brennan center for justice

Finally, the Department of Justice could create and maintain the database. The Department has similarresponsibilities in other contexts. For instance, the Anti-Car Theft Improvements Act of 1996 212 gavethe DOJ responsibility for creating the National Motor Vehicle Title Information System, a databasedesigned to compile information from a variety of sources on the histories of individual motor vehicles.The Act also provided the Department with enforcement powers in the event someone required tosubmit information to the database failed to do so.C. Analogous RegimesAnalogous regulatory regimes for other industries demonstrate the power and usefulness of this kindof regulatory scheme.The clearinghouse we propose is similar in principle to the database that Congress ordered the ConsumerProduct Safety Commission (CPSC) to establish as part of the Consumer Product Safety ImprovementAct (CPSIA) of 2008. 213 One of CPSIA’s key features was Congress’s mandate that the CPSC createa publicly available, searchable database that records information from, among others, consumers,government agencies, and healthcare professionals, regarding the harms related to the use of a consumerproduct regulated by the CPSC. 214 A House Committee Report on the legislation states that the “goalof the CPSC should be to devise a database that can rapidly provide consumers with ‘early warning’information about specific products that could pose serious safety hazards.” 215The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 216 and the Food and DrugAdministration (FDA) maintain similar “early warning” databases. NHTSA’s Early Warning Reportingdatabase collects and makes publicly available property damage reports and death and injury reportsprovided by manufacturers pursuant to the Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, andDocumentation (TREAD) Act of 2000. 217 Meanwhile, NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigations (ODI)database, even before the passage of the TREAD Act, has allowed consumers both to make and searchfor safety complaints regarding problems with motor vehicles or pieces of motor vehicle equipment. 218The FDA’s Adverse Event Reporting System, moreover, collects and makes publicly available adversedrug reaction information by healthcare professionals and consumers. 219These databases, although not quite as robust and user-friendly as the proposed CPSIA database, haveplayed important roles in protecting the public. Indeed, it was independent analysis of NHSTA’scomplaint database that catalyzed the Bridgestone/Firestone tire recall years ago. 220 And, it was theBridgestone/Firestone recall that was the impetus behind the passage of TREAD. 221In June 2009, researchers mining the NHTSA complaint database discovered the high rate of failure ofChinese valve stems; this ultimately led to the recall of millions of valve stems in vehicle tires. 222 Laterin the year, NHTSA launched an investigation of Toyota vehicles after receiving over 400 consumercomplaints about acceleration problems with the cars; some of these problems appear to have beenresponsible for fatal accidents. 223 This investigation led Toyota to announce on November 25 that itwould repair the accelerator pedals on some 4.26 million vehicles. 224 After the first recall, reports ofproblems with Toyota vehicles, which had been steady before acceleration problems began to receiveattention in the fall, surged. 225 As more customers came forward with complaints, federal investigatorsexpanded the probe to look at other problems with Toyota vehicles, and the company issued additionalrecalls for brake and acceleration problems. 226 On April 5, 2010, NHTSA assessed the largest legallypermissible fine against Toyota. In his letter to the company notifying them of the fine, NHTSA ChiefCounsel O. Kevin Vincent identified the manufacturer’s failure to notify authorities in a timely mannerafter becoming aware of the defects as the primary rationale for levying the harsh penalty. 22730 | Brennan Center for Justice