brennan center for justice
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Denise Lamb, who currently serves as Chief Deputy Clerk for Elections in Sante Fe County, New Mexico,believes that a central database that detailed malfunctions for each system, as well as workarounds orsoftware patches supplied by the vendors, could have prevented the problems that Bernalillo Countyencountered with its tally server in 2002, and certainly would have allowed the County to understandquickly the potential source of the malfunction once it occurred. She noted that, “vendors are in thebusiness of selling machines, and often don’t have an incentive” to inform present and future customersof problems with their systems. 119• • •10. Wake County, North Carolina, November 2002According to Wired News, ES&S discovered a glitch in the firmware of its touchscreen voting machinesused during early voting in the 2002 general election in Jackson County, North Carolina. 120 The glitch“made the ES&S machines falsely sense that their memories were full,” a company spokeswoman toldthe magazine. 121 The potential result of this error was that memory cards associated with the machineswould not record votes that had been cast. Fortunately,the problem was fixable. 122denise lamb, who currently serves aschief deputy clerk for elections insante fe county, new mexico, notedthat, “vendors are in the business ofselling machines, and often don’thave an incentive” to inform presentand future customers of problemswith their systems.Election officials in neighboring Wake County laterfound this same glitch “by chance” during their ownearly voting period that year. 123 Election officials toldWired that at the time, early voters would fill out paperapplications which contained tracking numbers. Eachapplication had a tracking number, and before the earlyvoters cast their votes on the touch-screen machines,poll-workers typed the number into the machines. Atsome point, election officials compared the number ofvotes on the machines to the applications, and foundthat the two figures did not match. 124 As the BrennanCenter and other organizations have documented, eventoday many election jurisdictions do not always followsuch reconciliation practices. 125According to Cherie Poucher, Director of the Wake County Board of Elections, upon learning of thediscrepancy, she immediately contacted ES&S. She says that at that point, she was told that JacksonCounty had experienced a similar problem. Poucher stated this was the first time she had been informedof this problem. 126Ms. Poucher stated that in all, six touch-screen voting machines used in Wake County had lost 436ballots as a result of the problem. Because the county had paper applications and a numerical codeassociated with the lost votes, they were able to contact voters whose votes had been lost, and providethem with the opportunity to revote. Many did so. 127 Unfortunately, as Professor David Dill of Stanfordhas noted, we can’t be sure “that other counties didn’t lose votes that they didn’t catch.” 12818 | Brennan Center for Justice
accessible voting systemsThe Help America Vote Act (HAVA) requires that every polling place used for federalelections be equipped with a voting system that is “accessible for individuals with disabilities. . . in a manner that provides the same opportunity for access and participation (includingprivacy and independence) as for other voters.” 129 Many disability rights advocates rightlyhail this provision of HAVA as a civil rights milestone, providing millions of Americanswith the opportunity to vote privately and independently for the first time in their lives.Unfortunately, however, reports indicate that accessible systems too often malfunctionon Election Day, frustrating voters with disabilities. 130 As a result, HAVA’s mandate hassometimes gone unfulfilled, and these voters have been forced to either seek assistance andlose their privacy while voting, or to give up on voting in their polling places altogether.Over the past several years, there have been several individual 131 and institutional 132 reportsdetailing problems that voters with disabilities have experienced using these systems. 133They have included audio keypads and output that failed to work, VVPAT printerson accessible units that malfunction, and accessible machines that cannot read ballotscorrectly. Frequently these “malfunctions” could have been avoided if poll workers orelection officials were aware of procedures to prevent them.The appendix available in the online version of this report details some of the defectsthat have threatened to disenfranchise voters with disabilities, but a comprehensivecollection of reported malfunctions in accessible voting systems does not exist in onelocation. There is no easy way for election officials, disability rights advocates or voterswith disabilities to review a comprehensive list of problems associated with these systems,or the countermeasures that election officials can implement to avoid them.A centralized database that allowed users to search these kinds of problems could greatlyimprove the voting experience of voters with disabilities. Such a database would notprevent malfunctions. But it would give election officials significant knowledge, so thatthey could take steps to prevent malfunctions, or quickly correct them. It would also giveelection officials – and voters – the opportunity to warn their counterparts in other areasof the country about problems experienced in various polling places with accessible unitsand to remedy such problems prior to Election Day.Brennan Center for Justice | 19
- Page 5: IV.A BETTER WAY TO TRACK AND ADDRES
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accessible voting systemsThe Help America Vote Act (HAVA) requires that every polling place used <strong>for</strong> federalelections be equipped with a voting system that is “accessible <strong>for</strong> individuals with disabilities. . . in a manner that provides the same opportunity <strong>for</strong> access and participation (includingprivacy and independence) as <strong>for</strong> other voters.” 129 Many disability rights advocates rightlyhail this provision of HAVA as a civil rights milestone, providing millions of Americanswith the opportunity to vote privately and independently <strong>for</strong> the first time in their lives.Un<strong>for</strong>tunately, however, reports indicate that accessible systems too often malfunctionon Election Day, frustrating voters with disabilities. 130 As a result, HAVA’s mandate hassometimes gone unfulfilled, and these voters have been <strong>for</strong>ced to either seek assistance andlose their privacy while voting, or to give up on voting in their polling places altogether.Over the past several years, there have been several individual 131 and institutional 132 reportsdetailing problems that voters with disabilities have experienced using these systems. 133They have included audio keypads and output that failed to work, VVPAT printerson accessible units that malfunction, and accessible machines that cannot read ballotscorrectly. Frequently these “malfunctions” could have been avoided if poll workers orelection officials were aware of procedures to prevent them.The appendix available in the online version of this report details some of the defectsthat have threatened to disenfranchise voters with disabilities, but a comprehensivecollection of reported malfunctions in accessible voting systems does not exist in onelocation. There is no easy way <strong>for</strong> election officials, disability rights advocates or voterswith disabilities to review a comprehensive list of problems associated with these systems,or the countermeasures that election officials can implement to avoid them.A centralized database that allowed users to search these kinds of problems could greatlyimprove the voting experience of voters with disabilities. Such a database would notprevent malfunctions. But it would give election officials significant knowledge, so thatthey could take steps to prevent malfunctions, or quickly correct them. It would also giveelection officials – and voters – the opportunity to warn their counterparts in other areasof the country about problems experienced in various polling places with accessible unitsand to remedy such problems prior to Election Day.Brennan Center <strong>for</strong> Justice | 19