vision but the execution. The transition from “take thisswab and clean that deck, because I don’t have anything elsefor you to do” to “can you teach me how this is done in thecivilian world,” is a long one. Such change is also absolutelydependent upon our ability to fund transportation forReservists from home to the Active Component site. This ismoving forward, but it isn’t fixed.Another aspect of the PIM is that we are moving away fromwarfighting to combat support. We are moving from tooth totail. This is obviously an outgrowth of the lack of enthusiasmfor equipment in the Reserve, but is it something more? Is it amindset which says that it is easy for “civilian” medical,law enforcement, andbusiness types tobe effective militarymedical, MAAs, andintelligence specialists,but not so easy toretain combat skills?I sense that there isan undercurrent thatbelieves this and,while I think that it iswrong, I understandthe appeal of thatargument. The majorappeal is, of course,financial. But, doesit spring from aparochialism whichsays leave the toughstuff to the full-timeprofessionals? I’m afraid that it does, but that is strictlyopinion.The one aspect of the PIM which is still a bit murky is NavyReserve authorized end-strength. You probably have seen thatwith this budget submission, the Navy Reserve is coming downanother three thousand or so to 67,800. About half of the cutscome from decommissioning squadrons and the remainder largelyfrom cutting unfilled billets according to VADM Cotton. 9 AfterFY-08, the number is to stabilize at 68,000. If you understand theFuture Years Defense Plan (FYDP), anything after the currentyear is subject to change and frequently does. Cutting unfilledbillets makes sense on the surface. Why continue to authorizeend-strength that isn’t filled. Unfortunately, we have always hada very fluid billet file so there are always unfilled billets in onearea and folks IAP in another area. More importantly, when youdon’t make your recruiting numbers, you will have unfilledbillets! (See page 19) If you don’t make your numbers again,you will have empty billets again. One can see where this spiralcould lead if recruiting, which is now a Navy responsibility nota Navy Reserve responsibility, isn’t fixed.18 NRA NEWS/APRIL 2007
An F/A-18 Hornet of VFA-201 “Hunters” prepares to launch fromthe flight deck of USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71). (U.S. Navyphoto by Photographer’s Mate Airman Brad Garner)The central issue of a strategic Reserve vice an operationalReserve or a combination of the two as the right thing for thecountry revolves around this question: How good are we atpredicting the nature of the next conflict, and what we will needto draw upon to meet that test? If you have the answer to the nextwar, step to the head of the class; and you will be in the historybooks. Since we never have that answer, it would seem prudent toput some insurance capability in our Reserve Component. Thehistory of our Navy is replete with examples of a strong NavyReserve. When we needed to call units during the Viet Nam era,we also learned the lesson of a not-so-strong Navy Reserve, notcompatible with current shipboard systems. When the Navyneeded an extra squadron at the beginning of the Iraq saga, wehad VFA-201; and they performed brilliantly. When we neededCombat SAR, something the Navy had not needed since VietNam, we had HCS-4 & 5; and they performed brilliantly. Will weno longer find ourselves with those kinds of unforeseen shortages?Impossible, because they were “unforeseen.” That is whyyou hedge your bets with your Reserve Component. You hedgewith the stuff that you aren’t sure that you will need, not justtoday’s “tail” that you know you need. That is why the NationalGuard has always retained some combat capability, not justcombat support and combat service support capability.Another part of answering the question of balance betweenstrategic and operational is the personnel piece. The Navy that weare building is increasingly technical, requiring specialists notmyriads of paint chippers. The LCS Sailors that we are buildingright now will be cross-trained and multitalented experts. Today’sSailors are not the “Swabbies” of decades ago; and tomorrow’sLCS Sailors, even less. The same is true of our aviators, surfacewarfare officers, and submariners. They will be increasinglyexpensive to produce and increasingly talented. Many of themwill leave the Active Component. Does it not make sense to retaina number of them in the Reserve Component just in case theTaiwan issue heads south or Iran cannot be diplomaticallyrestrained? LCS Sailors are going to have a long training track,most of it not OJT. This is a serious investment! Today’s aviatorsaverage three years of training before they get to the fleet toproduce readiness. 10 If we want to retain such investmentsbeyond those who choose to stay on active duty, can we enticethem by offering to make them MAAs or customs inspectors?The burning question here is the second one – can we sustainthe operational Reserve as it is being used today? Unchartedwaters. We don’t know, but we surely can see some signs ofnarrows ahead. For one, the Department of Defense recruiting andretention statistics for fiscal 2006 indicated that the Navy Reserveachieved 87 percent of its recruiting goal, the lowest of theReserve Components. 11 Intelligence billets were increasinglyhard to fill. While retention was within targets, losses are edgingup. Is this an anomaly because of the recent combining ofReserve recruiting and Active recruiting (the Army Reserveexperienced such an excursion when they combined), or is this anemerging trend?I feel compelled to say that nothing written here suggests a lackof willingness of our Reserve officers and enlisted to serve. WeChief of Naval Operations, ADM Mike Mullen, speaks toSailors assigned to Naval Mobile Construction Battalion(MMCB-133) in Rawen, Iraq.know that the opposite is true. Our Force Master Chief, AdmiralCotton, the MCPON, and CNO have all returned from the theaterwith great stories about Reservists serving and wanting to domore. Again, I refer you to our Horn of Africa article last month.Can we conclude from these stories that there is no end to suchservice; and, therefore, let’s press on? The four leaders that Imentioned here seem to think so. I know from personal experiencethat the willingness to serve and to do what one was trained fordid not always create the best decision for the family.No one knows whether we are going to see a gradual change interms of desire to be a Navy Reservist or whether we are buildingtoward a watershed course change where Navy people neitherbecome Reservists nor remain Reservists. The first would bemanageable through incentives, etc. The second would catch usunprepared and, perhaps, unable to meet the country’s needs.Some of the downward slope has been masked by the downwardslope in end-strength requirements. As end-strength requirementsstabilize (if they do), the issue may come more into focus or itmay not be there at all. Today, the Navy Reserve looks at anannual mobilization requirement (approximately 9,000), the poolof those not yet called, and the annual turnover (new bloodcoming aboard) and concludes that we can meet the challenge.It seems illogical to me that the majority of our Citizen Sailorswill choose to hop from one career to the military career and backagain, even on a one-year-out-of-six plan, if they believe that planwill be executed. (If one considers two six-month deploymentsconstituting one-year and overlays that on a fleet tour followed byNRA NEWS/APRIL 2007 19
Page 4: From the EditorWe were all saddened
Page 7 and 8: In Memory of CAPT John C. Rice, Jr.
Page 12 and 13: ProfessionalDevelopmentHow Long Is
Page 14 and 15: Junior OfficerColumnGet InvolvedLT
Page 16 and 17: S E A S C A P ELittoral Combat Ship
Page 20 and 21: S E A S C A P Eshore duty, it comes
Page 22 and 23: Active DutyProgramsNavy ReserveFull
Page 24 and 25: Retirees’ CornerLCDR Joseph Goldi
Page 26 and 27: NRASpring ConferenceAGENDAThursday,
Page 28 and 29: NAVAL RESERVE ASSOCIATIONDISTRICT P
Page 30 and 31: Reservists in ActionBurke Chapter M
Page 32: YOU LIVE AND SERVEIN BOTH WORLDS.SO

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