4. Pulaski County, Arkansas, May 2006During early voting in the May primary, several voters complained of problems with an ES&S touch screenDRE. 70 According to a local newscast, Pulaski County election officials tested the machine and determinedthat the machine was not broken; an optical illusion perceived by voters who were over six feet tall causedthe problem. 71 Officials determined that the angle at which particularly tall voters viewed the screen causedthem to believe that they were voting <strong>for</strong> the candidate below the one <strong>for</strong> whom a vote was recorded. 72 Thisis a significant problem given that more than 15 percent of American males over the age of 20 are six feettall or taller. 73Pulaski County Director of Elections Susan Inman told the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette that when sheasked ES&S to examine the machine to ensure that there wasn’t a problem with the equipment, a companyemployee told her that they were already aware of optical illusion problems experienced by tall voters. 74A review screen that appears be<strong>for</strong>e voters finalize their ballots alerted some to the fact that their voteswere not recorded as intended. However, several studies have shown that most voters will not noticeerrors on their final review screens, so there is no way to know how many voters in Pulaski Countyactually cast their ballots <strong>for</strong> candidates other than the candidate of their choice. 75 Officials were lividat the thought that ES&S could have known about the problem and failed to warn them. 76 PulaskiCounty Prosecuting Attorney Larry Jegley launched an investigation into the issue, saying, “I can’tunderstand how in the world a big company like ES&S, with contracts all over the state of Arkansas,would know about a problem like this and fail to fix it.” 775. Florida, November 2006• • •In 2007, Diebold, Inc. conceded that its optical scan readers had a glitch that caused memory cardfailures, and told the Daytona Beach News-Journal that it would investigate the “J40 connector” thatattaches memory cards to its optical scan voting machines. 78 This admission came after complaintsabout memory card failures from election officials dating as far back as 2000. 79According to the News-Journal, Volusia County, Florida reported that eleven memory cards in Dieboldoptical scan machines failed during the November 2006 general election. 80 Premier told the News-Journal that the 4.4 percent error rate in Volusia County was “unusual,” but an investigation by thepaper revealed even higher error rates in other Florida counties using the same equipment. 81 Accordingto public records obtained by the paper, several other Florida counties experienced failure rates thatwere comparable to or higher than those observed in Volusia County. 82The 2006 incidents were not the first time that memory cards in Diebold machines failed in Volusia andother Florida counties. According to the News-Journal, a 2004 county report indicates that Volusia had 57memory card failures, which Diebold stated was “more memory card failures than ‘the rest of our customersin Florida combined.’” 83 The paper also reported that Volusia’s problems with memory cards dated back tothe 2000 general election, when 300 ballots went uncounted when a memory card failed in the middle ofballot scanning. 84 The loss of votes was not discovered until a hand recount began as a result of the closecontest. 85 The News-Journal noted that “Volusia County’s most infamous memory card problem . . . whenmore than 16,000 negative votes were recorded against Al Gore,” had “never been determined.” At thetime, a county election official wrote an angry e-mail asking the manufacturer to “please explain this sothat I have the in<strong>for</strong>mation to give the auditor instead of standing here looking dumb.” 8614 | Brennan Center <strong>for</strong> Justice
Despite this long history of failures with the same equipment, state election officials said in 2007 thatthey were previously unaware of the problem. 87By 2007, nearly 25,000 Diebold optical scans machines were in use nationwide. The News-Journalreported that the manufacturer conducted a survey of its customers to determine the frequency of suchfailures, but refused to release results from the study, calling it proprietary in<strong>for</strong>mation. 88 According tothe News-Journal, officials at the Election Assistance Commission told the paper that they could notcompel distribution of this in<strong>for</strong>mation unless an official government agency requested the action. 89Many saw this as an argument <strong>for</strong> the EAC to bolster its clearinghouse function. “[T]he federal agencyrequired by law to act as a clearinghouse on voting system problems – the U.S. Election AssistanceCommission – has been slow to develop a place where such in<strong>for</strong>mation can be shared,” the News-Journal reported in 2007, “The [election] supervisors are left largely on their own.” 906. Broward County, Florida, November 2004• • •Two days after Election Day in November 2004, Broward County election officials double-checked electionresults and discovered that tens of thousands of votes on certain state amendments were not counted.The problem: a “software glitch” in the system usedto count the county’s absentee ballots. 91 Accordingto the Palm Beach Post, the software started countingthe news-journal reported thatbackward after it logged 32,000 votes in a race. 92Once officials identified the problem and obtained diebold conducted a survey of itscorrect vote totals, the newfound votes contributed toa changed result <strong>for</strong> a statewide gambling amendment customers to determine the frequencyand sparked angry calls <strong>for</strong> a recount. 93of such failures, but refused to releaseSeveral newspapers reported that ES&S, the voting the results, calling them proprietary.system vendor, claimed to have noticed the problemin 2002, and said it notified the Secretary of State’soffice of the issue after that election. 94 It isn’t clear from news accounts why Broward County did notadopt procedures to safeguard against this glitch once it was discovered. Broward County officials toldthe Palm Beach Post that the manufacturer claimed its upgrades were rejected by the Secretary of State’soffice in 2002; the state contested this claim. 95 One reason officials in 2004 may have been unaware ofthe problem: there was turnover in the offices of chief election officials in both Broward County andthe State of Florida between 2002, when the software glitch was originally discovered, and 2004, whenthe unaddressed problem caused Broward County to miscount the votes.Regardless of who was to blame <strong>for</strong> Broward County’s failure to address the problem ahead of time, acentralized database could have prevented it, by allowing Broward County officials in 2004 to reviewreported problems <strong>for</strong> their systems, including necessary workaround procedures, and avoid thecontroversy that followed the well-publicized tallying problems.Brennan Center <strong>for</strong> Justice | 15
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