PENNSYLVANIA<strong>Coverage</strong> Trigger & Number ofOccurrencesIntentional Acts ExclusionsPerpetrator:Non-perpetrator:In a case alleg<strong>in</strong>g sexual abuse of three children from 1986 to 1988,the court found one occurrence per child with the occurrence datebe<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>itial negligent failure to prevent the abuse. GeneralAccident Ins. Co. v. Allen, 708 A.2d 828 (1998); See also D’Auria v.Zurich Ins. Co., 352 Pa. Super. 231, 507 A.2d 857 (1986) (Physician’ssix-year sexual <strong>and</strong> drug-related affair with a patient was a cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>gtort for which there was only one “claim” <strong>and</strong> not a separatemalpractice <strong>in</strong> each policy period).Courts have upheld exclusions for bodily <strong>in</strong>jury expected <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tendedby the <strong>in</strong>sured where the <strong>in</strong>sured was the perpetrator because the<strong>in</strong>tent to harm was <strong>in</strong>ferred by the conduct. General Accident Ins.Co. v. Allen, 708 A.2d 828 (Pa. Super. 1998); Erie Ins. Exchange v.Claypoole, 673 A.2d 348 (Pa. Super. 1996); Aetna Casualty & SuretyCo. v. Roe, 650 A.2d 94 (Pa. Super. 1994); Wiley v. State Farm Fire& Casualty Co., 995 F.2d 457 (3d Cir. 1993). courts have refusedto <strong>in</strong>fer <strong>in</strong>tent where the alleged victim is of the age of majority <strong>and</strong>allegedly consented to the sexual conduct. See Teti v. Huron Ins.Co., 914 F. Supp. 1132 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v.Barthelemy, 33 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1994). The <strong>in</strong>ferred <strong>in</strong>tent rule is notapplied where the perpetrator is a m<strong>in</strong>or. Allstate v. Sanchez, 2003WL 22100865 (E.D. Pa. Jul. 30, 2003).Where the policy excluded coverage for <strong>in</strong>tentional acts of “the<strong>in</strong>sured,” coverage was barred only for the person who committed the<strong>in</strong>tentional act <strong>and</strong> not the co-<strong>in</strong>sured who was sued for negligence<strong>in</strong> connection with the abuse. General Accident Ins. Co. v. Allen, 708A.2d 828 (Pa. Super. 1998); See also Miller v. Qu<strong>in</strong>cy Mut. Fire Ins.Co. 2003 WL 23469293 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 4, 2003).Where the policy excludes coverage for <strong>in</strong>tentional acts of “any<strong>in</strong>sured,” one <strong>in</strong>sured’s <strong>in</strong>tentional acts bar negligent supervisionclaims aga<strong>in</strong>st other <strong>in</strong>sureds. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kenney, 2003 WL22316776 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 8, 2003); Allstate v. Sanchez, 2003 WL22100865 (E.D. Pa. Jul. 30, 2003).<strong>Sexual</strong> <strong>Misconduct</strong> ExclusionsStatute of LimitationsNot addressed.<strong>Claims</strong> for personal <strong>in</strong>jury <strong>and</strong> assault <strong>and</strong> battery must becommenced with<strong>in</strong> two years. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §5524.The Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to apply the discovery ruleto toll the limitations period <strong>in</strong> a sexual abuse case alleg<strong>in</strong>g repressedmemory f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g that the discovery rule would only apply where noamount of reasonable diligence would have enabled the <strong>in</strong>jured partyto discern the <strong>in</strong>jury. Dalrymple v. Brown, 701 A.2d 164 (Pa. 1997);Matthews v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Pittsburgh, 2004 WL 2526794(Pa. Com. Pl. Aug. 3, 2004).Report<strong>in</strong>g Laws23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §6311 et seq.– 56 –
PENNSYLVANIAOtherThe Pennsylvania courts have rendered mixed decisions as to whetheran employee’s sexual assault is outside the scope of the employmentfor purposes of respondeat superior liability. See Sanchez v.Montanez, 645 A.2d 383 (Pa. 1994) (<strong>Sexual</strong> assault of child outsidescope of employment);R. A. v. First Church of Christ, 748 A.2d 692(Pa. Super. 2000); Cf. Nardella v. Dattilo, 1997 WL 1056878 (Pa.March 21, 1997) (Priest’s sexual affair with an adult parishioner hewas counsel<strong>in</strong>g was arguably with<strong>in</strong> the scope of employment so as todefeat a motion to dismiss).The disclosure of relevant, non-privileged documents to an adversary<strong>in</strong> civil litigation does not constitute a threat of governmental<strong>in</strong>terference with the free exercise of religion <strong>and</strong> therefore does notviolate the First Amendment. Hutchison v. Luddy, 606 A.2d 905 (Pa.Super. 1992).– 57 –