report of the action team on global navigation satellite systems (gnss)

• Facilitation <strong>of</strong> GPS spectrum band licensing under <strong>the</strong> Radiocommunications Act; and• Maintenance <strong>of</strong> links with <strong>the</strong> United States to contribute to co-operation on GPS, andwith <strong>the</strong> European Union to keep abreast <strong>of</strong> developments with <strong>the</strong> proposed GALILEOsystem.527. The national strategic policy on satellite navigation “Positioning for <strong>the</strong> Future”, whichwas developed by <strong>the</strong> AGCC, is aimed at obtaining <strong>the</strong> best and most efficient use from GNSStechnology. The policy is based upon eight principles:• National coverage;• Safety;• Efficiency, economic and social benefits;• Industry development;• Flexibility <strong>of</strong> policy and strategy;• Appropriate standards;• Benefits to <strong>the</strong> environment; and• National security.528. The AGCC has recently been reviewed after its first three years <strong>of</strong> operation. TheCommittee will continue its work with some minor amendments to its terms <strong>of</strong> reference andmembership (Department <strong>of</strong> Transport and Regional Services, Canberra, Australia, November2003).B. User support and information dissemination529. The need for a link between users, equipment manufacturers, service providers and coresystem providers was highlighted in several <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> regional workshop <strong>report</strong>s and in <strong>the</strong>deliberations that occurred during <strong>the</strong> international expert meetings on GNSS held in Vienna in2002 and 2003. The objective is to increase awareness among users, provide information that iscritical to users with respect to GNSS service provision, and to ensure that core system providerstake into account user feedback.530. The type <strong>of</strong> information that needs to be relayed from service providers to users includes,but is not limited to <strong>the</strong> following:• Dissemination <strong>of</strong> GNSS system status information such as satellite health and satellitemaintenance and testing schedules — scheduled and unscheduled satellite outages within<strong>the</strong> core GNSS architecture have a direct impact on <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong> service that is availablefor a given GNSS application. Predictive tools exist in some application sectors such asaviation that can allow users to determine when poor service availability is likely and<strong>the</strong>n plan accordingly; and• Provision <strong>of</strong> timely notification <strong>of</strong> service denial or degradation through intentional orunintentional interference is critical. The dependency <strong>of</strong> users on GNSS is comparableto, if not greater than, o<strong>the</strong>r familiar services and utilities such as telecommunication andelectrical services. The intentional disruption <strong>of</strong> GNSS services could, <strong>the</strong>refore, posegreat risks to users that could lead to life-threatening situations. Such intentionaldisruptions could be hostile in nature, or <strong>the</strong>y could be <strong>the</strong> result <strong>of</strong> necessary <strong>action</strong>staken by sovereign nations whose national security may be at risk from <strong>the</strong> potentiallyhostile use <strong>of</strong> GNSS by o<strong>the</strong>r nations or terrorists. Such denials <strong>of</strong> service, even for96