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Of course, adding these kinds of provisions to contracts will probably only be of benefitto jurisdictions as they negotiate new contracts. Jurisdictions not purchasing new votingsystems in the near future (i.e., the vast majority of counties and states throughout thecountry) are unlikely to secure agreement from vendors to substantially amend theircontracts along these lines.Furthermore, even if all jurisdictions were able to get these kinds of provisions into theircontracts, it would still be important to mandate many of these provisions in regulation.For instance, if a vendor violates the notification terms of its contract with a small countyin Arkansas by failing to inform it of a voting system malfunction in New Jersey, theArkansas County is unlikely to find out about the violation under current circumstances.More to the point, even if it does learn of such a failure, the county is unlikely to bringan action under the contract (for all of the reasons discussed on pages 25 - 26 of thisreport) unless the malfunction brings disastrous results in its own election sometime later.The point of the database and stronger regulation is to minimize the likelihood of suchoccurrences by bringing problems to light before they can cause such significant harm.Implement Stronger State RegulationThe legislature in at least one state, California, has passed legislation requiring vendorsselling systems within its borders to notify the Secretary of State and all local electionofficials using its systems of any “defect, fault or failure” it discovered, within 30 daysof discovery. 284 As of the writing of this report, the legislation awaits a decision by thegovernor, who vetoed an earlier version of the bill in 2009. 285 This bill would empower theSecretary of State to seek monetary penalties against vendors for failing to comply withreporting requirements, and requires the Secretary to notify the EAC of the problem.While the California proposal would not have solved all of the problems identified in thisreport, it would have gone a long way toward forcing vendors to begin to publicly reportproblems with their systems when alerted to them. It could also have provided many of thebenefits (albeit on a smaller scale) that a national centralized database would provide: inparticular, increasing vendor accountability and incentivizing vendors to enhance internalcontrols; benefiting state certification programs by supplying tips for targeted testing andreview of the effectiveness of mitigations proposed by vendors; allowing election officials(in California, anyway) to get up-to-date information about their systems before deployingthem in elections.The California model presents the best legislative attempt we have seen, to date, to addressthe problems we have discussed in this report. We hope the governor will sign this bill intolaw and that other states will follow suit.Still, the limitations of this proposal as compared to a national clearinghouse are obvious.Among other things, the California bill only requires reporting for systems used in40 | Brennan Center for Justice
California; the bill does not mandate a searchable database that new election officials couldreview before each election; and because the bill could not provide a method for electionofficials and whistleblowers to anonymously report problems that might not technicallyfall within the definition of “defect, fault or failure” (such as the problems in PulaskiCounty, Arkansas, described on page 14 of this report), it would not necessarily resultin the sharing of information about some kinds of problems that still result in the loss ofhundreds and thousands of votes.Create a Voluntary DatabaseWhile the EAC has previously indicated that it does not believe it has the authority or resources tofacilitate the understanding and resolution of problems with non-EAC certified voting equipment,we can think of no legal reason why – even absent additional authorization from Congress – itcould not create a searchable database to which election officials, voters, and vendors could report.In the alternative, if the EAC determines it does not have the resources to create such a database,election officials, through organizations such as the National Association of Secretary of States, theNational Association of State Election Directors, , the National Association of County Recorders,Election Officials and Clerks, or the International Association of Clerks, Recorders, ElectionOfficials and Treasurers could sponsor such a database. There would be no way to force vendors toreport to this database, or to provide election officials with whistleblower protections for makingvoluntary reports – two important suggestions for the mandatory clearinghouse detailed in thisreport – but it could still lead to a much better resource for election officials than currently exists.Election officials using the same equipment could also create user groups where they could shareinformation about their systems electronically.Officials we interviewed wanted to see a database that vendors would be required to reportto, but many said they viewed a voluntary database as a good first step. For instance,Cuyahoga County, Ohio Board of Elections Director Jane Platten stated that “an exchangeof all information about anomalies, malfunctions and failures of voting systems is not onlymuch needed, but should be a requirement.” However, she added that “taking the small stepof creating a voluntary exchange of information would in my opinion have a huge impact onelection administration and operations.”Pressure Vendors to Voluntarily Post Information on Their Own Sites This YearOne drawback of the three previous recommendations – in addition to the largerrecommendation of the creation of a central, mandatory, and federal database – is that each willtake time to implement, and probably cannot be accomplished in time for this fall’s election. Bycontrast, vendors could significantly reduce the risk of a repetition of past problems with theirsystems by creating their own databases, and offering election officials who use their machinesaccess to them. As already noted in this report, because there is such high turnover amongelection officials, a new county director might not be aware of product advisories or softwarepatches sent by a voting system vendor to her predecessor three years earlier. Nor is she likelyBrennan Center for Justice | 41
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Of course, adding these kinds of provisions to contracts will probably only be of benefitto jurisdictions as they negotiate new contracts. Jurisdictions not purchasing new votingsystems in the near future (i.e., the vast majority of counties and states throughout thecountry) are unlikely to secure agreement from vendors to substantially amend theircontracts along these lines.Furthermore, even if all jurisdictions were able to get these kinds of provisions into theircontracts, it would still be important to mandate many of these provisions in regulation.For instance, if a vendor violates the notification terms of its contract with a small countyin Arkansas by failing to in<strong>for</strong>m it of a voting system malfunction in New Jersey, theArkansas County is unlikely to find out about the violation under current circumstances.More to the point, even if it does learn of such a failure, the county is unlikely to bringan action under the contract (<strong>for</strong> all of the reasons discussed on pages 25 - 26 of thisreport) unless the malfunction brings disastrous results in its own election sometime later.The point of the database and stronger regulation is to minimize the likelihood of suchoccurrences by bringing problems to light be<strong>for</strong>e they can cause such significant harm.Implement Stronger State RegulationThe legislature in at least one state, Cali<strong>for</strong>nia, has passed legislation requiring vendorsselling systems within its borders to notify the Secretary of State and all local electionofficials using its systems of any “defect, fault or failure” it discovered, within 30 daysof discovery. 284 As of the writing of this report, the legislation awaits a decision by thegovernor, who vetoed an earlier version of the bill in 2009. 285 This bill would empower theSecretary of State to seek monetary penalties against vendors <strong>for</strong> failing to comply withreporting requirements, and requires the Secretary to notify the EAC of the problem.While the Cali<strong>for</strong>nia proposal would not have solved all of the problems identified in thisreport, it would have gone a long way toward <strong>for</strong>cing vendors to begin to publicly reportproblems with their systems when alerted to them. It could also have provided many of thebenefits (albeit on a smaller scale) that a national centralized database would provide: inparticular, increasing vendor accountability and incentivizing vendors to enhance internalcontrols; benefiting state certification programs by supplying tips <strong>for</strong> targeted testing andreview of the effectiveness of mitigations proposed by vendors; allowing election officials(in Cali<strong>for</strong>nia, anyway) to get up-to-date in<strong>for</strong>mation about their systems be<strong>for</strong>e deployingthem in elections.The Cali<strong>for</strong>nia model presents the best legislative attempt we have seen, to date, to addressthe problems we have discussed in this report. We hope the governor will sign this bill intolaw and that other states will follow suit.Still, the limitations of this proposal as compared to a national clearinghouse are obvious.Among other things, the Cali<strong>for</strong>nia bill only requires reporting <strong>for</strong> systems used in40 | Brennan Center <strong>for</strong> Justice