GTZ Report on Proposal for Nepal Grant Formula - LGCDP

GTZ Report on Proposal for Nepal Grant Formula - LGCDP GTZ Report on Proposal for Nepal Grant Formula - LGCDP

12.07.2015 Views

Proposal for a municipal grant allocation formulaiiList of [igures and tablesFigure 1: Institutional symmetry in local government oinance...................................................................................4Figure 2: The importance of LDF in the past oiscal years for municipalities in Nepal.......................................6Figure 3: Revenue types and design criteria......................................................................................................................7Figure 4: The grant allocation scheme...............................................................................................................................14Figure 5: Unit cost of service delivery in dependency to population.....................................................................16

Proposal for a municipal grant allocation formula 1Preconditions for and assumptions on a local government system in a federal Nepal1 Preconditions for and assumptions on a local government system in a federal NepalThis report on behalf of gtz/udle aims to open the discussion on a future local government oinance sys-­tem. The current system of local government oinance has to be changed for a number of reasons:• First, Nepal's accession to the World Trade Organisation requires the abolishment of taxes that dis-­criminate imports. The main source of income for municipalities in Nepal is the Local Development Fee, which needs to be replaced until 2011.• Second, Nepal's development towards a federal system will create a new level between local govern-­ment and the federal government, and thus, the local government oinance system will have to reolect the new state restructuring.• Third, the current system of local government funding is based predominantly on a high share of federal support. However, a decentralised system would require strong local governments – not only legally, but also oinancially – to balance the idea of local self-­‐governance (legal autonomy) with oiscal autonomy.The design of a local revenue system includes three central dimensions: the assignment of revenue sources among types of government, the degree of autonomy with which subnational governments can exercise their assigned authority, and the efoiciency of the revenue administration system (Taliercio 2006, 107). This paper describes the design of a system of local government oinance in a future federal Nepal considering the legal authority and the assignment of revenues. • First, this chapter outlines key preconditions and assumptions of state structuring and the import-­ance of the local level within a federal structure. Key assumptions are the further deepening of local self-governance of local communities, the principle of subsidiarity and the principle of congruence (chapter 1.1 hereafter), and the principle of equivalence (chapter 1.2 on page 3f.) in oinan-­cing local services. The principle of connectivity relates to oiscal relations between levels of govern-­ment, federal, regional and local (chapter 1.3 on page 3f.). Altogether, these assumptions favor strong local governments within a federal structure. Key reason for proposing strong local govern-­ments is the empirical evidence from federal states in industrialised and developing countries, in which often the local government level is weakest in relation to the federal and regional level.• Second, the chapter titled Proposal for a new local government taxation system in a federal Nepal on page 5f. describes the future funding sources of local government in a federal Nepal, taking into ac-­count the undisputed end of the Local Development Fee, a centrally collected import tax redistrib-­uted to municipalities based on a historical municipal revenue source, the octroi. There is currently no single tax source that may replace the yields from the Local Development Fee, therefore new sources have to be identioied which should empower local government, but also guide them to en-­hanced responsiveness and accountability to the local communities. Shared taxes and supplements to existing non-­‐local taxes may fulloil this requirement. Based on three principles presented in chapter 1 an optimal set of local government taxes and user charges is presented.• Third, the chapter titled Proposal for a future grant allocation scheme for municipalities in a federalNepal on page 11f. outlines the fund olows between levels of government.• Finally, the forth and oifth chapter specioically address design question on allocation formulae for Dr Alexander Wegener interpublic consultancywww.interpublic-­‐berlin.de

<strong>Proposal</strong> <strong>for</strong> a municipal grant allocati<strong>on</strong> <strong>for</strong>mula 1Prec<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s <strong>for</strong> and assumpti<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong> a local government system in a federal <strong>Nepal</strong>1 Prec<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s <strong>for</strong> and assumpti<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong> a local government system in a federal <strong>Nepal</strong>This report <strong>on</strong> behalf of gtz/udle aims to open the discussi<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> a future local government oinance sys-­tem. The current system of local government oinance has to be changed <strong>for</strong> a number of reas<strong>on</strong>s:• First, <strong>Nepal</strong>'s accessi<strong>on</strong> to the World Trade Organisati<strong>on</strong> requires the abolishment of taxes that dis-­criminate imports. The main source of income <strong>for</strong> municipalities in <strong>Nepal</strong> is the Local Development Fee, which needs to be replaced until 2011.• Sec<strong>on</strong>d, <strong>Nepal</strong>'s development towards a federal system will create a new level between local govern-­ment and the federal government, and thus, the local government oinance system will have to reolect the new state restructuring.• Third, the current system of local government funding is based predominantly <strong>on</strong> a high share of federal support. However, a decentralised system would require str<strong>on</strong>g local governments – not <strong>on</strong>ly legally, but also oinancially – to balance the idea of local self-­‐governance (legal aut<strong>on</strong>omy) with oiscal aut<strong>on</strong>omy.The design of a local revenue system includes three central dimensi<strong>on</strong>s: the assignment of revenue sources am<strong>on</strong>g types of government, the degree of aut<strong>on</strong>omy with which subnati<strong>on</strong>al governments can exercise their assigned authority, and the efoiciency of the revenue administrati<strong>on</strong> system (Taliercio 2006, 107). This paper describes the design of a system of local government oinance in a future federal <strong>Nepal</strong> c<strong>on</strong>sidering the legal authority and the assignment of revenues. • First, this chapter outlines key prec<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s and assumpti<strong>on</strong>s of state structuring and the import-­ance of the local level within a federal structure. Key assumpti<strong>on</strong>s are the further deepening of local self-governance of local communities, the principle of subsidiarity and the principle of c<strong>on</strong>gruence (chapter 1.1 hereafter), and the principle of equivalence (chapter 1.2 <strong>on</strong> page 3f.) in oinan-­cing local services. The principle of c<strong>on</strong>nectivity relates to oiscal relati<strong>on</strong>s between levels of govern-­ment, federal, regi<strong>on</strong>al and local (chapter 1.3 <strong>on</strong> page 3f.). Altogether, these assumpti<strong>on</strong>s favor str<strong>on</strong>g local governments within a federal structure. Key reas<strong>on</strong> <strong>for</strong> proposing str<strong>on</strong>g local govern-­ments is the empirical evidence from federal states in industrialised and developing countries, in which often the local government level is weakest in relati<strong>on</strong> to the federal and regi<strong>on</strong>al level.• Sec<strong>on</strong>d, the chapter titled <strong>Proposal</strong> <strong>for</strong> a new local government taxati<strong>on</strong> system in a federal <strong>Nepal</strong> <strong>on</strong> page 5f. describes the future funding sources of local government in a federal <strong>Nepal</strong>, taking into ac-­count the undisputed end of the Local Development Fee, a centrally collected import tax redistrib-­uted to municipalities based <strong>on</strong> a historical municipal revenue source, the octroi. There is currently no single tax source that may replace the yields from the Local Development Fee, there<strong>for</strong>e new sources have to be identioied which should empower local government, but also guide them to en-­hanced resp<strong>on</strong>siveness and accountability to the local communities. Shared taxes and supplements to existing n<strong>on</strong>-­‐local taxes may fulloil this requirement. Based <strong>on</strong> three principles presented in chapter 1 an optimal set of local government taxes and user charges is presented.• Third, the chapter titled <strong>Proposal</strong> <strong>for</strong> a future grant allocati<strong>on</strong> scheme <strong>for</strong> municipalities in a federal<strong>Nepal</strong> <strong>on</strong> page 11f. outlines the fund olows between levels of government.• Finally, the <strong>for</strong>th and oifth chapter specioically address design questi<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> allocati<strong>on</strong> <strong>for</strong>mulae <strong>for</strong> Dr Alexander Wegener interpublic c<strong>on</strong>sultancywww.interpublic-­‐berlin.de

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