<strong>Proposal</strong> <strong>for</strong> a municipal grant allocati<strong>on</strong> <strong>for</strong>mula 6<strong>Proposal</strong> <strong>for</strong> a new local government taxati<strong>on</strong> system in a federal <strong>Nepal</strong>Figure 2: The importance of LDF in the past [iscal years <strong>for</strong> municipalities in <strong>Nepal</strong>12000000001000000000800000000<strong>Nepal</strong>ese Rupees6000000004000000002000000000FY91/92FY93/93FY93/94FY94/95FY94/96FY96/97FY97/98FY98/99FY99/00FY00/01FY01/02FY02/03FY03/04FY04/05FY05/06Annual BreakdownSince <strong>Nepal</strong>'s ratioicati<strong>on</strong> to accede the World Trade Organisati<strong>on</strong> it is clear that duties have to be abol-ished to foster free markets, and this would in c<strong>on</strong>sequence result in a dramatic oinancial loss of the re-ceiving municipalities. The importance of LDF is extraordinary high (see oigure 2 <strong>on</strong> page 6). Revenue from LDF has been growing <strong>for</strong> years and since some years, around <strong>on</strong>e billi<strong>on</strong> <strong>Nepal</strong>ese Rupees are redistributed to muni-cipalities.The design of a new local government oinance system <strong>for</strong> <strong>Nepal</strong> has thus to oind• alternatives to the LDF – in the amount of roughly <strong>on</strong>e billi<strong>on</strong> <strong>Nepal</strong>ese Rupees, and• to design a local government oinance system in a future federal <strong>Nepal</strong> based <strong>on</strong> the above menti<strong>on</strong>ed principles of c<strong>on</strong>gruence, equivalence and c<strong>on</strong>nectivity.2.2 A local taxati<strong>on</strong> system acknowledging the design principles of c<strong>on</strong>gruence, equivalence and c<strong>on</strong>nectivityAssignment of reas<strong>on</strong>able taxing powers helps give a government c<strong>on</strong>trol over its oiscal destiny. It al-lows the government, acting <strong>for</strong> its citizens, choice over its level of spending and how that spending will be oinanced from segments of its ec<strong>on</strong>omy. That is an important element <strong>for</strong> oiscal aut<strong>on</strong>omy. Dr Alexander Wegener interpublic c<strong>on</strong>sultancywww.interpublic-‐berlin.de
<strong>Proposal</strong> <strong>for</strong> a municipal grant allocati<strong>on</strong> <strong>for</strong>mula 7<strong>Proposal</strong> <strong>for</strong> a new local government taxati<strong>on</strong> system in a federal <strong>Nepal</strong>From the revenue side of the public ec<strong>on</strong>omy, oiscal aut<strong>on</strong>omy (and resp<strong>on</strong>sibility) is greatest when the subnati<strong>on</strong>al government chooses what taxes it will levy, deoines the bases it will use, sets the rate and preference structure <strong>for</strong> those bases, and administers the taxes that have been adopted (Mikesell 2003).Figure 3 <strong>on</strong> page 7 summarises the optimal design of three major types of income <strong>for</strong> local government bodies if the three guiding principles of c<strong>on</strong>gruence, equivalence and c<strong>on</strong>nectivity would be applied to the three main sources of income of local governments:• User charges (usually <strong>for</strong> utilities) and fees (usually <strong>for</strong> administrative services)• Local taxes• <strong>Grant</strong>s.Figure 3: Revenue types and design criteriaSourceFees and user chargesLocal taxes<strong>Grant</strong>sBasisLocal services where the individual c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong> is measurable and politic-ally desired (such as water, electricity, solid waste collecti<strong>on</strong>, etc.).Local fees and user charges should be designed that the services provided can be founded (full cost recovery).Local services, where the individual c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong> is either not measurable, or not desirable.Local taxes, however, should follow the principle of equivalence. There<strong>for</strong>e, the principle of equivalence is extended to local groups beneoitting from loc-al services such as house-‐ and land owners, businesses, or citizens.In an ideal world, grants do fuloil two functi<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong>ly: The serve to guarantee a minimum oinancial basis of local bodies (oiscal functi<strong>on</strong>) and to internalise external spatial effects. after Friedrich 2005Based <strong>on</strong> this optimal design, the following sub-‐secti<strong>on</strong>s deal with• An optimal set of local government taxes (secti<strong>on</strong> 2.2.1 <strong>on</strong> page 9f.),• A reas<strong>on</strong>able sharing of taxes between levels of government (secti<strong>on</strong> 2.2.2 <strong>on</strong> page 9f.),• An optimal set of local government taxes (secti<strong>on</strong> 2.2.3 <strong>on</strong> page 10f.).2.2.1 An optimal set of local government taxesProperty taxes are regarded often as an “optimal” local tax, especially when taking into account Anglo-‐Sax<strong>on</strong> literature. However, this type of tax affect <strong>on</strong>ly a specioic group of the local citizenry and not ne-cessarily the whole community. This tax is an example of a group-‐related equivalence, whereby the as-sumpti<strong>on</strong> is made that property owner beneoit in general from local government decisi<strong>on</strong>-‐making and service delivery bey<strong>on</strong>d user-‐charge based service delivery. Dr Alexander Wegener interpublic c<strong>on</strong>sultancywww.interpublic-‐berlin.de