LOUISIANA<strong>Coverage</strong> Trigger & Number ofOccurrencesIntentional Acts ExclusionsPerpetrator:Non-perpetrator:<strong>Sexual</strong> <strong>Misconduct</strong> ExclusionsStatute of LimitationsIn a case where two priests molested 31 children over a seven yearperiod, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, apply<strong>in</strong>g Louisiana law,found that the <strong>in</strong>itial molestation of each claimant dur<strong>in</strong>g each policyperiod constituted a separate occurrence. Society of Roman CatholicChurch of Diocese of Lafayette <strong>and</strong> Lake Charles, Inc v. Interstate Fire& Cas. Co., 26 F.3d 1359 (5th Cir. 1994), appeal after rem<strong>and</strong>, 126F.3d 727 (5th Cir. 1997).Louisiana courts have adopted the <strong>in</strong>ferred <strong>in</strong>tent rule <strong>in</strong> molestation<strong>in</strong> cases so that <strong>in</strong>tentional act exclusions preclude coverage for oneaccused of molest<strong>in</strong>g a m<strong>in</strong>or. See L.M. v. J.P.M. <strong>and</strong> State Farm Ins.Co., 714 So.2d 809 (La. App. 1998); Smith v. Perk<strong>in</strong>s, 648 So.2d 482(La. App. 1994), writ denied, 651 So.2d. 292 (La. 1995).In negligence case aga<strong>in</strong>st baby sitter alleg<strong>in</strong>g sexual molestationby sitter’s son, court found that an <strong>in</strong>tentional acts exclusion did notpreclude coverage. Johnson v. Ned, 2001 WL 1161270 (La. App. Oct.3, 2001). See also, Jones v. Doe, 673 So.2d 1163 (La. App. 1996)(<strong>in</strong>tentional acts exclusion did not bar negligence claim aga<strong>in</strong>st parentswhose son perpetrated sexual abuse of a m<strong>in</strong>or).The Louisiana courts have upheld sexual acts exclusions to precludecoverage to perpetrators <strong>and</strong> to other potentially liable parties. SeeSanchez v. Callegan, 753 So.2d 403 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (No coveragefor negligence claims aga<strong>in</strong>st perpetrator’s spouse because but forthe excluded sexual act, there would be no damage); Jones v. Doe,673 So.2d 1163 (La. App. 1996) (Molestation exclusion precludedcoverage for negligence claims aga<strong>in</strong>st school board); Ste<strong>in</strong> v. Mart<strong>in</strong>,709 So.2d 1041 (La. App. 1998) (<strong>Sexual</strong> misconduct exclusionprecluded coverage for nursery school operations); Duplantis v.State Farm, 606 So.2d 51 (La. App. 1992) (Exclusion precludedcoverage for claims aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>in</strong>sured <strong>and</strong> its employees); Cf. Newby v.Jefferson Parish School Board, 738 So.2d 93 (La. App. 1999) (<strong>Sexual</strong>molestation exclusion did not preclude coverage for claim <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>gconsensual sexual <strong>in</strong>tercourse).There is a one year prescriptive period for tort-based (delictual) claimswhich beg<strong>in</strong>s to run from the day <strong>in</strong>jury or damage is susta<strong>in</strong>ed. La.Civ. Code. Ann. § 3492.In 1993 there was legislation to provide a ten-year prescriptive periodfor an action aga<strong>in</strong>st a person for “sexual abuse of a m<strong>in</strong>or” whichbeg<strong>in</strong>s to run from the day the m<strong>in</strong>or atta<strong>in</strong>s majority; however, everyclaimant 21 years of age <strong>and</strong> older at the time the action is filedshall file a certificate of merit. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.9. TheLouisiana courts refused to apply this statute retroactively. G.B.F. v.Keys, 687 So.2d 632, 635 (La. Ct. App. 1997); Harrison v. Gore, 660So. 2d 563 (La. Ct. App. 1995).The above prescriptive period applies to negligence claims aris<strong>in</strong>g outof a party’s duty to prevent sexual abuse. See Mimmitt v. NationalRailroad Passenger Corp., 2000 WL 1449886 (E.D. La. Sept. 27,2000); Hall v. Hebert, 2001 WL 699989 (La.Ct. App. June 22, 2001);Dugas v. Durr, 707 So.2d. 1368 (La. Ct. App. 1998).– 26 –
LOUISIANAThe doctr<strong>in</strong>e of “contra non valentem” suspends the runn<strong>in</strong>g ofprescription where the cause of action is not known or reasonablydiscoverable by the claimant or where the defendant prevents theclaimant from fil<strong>in</strong>g suit. See Wimberly v. Gatch, 635 So.2d 206(La. 1994) (Parents’ failure to discover neighbor’s abuse of theirfive-year old son was the direct result of the defendant’s conduct,thus suspend<strong>in</strong>g the runn<strong>in</strong>g of the prescriptive period until the sondisclosed the abuse); Cf. J.A.G. v. Schmaltz, 682 So. 2d 331 (La.App. 1996) (Claimant did not prove that he repressed, suppressed oravoided all memory of the alleged abuse); Doe v A<strong>in</strong>sworth, 540 So.2d425 (La. App. 1989) (Claimant was aware of the experiences <strong>and</strong> theirperverse nature <strong>and</strong> therefore prescriptive period was not tolled).Report<strong>in</strong>g LawsOtherLa. Rev. Stat. Ann. Children’s Code Arts. 603 et seq.The Louisiana courts have rendered mixed decisions on vicariousliability for sexual conduct. See Sanborn v. Methodist BehavioralResources, 866 So.2d 299 (La. App. 2004) (<strong>Sexual</strong> assault of client bysubstance abuse counselor was not with<strong>in</strong> the scope of employment);Rambo v. Webster Parish School Board, 745 So. 2d 770 (La. App.2000) (Janitor’s sexual assault of eight-year-old student was not with<strong>in</strong>course <strong>and</strong> scope of employment); Baumeister v. Plunkett, 673 So.2d994 (La. 1996) (Hospital not vicariously liable for employee sexualbattery); Aaron v. New Orleans Riverwalk Association, 580 So.2d 1119(La. App. 1991) (Employer not vicariously liable for rape of employeeby perpetrators who obta<strong>in</strong>ed access with aid of co-employees); Cf.Harr<strong>in</strong>gton v. The Louisiana State Board Of Elementary, 714 So. 2d845 (La. App. 1998) (Found rape was <strong>in</strong> course of teacher / studentrelationship); Latullas v. State of Louisiana, 658 So.2d 800 (La. App.1995) (State liable for prison guard’s rape of <strong>in</strong>mate); Doe v. TheRoman Catholic Church For The Archdiocese of New Orleans, 615So.2d 410 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (Jury could have reasonably found thatChurch Youth Organization leader’s molestation of 14-year-old waswith<strong>in</strong> course <strong>and</strong> scope of his duties); Samuels v. Southern BaptistHospital, 594 So.2d 571 (La. App. 1992) (Hospital vicariously liable forhospital assistant’s sexual assault of patient).A claim for clergy malpractice stemm<strong>in</strong>g from a priest’s disclosureof claimant’s past experiences of sexual abuse by his father failedbecause of First Amendment. Lann v. Davis, 793 So.2d 463 (La.App. 2001); See also Roppolo v. Moore, 644 So. 2d 206 (La. Ct. App.1995); Glass v. The First United Pentacostal Church of Deridder, 676So. 2d 724 (La. App. 1996) (Defamation <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tentional <strong>in</strong>fliction ofemotional distress claims aga<strong>in</strong>st church <strong>and</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ister were barred byFirst Amendment)– 27 –