ISSN 1847-2397 godište II broj 1 2009. | volume II number 1 2009

Uvodna riječsuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1Uvodna riječČasopis Suvremene teme / ContemporaryIssues ušao je, unatoč utjecaju globalnegospodarske krize na financiranje znanstvenogizdavaštva, u svoju drugu godinu te na taj načinuspio zadržati predviđeni tempo i kontinuitetizlaženja. Nastavno na iskustvo prethodnog broja,uredništvo je za drugi broj odabralo radovekoji odražavaju multidisciplinarnu i međunarodnunarav časopisa Suvremene teme / ContemporaryIssues.U prvom dijelu ovoga broja predstavljamovam studiju o televizijskome oglašavanju uPakistanu s naglaskom na ženskoj perspektivi,analizu diskursa o reformi medicinskog sustavau Québecu, kao i raspravu o krizi društvenogpovjerenja u postkomunističkim zemljama naprimjerima Rusije i Bugarske.Drugi dio ovoga broja posvećen je temiu fokusu – Bosni i Hercegovini. Bosna i Hercegovinanalazi se u kritičnoj fazi reforme i konsolidacijedržavnosti, borbe s ratnim naslijeđemte napora oko približavanja Europskoj uniji. Iztog smo razloga odlučili u ovome broju dati višeprostora radovima koji se bave pitanjima ovedržave. Dva rada su djelo autorica iz Bosne iHercegovine, dok jedan članak potpisuje autoriz Hrvatske. Uz to, donosimo i izlaganje smeđunarodnog skupa posvećenog budućnostiBosne i Hercegovine, održanog u Budimpešti, ustudenom 2009. godine.Naposljetku, ističemo kako Suvremeneteme / Contemporary Issues, premda novičasopis, imaju za cilj postati hrvatski časopisza društvene i humanističke znanosti prepoznatu međunarodnoj akademskoj zajednici. Stogasmo u procesu, odnosno u pripremi, apliciranjaza uvrštenje u relevantne svjetske citatne baze.Uredništvocentar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr4

Jamshed Khattak, Aslam Khan: Understanding Female College Studentssuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1UDK: 316.66-055.2(549.1)Izvorni znanstveni članakPrimljeno: 1. 6. 2009.Understanding Female College Students’ Mind-set towardsTelevision Advertising in PakistanJAMSHED KHATTAKCollege of Commerce, Islamabad, PakistanASLAM KHANHITEK University, PakistanPurpose: This study examined the consequences and impact thattelevision advertising has upon the general attitude of female college studentstowards television advertising in Pakistan. The data was collected from randomlyselected 299 female college students. Methods: The respondents fromfive metropolitan cities like Peshawar, Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Quetta and Karachiwere asked to answer a self-administered questionnaire. Descriptive,t-statistics, correlation and regression statistical tools were used to analysedata. Results: The results of the study reveal that these students have negativejudgment about the ethical and social consequences of television advertising.However they have positive judgment about the economic impact of televisionadvertising. The students demand more regulation to control the televisionadvertising. The results indicated that there is a significant positive generalattitude of female college students towards the television advertising in Pakistan.The study predicted a positive relationship between the consequences/impact and general attitude of female college students towards the televisionadvertising. Recommendation: The study recommends that marketers andthe regulatory bodies have the responsibility to pay proper attention to therising ethical, social and regulatory concerns of the female college students’about the television advertising. Moreover the study provides a useful benchmarkfor future research studies.Key words: attitudes, television advertising, female students, Pakistan1. IntroductionIt is a fact that television is the major andleading communicator of our era. Television isthe most reachable media in Pakistan. Televisioncoverage in Pakistan is about 87-90 percent(Parveen, 2009). Advertising is the major earningsource of television and a powerful tool topenetrate into different segments of the society.Regardless of the fact that advertising is a successfultool for business, along with being a vitalelement of the modern age and a fast growingindustry, the public fondness of advertising is stilla matter of great concern (O’Donohoe, 1995). Ithas a great power to influence the consumers’vision about values, ethics and norms. Advertisingis also criticized for presenting misleadinginformation, promoting adverse values, fake claims,depiction of females as “erotic objects” andpersuading people to buy things they no longercentar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr6

Jamshed Khattak, Aslam Khan: Understanding Female College Studentssuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 17.2. Research ModelIt is apt at this stage to develop a model of the study which is discussed hereunder:Consequences andimpact of televisionadvertisingEthicalEconomicSocialFemale students’general attitudetowards televisionadvertisingRegulatoryThe judgment of students about the consequences and impacts of the television advertising(ethical, economic, social and regulatory) are taken as the independent variables, while the general attitudeof female students towards the television advertising is taken as the dependent variable.8. Research Methodology8.1. SampleThe targeted population was limited tofemale college students, with the aim of understandingthe mind-set of female college studentstowards television advertising. A national investigationwas performed in colleges of the six metropolitans(Karachi, Lahore, Quetta, Peshawar,Rawalpindi and Islamabad). A total of 400 questionnaireswere distributed, out of which 299questionnaires were retrieved. The responserate was 75%.(a) Ethical consequences (deception,puffery, sexual appeals)(b) Social consequences (needlessproducts, clutter, materialisms,undesirable values)(c) Advertising regulations (harmfulproducts, exiting regulations,proliferation)8.2. Measurement of the VariablesBauer and Greyser (1968) adaptedLarkin’s (1977) items to study attitudes towardadvertising. Consequently, several other studies(Anderson et al., 1978; Andrews, 1989; Greyserand Reece, 1971; Haller, 1974; Schutz andCasey, 1981; Triff et al., 1987) used the samescale. The study has considered measures tojudge the following three attitudinal areas usingLarkin’s scale:The General Attitude scale (good,helpful, believable) is selected from Pollay andMittal (1993) to measure the general attitude offemale college students towards television advertising.To measure the response, the five pointLikert Scale from strongly disagree to stronglyagree was devised. The demographic informationlike gender, age and class of the respondentswere also sought through the questionnaire.centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr10

Jamshed Khattak, Aslam Khan: Understanding Female College Studentssuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 18.6.1. The Ethical ConsequenceThe results in Table 4 show that the respondentsagreed that most of television advertisingis false/misleading, exaggerated informationand contains sexual appeals. In the realmof ethical consequences the result indicates thatfemale college students have a negative attitudetowards moral consequences of television advertising.8.6.2. The Economic ImpactIn the domain of the economic impactthe figures in Table 4 disclose that female studentsconsider television advertising to be servingto the development of the national economy,raising the standard of living of the community,assuring quality goods and encouraging competition,leading to price cut-backs of merchandiseand services. The result indicates a positiveattitude of students with regard to the economicimpact8.6.3. The Social ConsequenceFemale college students admitted thattelevision advertising is convincing people to buyproducts which they do not really need, thereforeconfusing them and also promoting materialism.The result in Table 4 confirms that female collegestudents acknowledge television advertisingto be a source of promoting obscene valuesamong the youth. The results imply that the attitudeof female college students towards televisionadvertising social consequence is negativeand consider having adverse effects on society.8.6.4. Feelings about Advertising RegulationsThe mean score of the respondents inTable 4 recommends blocking television advertisingof products which have a damaging impacton society. The students have demanded moreregulation for control and proliferation of televisionadvertising. The overall outcome proposesthat female students are not happy with the abilityof existing regulations to control and checktelevision advertising effectively.8.6.5. The General Attitude towards TelevisionAdvertisingWith regard to the general attitude, resultsin Table 4 advocate that respondents areconvinced that television advertising is good andhelpful. However, they oppose on the point thattelevision advertising is believable. The resultsput forward that female college students’ generalattitude is positive towards television advertisingin general.8.7. Correlation Analysis of VariablesTable 5Correlation matrix of variablesGeneralEthical Economic Social RegulatoryattitudeGeneral1attitudeEthical .184 ** 1Economic1.342impact** .050Social .106 * .356 ** .045 1Regulatory .133 * .367 ** .141 * . .386 ** 1** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr13

Jamshed Khattak, Aslam Khan: Understanding Female College Studentssuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1The results of the correlation coefficientsin Table 5 show a significant correlation amongall the independent variables and the general attitudeof female college students towards televisionadvertising.The results in Table 5 indicate that thereexists a positive correlation between the ethicalconsequences and the general attitude of femalecollege students towards television advertising.The results also reveal that the more ethicaltelevision advertising is, the more positive isthe attitude of female college students towardsadvertising. Hence it supports the H 6.The correlation coefficient between theeconomic impact of television advertising andthe general attitude of students towards televisionadvertising, as indicated in Table 5, is fairlysignificant. The study draws the inference thatthe more positive the economic impact of televisionadvertising is, the more positive is the attitudeof female students towards advertising. Weagree to H 7.The significant correlation coefficientin Table 5 between the social consequences oftelevision advertising and the general attitude offemale college students towards it conclude thatthe more socially responsible television advertisingis, the more positive is the general attitudeof female college students. The hypothesis H 8isestablished.The result in Table 5 demonstrates asignificant correlation between the mind-setabout television advertising regulations and thegeneral attitude of female college students towardstelevision advertising. We can infer thatthe more government regulations are set to controlthe television advertising, the more positivethe general attitude of the female college studentsis towards advertising. Hence the studyacknowledges H 9.8.8. Regression AnalysisTable 6Model summaryModelStd. error of theR R square Adjusted R squareestimate1 .383 a .146 .135 .57316a. Predictors: (constant), regulatory, economic, ethical, socialTable 7 ANOVAModelSum ofsquaresdf Mean square F Sig.1 Regression 16.577 4 4.144 12.615 .000 aResidual 96.583 294 .329Total 113.159 298a. Predictors: (constant), regulatory, economic, ethical, socialb. Dependent variable: general attitudeThe results in Table 6 and Table 7 indicate that the independent variables significantly explainthe variation in the general attitude of female college students towards television advertising.The results in Table 8 show that the ethical consequences and the economic impact significantlypredict the general attitude of female college students towards television advertising. However the socialconsequences and feelings about the advertising regulation do not significantly predict the generalattitude of female college students towards television advertising.centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr14

Jamshed Khattak, Aslam Khan: Understanding Female College Studentssuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1Simpson, P. M., Brown, G., Wilding II, R.E. (1998): The Association of Ethical Judgment of Advertisingand Selected Advertising Effectiveness Response Variables, Journal of Business Ethics, 17(2):125-136Singh, R., Sandeep, V. (2007): Socio-Economic and Ethical Implications of Advertising - A PerceptualStudy, International Marketing Conference on Marketing & Society, 8-10, IIMKTactics’, Advances in Consumer Research, 13: 1-3Wills, J. R., Ryans, J. K. (1982): Attitudes toward Advertising: A Multinational Study, Journal ofInternational Business Studies, 13 (3): 121-129Wolburg, J. M., Pokrywczynski, J. (2001): A Psychographic Analysis of Generation Y Female Collegestudents, Journal of Advertising Research, 41(5) 33-50Wright, P. L. (1986): Schemer Schema: Consumers’ Intuitive Theories about Marketers’ Influence, inLutz, R. (eds): Advances in Consumer Research, Association of Consumer Research, Provo, UT,13:1-3Zhang, P. (2000): The Effect of Animation on Information Seeking Performance on the World: SecuringAttention or Interfering with Primary Tasks?, Journal of the Association for Information Systems(JAIS), 1 (1): 1Razumijevanje stavova studentica prema televizijskom oglašavanjuu PakistanuJAMSHED KHATTAKEkonomski fakultet, Islamabad, PakistanASLAM KHANSveučilište HITEK, PakistanSvrha: Istraživanje se bavi posljedicama i utjecaju koje televizijskooglašavanje ima na opće stavove studentica prema televizijskom oglašavanjuu Pakistanu. Podatci su prikupljeni na temelju slučajnog uzorka od 299 studentica.Metode: Respondentice iz pet glavnih gradova poput Peshawara,Islamabada, Rawalpindi, Quetta and Karachia su odgovorile na upitnik. Zaanalizu podataka korišteni su statistički postupci, poput deskriptivne statistike,T-statistike, korelacija i regresije. Rezultati: Rezultati istraživanja pokazuju dastudentice imaju negativne stavove o etičkim i socijalnim posljedicama televizijskogoglašavanja. S druge strane, imaju pozitivne stavove o ekonomskimučincima televizijskog oglašavanja. Studentice zahtjevaju više zakonske regulativekoja bi kontrolirala televizijsko oglašavanje. Rezultati upućuju na to dapostoji značajan pozitivan opći stav prema televizijskom oglašavanju u Pakistanu.Studija je predvidjela pozitivnu korelaciju između posljedica/ učinakai općeg stava studentica prema televizijskom oglašavanju. Preporuke: Preporukestudije za oglašivače i zakonodavce odnose se na preuzimanje većeodgovornosti u rastućim etičkim, socijalnim i regulatornim pitanjima s kojimase susreću studentice u pogledu televizijskog oglašavanja. Osim toga, studijamože biti korisno polazište za buduća istraživanja i komparacije.Ključne riječi: stavovi, televizijsko oglašavanje, studentice, Pakistancentar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr17

Sabina Stan: The Discourse on the “Crisis of the Health Care System”suvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1UDK: 349:614.2>(71)=111Izvorni znanstveni članakPrimljeno: 14. 5. 2009.The Discourse on the “Crisis of the Health Care System” andthe New Governance Model of Health Care in QuebecSABINA STANDublin City University, IrelandDuring the last decade, public discourse on the “crisis of the healthcare system” in Quebec and Canada soared to the extent that the crisis hascome to be seen by many Quebeckers and Canadians as an enduring featureof their health care sector. Based on analysis of articles from the Quebec writtenmedia, the article shows that the crisis discourse contributes to promote amarket-like governance model of the health care sector and to foster the acceptanceof market-oriented health care policies.Key words: health care, governance, discourse, crisis, neoliberalism1. IntroductionSocial scientists have recently devotedattention to the popular reception of “healthnews stories” (Adelman and Verbrugge, 2000;Brodie et al. 2003; Seale, 2004; King and Watson,2005). But while health policy scored secondamong the health news stories which mostcaptured the interest of the American public, theimportance of media in shaping “public viewsabout the health care system” has only started tobe envisioned (Davin, 2005; Henderson, 2010).This article takes as a case of study the discourseon the “crisis of the health care system” developedin the Quebec francophone print media inthe last two decades and tries to unveil the mannerin which it might have contributed to healthpolicy in Quebec and Canada.The article starts from the premise thatmedia discourse on the “crisis of the health caresystem” offers a privileged perspective for dealingwith matters at the intersection of media discourse,health policy, organisational ensemblesand social problems. Indeed, as this article willshow, the period during which the crisis discoursedeveloped was both preceded and followedby some of the most important reformsthat affected the Quebec health care sectorsince its constitution at the beginning of the 70s.The first was the Rochon reform of 1996-1997,which tried to answer to increased strain on publicfunds with the “ambulatory turn” and the correspondingreduction of total hospital capacity(Bernier and Dallaire, 2001). The second reformstarted in 2003, after the discourse had reachedits peak, and stressed the need to change thehealth care sector along management and marketlines. This article aims to show that, while thecrisis discourse was triggered by reactions to thefirst reform, it also contributed to the lean acceptanceof the marketising stance present in thesecond reform. This article will analyse, in thefirst part, the media discourse on the “crisis ofthe health care system”, and will address, in itssecond part, issues pertaining to its productionand to its ideological effects.centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr18

Sabina Stan: The Discourse on the “Crisis of the Health Care System”suvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 12. Discourse, Social Problems and PolicyA number of social scientists have rejecteda conception of social problems as simply“objective and identifiable societal conditions”.Social problems were seen as “products of aprocess of collective definition” (Hilgartner andBosk, 1988; Spector and Kitsuse, 2006), withdiscourse playing a major role in their construction(Herdman, 2002: 162). Following these approaches,this article sees “the crisis” and “thehealth care system” not as objects existing outthere in a separate material world, but as objectsof political and managerial intervention that areconstructed through discursive practices. 1I envision discourse as a class of relatedtexts that exists “beyond the parts which composeit”, the unity of which is given by their commonproduction in a particular social field (Chalaby,1996: 689, 690). The meaning of a particular discourseis given not only by its component texts,but also by its relationship with other discourses,as well as by the social conditions and structuralcontext of its production (Chalaby, 1996; Fissand Hirsch, 2005). Moreover, as discourse hasa processual (Purvis and Hunt, 1993: 496) andperformative (Kuipers, 1989: 103) character, itsmeaning is also informed by the manner in whichit unfolds in time, by its temporal dynamics.Discourses furnish frameworks for envisioning,and, in fact, systematically shaping not only theproblems that span a certain domain of activity,but also the causes of these problems, their possiblesolutions, and, finally, the object of politicaland managerial intervention (Foucault, 1971:71). From the standpoint of public policies andorganisations, discourses supply the parametersthat fashion the architecture of policy objects, aswell as the frames for thinking of the possibility ofpublic intervention (Bridgman and Barry, 2002).Discourses also take part in the symbolicstruggle for the production of the commonsense and for the “monopoly over legitimate processesof naming” (Bourdieu, 2001: 307). It isthus important to dwell on their dynamics andon the manners in which they are articulated ashegemonic at different moments (Torfing, 1999:101). One of the most current techniques in thisrespect is to render their propositions naturaland taken-for-granted (Purvis and Hunt, 1993:1 A focus on discourse does not mean denying theexistence of real problems in the health care system, but itdoes imply approaching these problems from a perspectivethat takes into account the constructed, situated and conjecturalnature of these problems.478, Bourdieu, 2001: 209). 2In modern societies, state bureaucraciesand their representatives were traditionallyconsidered to be the most important producersof social problems and discourses (Bourdieu,1994: 2). But in contemporary Western societies,states no longer retain the monopoly to influencepublic opinion, policies or discourse. In oursocieties, media acquired a leading role in theproduction of discourses and of social problemssuch as “crises” (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988).3.MethodologyThe field of discursive production Ihave chosen is the written francophone press inQuebec. The study used as a selection tool thedatabase Biblio Branchée of the media serverEureka.cc. 3 The database includes only threeof the five main francophone dailies in Quebecprovince, namely La Presse, Le Devoir and LeSoleil, leaving outside the two main tabloidsJournal de Montréal and Journal de Québec. Itis due to these limitations in the selection of thejournals that the present study does not claim tobe representative of all print media. Instead, itaims to highlight some, albeit significant, discursivedevelopments taking place in at least part ofthe Quebec written media field. Further researchon the two tabloids would need to be carried outin order to attain representativeness as well asto investigate further the hypothesis advanced inthis article.The limitations present in terms of representativenessare balanced out by some positivegains in terms of significance. Thus, whilethe three chosen dailies are surpassed in termsof circulation by the two tabloids, they constitutenevertheless important authoritative voices indomains of national importance such as health2 By seeing discourse as actual "networks of communication"(Purvis and Hunt, 1993: 485), I dwell on its characteras lived, concrete practice. But I still seek to unveil its"ideological effects" (Purvis and Hunt, 1993: 485) by tacklingthe issue of domination and hegemony. Thus, my approachto discourse departs from Foucaultian ones and nears neo-Gramscian perspectives such as the one advanced by Laclauand Mouffe (see Torfing, 1999). Recognising that discoursesdo not strictly correspond to class divisions, thatthey have diffuse frontiers and that they are indeterminateand produced by a multiplicity of centres, does not preventus from recognising that, in historically situated moments oftime, certain actors and institutions have a hold on the articulationof particular dispersed discourses into a hegemonicone, and, consequently, in negating and repressing alternativemeanings (Bourdieu, 2001, Chalaby, 1996, Torfing,1999).3 See their website at Eureka.cc for more information.centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr19

Sabina Stan: The Discourse on the “Crisis of the Health Care System”suvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1care. 4 The chosen dailies also reflect variousdivisions inside the Quebec written media field.Thus, while La Presse and Le Devoir are bothpublished in Montreal, Le Soleil is published inQuebec City. And while La Presse and Le Soleilbelong to media empires Power Corporationand Hollinger, and promote more right wing positions,Le Devoir is an independent daily eversince its foundation and is known for left-leaningaffinities.Articles were selected using the “LEAD= crise ET système ET santé “ search of the database.This option searches for articles wherethe first two paragraphs simultaneously containthe words crise, système and santé (crisis, systemand health, respectively). The search givesa good approximation of the evolution of articlesthat include references to the crisis of the healthcare system, while also restricting itself to thosemedia utterances that are most likely to have animpact on readers. The selection was further refinedby dropping articles that were not referringto the crisis of the health care system. 5 The principalbody of data is comprised of 139 articlescovering the period 1988-2003. The analysiswas based on three careful successive readingsof the articles conducted by myself that paid attentionto the articulation of the meanings of “thecrisis”, its causes, its object (“the system”) andits solutions.In addition to this search, I performedseveral other searches that sought to place the“crisis of the health care system” in a wider discursivefield, by looking at discussion on the crisisof other possible related objects or on chaoticevents that affected the system. I thus selectedthe articles that, during the same period, madereferences to the crisis of the health care sector(“crise du secteur de la santé”), the crisis ofhealth care (“crise des soins de santé”), the crisisof health care services (“crise des servicesde santé”), the crisis of the health care network(“crise du réseau de santé”), the emergencyroom crisis (“crise des urgencies”) or “hospital4 As in other countries, in Quebec also the threedailies are seen as being more “intellectual” than the more“popular” tabloids.5 A total of 64 articles were dropped from the initialbody of 203 articles. While Le Soleil sometimes duplicatesarticles from La Presse, the number of duplicates in my corpusof data was limited to 5 articles. I chose to keep Le Soleilduplicates in my corpus because, considering the definitionof discourse I am using in this article, they constitute equallyworthy texts that contribute to the constitution of discourse.Whereas from a quantitative point of view they are the samewith the original, and should be dropped, from the qualitativeperspective adopted here, they are different texts and shouldbe counted as separate.closing” (“fermeture d’hôpitaux”). Analysis of theresulting data sought to uncover the number ofarticles, per year, that mentioned the respectivephrases.As Graphic 1 shows, the yearly numbersof articles referring to the crisis of the health caresystem are relatively low up until 1997 (they varybetween zero and five). The incidence increasessignificantly beginning in 1998 (14 articles),reaches a peak in 2000 (39 articles), after whichit decreases while still remaining at significantlevels (12 in 2001; 24 in 2002; and 16 in 2003).The passage from scattered statements to a fullblowncollection of utterances, i.e. a discourse,occurs then only after 1998. 1998 is thus thedate of birth of the crisis discourse.This development is apparent not only inthe swift numerical intensification of utterances,but also in the qualitative change in their textualcontexts. These textual contexts can be dividedbetween, on the one hand, short news texts (actualités),and, on the other hand, editorials andlonger articles that discuss and analyse in lengththe fate of the health care system. For the entireten-year period 1988-1997, our body of data includedonly 14 texts of the second type. By comparison,during the six-year period 1998-2003,the number of more consistent texts dedicated tothe health care system multiplies by more thanseven, to reach 102.In the process, a new vision of the problemsaffecting the health care system (“the crisis”)imposes itself in the francophone media.Before 1998, the crisis was seen mainly as apartial and temporary phenomenon. As much ashalf of the articles from the period 1988-1997 referto crises IN the health care system (9 out of18). There are emergency rooms crises (whenpatients overflow emergency rooms’ capacity),personnel crises (when lack of sufficient numbersof physicians and nurses is considered dramatic)and labour relations crisis (when physiciansor other health care personnel engage instrikes). As they occur in certain precise points ofthe health care system (a hospital, an emergencyroom, a regional health board), these criseshave rather precise organisational boundaries.Moreover, as such, they are viewed as circumscribedand partial.On the other hand, the other half of thearticles from the period 1988-1997 that refer toa crisis OF the health care system construct iteither as a future event or as a temporary situation.At the very beginning of the period, in 1988,several articles refer to the crisis of the healthcare system as a possible future event.centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr20

Sabina Stan: The Discourse on the “Crisis of the Health Care System”suvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1constitutes itself into “a window to the fragility ofour system”. 11Thus, after 1998, the crisis is conceivedof as a quasi-permanent feature of the system. Ifin the spring 1998, there is a “very profound crisisthat touches the health care system”, 12 at thebeginning of 1999, there is a “perpetual state ofcrisis” 13 that in several months transforms itselfinto “the most profound crisis of the last ten years[assaulting] our health care system”. 14 At the beginningof 2000, the problems of the health caresystem are no longer “conjectural”, 15 and later itis restated that the health care system is in “apermanent state of crisis”. 16 One year later, oneis summoned to take notice of the crisis’ gravityand of “how profound a crisis our health caresystem goes through”. 17Thus, after 1998, a new vision of thecrisis develops, takes hold of media discourseand becomes the dominant way to qualify thesystem as a whole in this field. Indeed, now, discussionon the crisis is conducted in a matterof-factmanner that renders its existence evidentand natural. In the new vision, the crisis of thehealth care system is just there. It is a takenfor-granted,normal phenomenon, the existenceof which does no longer need to be proven, butonly, at most, illustrated. This generalisation andnaturalisation of the idea that the health caresystem is in crisis can be seen as indicative ofits institutionalisation and of its transformationinto a dominant vision of the present state of thehealth care system. 18This vision of the crisis supplies theframework for conceiving of the problems of thehealth care system (“the crisis”) as permanent,general and profound ones. But the crisis discourseoffers not only a framework for envision-11 Le Devoir, April 1, 2000: F412 Le Devoir, April 20, 1998: A113 La Presse, February 24, 1999: B314 Le Devoir, July 13, 1999: A615 Le Devoir, February 5, 2000: A1216 La Presse, March 24, 2000: B3; La Presse, June21, 2002: A1017 La Presse, May 23, 2001: A1618 The dominance of a new vision of the crisis isalso compounded, paradoxically, by the fact that voices thatcontest the existence of the crisis also intensify during theperiod 1998-2003. Marginal as they are (of the total articlesanalysed here, only nine include a negation of the crisis),these voices almost double their strength after 1998. Denialsof the existence of the crisis can be seen not so much as participatingin a powerful counter discourse, but more as merereactions to a powerful vision that imposes itself as the prismthrough which the health care system is read.ing the problems of the health care system; italso comprises visions of the causes of theseproblems.5. Articulations: The Causes of the CrisisIn order to grasp the manner in whichthe crisis discourse envisions the causes of thecrisis, I will make a couple of distinctions. On theone hand, I distinguish between causes externaland internal to the system, that is, betweencauses that lie in the system’s environment andcauses that lie in the functioning of the system.On the other hand, I also distinguish betweencauses that are seen in terms of agency (i.e.originating in the action of real, identifiable actors,such as, in this case, the government,pharmaceutical companies or physicians), andcauses that are seen in terms of abstract processesor entities (such as demographic andeconomic trends or “the structure”). Within thecrisis discourse, few voices seriously considerthe contribution of external factors to the developmentof the crisis. Among external factors,what we could call “external agents” is very marginal.In fact, only two articles explicitly see thecrisis as resulting from the actions of real, concreteagents – namely, the Quebec government,and physicians and pharmaceutical companies,respectively. 19 Among external causes, the pivotalplace is accorded not to identifiable agents,but rather to trends which are seen as inherentin the evolution of our contemporary societies.These are global trends that drive up health caredemand and thus health care costs: the ageingof the population, technological developments inmedicine, the invention of new drugs and newcontagious diseases like SARS (in 2003). It isdue to their sheer amplitude that these trendsimprint themselves on the health care system soas to render it “an abyss without bottom”. 20In this way, the crisis discourse takesa natural and abstract turn, as real agents thatcould be made accountable are discharged in favourof abstract forces for which nobody can beblamed. Thus, the crisis itself is rendered natural,ineluctable, caught in the current, given, orderof the world. As one article states, “the pressuresthat threaten us in the future [ensure that]we are heading for a crisis”. 21As external abstract causes are natu-19 Le Devoir, July 13, 1999: A6, Le Devoir, April 12,2003: B720 La Presse, May 23, 2001: A1621 La Presse, June 5, 2000: B2centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr22

Sabina Stan: The Discourse on the “Crisis of the Health Care System”suvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1ralised as given, they become a context formore fundamental causes that are related to thespecificity of the health care system in Quebecand Canada. After 1998, it is causes internal tothe system that are seen as the true roots of thecrisis. The debate is thus shifted from externalpressures on the system (diminishing resources,increased demand-induced costs) to the internalfunctioning of the system. As stated in one article,the cause of the crisis rests in “the allocationand the use of resources inside the network. Insum, what causes the problem is less the sumof money than the manner in which the latter isspent”. 22 Vital causes are thus seen to be not“conjectural financial problems”, but “seriousstructural problems” of the system. 23The crisis discourse constructs theseinternal causes by referring once more to abstractnotions, such as “structure”, “organisation”,“management” (gestion), “(governmental)bureaucracy”, “political interference”, or “technocraticapproach”. All of these notions are seen aslaying at the origin of the vicious functioning ofthe system, transforming it into “a vast impersonalstructure” and a “bureaucratic monster”. 24 The“archaic”, “anachronistic”, “lazy and rusted” systemis characterised by the “fundamental vices”which are a “rigid network” and a “blind, insulated”and “superfluous” central bureaucracy. 25 It isa “big steamship difficult to manage”, plagued by“waste, bad choices and, especially, paralysis”. 26In sum, the system has become inefficient, as ischaracterised by “a heavy bureaucracy, a muchcentralised decision mechanism and rigid collectiveconventions”. 27By using an abstract language that doesnot lend itself easily to decoding by outsiders,this vision puts forth causes that cannot be easilyattributable to the concrete action of specific actors.Who, exactly, has a “technocratic approach”,what is “the structure”, and who is and who is notof the “bureaucracy”? A more attentive analysisunearths nevertheless some distinctions. Thereis, thus, on the one hand, the “structure(s)” of thesystem, a rather vague notion that seems to goalong with “bureaucracy” and “organization”, andthat seems to include the administration of hos-22 La Presse, February 24, 1999: B323 La Presse, March 24, 2000: B324 La Presse, June 3, 2000: B2; Le Devoir, 25 June1999: A9.25 La Presse, February 13, 1999: B2; La Presse,March 24, 2000: B3; La Presse, June 7, 2000: B226 La Presse, June 9, 2000: B227 Le Devoir, May 3, 2000: A7pitals, community centres (CLSCs), the Regionaldistrict boards (RRSSS) and the ministry. 28 Onthe other hand, there is “health care” (“les soinsde santé”), a notion that covers rather unambiguously“services offered in the private offices ofphysicians”. 29 Like two opposing poles, the twoare characterised by contrasting qualities. At onepole, there are “heavy” and “rigid” “structures”. Atthe other, there are “lighter and less expensive” 30health care services.Thus, the structure(s), the organizationand the management (i.e. the domain of governmentalreforms and of public interventions) areset in contrast to “programmes and processesof [health] care” (i.e. the domain of physicians’private interventions). 31 The first are bad, thesecond are good. The causes of the crisis of thesystem lie in the first package, which thus getsequated with the system’s deeper essence. Inthe end, the system becomes the equivalent of(the bad) structure, organization and management,or of a badly conceived and badly managedobject of public intervention. 326. Articulations: A New Object of Interventionand New SolutionsThe emphasis on structure, organisationand management serve to construct symbolicallya specific object of public intervention: the system.That the system, as defined above, is thetrue object of the crisis is also proven by the factthat the crisis is much more associated with itthan with other possible objects. Indeed, phraseslike “health care” (“soins de santé”), “healthcare sector” (“secteur de la santé”), “health carenetwork” (“réseau de la santé”) or “health careservices” (“services de santé”) are much lessprone to be seen as an object of the crisis in theQuebec francophone media. A search for associationsbetween each of these phrases and theterm “crisis”, during the same 1988-2003 period,gave numbers significantly lower than thosefound for the association between “the healthcare system” and the “crisis”. 3328 Le Devoir, November 16, 2002: G5.29 Le Devoir, February 13, 1999: A8.30 Le Devoir, February 13, 1999: A8.31 Le Devoir, August 6, 1999: A932 Thus one can see at work within the crisis discoursediscursive operations (Torfing, 1999: 96-98) of constructingboth relations of difference (between “health care”and “bureaucracy”) and relations of equivalence (betweenbureaucracy, public services and bad management) aroundthe discursive “nodal point” of “the system”.33 Namely, there were 15 articles for "the health carecentar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr23

Sabina Stan: The Discourse on the “Crisis of the Health Care System”suvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1While, within the crisis discourse, otherdomains of public intervention are obscured andignored, the system becomes the focal point towardwhich the problems of the health care sectorconverge. The costs that matter are not “thecosts of health care” (“les coûts des soins de santé”)but “the costs of the public health care system”(“les coûts du système de soins public”). 34Building on organic metaphors so much used insocial sciences (Purvis and Hunt, 1993: 485),the system becomes an organic-like entity that isendowed with an anatomy (“the structure”) and aphysiology (“management”). It becomes even asubjective agent. Indeed, there is a “loss of trustin the health care system” 35 (and not in physiciansor politicians). What needs to be healedare the “evils of our health care system” 36 (andnot of the medical-industrial complex). Finally,when the SARS crisis bursts out in 2003 in Toronto,it is the system that has to deal with thecrisis 37 and that thus makes errors, and it is itwhich is “submerged” and “causes havoc” 38 (andnot health care personnel, hospital administrators,officials or politicians).The symbolic production of a new objectof public and managerial intervention, “the system”,is compounded by the articulation of thenew visions of the crisis and of its causes thatare developed after 1998. Seeing the crisis asgeneral, permanent and intrinsic, as well amenableto internal, structural causes, leads to atotalising vision of the health care network. “Thesystem” becomes an indivisible entity, of whichone can talk as of a singular, identifiable whole.It is seen as homogenous totality and unity, anentity, the functioning and characteristics ofwhich can neither be reduced to its constituent,differentiated, parts, nor emanate from its environment.Instead, they are put into motion by aninternal principle of structuring, organisation andmanagement. As it is contrasted with the privateintervention of physicians or of companies, thisprinciple could be called, even if it is not formulatedas such in the crisis discourse, the publicregulation principle. Underlying the crisis discourseis the idea that public regulation of healthcare services and of public services in general,sector", 54 for "the health care network", 23 for "the healthcare services" and 47 for “health care”. These numbers wereobtained after subtracting from the initial sums the articlesthat also include the term "system".34 Le Devoir, April 1, 2000: F635 La Presse, June 3, 2000: B236 La Presse, September 13, 2000: B237 Le Soleil, June 1, 2003: A338 Le Soleil, September 22, 2003: A5is bad, and can only lead to the general ills of“bureaucracy” and of “political intervention”.This new vision of the crisis, and of thesystem that bears it, conveys images of a permanentand amplifying crisis that calls for imminentsolutions. Constructing the problems of adomain of public intervention as profound, inherentand permanent, envisioning the object of thisintervention as a totalising system propelled bya functioning principle, and conveying the feelingof the urgency to act, all contribute to the subtleimposition of a certain set of solutions as good,legitimate, and in need of rapid application. Inthis vision, the solution follows obviously andnaturally from the diagnosis. The system has tobe transformed profoundly, and more preciselythrough a change in the principle that rests at itsbasis. “The public” has to give way to “the private”.In line with the diagnosis of “rigid structure”,the call is for “lightening the structures” 39on a model based on private physician cabinets,i.e. by limiting public intervention into the system.In the same vein, the diagnosis of “rigid framing”(read “public” framing) calls for introducing in thesystem “technological and scientific progressesand the new management modes” that form thebasis for the increase in productivity in other sectors.40 Considering that these “new managementmodes” are the ones current in the private, marketsector, what are called for are more “private”and more “market” in the public health care sector.Thus, we can see that the matters atstake in the different symbolic struggles stirredby the crisis discourse are the very foundationalprinciples of the system. The conflicts revolvearound one of the most debated themes inhealth care in Canada and in Quebec, that is,the balance between the private and the publicin the health care system. These conflicts pitchthe promoters of what I will call “marketisation”(i.e. the idea of rendering more market-like thehealth care system) against the defenders of thepublic character of the system. Therefore, I usemarketisation as a short phrase for calls for “givinga stronger place to the private sector”.39 La Presse, February 24, 1999: B340 La Presse, April 27, 1999: B3centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr24

Sabina Stan: The Discourse on the “Crisis of the Health Care System”suvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1Marketisation constitutes one of themost frequent topics tackled in the articles analysedin this article. More than a third of the articles(48/139) do not restrict themselves to diagnosingthe health care system, but also givesolutions by either proposing or opposing itsradical change through marketisation. Graphic 2shows that, after 1998, in parallel with the rise ofa new vision of the crisis and the system, thereis also a rise of marketisation as one of the mainconcerns of the crisis discourse. 41Moreover, “marketisation” becomes themain solution promoted by the crisis discourse.Of the total number of articles explicitly referringto marketisation (48), only a third opposes it(16), whereas the large majority adopts positionsfavourable to it (32 articles).Interestingly, the marketisation debatedoes not neatly follow the right-left divide amongthe chosen dailies. Indeed, if La Presse is themost fervent promoter of marketisation, with 22pro marketisation articles against only 4 countermarketisation articles, Le Soleil shows a morebalanced picture, with a corresponding score of4 vs 4. However, most surprisingly, Le Devoirdoes not oppose marketisation with the samegusto as La Presse promotes it. Indeed, with ascore of 6 vs 8, it engages, considering its leftleaningrenown, only half-heartedly in the attackon marketisation. This indicates that the causeof marketisation has transgressed classical politicalfrontiers, as its progress is facilitated notonly by its strong promotion in right-leaning dailiesbut also by the left-leaning daily’s reluctanceto engage with the topic as well as by its frequentembrace of it.The cutting across of political frontiers ofthe pro-maketisation position is compounded byits discursive fuzziness. Indeed, “marketisation”covers a rather ambiguous discursive place, asarticles do not, contrary to academics and policymakers, dwell on elaborate or even on any definitionat all. As we have seen, in the articles analysedhere, marketisation is reflected in calls for“giving more place to the private sector”. It is becauseof the inherent fuzzy discursive contoursof these calls that they can resonate both withpositions, advocated by some self-alleged leftwingQuebec experts, that defend the introductionof a market-like governance (that would re-41 The only time after 1998 when marketisation wasno longer an issue in the crisis discourse is 2003.At this point, an expectative attitude towards the policies ofthe new govern-ment (Parti libéral, elected in April 2003) andthe quasi-monopolisation of the discoursive domain by theSARS crisis contributed to what can be seen for now a paranthesisin debate.linquish to the private sector only subcontractedauxiliary services that are not seen as “the core”of health care services), and with the positions,advocated by right-leaning experts, that militatefor the outright privatisation of the system by allowingprivate hospitals and clinics and privateinsurance. 42It can thus be said that the discourse onthe crisis of the health care system, as developedin Quebec written media, serves mainly asa vehicle for the promotion of the idea of marketisationof the health care system. Indeed, whilethe crisis discourse was not produced solely byright-leaning privatising voices in media, politicaland expert circles, and left-leaning analystshave not managed to prevent the imposition andfinal dominance of a marketisation stance withinthis discourse and within the larger policy arena.By constructing the system as a public domaindisjointed from private health care provision,and, as such, prone to crisis, the crisis discoursemade space for a neat articulation of marketisationpropositions.Moreover, “marketisation” becomes themain solution promoted by the crisis discourse.Of the total number of articles explicitly referringto marketisation (48), only a third opposes it(16), whereas the large majority adopts positionsfavourable to it (32 articles).Interestingly, the marketisation debatedoes not neatly follow the right-left divide amongthe chosen dailies. Indeed, if La Presse is themost fervent promoter of marketisation, with 22pro marketisation articles against only 4 countermarketisation articles, Le Soleil shows a morebalanced picture, with a corresponding score of4 vs 4. However, most surprisingly, Le Devoirdoes not oppose marketisation with the samegusto as La Presse promotes it. Indeed, with ascore of 6 vs 8, it engages, considering its leftleaningrenown, only half-heartedly in the attackon marketisation. This indicates that the causeof marketisation has transgressed classical politicalfrontiers, as its progress is facilitated notonly by its strong promotion in right-leaning dai-42 It could be further argued that the distinctionmany promoters of the new public management make betweenthe “introduction of market mechanisms” (such ascompetition, contracts and outsourcing of auxiliary servicesto the private sector) and outright “privatisation” (which theydefine as the introduction of private hospitals and cabinetsand of private insurance) is in itself a manner of promotingnot only marketisation, but also at least a partial privatisationof the health care system (in the sense that some parts ofthe system are brought under the control of private interests).See, for such an alternative view on the privatisation of thehealth care system, Armstrong and Armstrong (1996, 2008)and Lewis et al. (2001).centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr25

Sabina Stan: The Discourse on the “Crisis of the Health Care System”suvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1Graphic 2Number of articles, per year, defending (M+) or opposing (M-) marketisation in LaPresse, Le Soleil and Le Devoir, between 1988 and 2003Number of articles, per year, defending (M+) or opposing (M-) marketisationin La Presse , Le Soleil and Le Devoir , between 1988 and 2003121086M+M-4201988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003lies but also by the left-leaning daily’s reluctanceto engage with the topic as well as by its frequentembrace of it.The cutting across of political frontiers ofthe pro-maketisation position is compounded byits discursive fuzziness. Indeed, “marketisation”covers a rather ambiguous discursive place, asarticles do not, contrary to academics and policymakers, dwell on elaborate or even on any definitionat all. As we have seen, in the articles analysedhere, marketisation is reflected in calls for“giving more place to the private sector”. It is becauseof the inherent fuzzy discursive contoursof these calls that they can resonate both withpositions, advocated by some self-alleged leftwingQuebec experts, that defend the introductionof a market-like governance (that would relinquishto the private sector only subcontractedauxiliary services that are not seen as “the core”of health care services), and with the positions,advocated by right-leaning experts, that militatefor the outright privatisation of the system by allowingprivate hospitals and clinics and privateinsurance. 4343 It could be further argued that the distinctionmany promoters of the new public management make betweenthe “introduction of market mechanisms” (such ascompetition, contracts and outsourcing of auxiliary servicesto the private sector) and outright “privatisation” (which theydefine as the introduction of private hospitals and cabinetsand of private insurance) is in itself a manner of promotingnot only marketisation, but also at least a partial privatisationof the health care system (in the sense that some parts ofIt can thus be said that the discourse onthe crisis of the health care system, as developedin Quebec written media, serves mainly asa vehicle for the promotion of the idea of marketisationof the health care system. Indeed, whilethe crisis discourse was not produced solely byright-leaning privatising voices in media, politicaland expert circles, and left-leaning analystshave not managed to prevent the imposition andfinal dominance of a marketisation stance withinthis discourse and within the larger policy arena.By constructing the system as a public domaindisjointed from private health care provision,and, as such, prone to crisis, the crisis discoursemade space for a neat articulation of marketisationpropositions.7. Whose Discourse?The notion of a crisis was applied tosocial phenomena ever since analysts tried tomake sense of the political, economic and socialtransformations that shook the Western worldat the end of the 18 th century. Consequent to itssteady success over time, the notion was transformed,in the second half of the 20th century,to an “all-pervasive rhetorical metaphor” (Holton,1987: 502-503) and a “ready-made catchword”the system are brought under the control of private interests).See, for such an alternative view on the privatisation of thehealth care system, Armstrong and Armstrong (1996, 2008)and Lewis et al. (2001).centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr26

Sabina Stan: The Discourse on the “Crisis of the Health Care System”suvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1(Starn, 1971: 13). But, while the notion of crisisis all pervasive and is used to advance diversepolitical agendas, it has nevertheless been mobilisedwith more success by the right. Indeed,as it was applied with a vengeance in analysesof post oil crisis developments in Western societies,the notion was turned into a major componentof neo-liberal bashing of the welfare state.In this discursive process, the disciplineof management played an important role. Thus,on the one hand, in the struggle over the legitimatedefinition of and scholarship on the notionof crisis, management succeeded in gaining holdon the notion by transforming it into another of itsdomains of expertise. 44 On the other hand, thelate 20 th century also witnessed the introductionof management theories in public administration.The resulting “new public management” broughtinto conjunction both systemic and crisis visionsof public services. This conjunction transformedolder strains of meaning of the notion of crisis.Indeed, older dramaturgical, historical and medicalmeanings construct the crisis as a key buttemporary moment in a developmental cycle(Holton, 1987: 504, Masur, 1975, Starn, 1971).By contrast, in the health care crisis discourseanalysed above, the crisis is seen as a permanentstate and an inherent condition of the system.In a wider perspective, the discourse onthe crisis of the health care system developed inQuebec can be seen as contributing to the widerdiscourse on the crisis of public health care systems,which is itself part of the even wider discourseon the crisis of the welfare state. As withthe latter, the discourse on the crisis of the healthcare system is a global one. Indeed, the last decadewitnessed the development of a transnationalneo-liberal “reforming common sense” inrespect to health care (Serré and Pierru, 2001).Produced by international financial and healthorganisations, this new consensus is based essentiallyon an economic and managerial visionthat obscures and disqualifies political approachesto health issues. Through the production of44 This was specifically done through the "crisismanagement" branch. See, for example, the special numberof the Journal of Business Administration edited by Smartand Stanbury in 1978, under, significantly for the merger betweenmanagement and public policy, the Institute for Researchon Public Policy. The special number was titled Studiesin Crisis Management. Ever since the beginning of the90s, a journal was, specifically dedicated to the topic underthe title Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management. Itis interesting to note that management studies’ take-over ofcrisis scholarship and expertise continues the 20 th centurypredominance of classical economy in the handling of thenotion of crisis (Masur, 1978: 590).international data, statistics, classifications andcomparisons, these organizations dramatisethe dysfunctions of existent public health caresystems by diagnosing them with an “efficiencycrisis” having its cause in their bureaucratic organization45 (Serré and Pierru, 2001).This global discourse on crisis provided,to a wide range of actors, a ready repertoire fortalking about problems in the health care sector.Evans noticed, for example, that the decline inhospital use, that followed, in Quebec, the Rochonreforms, has lead to increasing claims, particularlyfrom hospital workers, that “the systemis falling apart”. For him, the declining positionof hospital workers drove them, once “the strongestsupporters of Medicare, 46 into an inadvertentalliance with its traditional enemies” (Evans,2000: 894). These enemies are “powerful interestgroups” that include providers of care (physicians,private insurers and corporate providers),higher-income Canadians, as well as “ideologicalentrepreneurs” that “champion the interestsof the wealthy, cheerleading for the private marketplace”(Evans, 2000: 894-896; also, Evans,2008). Additionally, according to Hutchinsonand his colleagues, crisis statements can alsobe fostered by less ferocious foes of the publicsystem. For example, policy makers keen on effectingchange in the atomised primary care sectoroften have recourse to propositions for radicalchange. For them, crisis statements serve tosecure public and political support to “big bang”approaches (Hutchinson et al., 2001).These diverse statements, claims, andinterests have collided with media campaignsthat have made the Canadian health care crisistheir battle horse. Some analysts saw thus thecrisis discourse as mounted in explicit “disinformationcampaigns” of a “policy warfare” originatingin the neighbouring United States (Evans,2000: 894, 895, Marmor, 1999). The campaignsdeveloped at the beginning of the nineties “as a45 The more so, as some analysts point out, whenmedia's search for sensational revelations weigh the balancetowards the darkest scenario. Thus, for example, whenCanadian media made their selective reading of the 2000WHO report, and chose to downplay a still respectable 7 thplace ranking in terms of goal attainment occupied by theCanadian health care system, for its 30 th rating in terms ofachievement relative to potential. For some analysts, thischoice has contributed to further "promoting an air of crisis"(Lewis et al., 2001: 926).46 In English Canada, “Medicare” is used in referenceto what Quebec terms as “le régime d’assurancemaladie” and sometimes as a synonym for “the health caresystem”. It would be interesting to analyse, in a comparativeperspective, the English media use of “the system” in its discourseon the health care sector.centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr27

Sabina Stan: The Discourse on the “Crisis of the Health Care System”suvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1side effect to achieve health care reform in theUnited States” and inevitably spilled over intoCanadian media and health services academicand policy literature.But why, for all matters, did the crisis discourseonly enter the Quebec health care arenaonly at the end of the nineties, and why it hastaken this particular form? Of course, the turbulentchanges effected during 90s led the Canadianhealth care system to “an apparent stateof crisis” marked by contradictory measures,services slashing and disorganising restructurings(Lewis et al., 2001: 926). Still, reading theappearance of chaos as a “crisis of the healthcare system” was not the only reading available.Elements of the chaos could still have been readas separate ones, and not necessarily as takingpart in a more total, encompassing crisis of thesystem.For example, one event with importantchaotic consequences for the system, “hospitalclosings” (“fermeture d’hôpitaux”), saw its medianotoriety reach a peak in 1995, 47 but faded awaybefore the take off of the crisis discourse in 1998.By comparison, the more visual events of “emergencyroom crises” (“crises des urgences”) hada media evolution that closely preceded the crisisdiscourse (as it took off in 1998 and reachedits peak in 1999 48 ). It seems that, as media coverageof emergency room crises intensified, it fuelleda more encompassing systemic discourseon the crisis. How did it happen, and why did thecrisis have to be systemic?The particular meaning of the crisisdiscourse stems from larger ideological transformations(i.e. the turn from Keynesianism toneo-liberalism), but also from the conjectural internalstruggles of the social field in which theyare produced (Chalaby, 1996: 691, 694), namelyin this case the francophone journalistic field. InCanada and Quebec, the end of the nineties sawinternal competition inside the field mount in intensity,as francophone and Anglophone mediaalike went through a process of renewed concentration.49 Moreover, the continuous trend of47 The 1995 peak registered more than 160 mentionsof the phenomenon in the three dailies considered here.48 In 1999 there was a peak of 60 articles mentioning“the emergency room crisis” (“la crise des urgences”).49 The dailies analysed here were subject to earlierprocesses of concentration. While Le Devoir always remainedan independent journal, La Presse was bought byQuebec media mogul Paul Desmarais in 1967, and Le Soleilwas purchased by the Hollinger group of Conrad Black in1987 (Gingras, 1999:115, 118). But at the end of the 90s,Canadian media underwent a series of important mergersand buy-outs, leading to "one of the world's highest degreesthe diminishing importance of the written pressvis-à-vis other media (television and internet) putfurther pressure on editors and journalists insidethe written media field.The media’s propensity to offer a moreschematic and dramatic presentation of issueswas compounded with an appearance of chaosin the health care sector, a strengthening of rightwing positions in the Canadian media (Hackettand Gruneau, 2000: 204) and intensified internalcompetition in the journalistic field, to producediscussion of on an encompassing, systemic crisis.By claiming expertise on the health care domain(through powerful statements on the systemiccrisis affecting it), media executives andjournalists not only gave voice to marketisinginterests, but also enhanced their own positionsand established a new symbolic territory (“thehealth care system”) inside a shrinking journalisticfield.Of course, media discourses are not onlythe domain of journalists and editorial boards.One, they are overlapping with and are participatingin larger discourses, such as those developedby governments, experts, or other media.Two, media discourses are not produced solelyby the media, as discourse producers are alwaysmultiple (Chalaby, 1996: 695). In fact, mostof the articles analysed here include (cited orauthored) utterances not only of journalists, butalso of other social actors, such as politicians,officials, experts, representatives or membersof different professional and labour groupings.Journalists are part of a bigger chorus of voices,as they “give form to concerns and problems ofother social worlds, in particular the political andthe administrative ones” (Pierru, 2004: 2).Therefore, we can say that the discourseon the crisis of the health care system in Quebecis produced by a variety of actors and forces: theglobal neo-liberal ideology of welfare state bashing,essays by health care policy makers on advancingmore radical reforms of the health caresector, the intensification of struggles inside thefrancophone journalistic field, as well as contestationsby actors inside the health care field triggeredby health care reforms.of press concentration" (Fleras, 2003: 110). Even if this concentrationaffected less the written Quebec francophonemedia, it certainly affected the manner in which Quebec journalistsperceived their field.centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr28

Sabina Stan: The Discourse on the “Crisis of the Health Care System”suvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 18. Effects of the Crisis DiscourseThe crisis metaphor not only “gives fullvent to feelings as to the intolerability of thepresent” (Holton, 1987: 504), but also contributesto the cultural construction of this feeling.Moreover, the crisis discourse is not necessarily“suggestive of […] a ‘critical’ standpoint” (Holton,1987: 505), but rather, as the case analysedhere showed, a sign of utopian politics callingfor a radical “dissolution of the public realm”(Clarke, 2004) through the thorough institution ofthe idea of the Market (Carrier, 1997; Newmanand Clarke, 2009).Appealing to a crisis discourse to qualify“the system” is also a powerful manner to claimknowledge and “truth”. While any discourse embodiesclaims to knowledge (Torfing, 1999, Foucault,1971), the notion of crisis always potentiallyevokes its older meanings of “moment oftruth”, of revelation of the deeper essence of aphenomenon (Starn, 1971: 16). “The crisis of thehealth care system” offers, in this perspective,the revelation of the true nature of the system,construed in this case as being in the same timeevil and bureaucratic (i.e. “public”).The discourse on “the crisis of the healthcare system” contributes to the adoption of policieswith very concrete effects. In Quebec, thecrisis discourse succeeded in radicalising andlimiting policy horizons, by making marketisationseem not only justifiable but also an inevitablecomponent of health care reforms. The ideologicaleffects of the crisis discourse can thus beseen as advancing a more or less hidden marketisationagenda of “powerful interests”. Whilewitnessing a real privatisation of health carethrough the private provision of services not coveredby public funds (Lewis et al., 2001: 927)and discontinuing the historically feeble overtpolitical support for privatisation, the end of the90s saw a powerful current in official, academicand media discourse in Quebec and Canadato giving “more and more prominence to privatesector delivery of health care” (Bernier andDallaire, 2001: 130; Armstrong and Armstrong,2008). Thus, when the Parti libéral took powerin Quebec in April 2003, it committed itself toa marketising and privatising reform the publicacceptance of which was prepared by previousyears of media crisis discourse.Both the Parti libéral commitment to aprivatising stance towards the health care sectorand the public acceptance of this stancewere fully revealed by the July 2005 Chaoulliruling (Crawford, 2006). On this occasion, theSupreme Court of Canada overthrew Quebeclaws banning the purchase of private insurancefor medically necessary services. Seizing theoccasion, the Parti libéral ignored possibilitiesof blocking the ruling and further expanded itseffects by announcing only months later that itwill consider shortly what part the private sectorshould play in health care. At the same time,public reactions to the ruling and to the government’sposition vis-á-vis the ruling have not yetmanaged to consolidate in a powerful movementagainst privatisation. Thus, the crisis discoursemight have realised just this: to trigger maybenot so much deep adhesion to privatisation asindifference and a wait-and-see attitude to thepolicies of a government determined to transformalong market lines the health care sector.Following Mintz, we can distinguish twomeanings of the crisis. On the one hand, the“outside meaning” (Mintz, 1985) of the crisis pertainsto the meanings the crisis has for differentpower holders. Thus, if for government officials,the crisis might constitute a means for legitimisingreform, for private companies, the crisis is ameans for legitimising health care privatization,and, tacitly, profits derived from health care provision.On the other hand, the crisis has also an“inside meaning” (Mintz, 1985), one that pointstowards its meanings for health care workersand patients. In this article I concentrated on thecrisis’ outside meaning, the one related to powerand to powerful actors, to policy shifts and to envisionedgains. Its inside meanings remain yetto be studied and constitute an interesting anglethrough which to approach contemporary healthcare transformations. In fact, the inside meaningof the crisis of the health care system pointsto the novel temporality of the flexible phase ofcapitalism, particularly, in health care, to shiftsin patterns of care away from the hospital andto shorter stays inside the system. Documentingthis temporality of accelerated “people-processing”inside the system and its consequencefor the manner in which the system is lived bythose who are inside it or who are just passingthrough it, constitutes a fruitful agenda for futureresearch.centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr29

Sabina Stan: The Discourse on the “Crisis of the Health Care System”suvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1ReferencesAdelman, R., Verbrugge, L. (2000): Death Makes the News: The Social Impact of Disease on NewspaperCoverage, Journal of Health and Social Behaviour, 41: 347-367Armstrong, P., Armstrong, H. (2008): About Canada: Health Care, Black Point, Nova Scotia: FernwoodPublishingArmstrong, P., Armstrong, H. (1996): Wasting Away: The Undermining of Canadian Health Care. Toronto:Oxford University PressBernier, J., Dallaire, M. (2001): What Price Have Women Paid for Health Care Reform? The Situation inQuebec, in P. Armstrong et al. (eds): Exposing Privatization: Women and Health Care Reform inCanada, Aurora, Ont.: Garamond PressBourdieu, P. (1994): Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field, SociologicalTheory, 12 (1): 1-18Bourdieu, P. (2001): Langage et pouvoir symbolique. Paris: Éditions du SeuilBridgman, T., Barry, D. (2002): Regulation is Evil: An Application of Narrative Policy Analysis to theRegulatory Debate in New Zealand, Policy Sciences, 35: 141-161Brodie, M., Hamel, E., Altman, D., Blendon, R., Benson, J. (2003): Health News and the AmericanPublic, 1996-2002, Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 28 (5): 927-950Carrier, J. (1997): Meanings of the Market: The Free Market in Western Culture, New York: New YorkUniversity PressChalaby, J. K. (1996): Beyond the Prison-House of Language: Discourse as a Sociological Concept,British Journal of Sociology, 47(4): 684-698Clarke, J. (2004): Dissolving the Public Realm? The Logics and Limits of Neo-Liberalism, Journal ofSocial Policy, 33 (1): 27-48Crawford, M. (2006): Interactions: Trade Policy and Healthcare Reform after Chaoulli v. Quebec,Healthcare Policy/Politiques de Santé, 1(2): 90-102Davin, S. (2005): Public Medicine: The Reception of a Medical Drama”, in: King, M., Watson, K. (eds):Representing Health: Discourses of Health and Illness in the Media, New York: Palgrave MacMillanEvans, R. (2008): Reform, Re-form, and Reaction in the Canadian Health Care System, Health LawJournal, 16: 265-286Evans, R. (2000): Canada, Journal of Health Policy, Politics and Law, 25 (5): 889-897Fiss, P., Hirsch, P. (2005): The Discourse of Globalisation: Framing and Sensemaking of an EmergingConcept, American Sociological Review, 70 (1): 29-52Fleras, A. (2003): Mass Media Communication in Canada, Toronto: Harcourt Brace CanadaFoucault, M. (1971): L’ordre du discours: Leçon inaugurale au Collège de France prononcée le 2décembre 1970. Paris: GallimardFrank, T. (2000): One Market under God: Extreme Capitalism, Market Populism, and the End of EconomicDemocracy, New York: Random HouseGingras, A.-M. (1999): Médias et démocratie: Le grand malentendu. Ste-Foy, Qc: PUQHackett, R., Gruneau, R. (2000): The Missing News: Filters and Blind Spots in Canada’s Press. Aurora,Ont.: Garamond PressHenderson, L. (2010): Medical TV Dramas: Health Care Soap Opera, Socialist Register, 46Herdman, E. (2002): Lifelong Investment in Health: The Discursive Construction of Problems in HongKong Health Policy, Health Policy and Planning, 17 (2): 161-166Hilgartner, S., Bosk, C. L. (1988): The Rise and Fall of Social Problems: A Public Arenas Model, AmericanJournal of Sociology, 94 (1): 53-78Holton, R. J. (1987): The Idea of Crisis in Modern Society, The British Journal of Sociology, XXXVIII (4):502-520Hutchinson, B., Abelson, J., Lavis, J. (2001): Primary Health Care in Canada: So Much Innovation, SoLittle Change, Health Affairs, 20 (3): 116-131King, M., Watson, K. (eds) (2005): Representing Health: Discourses of Health and Illness in the Media.New York: Palgrave MacMillanKuipers, J. (1989): Medical Discourse’ in Anthropological Context: Views of Language and Power,Medical Anthropology Quarterly, 3 (2): 99-123Lewis, S., Donaldson, C., Mitton, C., Currie, G. (2001): The Future of Health Care in Canada, BritishMedical Journal, 323 (20): 926-9.centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr30

Sabina Stan: The Discourse on the “Crisis of the Health Care Systemsuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1Marmor, T. (1999): The Rage for Reform. Sense and Non-sense in Health Policy: Market Limits in HealthReform, in: Drache, D., Sullivan, T. (eds): Public Success, Private Failure, London: RoutledgeMasur, G. (1973): Crisis in History, in: Wiener, I. P. (ed.): Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies inSelected Pivotal Ideas Vol. I, New York: Charles Scribner’s SonsMintz, S. (1985): The Sweetness of Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History, New York: VikingNewman, J., Clarke, J. (2009): Publics, Politics and Power: Remaking the Public in Public Services,London: SagePierru, F. (2004): La fabrique des palmarès. Genèse d’un secteur d’action publique et renouvellementd’un genre journalistique: les palmarès hospitaliers, in Legavre, J.-B. (ed.): La presse écrite:regards sur un objet délaissé, Paris: L’HarmattanPurvis, T., Hunt, A. (1993): Discourse, Ideology, Discourse, Ideology, Discourse, Ideology..., The BritishJournal of Sociology, 44 (3): 473-499Seale, C. (2004): Health and the Media, Oxford: Wiley-BlackwellSerré, M., Pierru, F. (2001): Les organisations internationales et la production d’un sens communréformateur de la politique de protection maladie, Lien social et politiques, 45: 105-130.Smart, C. F., Stanbury, W. T. (eds) (1978), Studies in Crisis Management: Theme issue of Journal ofBusiness Administration, 9:2Spector, M., Kitsuse, J. (2006): Constructing Social Problems, New Brunswick, N.J.: TransactionPublishersStarn, R. (1971): Historians and ‘Crisis’, Past and Present, 52: 3-22.Torfing, J. (1999): New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe and Žižek. Oxford: BlackwellBritishMedical Journal, 323 (20): 926-9.Diskurs o „krizi zdravstvenog sustava” i novi model upravljanjazdravstvenom zaštitom u QuébecuSABINA STANGradsko sveučilište u Dublinu, IrskaTijekom prošlog desetljeća, javni diskurs o „krizi zdravstvenog sustava”u Québecu i Kanadi narastao je do takvih razmjera da je u očima mnogihKvebečana i Kanađana kriza postala trajna značajka sektora zdravstvenezaštite. Na temelju analize članaka iz kvebečkog tiska, članak pokazuje kakodiskurs o krizi pridonosi promicanju tržišno orijentiranog modela upravljanjazdravstvenom zaštitom te potiče prihvaćanje tržišno orijentiranih politika uzdravstvu.Ključne riječi: zdravstvena zaštita, upravljanje, diskurs, kriza, neoliberalizamcentar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr31

Plamena Pehlivanova: The Decline of Trust in Post-communist Societiessuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1UDK: 32.019.5(497.2+470)Pregledni radPrimljeno: 17. 8. 2009.The Decline of Trust in Post-communist Societies: The Case ofBulgaria and RussiaPLAMENA PEHLIVANOVAUniversity of Chicago, USAAfter the fall of communism in Bulgaria and Russia, the form ofunderground communities still remained in the collective consciousness,as people became even more secluded around their tight circles of familyand friends. The family bonds became the new cradle of trust that mighthave resulted in the low levels of bridging and out-group trust. Trust towardgovernment institutions and formal organisations have dramaticallydeclined in accord with the decline in social and political participation. Fromobservations of the Bulgarian society from 2000 to present, I propose thatinformal personal contacts on the micro-level rather than formal institutionalparticipation on the macro-level tend to generate social trust and thus hamperinstitutional legitimacy. The family substitutes the role of the institutionas it provides for value priorities and moral resources for one’s realisation.Contrary to the Tocqueville and Putnam model, I propose that in Bulgariaand Russia such interpersonal relations generate trust and intermediaryorganisations do not. Furthermore, the paper will study: 1) the levels of trustin comparison to the levels of social participation, 2) the level of economicdevelopment and 3) the development of the family structure as an influentialfactor of trust and social/political participation. The study will focus on thesocial development of post-communist Bulgaria and Russia (from 1999 topresent), with the Chinese and Dutch societal model as comparison.Key words: trust, social capital, confidence, fatalism, social and politicalparticipation, intermediary organisations, legitimacy organisations1. Background:After the death of Stalin in 1953 the SovietUnion experienced the melt-down period,referred to as The Thaw. The Khrushchev eragave rise to multiple underground associationsthat were the building blocks of the future democracy.They were non-conformist groups likethe Lianozovo School of Oscar Rabin and musicianssuch as Visotsky and Akudjava that graduallydestabilized the regime from within and consequentlybecame the catalysts for the break ofthe Soviet Union. This was the period in whichunderground, non-conformist art groups formedto share their independent views on societyand culture; it was the common goal that unitedthem and created a rich social capital throughout.Breaking away from the government influenceand commands, radical young individualsformed social groups that were built around acommon scepticism toward the government andthe goal to radically break away the order. Peopleformed tight circles based around their familyand friends, as they shared common views andideas about life. However, after the fall of communismin Bulgaria and in Russia, the form ofcentar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr32

Plamena Pehlivanova: The Decline of Trust in Post-communist Societiessuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1underground communities still remained in thecollective consciousness, as people becameeven more secluded around their tight circlesof family and friends. The family bonds becamethe new cradle of trust that might have resultedin the low levels of bridging and out-group trust.Trust toward government institutions and formalorganisations have dramatically declined in accordwith the decline in social and political participation.Through my observations of the Bulgariansociety from 2000 to present, I propose thatthe informal personal contacts, rather than formalinstitutional participation, tend to generatesocial trust and hamper institutional legitimacy.The family substitutes the role of the institutionas it provides for value priorities and moral resourcesfor one’s realisation. Contrary to theTocqueville 1 and Putnam model, I propose thatin Bulgaria and Russia, such personal relationsgenerate trust and intermediary organisations donot. Furthermore, the paper will study the levelsof trust in comparison to the levels of participation;to the level of economic development, andthe development of the family structure as an influentialfactor of trust and social/political participation.The study will focus on the developmentof post-communist Bulgaria and Russia (from1999 to the present) and it uses the Chinese andDutch societal model for comparison.2. IntroductionWith the fall of communism in both postcommunistcountries (Bulgaria and Russia) theformal public participation declined in accordwith the decrease in social and political trust.However, the interwoven structure of the familyfunctions as the epicentre for the continuation ofsocial traditions. From the World Value Surveywe learn that people in both countries trust mosttheir families and close friends, and distrust anykind of social and political structures (esp. government).We also see that most participationtakes place in activities involving tight social circlesand less in any kind of formal (sport, church,work) organisations, and least in any kind of politicalor governmental institutions. For example,the World Value Survey shows us that - in Russia38.5% and in Bulgaria 24% of society does nottrust the Parliament at all, in contrast to the Neth-1 Civic and political organisations educate individuals aboutbeing citizens in a free society. Such groups may also formalliances with like-minded organisations in order to lobbyor coordinate their advocacy messages. Most importantly,these organisations become reservoirs of social capital andtrust.erlands with 4.8%. Furthermore, from the surveysections — “Frequency of spent time”, we noticethat Bulgaria and Russia prevail in spending timewith family and friends and minimal with formalorganisations (like church, sports and communalorganisation). It is shocking to note that 79.6% ofthe Bulgarian and 67.8% of the Russian populationclaims “not involved” in any voluntary organisations.Whereas in the US and the Netherlandsthe cultural participation has dramatically risen,Bulgaria and Russia report almost 90% of theirpopulation as “no member of any organisation”. 2According to the results from the Eurobarometersurvey for 2004, the Bulgarian institutionswere facing a crisis of confidence. Lowlevels of trust have remained the same (sincethe fall of the regime) for most of the nationalpolitical institutions, while some “don’t knows”have been transformed into negative opinions.Plamen Georgiev claims that, “the result is 10points decrease in trust in the National Parliament(81%), 6 point decrease in political parties(83%), a 7 point decrease in national government(70%) and 5 point higher mistrust in the Bulgarianjustice system (70%).” (Plamen, 2007: 138).Out of all countries surveyed by the Euro barometer,Bulgarians tend to mistrust the most theirnational legal system. The survey also showsthat, out of all countries polled, Bulgarians andRomanians are the most dissatisfied with theirquality of life. While pessimistic about the politicalinstitutions and their quality of life, Bulgarianshave shown high expectations towards the EuropeanUnion. Particular support and optimism hasbeen reflected by young people between 15 and24 years of age. In general, the Euro-barometerreports show that Bulgarians have become lesspessimistic in national terms and more realisticin their Euro-optimism and the role of Europe inthe future of their country. However, what is thereason for the decline of trust and participationafter the fall of the regime? How can we comparethe Bulgarian case with the Chinese sociopoliticalmodel? How do we fight antagonismand growing pessimism in the Balkans?2 The survey results have been extracted from the WorldValue Survey – Bulgaria (1999) and Russia (1999)centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr33

Plamena Pehlivanova: The Decline of Trust in Post-communist Societiessuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1Table 1Confidence in InstitutionsPresident 71%Army 55%Police 51%Local Government 40%Banking System 37%Cabinet 30%ProsecutionCourts of LawParliament18%18%15%* Survey conducted by Gallup, July20053. History and Old AgeThe political and social behavior of theBalkans can be explained by the inherited cultureof traditional antagonism that relates not only totheir communist past. Nikolay Valkov describesthis behavior as formed around culture, historyand the political model of the country. (Valkov,2009) Furthermore, his study closely comparesthe resemblance between Latin European countriesto post-communist countries in their democraticpolitical model and low voluntary organisationalmembership. It could be argued thatthe interpersonal relations on the micro-levelinfluence the social and political structure of thestate. Nevertheless, through his analysis, Valkovopposes this theory and concludes that the lowassociational life model in post-communist societiesis not necessary correlated with their democraticperformance. Instead, he believes that thelow membership rates should be understood assomething which has its own internal logic andexplanation. “The origins lie in the nature of thesocietal transformation in the region.” (Valkov,2009: 14). Bulgarians in this way are less boundto the values of individual worthiness. Their socialsolidarity is a hybrid of the old structured collectivismthat emerged as structures during thetransition, believes Plamen Georgiev.Eastern and Central Europe have goodreason to distrust the government, since theyhave lived in authoritarian regimes, some moretotalitarian than others, forced to subjugate individualinterest to those of the Communist Party.Social participation in “volunteer” and politicalorganisations was advocated (if not enforced),which led to drastic decline in any kind of politicalor civic organisations after the fall of communism.With the fall of the regime, the reactionwas a massive alienation and distrust towardthe communist regime and “lingering cynicismtoward political and civil institutions” (Georgiev,2007:138). One may speculate that with thefall of the regime, there would have been ancentar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr34

Plamena Pehlivanova: The Decline of Trust in Post-Communist Societiessuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1increase in social participation and enthusiasmfor independent civic and cultural organisations.As Nikolay Valkov states in his study of postcommunistcountries, there is an expectationthat vigorous civic engagement precedes, triggers,or follows democratization of an authoritarianpolitical regime. (Valkov, 2009: 2). However,with the development of democracy in Bulgariaand Russia (1990-1999) the World Value Surveyshows a decline in civic and political activism.The reappearance of democracy in Eastern andCentral Europe coincided with the decline in associationalactivity. In relation to decline in socialparticipation, we also witness a decline in politicaland civic trust. Contrary to the Tocquevillianmodel, which infers that democratic systemsincrease participation, it seems that post-communistsocieties such as Russia and Bulgaria donot necessary manifest the inferred high voluntaryactivism.To the question: “Can most people betrusted?”- Bulgaria (1997-1999) witnessed 8%decline, while Russia (1990-1999) witnesseda 15.7% decline. Confidence in Parliament declined:in Bulgaria (1990-1999) with 24% and inRussia (1990-1999) with 22%. The New DemocraciesBarometer (2001) exhibits Bulgaria andRomania as the countries with the highest levelof distrust among the new democracies. The resultshere reflect the difference in experience ofeach country under communism. Furthermore,William Mishler and Robert Rose speculate thatmost citizens don’t distinguish between institutionsof state and society but they judge themholistically and evaluate them sceptically. (Mishler,Rose, 1997: 420). This argument resemblesthe one put forward by Thompson in CulturalTheory (Ellis,Thompson, Wildavski, 1990), andis ambitious enough to involve future studies onhow fatalism affects participation. Why did trustdecline and continues to decline in Bulgaria? Onthe other hand, how can we compare the Chinesesocial model to Bulgaria and Russia?Trust is to be consequentially developedby the society and it needs to come from thepositive performance of political and civil institutionsthat, as Hirschman says, is measured by“reasonable measure of individual and collectivegood” (Hirschman, 1970: 58). Trust is initiallyvery important for the development of democracyin post-communist countries like Bulgariaand Russia. “Trust in civil institution doesn’t diminishdemocracy but completes it, enhancingthe effectiveness of political institutions” (Mishler,Rose, 1997: 420). In the case of Bulgariaand Russia, one can speculate that the fall of theregime witnessed an increase in social activism,which adopted “the fight for democracy” as theirslogan. However, the legitimacy of institutionswas no longer judged by ideology but by performance.Thus, the economic downfall resulted indecreased political trust and participation, andincreased social dissatisfaction. The StandardEurobarometer Analysis of 2008 states the following:“Bulgarians continue to be least satisfiedwith their way of life of the entire Eurobarometerpoll (59%). However, while,in the spring (2008), they felt stronglythe positive effects of EU membershipand their life satisfaction was on the rise,reaching its highest scores (40%), now– under the influence of the crisis, it hasdecreased (by 2 points). This strong dissatisfactionwith life may be explainedby the unanimous opinion of citizensthat compared to the average in the Europeancountries, the situation in Bulgariais worse in all areas: 88% give anegative assessment regarding the situationof the national economy, 77% - regardingthe employment situation, 84%- regarding energy prices, and at leastnine out of ten interviewed – regardingthe cost of living (92%) and the qualityof life (93%).” (Standard Eurobarometer70, 2008)The growing income gap between thepeople and the insufficient pensions also furtheredthe antagonism in Bulgaria. When asked:“How would you rate the current retirement fundsin Bulgaria?”, 82% of the Bulgarians answer as“Bad + Very Bad”, while only 52% of the EuropeanUnion population reports the same. Bulgariaand Hungary are presented as the EuropeanStates with the highest dissatisfaction ratein their retirement funds. At the same time, 25%of Bulgarian households report in WVS to havethe minimum salary income, in comparison tothe only 9% of Russian, and 2% of Chinese andDutch households. While we see highly skeweddata for Russia and Bulgaria, Chinese and Dutchdata have a rather uniform bell-shaped distribution.Do income and retirement funds affect participation?The data show that Bulgarians withlowest income levels tend not to participate involuntary organisations. However, income is notthe only cause for decline in participation; ageproves to be another important factor that wehave to control for.centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr35

Plamena Pehlivanova: The Decline of Trust in Post-Communist Societiessuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 14. AgeIn order to dig deeper into the causalityof the decline in trust and participation of theBulgarian, Russian and Chinese society, wemust look at the age distribution in these countries(Table 2). It is striking to see that 23.3% ofthe Bulgarian society consists of people over 65years old, while in the Chinese they compriseonly 6% of the population. There is a big differencein Bulgarian and Chinese demographics,where the Bulgarian population growth rateis -0.813% (2008 est.), the Chinese is 0.629%(2008 Est.). How does this affect the reports ontrust and participation of the two populations?The older generation in Bulgaria reportsto participate least in voluntary organisations andexpresses the highest dissatisfaction with life.For example, to the question in the World ValueSurvey: “Please look carefully at the followinglist of voluntary organisations and activities andsay...which, if any, you belong to?” 79% of theBulgarians answered “Belong to none”. Herewe see that only 20% of Bulgarians and 32% ofRussians belong to any voluntary organisations,in contrast to 92% of Dutch. In order to explainthis phenomenon of decline in associational lifewe must look at two factors: age and income ofthe population. As previously noted, 43% of theinterviewed Bulgarians is above 50 years of age;while in China it is only 25%. In other words, thedominant population of Bulgaria consists of elderly(born after 1951) while China consists ofpredominantly 33-49 year olds. Therefore, theanalysis has to control for the variable of age andincome to see whether their effect on participation.When controlling for age, the World ValueSurvey presents that 46% (BG) of the “Belongto None” section is made up of people above 50years old (Table 3). Interestingly enough, theChinese model shows that 43% of the “Belong toNone” section is composed of 15-29 year olds.Therefore, the Bulgarian and Chinese modelseems to differ in the level of participation betweentheir age groups. What does this tell usabout the younger generation in China and theolder generation in Bulgaria? Since the Bulgarianpopulation is dominated by the older generation,we see that this survey on participation isalso influenced by the opinions of the elderly.The outcomes also support observationsmade by Terry Clark in his The New PoliticalCulture that younger people participatemore than the elderly (Clark, Hoffmann-Martinot,1998:126). In support of the New Political Model,we see that in Bulgaria there is a decline in associationallife with the increase of the age factor.Similarly, the table below shows a decrease incultural activism with the increase of age.5. Social and Cultural ParticipationJames Coleman and Robert Putnamboth emphasize trust as an important factor forthe establishment of civil society, the sense ofcommunity and connection between citizens ininstitutions that connect them with government.Political activism is an example where the socialtrust is measured in participation. In BowlingAlone, Robert Putnam chooses bowling asTable 2:Participation declines with AgeAge vs. Mean of Belonging to Cultural Organisations15-24 0,17525-34 0,12335-44 0,1145-64 0,165 0,085Survey conducted by Terry Clark, University of Chicago* This table controls for the Age vs. Mean of people belonging to CulturalActivitiescentar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr36

Plamena Pehlivanova: The Decline of Trust in Post-Communist Societiessuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1an example of civic participation, which providesfor bonding and establishment of social trust. Hefurther argues that social trust is strongly associatedwith forms of civic engagement and socialcapital. Putnam implies that “people, who trusttheir fellow citizens, volunteer more often, participatemore often in politics and communityorganisations.” (Putnam, 2000: 136-137). It isdiscouraging to see the statistic on Bulgaria andRussia, which show a decline in participationand relevantly the decline in trust. In her articleSocialization for Participation, Natalia Letki discussesthat the low level of citizen involvementin politics, in East-Central Europe, is linked tolow levels of social capital. Letki mentions theprevailing apathy, lack of interest and low participationin politics. (Letki, 2004: 669). Accordingly,the author cites leading sociologists suchas Inglehart and Catterberg, who argue that theweakness of political involvement are blamed onthe weakness of civil society and low levels ofinterpersonal trust.The World Value Survey and the NewDemocracies Barometer present very little positivetrust in civil and political institutions (for Bulgaria)with most distrust directed toward the JudiciarySystem and the Parliament. Participationin political parties, trade unions and other governmentorganisations is witnessing a decline.From Putnam’s point of view, Bulgaria and Russiaare witnessing a great decline in participationin relation to trust. However, one might arguethat this evaluation is based only on the analysisof formal civic and political organisations.As argued by Clark, Achterberg andNavarro, Putnam doesn’t take an account forscenes 3 and thus excludes the unofficial types ofsocial participation, which also generate social3 Scenes are the concept introduced in Clark, Achterberg,and Navarro conference paper Culture is on the Rise - Why?Theories of Cultural Participation and Empirical Evidence.Scenes are constructed by physical structures, people andneighborhoods. People’s interaction with these structurescreates the dynamic of scenes. The three aspects of scenes(values on which they are judged) are: legitimacy, authenticityand theatricality.Table 3Rising Membership of Cultural Activity GroupsCountry 1981 1990 2000 DeltaNetherlands 12,5 34,6 45,2 32,7USA 13,9 19,7 36,9 23Bulgaria 4,3 4 -0,3Portugal 6,2 3,7 -2,5Brazil 5,4 2,4 -3Latvia 6,8 3,7 -3,1Russia 4,9 1,2 -3,7Lithuania 7,3 2,9 -4,4China 7,3 2,2 -5,1* Survey conducted by Terry Clark, University of Chicagocentar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr37

Plamena Pehlivanova: The Decline of Trust in Post-Communist Societiessuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1capital. For example, Clark studies the “risingmembership of cultural activity groups” in orderto emphasize the role of scenes in the post-materialistcountries. (Clark, Achterberg, Navarro2007: 11). The Netherlands witness the highestrise of membership, while Bulgaria, Russiaand China present a negative delta growth. Whydoes membership decline in Bulgaria and Russia,and how can we compare their outcomes tothe Chinese model?The studies and analysis of Clark,Achterberg and Navarro show that cultural participationin post-communist or communist countriesis decreasing (Table 3). They explain thisphenomenon as - participation in the post-communistcountries doesn’t lead to legitimacy. Onthe other hand, we should consider the idea thatsocial structures have lost their legitimacy on thegrounds of historical ineffectiveness and forcefulauthoritarian model. Furthermore, how doesChina compare to this model? We see in thetable above that Chinese participation in culturalorganisations is even lower than Bulgaria andRussia. In regards to the state economy, Bulgariareports the lowest economic growth betweenthe three countries, which could be correlatedwith the negative participation levels. On theother hand, China reports a GDP of $3.251 trillion(2007 est.) and at the same time witnessesthe lowest social association. What does this sayabout the Chinese model? The Chinese societyreports to be most concerned with materialistic,not post-materialistic values. Since the changeof the regime from legitimacy based on ideologyto legitimacy based on performance, theChinese society has witnessed increase in trusttoward the economic performance of the country,rather than the cultural/voluntary institutions.Students place a great deal of faith in the capacityof economic growth to solve their problems.While students agree that the environment is aserious problem, they place economic developmentbefore environmental protection in terms ofdomestic goals. (Stalley, Yang, 2006: 13) . Anotherexample becomes the environmental NGOs,which maintain only about 100 volunteers, ofwhich only 20 are considered regular contributors.Many Chinese environmental organisationsposses a degree of freedom, say Phillip Stalleyand Dongning Yang. Nevertheless, these philanthropicand environmental organisations remainclosely tied to the state and perform functionsin line with the central government policies. Thegovernment’s restrictions on NGOs and socialorganisations are argued by Peter Ho to havethis negative effect on participation (Ho, 2001).In general, the Chinese society remainsrestricted because of limitations in its political opportunitystructure – the lack of elections, the restrictionson social organisations and the lack ofcivil society. In addition, the Chinese society hasbeen focusing on the two most important domesticdevelopment goals – 1) promoting scientificadvancement and 2) controlling the population.So, environmental protection has been viewedas post-materialist issue and has been rankedbelow the government’s materialist goals. Thebelief in the “ideology of economic development”has hampered the likelihood of anti-pollutionmovement and the support in post-materialistissues. Therefore, the Chinese society can bedefined as materialistic and not yet issue-based,which partially explains its negative culturalparticipation levels. Here, the Chinese modelis similar to outcomes of Bulgaria and Russia;however the mechanism, which explains it turnsout to be very different. While the Bulgarian societyshows a decrease in cultural participationbecause of distrust and antagonistic behavioralpatterns, China’s negative delta membershipcomes from the government’s emphasis on theeconomic, rather than cultural, development.Another explanation to why there is adecline in voluntary and cultural organisationson the Balkans and Russia, given by PlamenGeorgiev in The Bulgarian Political Culture, isthat their society is less aware of the instrumentsof genuine democratic government; their mentalityis still set on the centralist model, like China(Georgiev, 2007:111). As previously noted byGallup International (2005), the President earns71% of the Bulgarian’s trust and the Army 55%,while the Parliament earns only 15%. Crosscompared internationally, the survey by the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (2009)found that trust levels for President Medvedev(Russia) have grown to 73 percent in the pastthree years. It is striking to see that both Bulgarianand Russian presidents have earned morethan 70 percent of their citizens’ trust, when atthe same time 22 percent of them express thatthe previous political regime was “Bad” (1999).However, the Gallup International presents a dualisticconcept. Does the survey actually test the“Trust in the President” or the “Trust in the Presidency”?Plamen Goergiev infers that the surveydefined rather dualistically by the concepts of“President” and “The Presidency” seems to benot less consistent (Georgiev, 2007: 112). Hepresents data for the levels of trust in differentpresidents: (1992) saw an 88% of the “blue”centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr38

Plamena Pehlivanova: The Decline of Trust in Post-Communist Societiessuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1cohort strongly supporting the President, while1993 reported less than 50% support. The turningpoint was the reign of Z. Zhelev’s appealfor a national agreement and the restructuringof the political space. The results proved a dropin shared trust toward his personality and at theend of 1995 Bulgarian voters reported less than50% support. It is interesting to note that Georgievalso argues that the attitudes toward thePresidency are not influenced by the hypotheticmodels of “imperial”, “corporative” or “symbolicallyweek”. Instead of evaluating on the “idealtype model”, the Bulgarians prove to be influencedmore by the personality of the individual.Personal legitimacy has clearly become moreimportant than the institutional legitimacy modelof the Soviet past. Here charisma dominates“the regime”. “President of ‘all Bulgarians’ hasbeen the most acceptable mantra of latest votingcampaigns, whereby a ‘non-militant’ (eventhough paternalist) role of the President is givenmerit.” (Georgiev, 2007: 112). The Alpha Research4 done in October 2000 further discussesthe trust toward the President:“In general, the Bulgarians are morelikely to trust institutions as the Presidentand the mayor, which are directlyelected and are embodied by a certainpersonality. This to large extent is due tothe strict reticence towards the peoplearound - 77% of the respondents standto the position that “one has to be verycautious with the people” (Alpha Research,2000: 4).Unfortunately, the World Value Surveydoesn’t study the confidence level for the roleof the president in the Bulgarian society. Nevertheless,WVS shows “Confidence in the ArmedForces” as being 60%. The Bulgarian army enjoyshigher trust than any other institution since1989. This is because the army has been traditionallyand rather sentimentally bound institutionin the nation’s political culture. Georgiev furtherdefines the army as a contributor toward the territorialintegrity and has played a role of significantsocializing institution (Georgiev, 2007:112). Justas Tocqueville defines the intermediary organisationsas socialization structures, the Bulgarianarmy is seen as a “melting pot” for ethnic, educationaland cultural differences in the country.4 Alpha Research is a private, independent full-service researchagency, established in 1997. It is a member of ESO-MAR (The European Society for Opinion and Market Research)and of the Bulgarian Sociological Association.Therefore, the army counts as a reliable factor ofstability in Southeastern Europe. Since societalexpectations remained unmet after the fall of theregime, the social distress and antagonism grewconstantly. Negativism toward the previous politicalsystem is mostly observed in the youngergeneration (15-29 year olds). The elderly, however,show more trust and more optimism towardthe old political regime and towards the armedforces. Instead, the people over 50 years of agereport the most dissatisfaction with life; they tendto have the lowest income levels and to be mistreatedby the state as they receive miserablepensions.A 45% of the people over 50 years ofage (the sociodemographics given by the WVS)witness total butchering of their expectations bythe mistreatment of the state. Thus, the growthof antagonism and nostalgia within the circles ofthe older population seem inevitable. The needfor a strong leader is expressed by the Bulgariansociety in the WVS, which reports 48% beingin favor of having a strong leader. Contrastingly,only 13% of the interviewed Chinese reported asbeing in favor of such model. Even after the fallof communism and the fight for democracy, theBulgarian mentality remains most trustful in thepaternalistic-authoritarian model.Not very different from the Chinesecase, the Eurobarometer for 2008 reports Bulgariaas definitely in favor of more economic developmentand interested in materialist values,rather than post-materialist issues. For example,“What expenditure, do you think, has the largestshare of the European Union budget?” (2008),38% of Bulgarians report as “don’t knows”. 35%think that they go for economic growth and only1% think that they go for culture and media.However, when asked “For what sector wouldyou like most of the EU budget to be used?” Bulgariansplace first the economic growth (like theChinese) and least the culture/media (Table 6).This opinion study of the European Barometer(2008) shows that the society is in needof economic betterment; it focuses mostly on thematerialist values, rather than post-materialist issues.6. The FamilyThe analysis up to here aimed to explainthe reasons and effects of decline in trust in theBulgarian and Russian society. We looked athow income and economic levels affect participation,how materialist state goals hamper therise of post-materialist values and movements.centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr39

Plamena Pehlivanova: The Decline of Trust in Post-Communist Societiessuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1On the other hand, we observed the increasein social antagonism as a result of growing inequalityand dissatisfaction with life in society.This section will try to further focus on the levelsof trust that society reports and how does insideand outside group trust affect participation andthe development of society. Who do Bulgarianstrust? Why? And where do they spend most oftheir leisure time?“Our Circle” became a common phraseused during the Thaw period in Russia and inBulgaria, where tight circle of family and friendswould meet and discuss shared ideology andopinions. The family structure, which was predominantlynuclear, helped in the establishmentof tight bonds and facilitated the creationof strong social capital among its members. Ina way, the circle generated the micro-level trustwhich has declined towards the state in the lastyears of the regime. Through tough political andeconomic transitions, the Bulgarian society witnesseda decline of the social ties that existedduring communism. The social inequality andthe later emergence of “dirty money” and corruptiontriggered the disintegration of society, whichled to social alienation and loss of institutional legitimacy.The older generation in particular tendsto express suspicion and negativism toward thenewly rich. Inequality and miserable financialstatus of most elderly in Bulgaria has proven toaffect their social and political trust levels. Frommy personal observations of the older generationin Bulgaria, it seems that the elderly haveisolated themselves within a very limited circle offamily and friends who have earned their trust.It can be argued that the family substitutes therole of the institutions as it provides for value prioritiesand moral resources for one’s realization.Contrary to the Tocqueville and Putnam model,I propose that in Bulgaria and Russia, such personalrelations generate trust and intermediaryorganisations do not.Relevant to the WVS study of “Participationin Voluntary organisations”, (Table 4),the survey based on “Spending of leisure time”analyses where and how people spend theirtime. According to Terry Clark, unofficial socialinteractions, such as consumption, generate astrong social capital (Clark, Achterberg, Navarro2007: 11). In this sense, based on the survey on“spending leisure time” we could analyse whereand how people interact and hypothesize howsocial capital is constructed in the different countries.From this table presented by the WVS,we can see that in contrast to the United States,more than 70% of the interviewed from China,Russia and Bulgaria report to “not at all” spendtheir time in sports, cultural or communal organisations.When we add the variable of “age” tothe table, we see that in Bulgaria (1999) 55%of the people over 50 years of age don’t spendany time, while 45% of the younger spend theirtime weekly in such organisations,. On the otherhand, in Russia (1999) - 60% of the 30-49 yearolds don’t spend any time, but 65% of the youngerinterviewees spend their time weekly in communalorganisations. Why is there such a generationalgap? What makes the older populationTable 4Spending of leisure time: “How often do you spend time with people atsports, culture, communal organisations?”CountryNot at allOnly a fewtimesOnce amonthWeeklyBulgaria 70% 7% 11% 10%China 85% 9% 2% 2%Russian Federation 75% 10% 5% 6%United States 25% 26% 24% 20%* World Value Survey (1999)centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr40

Plamena Pehlivanova: The Decline of Trust in Post-Communist Societiessuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1more isolated, less trustful and not participating?When we test the WVS section of “Spend leisuretime”, the data shows that Russians and Bulgarianshardly spend any time in formal clubs, organisationsor cultural gatherings. An influentialfactor for these negative results are the opinionsreported by the older generation. Nevertheless,we should a question: why is this so? The marginalstable shows very intriguing results underthe section “Not applicable”. It is interesting tonote that only Bulgaria and Russia show percentageoutcome in this section. The result forBulgaria (46%) and the Russia (23%) shows avery high percentage that shouldn’t be ignored inthis analysis. What does “Not applicable” mean?Does it mean that such organisations are a nonexistingconcept for 46% of the Bulgarians and23% of the Russians? During the communisticregime, the Bulgarian and Russian society wererequired to become members of organisations –such as sports clubs, youth clubs, party organisations,and various professional unions – whichwere controlled by the state. However, with thefall of the regime, these organisations vanishedTaking note of the marginals section under this study, the following is observed:Table 5Marginals for question: “How often do you spend time with people at sport,culture, communal organisations?”Country Not applicable % nBulgaria 46 460China 0,0 0Russian Federation 23,3 583United States 0,0 0World Value Survey (1999)*The marginals section pays attention to the section “Not Applicable” and theresults that follow under the countries of Bulgarian (1999) and Russia (1999).or were modified and altered into new formsadaptable to the new democratic society. It isreasonable to infer that with the disintegration ofthese formal clubs and organisations, the oldergeneration couldn’t adapt with the new forms orwas not well-informed about the emergence ofnew ones. In general, the older generation experiencedinequality from the state (in terms of incomeand pension) and was left in isolation fromthe rapidly emerging new forms of civil life. Thisneglect and seclusion left the elderly with the inabilityto adapt to the tempo of the social modernizations.In these terms, older people in bothcountries might show inadequate responses tosurveys like the one shown above. “Not applicable”,thus proves to be a very important fieldfor further examinations and speculations.Nevertheless, the WVS from 1999 observesa decline of social participation in formalorganisations in Bulgaria, Russia and China. Amore recent study under the European Barometerexamines the changes in the Bulgarian societyafter 2007 and it reports pessimistic outcomesnot very different from the observationsin 1999. “Citizens’ mistrust towards national governments,parliaments and the judiciary has registeredagain, as in previous surveys, its highestlevels, and trust – the lowest scores, in the wholeEurobarometer survey” (Eurobarometer, 2008:5). On the other hand, the above mentionedeconomic inequality and the general influenceof the economic downfall coincides with growingoutgroup distrust in the Bulgarian and Russiansociety. WVS (1999) asks: “Generally speaking,would you say that most people can be trustedor that you need to be very careful in dealing withpeople?” The answers are:centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr41

Plamena Pehlivanova: The Decline of Trust in Post-Communist Societiessuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1(1) Most people can be trusted(2) Can’t be too carefulA 67.5% of Bulgarians and 73.7% Russiansshow increasing distrust toward the restof the society. In contrast to China (43.8%) andthe Netherlands (40%), the two post-communistcountries report that most people cannot betrusted. In his article on the E Pluribus Unum:Diversity and Community in the Twenty-firstCentury, Robert Putnam proposed two theoriesthat reflect the effect of growing diversity- Theory 1: Diversity enhances bridging andout-group solidarity and Theory 2: Diversity enhancesbonding and in-group solidarity (Putnam,2007: 115). Contrary to these theories, Bulgariareports to be one of the Balkan countries withthe highest diversity, and at the same time withsteady ethnic tolerance. Thus, the increase insocial distrust cannot be fully explained on theTable 6“Most people can be trusted?”Country Most can be trusted Can’t be trustedBulgaria 24,9 67,5China 52,5 43,8Netherlands 59,4 39,9Russian Federation 22,9 73,7* World Value Survey (1999)terms of diversity. The growing distrust in the twocountries might be a result of economic shifts,diversity growth or cultural value shifts in the differentgenerations. These three factors shouldbe a theme for further research on the declineof trust in these two communities. However, wewill focus on another important factor that mighthave an influence on these social and culturaldevelopments – the structure of the family. Thestructure of the Bulgarian and Russian familyplays an important role throughout history andhas contributed toward the formation of very particularcommunal social structures and folkloreculture. The family has always been an epicenterof folklore and religious rituals and so it hasgenerated strong interpersonal trust within itsmembers. We can further note that during theSoviet years, society turned pessimistic towardthe role of institutions and their ineffectiveness; itfurther obtained trust toward the role of interpersonalcontacts as essential instruments to exchangeand attain goods. Accordingly, the AlphaResearch (October 2000) surveying the politicalparticipation in the Bulgarian society:“Family and political institutions are positionedin the two poles of the publictrust. Strongest is the confidence in kinship.According to a decimal grade scale(where 1 means absence of trust, and10 marks full trust), only family and relativesreceive grades close to the maximum- family takes 9.6, and relativesare assessed with 7.9. Next in place areneighbors (5.9) and Bulgarian nationals,i.e., those with whom people communicatedirectly.” (Alpha Research,Oct. 2000)Likewise, the WVS studies how thesecountries spend their leisure time. The questionsthat deal with a participation or spending time informal or communal organisations show negativeresults, while the ones that deal with familyand friends show strong positive outcomes.It is interesting to note that the Chinese spendmost time with family, which is also observed inBulgaria and Russia. We note further that Bulgariaand Russia show strong distrust towardtheir own societies, which indicates the outgroupcentar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr42

Plamena Pehlivanova: The Decline of Trust in Post-Communist Societiessuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1distrust of these societies. Nevertheless, we observemore ingroup trust, more bonding ratherthan bridging and more time spent with familyand close friends rather than at any civic associations.In The New Political Culture, a followingmodel is proposed (Clark, Hoffmann-Martinot,1998: 27):Having a slimmer family and more educationcontributes towards the increase in individualand group tolerance. These factors alsofacilitate the rise of the New Political Culture.However, having a slimmer family and the possessionof individualistic values is not embeddedin the Bulgarian and Russian history. Instead thecultural forms of the two countries have developedaround the nuclear and extended familystructures, which Maria Todorova has studied asfar as during the Ottoman rule of Bulgaria. The“cult of the family” can be explained through theevolution of the family model in the Balkan history.In her Balkan Family Structure and the EuropeanPattern: Demographic Developments inOttoman Bulgaria, Maria Todorova emphasizesthe Balkan tendency to predominate in nuclearSlimmer Family: decline in extendedfamily; weakening of family linksMore tolerance of individual andgroup toleranceMore Education: more media accessfamily households since 1863 (Todorova, 2006:25). Changes within the family structure have occurreddue to variety of factors – social structureand social values, economy and environmentalconstraints. Nuclear family dominated during theOttoman rule and the extended family expandedduring the Soviet period. Following the Sovietera, observations show an increase of extendedhouseholds during the 1990s. Second, it appearslikely that some reversal occurred over the firstquarter of the 20th century due to the substantialincrease in the share of solitaries. For the longSoviet period, however, the relative order of thecategories remains roughly the same. The largestgroup is simple family households, accountingfor 41% and 55%. The second and thirdlargest categories are solitaries and extended/multiple households with 18–22 and 15–24%.Finally, there is a more or less stable 10–15%one-parent households. During pre-soviet andSoviet period, it was the norm for newly marriedcouples to co-reside with the parents of oneof the two spouses. “For the years up to 1970they yield an expected bandwidth variation of extendedhouseholds of between 30 and 45%, i.e.well above the actual percentage of extensionfound in the population census data for theseyears.” (Afontsev et al., 2008: 177). Accordingto the logic of the model, Afontsev argues thatthis would mean that not even all ‘available’ widowsjoined their married children’s household atold age, and she strongly suggest that nuclearfamily formation was the norm. Starting from the1970s, however, the calculations yield an expectedshare of extended households of around20%, which approaches the ‘real’ values enoughto hint at the possible existence of an extendedfamily system during the later Soviet period.Similar to the Bulgarian model, the Russianfamily structure also portrays a traditionalpattern of nuclear and extended family structures.In looking at the history of the family structure,we must also take under consideration thestructure and availability of housing as a factorthat influences patterns of household formation.As Sergey Afontsev et al. mention in their studyurban housing in Russia was in very short supplythroughout most of the 20th century, with theexception of the years of actual de-urbanizationduring the Civil War. (Afontsev et al., 2008: 190).In the table above, it is seen that the share ofsolitaries among urban households was lowestduring the 1930s to 1950s, when housing wasmost scarce due to the combination of high ratesof rural–urban migration and low investment incivil construction. The shortage of housing thusobviously became an important factor behind theformation of extended and multiple households,and influenced the cultural preferences that favoredsuch households. Newly married couplesoften could not obtain separate apartments untiltheir 30s and so, like the Bulgarian families,centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr43

Plamena Pehlivanova: The Decline of Trust in Post-Communist Societiessuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1had not much of a choice but to reside with theirparents. Important is to consider the ecologydependentmechanism, which the communalapartments (komunalki) introduced towards thepattern of family life. From the Communal Livingin Russia Project we are able to grasp theatmosphere of the interior structure of the komunalki,and to also read primary documentswritten by members of these social/family structures.There are many reasons why people livedin communal apartments in the Soviet period,and why many continued to live in them after thecollapse. From a simple historical view, the severeshortages of housing explain the existencein these komunalki (in Bulgaria and Russia) duringthe entire USSR. The ideology behind thismass phenomenon came from the state’s communistphilosophy of “communal lifestyle”. Afterthe collapse, many unmarried, divorced or widowedwomen remained living in them, becauseof the inability to improve their standard of livingand the decline in their pensions/incomes.“Unless they have cash income apart from theirprimary salaries, personnel in education, healthcare, the sciences, civil administration, and otherpublic sectors earn less than the average monthlysalary (as of 2006, 9900 rubles per month orapproximately $343, according to the RussianFederal State Statistics Service)” (Buckley, Gurenko,1997: 1).In Bulgaria (1990), the Country StudiesSeries by the Federal Research Divisionof the Library of Congress reports: 65% of thepopulation averaged only half a room per familymember. Only 36% of families with childrenunder eighteen had a separate children’s room;65% used the living room as a bedroom; and57 % used the kitchen as a bedroom. By 1990communal apartments were becoming rarer,however; at that time, 12 percent of familiesshared a kitchen with another family (NationsEncyclopedia, 1992). The Country Studies alsoreport that 60 % of the younger generation wasforced to stay in their parents’ homes after marriage.In 1990 over 40 % of homes included twoor more families or other relatives of one family.Members of three or even four generations oftenlived together. Traditional acceptance of theextended family contributed to this situation, butlong waits for separate housing also played acritical role. In 1979 the government establisheda special Young Newlywed Families Fund thatensured that new families would receive at least25 % of new government housing. This programdelivered more housing to young families in the1980s, but waiting lists also grew longer duringthat period.The relationship between housing andpatterns of household formation proves to bemuch emphasized in the 1990s because of constructionstandstill in both countries. The 2002census outcomes also reflect the emergenceof a phenomenon relatively new to the Russianand Bulgaria society — young urban professionalsleaving the parental home before marriageand setting up one-person households in rentedor purchased apartments (Afontsev, 2008:178). The modernization tendencies enforce ofthe emergence of a contingent of young urbanprofessionals who set up a separate householdbefore marriage. Nevertheless, social and economicinstability in these two countries continuesto strengthen the institute of family as anincome-pooling unit, including the traditional extendedfamily household. Because of the economicinstability and the transitional processesthat are still underway, it cannot yet be predicted,which of these trends will eventually prevail.In these terms, the family remains astrong institution which has traditionally formedthe moral values and cultural patterns in bothBulgaria and Russia. As Inglehart has noted,some post materialistic values have had animpact on the younger Bulgarian generation –autonomy, postponing marriage and increasedmobility (Inglehart, 1997: 132). However, healso claims that empirical evidence is still limitedand not representative to predict the developmentof the activist role of the family in relationto affirmation of the democratic values (Georgiev,2007: 121). In addition, the Bulgarian andRussian family structure cannot yet be definedas “slim”, as mentioned by Clark’s model in TheNew Political Culture (Clark, Hoffmann-Martinot,1998). Even though not slim, the contemporaryBulgarian family is to be characterized with higheducational homogeneity, says Plamen Georgiev.(Georgiev, 2007: 120). As previously noted,Terry Clark’s model suggests that higher educationand slimmer family lead to the increase inindividual and group tolerance (Clark, Hoffmann-Martinot, 1998). However, the two influential factorsare not fully expressed in the Bulgarian case.The educational level seems relatively high butthe family has not evolved to answer the categoryof “slim”. As a result, though, Georgiev furthernotes that the Bulgarian society reports a steadyethnic tolerance, especially concerning religion.The Ottoman occupation and the WWII Jewishimmigrant population in Bulgaria have resultedin gradual increase in ethnic tolerance. Therefore,the Bulgarian social mechanism doesn’tcentar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr44

Plamena Pehlivanova: The Decline of Trust in Post-Communist Societiessuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1seem to fit the NPC model proposed by Clark.In the Bulgarian and Russian case studies,the family has become the basic factor forpolitical socialization and milestone for shapingthe new civic culture. The economic instability inthe two countries has enforced the strength ofthe family unit, while it has also increased thedistrust toward local institutions and authorities.The social capital cannot be sought as a productof intermediary organisations, as De Tocquevilleargues, but has allocated itself in the isolatedfamily unit structures and the informal social folklorepractices. Wedding processions, socializingover coffee, sitting parties and unofficial folkloredance collectives are types of these unofficialsocio-cultural scenes in Bulgaria that encouragesocial participation in contrast to the institutionalizedorganisations. To relate it internationally,this unofficial cultural model of Bulgaria andRussia is similar to Spain’s informal social sceneof Pandillas and Movidas. Furthermore, thesesocial practices reveal a continuation of folkloreculture that is built around the family structureand inspired by an oral tradition. Folklore practicesin general have been formed in a more intimatescale and have become situated aroundthe circle of family and relatives.Even though personal relations seem togenerate trust and intermediary organisationsdo not, we should consider the social trust thatis directed toward the national institutions. If thepersonal relations and family circle provide trustand other organisations do not, then how do weexplain the trust in EU institutions that Eurobarmeter(2008) reports?“Trust in the European Union amongBulgarians is higher than the trust inother international organisations, suchas NATO and UN. The high level of trustin the EU and its institutions is in sharpcontrast with the new wave of mistrustin the Bulgarian institutions.” (StandardEurobarometer 70, 2008)Unlike the average EU citizen, but similarto the new member states, Bulgarians trust onlythe European Union, its institutions and internationalorganisations. Also, at least every secondBulgarian trusts the European Commission (BG- 51%, EU27 - 47%) and the European Parliament(BG - 57%, EU27 - 51%), and almost halfof those polled trust the European Central Bank(BG - 49%, EU27 - 48%) and the Council of theEU (BG - 46%, EU27 - 42%). On the contrary,mistrust in the Community institutions is on therise in the EU27, but in Bulgaria it has droppedand is now half the EU average for each and everyEU institution. The Bulgarians show highestmistrust in the country’s political and executivepower. In contrast to the Bulgarians, the regionaland local authorities gain the highest level oftrust among citizens in the EU (50%). However,Bulgarians reports of mistrust towards nationalgovernments, parliaments and the judiciaryprove to have the highest levels and the lowesttrust scores in the whole Eurobarometer survey.7. ConclusionAlbeit enthusiastic about their future atthe beginning of the twenty first century, the citizensof Bulgaria and Russia display more apathy.Observing the development of post-communistsocieties has further proven that democraticconditions do not always co-exist with the vigorouspolitical activism and civic associations.Instead, as stated by Nikolay Valkov, low associationalactivity rates in these countries shouldbe understood as something, which has its owninternal logic and explanation (Valkov, 2009: 14).These social patterns can be explained by theinfluence of cultural folklore on the social mentality,or through the institutional structures andpolitical actors that are seen as responsible forthe social welfare. While the social and economiclevels in Bulgaria and Russia remain unstable,the cultural significance of the family structurewill remain a stronger institution for the provisionof social capital and trust than the intermediaryand government organisations. Even with theprogression of post-materialist values in thesesocieties, the family will remain a traditionalenforcer of moral values and cultural patterns.Thus, we have witnessed that both post-communistsocieties portray an ecology-dependentstructures that establish cultural and social patterns.The unsatisfactory financial status of individualsand the generational differences in thetwo societies also influence the levels of distrustand political and civic participation. While pessimisticabout the political institutions and theirquality of life, Bulgarians have shown high expectationstowards the European Union. Particularsupport and optimism has been reflected byyoung people between 15 and 24 years of age.In general, the Eurobarometer (2008) reportsshow that Bulgarians have become less pessimisticin national terms and more realistic in theirEuro-optimism and the role of Europe in the futureof their country. According to these results,centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr45

Plamena Pehlivanova: The Decline of Trust in Post-Communist Societiessuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1the Bulgarians express some kind of institutionaltrust, however not toward any of their local ones.Hope seems to exist for the increase in nationaltrust with the enhancement in economic prosperityand the effectiveness of local institutions.ReferencesAfontsev, S. (et al.) (2008): The urban household in Russia and the Soviet Union, 1900–2000: Patternsof family formation in a turbulent century, The History of the Family, 13 (2): 178-194Alpha Research: Political Participation in Bulgaria - October 2000 Key Findings, http://www.democ.uci.edu/resources/virtuallibrary/bulgaria2000.report.pdf (March 15, 2009)Buckley, R. M., Gurenko, E. N. (1997): Housing and Income Distribution in Russia: Zhivago’s Legacy.The World Bank Research Observer, 12: 19-32Clark, T. N., Hoffmann-Martinot, V. (ed.) (1998): The New Political Culture. Boulder, CO: WestviewPressClark, T. N., Achterberg, P., Navarro, C. (2007): Culture is on the Rise - Why? Theories of CulturalParticipation and Empirical Evidence, Conference paper, GlasgowColeman, J. S.: Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, American Journal of Sociology, 94:95-120Curtis, G. E. (ed.) (1992): Bulgaria: A Country Study, Washington: GPO for the Library of CongressEllis, R.,Thompson, M., Wildavsky, A. (1990): Cultural Theory, Boulder, CO: Westview PressEurobarometer 70, National Report: Executive Summary – Bulgaria, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb70/eb70_bg_exec.pdf (March 10, 2009)Fukuyama, F. (1995): Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New York: Free PressHirschman, A. O. (1970): Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organisations, andStates, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University PressHo, P. (2001): Greening without Conflict: Environmentalism? NGOs, and Civil Society in China,Development and Change, 32 (5): 893-921Inglehart, R. (1997): Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in43 Societies. Princeton N.J.: Princeton University PressKoford, K., Miller, J. B. (1995): Contracts in Bulgaria: How Firms Cope when Property Rights areIncomplete, University of Delaware Working Paper, 95-04Letki, N. (2004): Socialization for Participation? Trust, Membership and Democratization in East-CentralEurope, Political Research Quarterly, 57(4): 665-679Mishler, W., Rose, R. (1997): Trust, Distrust and Scepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil and PoliticalInstitutions in Post-Communist Societies, The Journal of Politics, 59 (2): 418-451Nations Encyclopedia, Country Listings: Bulgaria, http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-1928.html (April 13, 2009)Newton, K. (2001): Trust, Social Capital, Civil Society, and Democracy, International Political ScienceReview, 22 (2):201-214Putnam, R. D. (2000): Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community, New York:Simon & SchusterPutnam, R. D. (1993): Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University PressPutnam, R. D. (2007): E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century,Scandinavian Political Studies, 30 (2): 137-174Stalley, P., Yang, D. (2006): An Emerging Environmental Movement in China, The China Quarterly, 186:333-356Todorova, M. (2006): Balkan Family Structure and the European Pattern: Demographic Developmentsin Ottoman Bulgaria, Budapest: Central European University PressValkov, N. (2009): Membership in voluntary organisations and democratic performance: European andPost-Communist countries in comparative perspective, Communist and Post-Communist Studies,42 (1): 1-21World Value Survey, Online Data Analysis, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ (January 15, 2009)centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr46

Plamena Pehlivanova: The Decline of Trust in Post-Communist Societiessuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1Pad povjerenja u postkomunističkim društvima: SlučajBugarske i RusijePLAMENA PEHLIVANOVASveučilište u Chicagu, SADNakon pada komunizma u Bugarskoj i Rusiji, oblici podzemnih zajednicasu ostali u kolektivnoj svijesti, a ljudi su se još više povukli u uski krugobitelji i prijatelja. Obiteljske spone postale su novi izvor pojverenja što zamoguću posljedicu ima nisku razinu povjerenja prema vani. Povjerenje premadržavnim institucijama i formalnim organizacijama dramatično je opalo,sukladno s padom društvene i političke participacije. Na temelju opažanja ubugarskom društvo od 2000. godine naovamo, smatram kako osobni kontakti,naspram formalnih organizacija, stvaraju povjerenje te sprječavaju izvanjskuparticipaciju. Obitelj substituira ulogu institucija, budući da pruža vrijednosneprioritete i moralne resurse za osobno samoostvarenje. Suprotno Tocquevilleovomi Putnamovom modelu, smatram kako u Bugarskoj i Rusiji osobni odnosistvaraju povjerenje, dok posredničke institucije to ne čine. Nadalje, članakproučava razine povjerenja u usporedbi s razinama participacije, kao i gospodarskograzvoja i obiteljske strukture kao utjecajnim faktorima povjerenja idruštvene/političke participacije. Studija se fokusira na razvoj postkomunističkeBugarske i Rusije (od 1999. naovamo) te koristi kineski i nizozemski model zausporedbu.Ključne riječi: povjerenje, socijalni kapital, pouzdanje, fatalizam, društvena ipolitička participacija, posredničke institucijecentar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr47

Saša Mrduljaš: Oblik državnog uređenja BiH po Cutileirovom planusuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1UDK: 323.1(497.6)Pregledni radPrimljeno: 11. 5. 2009.Oblik državnog uređenja Bosne i Hercegovine po Cutileirovomplanu (18. ožujka 1992.) međunarodne zajednice 1SAŠA MRDULJAŠInstitut društvenih znanosti “Ivo Pilar” - Centar SplitTijekom završne faze raspada Jugoslavije, u okolnostima kojevode državnom osamostaljenju njenih republika i koje u bitnome označavasrpska velikodržavna agresija na Hrvatsku, dolazi i do konačne kristalizacijepolitičkih ciljeva triju bosansko-hercegovačkih naroda. Tako krajem1991. Srbi pristaju uz opciju stvaranja srpske državne tvorevine nadvije trećine bosansko-hercegovačkog teritorija s perspektivom njenogpriključenja Srbiji. Nasuprot tome, druga se dva naroda zalažu za neovisnostBiH. No, dok je Hrvati vide kao složenu (kon)federativnu državu trijunacionalno-teritorijalnih jedinica, pri čemu bi hrvatska jedinica zauzimalaoko trećine njena teritorija, Muslimani/Bošnjaci teže transformaciji BiH uunitarnu tvorevinu. Takvu koja bi u uvjetima, skoro očekivane muslimanske/bošnjačke apsolutne brojčane nadmoći faktično funkcionirala kao muslimanska/bošnjačkanacionalna država. S ciljem usuglašavanja političkih ciljevatriju bosansko-hercegovačkih naroda i harmonizacije njihovih međusobnihodnosa međunarodna je zajednica početkom 1992. otpočela svoj direktanangažman u BiH u sklopu kojeg je oblikovan i međunarodni/Cutileirov plannjenog unutrašnjeg uređenja. Riječ je bila o jedinom planu međunarodnezajednice koji je kreiran u ozračju koje nije bilo određeno ratnim prilikama(travanj 1992 – studeni 1995.) te traumatičnim iskustvima koja determinirajubosansko-hercegovačku postratnu političku zbilju. Stoga je međunarodnazajednica prilikom kreacije Cutileirovog plana bila u mogućnosti u znatnovećoj mjeri uvažiti i ustavno određenje (Socijalističke Republike) BiH, pokojem je ista imala biti državom triju konstitutivnih, suverenih i jednakopravnihnaroda (Hrvata, Srba, Muslimana/ Bošnjaka) i djelovati na rješenju koje bise temeljilo na etički opravdanom principu podjednakog uvažavanja i zakidanjatriju bosansko-hercegovačkih naroda. Sve u svemu, djelovanje u takvimokolnostima dovelo je međunarodnu zajednicu na pozicije da kreira i podrži planpo kojem je u interesu harmonizacije međunacionalnih odnosa BiH imala funkcionirati,kako iz analize sadržaja samog plana proizlazi – kao izrazito integriranakonfederativna tvorevina.Ključne riječi: Bosna i Hercegovina, Hrvati, Srbi, Muslimani/Bošnjaci,međunarodna zajednica, Cutileirov plan, konfederacija1 Ovaj članak izrađen je u okviru znanstveno-istraživačkog projekta „Hrvatski identitet i multikulturalnost Mediterana u doba globalizacije“–šifra: 194-1941560-1546centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr48

Saša Mrduljaš: Oblik državnog uređenja BiH po Cutileirovom planusuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 11. Uvod: Okolnosti raspada SocijalističkeFederativne Republike JugoslavijeTijekom osamdesetih godina prošlogstoljeća glavno političko pitanje unutar SocijalističkeFederativne Republike Jugoslavije (SFRJ) biloje pitanje (redefinicije) oblika njenog državnoguređenja. Dok je srbijansko partijsko rukovodstvotežilo prema unitarizaciji i centralizaciji Jugoslavije,politička vodstva „nesrpskih“ republika/naroda inzistirala su na očuvanju postojećeg stanjaili na dodatnom jačanju (kon)federalističkihznačajki zajedničke države.Nakon što se u užoj Srbiji 1987. etabliranova vladajuća garnitura sa SlobodanomMiloševićem na čelu, koja otpočinje sa izvaninstitucionalnim,manipulativnim i nasilnim nametanjemvlastitih htijenja te koja uspijeva podreditiVojvodinu, Kosovo i Crnu Goru, problematikadržavnog uređenja Jugoslavije otpočinjeusmjeravati jugoslavensko društvo u pravcukrajnje zaoštrenih političkih odnosa. Taj će serazvoj osobito snažno očitovati poslije raspadaSaveza komunista Jugoslavije u siječnju 1990.,izazvanog pokušajem srbijanskog rukovodstvaza stjecanjem kontrole nad tom institucijomposredstvom koje je htjelo olakšati realizacijuvlastitih ciljeva, odnosno nakon što tijekom istegodine u „nesrpskim“ republikama, poslije demokratskiprovedenih izbora, vlast preuzmunove političke strukture. Za razliku od prethodnih,one su, naročito u Sloveniji i Hrvatskoj zauzeleotvorene konfederalističke pozicije oštro sesuprotstavljajući srbijanskim zahtjevima.U okolnostima određenim radikalnompolitičkom podvojenošću, neravnotežom snagaočitovanom u činjenici da je uz srbijansko rukovodstvopristajala srbizirana Jugoslavenska narodnaarmija (JNA) kao i spremnosti srbijanskog iarmijskog vrha da nasilno ostvare vlastite ciljeve– mogućnosti za kompromisno rješenje temeljneproblematike jugoslavenskog društva gotovo inije bilo. S tim u vezi, nakon procjene kako vlastiteciljeve neće moći ostvariti na miran način,srbijansko i armijsko rukovodstvo otpočinju pripremeza njihovu oružanu realizaciju. Uz ostalo,one su uključivale oduzimanje oružja teritorijalnimobranama „nesrpskih“ republika te temeljitonaoružavanje srpskog stanovništva izvan Srbije.Pored toga, od same uspostave demokratskiizabrane vlasti u Hrvatskoj, konstituirane odstrane Hrvatske demokratske zajednice (HDZ),poticano je teritorijalno izdvajanje dijela srpskogstanovništva unutar te republike, predvođenogSrpskom demokratskom strankom (SDS). Pritome se srpskom življu pružala podrška u lokalnimsukobima s hrvatskom vlašću.Otvorena agresija na Sloveniju, a zatimi na Hrvatsku uslijedit će nakon što početkomljeta 1991. spomenute republike proglase svojuneovisnost. No, dok je napad na Slovenijuneuspješno okončan već kroz nekoliko dana,nakon čega pred tom republikom više nije biloozbiljnijih prepreka na putu k potpunoj državnojsamostalnosti, agresija na Hrvatsku dovodi do izbijanjaizrazito snažnog ratnog sukoba.Izbijanje agresije dolazi i do intenzivnoguključivanja međunarodne zajednice ujugoslavenska politička zbivanja, usmjerenogna obustavljanje ratnih sukoba i na iznalazakpolitičkih rješenja putem kojih bi se uspostavljenimir održao. U interesu ostvarenju tih ciljeva,međunarodna je zajednica početkom rujna 1991.utemeljila i Međunarodnu konferenciju o (bivšoj)Jugoslaviji. Unutar njenih okvira kreirala je te odpočetka listopada do početka studenog nudila naprihvaćanje vlastiti model njenog unutrašnjegpreuređenja po kojem se trebala transformiratiu svojevrsnu južnoslavensku zajednicu neovisnihdržava (Nacrt Konvencije Konferencije o miruu Jugoslaviji / Carringtonov plan). No, nakon štou studenom Srbija i Crna Gora definitivno odbijutakvu mogućnost te nakon što krajem istogmjeseca Arbitražna komisija Konferencije oJugoslaviji zaključi da se Jugoslavija „nalazi uprocesu raspada’’ međunarodna zajednica krajemprosinca iskazuje spremnost za priznanjempune državne neovisnosti onih jugoslavenskihrepublika koje ga zatraže. Time su stvoreni uvjetiza međunarodno priznanje samostalnosti Slovenije,Hrvatske i BiH, do čega dolazi početkom1992. te naknadno i Makedonije.S druge pak strane, međunarodno jeposredovanje imalo svog značaja i za obustavuratnih djelovanja. Prvo u Sloveniji a naknadno iu Hrvatskoj. Naime, uz međunarodnu asistencijupočetkom su siječnja 1992., potpisivanjem,kako će se pokazati relativno stabilnog primirjaprivremeno okončani ratni sukobi u toj republici.No, do tada su agresorske snage uspjeleokupirati četvrtinu hrvatskog teritorija na kojemje formirana tzv. Republika Srpska Krajina. Taj ćeprostor Hrvatska uspjeti povratiti tek tijekom 1995. i1997. (istočna Slavonija). 22 v. više kod: Bilandžić, 1999; Javorović, 1995; Jović, 2003.centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr49

Saša Mrduljaš: Oblik državnog uređenja BiH po Cutileirovom planusuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 12. Bosna i Hercegovina izmeđudemokratskih izbora (studeni 1990.) imeđunarodnog priznanja (travanj 1992.)Polarizacija političkih odnosa unutarJugoslavije nije mogla zaobići niti BiH. Tim višešto je u središnjoj jugoslavenskoj republici, odsveukupno 4.377.033 stanovnika (popis 1991.),pored 1.902.956 ili 43,5% Muslimana/Bošnjaka,242.682 ili 5,5% Jugoslavena te 104.439 ili 2,4%ostalih, živjelo 760.852 ili 17,4% Hrvata i 1.366.104ili 31,2% Srba (Gelo i dr. (ur.), 1995: 9). Dakle, uBiH su pripadnici dvaju najbrojnijih, u osnovi političkikonfrontiranih jugoslavenskih naroda zajedno predstavljali48,6% njenog stanovništva. Do otvorenih,još uvijek političkih konfrontacija u BiH doći će nakondemokratski izbora krajem 1990. kada vlastu njoj preuzmu nacionalno-afirmativne stranke tj.muslimanska/bošnjačka Stranka demokratske akcije(SDA) te bosansko-hercegovački HDZ i SDS(Herceg, Tomić, 1998). U vrijeme već odmaklenacionalne homogenizacije na razini cjelokupneJugoslavije, bosansko-hercegovački SDS iHDZ postaju promicatelji onog vida unutrašnjeguređenja zajedničke države koji je već formuliranu nacionalnim centrima srpskog i hrvatskognaroda.Za razliku od susjedne Hrvatske, unutarkoje je politička suprotstavljenost između vladajućegHDZ-a i SDS-a gotovo odmah dovela do beskompromisnogzauzimanja oštrih protivničkihpozicija pa i do oružanih sukoba, u BiH je put dotakvog razvoja događaja bio usporeniji. Prvenstvenostoga što su hrvatsko-srpski odnosi u tojzemlji uvelike bili determinirani političkim pozicijamaMuslimana/Bošnjaka te odnosima s njima. Jeri za Hrvate i za Srbe bilo je izuzetno bitno imatiMuslimane/Bošnjake u vlastitom konfederalističkomili unitarističko- centralističkom bloku. Time bi u BiHjedna od opcija uređenja Jugoslavije stekla dominantnepozicije što bi značajno utjecalo na karaktersamih unutarjugoslavenskih odnosa.No, u danom vremenu sami Muslimani/Bošnjaci nisu bili voljni, izuzev u nedostatkudruge mogućnosti, odlučno se prikloniti kojemod postojećih blokova. Iako su predstavljaligotovo apsolutnu većinu stanovništva unutarBiH, živjeli su u okružju, općenito gledano,brojnijih Hrvata i Srba. Pored toga, po UstavuSocijalističke Republike (SR) BiH sva su tribosansko-hercegovačka naroda, unatoč razlikamau brojčanoj veličini imala statuse konstitutivnih,suverenih i međusobno jednakopravnih naroda. 3 U3 v. uvodni dio Ustava SR BiH (1974.) te članke 1., 2. i 282.kao i amandmane na rečeni Ustav iz 1990. kod: Ustavi,takvim se okolnostima niti muslimanska/bošnjačkabrojčana nadmoćnost unutar BiH nije mogla adekvatnopolitički kapitalizirati. Svjesni kako bi ihpriklanjanje pojedinoj od oštro suprotstavljenihopcija izložilo konfrontaciji s kojim od susjednihnaroda, konfrontaciji koja bi po Muslimane/Bošnjake mogla biti izrazito štetna, oni su svojepolitičko djelovanje primarno usmjerili u pravcujačanja vlastitih pozicija unutar BiH. Konkretno,inzistirajući na očuvanju i jačanju njene državnesamobitnosti i teritorijalne cjelovitosti djelovali suu pravcu njenog uređenja kao unitarne tvorevine(Filandra, 1998; Kasapović, 2005; Valenta, 1991).Uspješnom realizacijom tih ciljeva, Muslimanima/Bošnjacima bi se otvorio daleko širi manevarskiprostor. Jer unitarna BiH, naročito nakon postizanjaiščekivane muslimanske/bošnjačke apsolutnebrojčane nadmoći, faktično bi predstavljala nacionalnudržavu tog naroda na cjelokupnoj bosanskohercegovačkojprostornosti. U takvoj državi, unutarkoje bi u bitnome bila umanjena sposobnostbosansko-hercegovačkih Srba i Hrvata utjecanjana muslimanske/bošnjačke pozicije, stvorile bi se iodgovarajuće pretpostavke za odlučnije muslimansko/bošnjačkoistupanje na jugoslavenskoj razini.U skladu s navedenim zanimljivo je navestisljedeću izjavu akademika Muhameda Filipovića (upredizbornom razdoblju jednog od čelnika SDA):„Mi smo imali elemente (Muslimani/Bošnjaci, S.M.)da izađemo iz cijele te drame balkanskog prostoraizbjegavajući rat. Mi smo imali demografsku, kulturnu,intelektualnu i ekonomsku propulziju, mi smopostali ne samo najbrojnija nego i dominirajuća grupacijau BiH i vrlo značajan faktor u cijelom konteksturegionalne politike, a to su sve elementi koji suu varijanti mirnog razvoja, bez obzira pod kakvim seokolnostima taj razvoj odvijao, bili za nas i radili zanas. Ja sam izračunao da bismo mi do 2001. godine,dakle do danas, bili u BiH 62% ukupnog brojastanovništva, bili bismo ekonomski jaki, pogotovo akobi država donijela neke mjere restitucije imovine…(Dani, 1.3.2002).“U konačnici, naročito svojim izričitim zahtjevomza očuvanjem i jačanjem državnosti BiH,Muslimani/Bošnjaci su morali doći do „konfederalističkihpozicija“. No, do njih su, barem po svojojtadašnjoj političkoj percepciji mogli doći i bez konfrontiranjasa Srbima. Čak i posredstvom eventualne,kratkoročne i taktičke suradnje s njima. 41974.; Amandmani, 1990.4 o pokušaju stvaranja srpsko-muslimanskog/bošnjačkogpolitičkog dogovora vidjeti: Filipović, 2000; Izetbegović, 2001centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr50

Saša Mrduljaš: Oblik državnog uređenja BiH po Cutileirovom planusuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1Iz prikazane se muslimanske/bošnjačke„otvorenosti“ za oba međusobno suprotstavljenabloka u BiH vidi kako se dugo vodilo svojevrsnopolitičko nadmetanje između Srba i Hrvata za pridobivanjaMuslimana/Bošnjaka što je usporavaloizbijanje oštrih međunacionalnih konfrontacija.Međutim, tijek događaja u ostatku Jugoslavijeubrzao je kristalizacije pozicija i u samoj BiH.Nakon što su početkom ljeta 1991. Hrvatska iSlovenija proglasile neovisnost, nakon otvorenevelikosrpske agresije na te dvije republike te direktnoguključivanja međunarodne zajednice u jugoslavenskazbivanja, koje je bilo afirmativno zausmjeravanje BiH prema državnoj neovisnosti –Muslimani/Bošnjaci su dovedeni u poziciju da sejasno i trenutačno opredijele. Konkretno, žele lisvoje djelovanje usmjeriti k državnoj neovisnostiBiH ili u pravcu uklapanju te zemlje u okvir „krnjeJugoslavije“/Velike Srbije. U takvom ozračjuoni se opredjeljuju za prvu opciju. Rečeno jeopredjeljenje omogućilo nastanak neformalnehrvatsko-muslimanske/ bošnjačke koalicije kojaće do početka travnja 1992., kad je uslijedilomeđunarodno priznanje državne neovisnostiBiH, uspješno realizirati cilj zbog kojeg je nastala.Mada je sve do kraja ljeta 1991. glavnopolitičko pitanje u BiH bilo pitanje njenog državnopravnogstatusa, prvenstveno u odnosu na (pre)oblikovanje državnog uređenja Jugoslavije, ono jezarana, još početkom iste godine, potaklo i kalkulacijevezane uz mogućnost (unutrašnje) podjele tezemlje. I kod Srba i kod Hrvata te se kalkulacijeprvo pojavljuju kao alternativa mogućnosti da priodređivanju državno-pravnog statusa BiH njihovaopcija doživi poraz. Tako se kod Srba razvijaspremnost za stjecanjem „samo“ onog dijela BiHkoji doživljavaju kao ekskluzivno srpski i koji jepo njihovim viđenjima zauzimao 64% teritorija terepublike (Vudvord, 1997: 210). Nakon propastimogućnosti pridobivanja Muslimana/Bošnjaka zavlastitu opciju, odnosno nakon što u listopadu 1991.hrvatsko-muslimanska/bošnjačka koalicija usmjeriBiH u pravcu državne neovisnosti, ideja o izdvajanjugotovo dvije trećine bosansko-hercegovačkogprostora i njegovom pripajanju Srbiji postajestrateškim srpskim ciljem. Krajem 1991. ubrzanose osnivaju samoproglašene srpske autonomneoblasti u BiH, koje će u konačnici prerasti u RepublikuSrpsku (RS) te državna tijela buduće srpskejedinice (Begić, 1997). Ujedno, uz intenzivne pripremeza oružani sukob, sa srpske se strane najavljujei agresija na susjedne hrvatske i muslimanske/bošnjačke prostore, koje se jednostrano proglašavasrpskima u slučaju priznanja BiH kao unitarnedržavne tvorevine.Prve naznake hrvatskog kalkuliranja seventualnom (unutrašnjom) podjelom BiH pojavljujuse u proljeće 1991. Inicijalno su vezaneuz nastanak uvjerenja da se Srbe, prvenstvenozbog njihove vojne i demografske snage, nećemoći dovesti u poziciju da žive u BiH kojoj bi državno-pravnistatus i unutrašnje uređenje odrediladruga dva naroda te iz bojazni da posredstvomeventualnog srpsko-muslimanskog/bošnjačkogdogovora bosansko-hercegovački Hrvatine „završe“ u „krnjoj Jugoslaviji“. Nakon nastankahrvatsko-muslimanske/ bošnjačke koalicije konačnose kristalizira hrvatska pozicija nasprami unutar BiH. Sa hrvatske se strane daje podrškasamostalnosti BiH i nepovredivosti njenih državnihgranica no ujedno se insistira na (kon)federativnom uređenju tj. na unutrašnjoj podjelibosansko-hercegovačkog teritorija na etničkomprincipu i uspostavi, uvjetno rečeno triju nacionalnihjedinica. Pri tome se, po inicijalnim zahtjevima,za hrvatsku jedinicu traži gotovo trećina teritorijaBiH. 5 O navedenom političkom opredjeljenjubosansko-hercegovačkog HDZ-a naknadno će vrloupečatljivo posvjedočiti prijedlog referendumskogpitanja o državnoj neovisnosti BiH formuliran nasjednici središnjeg odbora te stranke u Livnu 9.veljače 1992.: „Jeste li za suverenu i nezavisnuBosnu i Hercegovinu, državnu zajednicu konstitutivnihi suverenih naroda hrvatskog, muslimanskogi srpskog u njihovim nacionalnim područjima(kantonima)? (prema: Čekić, 1994: 312)“.U skladu sa svojim temeljnim opredjeljenjem,koje je uz ostalo uključivalo i zalaganje zacjelovitost BiH, Muslimani/Bošnjaci su snažno idugotrajno odbacivali svaku ideju njene podjele.U tom su smislu bili i protiv unutrašnje podjelena etničkom principu držeći da bi takvo što predstavljalotek etapu na putu razbijanja BiH. Mjestotoga predlagali su decentralizaciju na temeljuneetničkih pretpostavki. Ipak, iz suočenostisa već postojećim „parcelizirajućim alternativama“bosansko-hercegovačkih Srba i Hrvatate u prilikama koje im, barem u datom vremenunisu omogućavale ostvarenje strateškihciljeva i kod Muslimana/Bošnjaka se do ljeta1991. (Bosanski pogledi, 29.8.1991.; Filipović,2000: 57; NIN, veljača 2003.; Slobodna Bosna,18.3.2004.) razvija alternativna opcija po kojoj biu slučaju (unutrašnje) podjele BiH muslimanska/bošnjačka jedinica trebala zauzimati oko 45-50% njenog teritorija. 65 autorov proračun prema karti kod: Ivanović, 2000, prilozi6 autorov proračun prema kartama kod: Valenta, 2000: 46-47; Krmpotić i sur., 1998: 296centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr51

Saša Mrduljaš: Oblik državnog uređenja BiH po Cutileirovom planusuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1Slika 1.: Etnički zemljovid Bosne i Hercegovine (1991.) 77 linije – vanjske granice BiH i granice bosansko-hercegovačkih općina; točke – naselja BiH; žuto – hrvatski etnički prostori;narančasto – srpski etnički prostori; zeleno– bošnjački etnički prostori. Zemljovid izradio dr.sc. Saša Mrduljaš prema podacima:Gelo i sur., 1995.centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr52

Saša Mrduljaš: Oblik državnog uređenja BiH po Cutileirovom planusuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1Pristup koji je međunarodna zajednica zauzelakrajem 1991. godine prema rješenju međunacionalnihrelacija na prostoru (bivše) Jugoslavijenije omogućavao nadilaženje dubokih suprotnostiizmeđu triju bosansko-hercegovačkih naroda uodnosu na državno-pravni status i unutrašnjeuređenje BiH. Štoviše, u postojećim je okolnostima(indirektni) međunarodni poticaj procesudržavnog osamostaljenja BiH dodatno pogoršavaomeđunacionalne odnose u toj zemlji. U prvom reduizmeđu Srba s jedne te Bošnjaka i Hrvata s drugestrane. No, utjecao je i na pogoršavanje odnosa izmeđuta dva, oko državne neovisnosti povezananaroda. Naime, intenziviranjem procesa kojije vodio prema osamostaljenju BiH intenziviralose i hrvatsko djelovanje na njenom uređenju kaosložene države. Ono se pak najsnažnije, time iza Bošnjake najiritantnije, manifestiralo posredstvomsamoinicijativnog osnivanja hrvatskih zajednicatj. hrvatskih teritorijalno-samoupravnih jedinica.U svakom slučaju, suočivši se sa krajnjezaoštrenim međunacionalnim odnosima u BiH,međunarodna se zajednica početkom veljače 1992.direktno uključuje u bosansko-hercegovačka zbivanja,s ciljem harmoniziranja međuetničkih relacijaposredstvom adekvatnog razrješenja nacionalnihstatusa i odnosa te otklanjanja mogućnost izbijanjaoružanih sukoba u BiH. Ukratko, djelujući idalje afirmativno na proces njenog osamostaljenja,uz inzistiranje na nepovredivosti bosanskohercegovačkihdržavnih granica, međunarodna jezajednica usredotočila svoje napore na kreacijutakvog unutrašnjeg uređenja BiH koje bi istodobnoosiguravalo i njenu državnu opstojnost ivitalne nacionalne interese svakog od triju bosansko-hercegovačkihnaroda.Angažman međunarodne zajednice ukontekstu BiH, koji se bio odvijao pod vodstvomportugalskog diplomata Joséa Cutileira relativno jebrzo doveo do rezultata. Konkretno, u okviru svogdjelovanja, međunarodna je zajednica kreirala nacrtpolitičko-pravnog modela unutrašnjeg uređenjaBiH, odnosno „Izjavu o principima za novo ustavnouređenje BiH“. Spomenuti dokument, kolokvijalnopoznat kao Cutileirov plan, već su 18. ožujka 1992.neformalno prihvatili predstavnici svih triju bosansko-hercegovačkihnaroda. Trostranim prihvaćanjemCutileirovog plana 8 izgledalo je da je stvorenaosnova za stabilizaciju međunacionalnih odnosa u BiHte izbjegnuta mogućnost izbijanja rata u toj zemlji.Međutim, zbog nezadovoljstva pojedinim njegovimrješenjima te držeći da će nakon najavljivanog,skorog priznanja neovisnosti BiH imati daleko8 o fazama njegova nastanka v. više kod: Begić, 1997:83-100; Ivanović, 2000: 211-221, 282-288; Markešić, 2004:59-61; Tuđman, 2005: 134-163širi manevarski prostor za realizaciju autentičnihnacionalnih ciljeva. Bošnjaci faktički odbijajuCutileirov plan već krajem istog mjeseca(Oslobođenje, 26.3.1992.: 5; Slobodna Dalmacija,26.3.1992.: 4). Bošnjačko odbijanje planate međunarodno priznanje BiH bez da su u njojprethodno regulirani nacionalni statusi i odnosi,Srbi su iskoristili kao povod za otpočinjanje otvoreneagresije na bosansko-hercegovačke Hrvate iBošnjake te na etničke prostore tih dvaju naroda.Time otpočinje četvorogodišnji, izuzetno razornirat u BiH.3. Cutileirov planMeđunarodna je zajednica i nakon izbijanjarata nastavila djelovanje na iznalasku odgovarajućeg,za povratak mira afirmativnog modelaunutrašnjeg uređenja BiH. No, ratni sukobite događaji izazvani tim sukobima izuzetno suusložili međunarodno djelovanje. Naime, u novimokolnostima međunarodna je zajednica prikreaciji ustrojstvenih modela za BiH morala uzimatiu obzir vojno-političko-teritorijalne odnosesnaga u BiH; humanitarnu situaciju u toj zemlji;zatim, uvjetno rečeno globalno javno mnijenje;nacionalne interese vodećih svjetskih država involviranihu rješavanje bosansko-hercegovačke problematike,itd. Uvelike zbog navedenih razloga,međunarodni planovi za BiH koji su nastajali tijekomrata nerijetko su se izrazito razlikovali posvojim ustrojstveno-kartografskim rješenjima. 9Napokon, prilikom kreacije aktualnogwashingtonsko-daytonskog modela unutrašnjegustrojstva BiH, međunarodna je zajednica, kaošto je navedeno, također u bitnome morala uvažitirealitete na čiju su pojavu utjecale ratne prilike.Sukladno okolnostima u kojima je spomenutimodel oblikovan, razumljivo je da njegova rješenjauvelike nisu funkcionalna te ih se u postratnomvremenu pokušava modificirati. No, i taj, modifikacijskivid djelovanja, snažno je determiniraniskustvima i pozicijama koja su unutar BiH i kodrelevantnih čimbenika međunarodne zajednicestvorena tijekom ratnih zbivanja.S obzirom na rečeno, može se zaključitida pristup međunarodne zajednice rješenju bosansko-hercegovačkeproblematike, od „trenutka“kad se njom počela direktno baviti početkom veljače1992. pa do danas, jedino tijekom prva dvamjeseca međunarodnog djelovanja nije bio de-9 Vance-Owenov plan, Owen-Stoltenbergov plan, Akcijskiplan EU, Washingtonski sporazumi (uspostava hrvatskobošnjačkeFederacije BiH), Plan kontaktne skupine, Daytonskisporazumi (uspostava ''daytonske'' BiH koja se sastoji odRepublike Srpske i Federacije BiH).centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr53

Saša Mrduljaš: Oblik državnog uređenja BiH po Cutileirovom planusuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1terminiran ratom i posljedicama ratnih djelovanja.U tom smislu valja istaknuti poseban značajCutileirovog plana u odnosu na sve ratne planovei postratne prijedloge unutrašnjeg uređenjaBiH. Jedino je taj plan međunarodne zajednice, čijeje prihvaćanje predstavljalo svojevrsni preduvjetmeđunarodnom priznanju BiH (Slobodna Dalmacija,19.3.1992.: 4; 30.3.1992.: 11; 7.4.1992.: 13)nastao u relativno mirnom ozračju, u vremenu ukojem je još uvijek bila u poziciji da pri kreacijimodela unutrašnjeg uređenja BiH prvenstvenopolazi od potrebe podjednakog uvažavanja i zakidanjainteresa sva tri bosansko-hercegovačkanaroda. U svezi s istaknutim značajem Cutileirovogplana u nastavku ćemo rada, nakon njegovecjelovite prezentacije, pokušati utvrditi kakav jeuopće oblik unutrašnjeg uređenja predviđao zaBiH.3.1. Cjeloviti sadržaj Cutleirovog planaIZJAVA O PRINCIPIMA ZA NOVO USTAVNO UREĐENJE BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE 10A) NEZAVISNOST1. Bosna i Hercegovina biti će država sastavljena od tri konstitutivne jedinice zasnovane nanacionalnom principu i uz uvažavanje ekonomskih, zemljopisnih i drugih kriterija.2. Bosna i Hercegovina ostaje u postojećim granicama, a Vlada BiH kao ni vlade konstitutivnihjedinica neće ohrabrivati bilo kakav zahtjev za priključenjem dijela njene teritorije nekoj odsusjednih država.3. Suverenitet počiva na građanima muslimanske, srpske i hrvatske nacionalnosti, kao idrugih nacija i nacionalnosti koje to svoje pravo ostvaruju kroz građansku participaciju u konstitutivnimjedinicama i centralnim organima republike.B) GENERALNI PRINCIPI1. Bosna i Hercegovina i njene konstitutivne jedinice počivati će na sljedećim ustavnimprincipima kako su oni shvaćeni i primijenjeni u demokratskim državama zapadne Europe i kakosu postavljeni u nacrtu Konvencije o kojoj se raspravlja na Konferenciji:a) poštivanje ljudskih prava u najvišim standardima, kako je to predviđeno u nacrtu Konvencije,poštivanje privatnog vlasništva, tržišne ekonomije i slobode ulaganja kapitala;b) opće i jednako pravo glasa, slobodni izbori i tajno glasovanje;c) sloboda političkog i sindikalnog djelovanja;d) sekularni sistem sa punim vjerskim slobodama, uz odvojenost crkve od države,razgraničenjem resora u Vladi, vladavina zakona, uz demokratski i efikasan sistem kontrole izaštite ustavnosti i zakonitosti;e) međunarodna kontrola i jurisdikcija za zaštitu ljudskih prava i sloboda.10 Cutileirov plan, odnosno njegovu zadnju, trostrano prihvaćenu i politički-pravno najrelevantniju verziju, uz prilagodbu hrvatskomjeziku, prenosimo prema: Oslobođenje, 19.3.1992.: 1centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr54

Saša Mrduljaš: Oblik državnog uređenja BiH po Cutileirovom planusuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1C) PARLAMENT I VLADA BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE1. Parlament Bosne i Hercegovine sastoji se od Vijeća građana, koje će biti direktno birano iVijeća konstitutivnih jedinica, u kome će svaka konstitutivna jedinica imati jednak broj predstavnika.2. Parlament koji će djelovati preko Vijeća građana, Vijeća konstitutivnih jedinica i Vladeimati će kompetencije da, u svojstvu zakonodavca, razmatra i usklađuje prijedloge konstitutivnihjedinica u sljedećim oblastima: centralna banka i monetarna politika, vanjski poslovi, obrana, ekonomskapolitika, ekonomski odnosi uključujući sva pitanja koja se tiču više od jedne konstitutivnejedinice, transport, energetika, plinovodi i vodoprivreda kao i druga pitanja. Odluke koje se tičuzastave, grba, visokog obrazovanja, religije kao i one koje se odnose na obranu, makroekonomskupolitiku, opća pitanja ekonomske politike, zatim odluke koje se tiču odnosa BiH i susjednih državabiće u nadležnosti Vijeća konstitutivnih jedinica, a donositi će se većinom od četiri petine ukupnogbroja predstavnika.BILJEŠKA: pitanja koja se tiču budućnosti oružanih snaga BiH biti će definirana u nastavku pregovora.Ovo se ne odnosi na sadašnje vojne formacije, jer će se to pitanje rješavati odvojeno.3. Sastav javne uprave i pravosuđa BiH treba proporcionalno izražavati nacionalni sastavstanovništva BIH.4. S ciljem razrješavanja ustavnih pitanja, vezanih za nadležnost BiH i konstitutivnih jedinica, biti ćeustanovljen poseban sud, koji će u periodu ne kraćem od pet godina uključivati osobe izvan BiH i izvannjoj susjednih država. Ovaj sud imati će po jednog člana iz svake konstitutivne jedinice i isti brojvanjskih članova, uvećan za jedan. On će donositi odluke običnom većinom.D) KONSTITUTIVNE JEDINICE1. U Bosni i Hercegovini ustanoviti će se konstitutivne jedinice definirane u E odjeljku.2. Parlament i Vlada konstitutivnih jedinica imati će nadležnosti usklađene sa zakonodavstvomBosne i Hercegovine u oblastima koje su već navedene i u skladu sa navedenom procedurom, teshodno tome zakonsku i administrativnu nadležnost oko pitanja koja se tiču konstitutivne jedinice,po imenice u upravi i organima konstitutivne jedinice, eksproprijaciju imovine za javne potrebe,katastar, vatrogasne službe, gospodarske komore, nadzor kooperacijskih trgovačkih organizacija,štednih i kreditnih banaka, nadzor dobrotvornih ustanova, socijalnog i zdravstvenog osiguranja,očuvanje kulturno-povijesnog nasljeđa, zatim biblioteke, instituti i muzeji, korištenje zemlje, brigao čovjekovoj okolini, stambena pitanja, tržišta, putovi, servisi za hitne usluge, rudarstvo, lov i ribolov,nacionalni parkovi, vodoprivreda, plinovodni transport unutar konstitutivne jedinice, turizam,poljoprivreda i šumarstvo, socijalna pomoć, obrazovanje, školstvo, policija, trgovina i drugi aspektiekonomske politike, sigurnost javnih skupova, javno zdravstvo, sport i rekreacija i druga pitanja.Svaka konstitutivna jedinica će organizirati svoje vlastite institucije. Konstitutivna jedinica možeostvarivati veze sa drugim republikama i organizacijama u tim republikama, pod uvjetom da su teveze i odnosi u skladu sa nezavisnošću i integritetom BiH.3. Sve institucije (organi, uprave, pravosuđe itd.) unutar jedne konstitutivne jedinice trebajuproporcionalno izražavati nacionalni sastav konstitutivne jedinice.4. Pripadnici nacionalnosti koja će biti u manjini u nekoj konstitutivnoj jedinici uživati ćeprava slična onim iz članka 2 (3) nacrta Konvencije.E) DEFINICIJA KONSTITUTIVNIH JEDINICA1. Biti će formirana radna grupa, s ciljem da definira teritorije konstitutivnih jedinica, zasnovanihna nacionalnom principu i uzimajući u obzir ekonomske, geografske i druge kriterije. Kartacentar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr55

Saša Mrduljaš: Oblik državnog uređenja BiH po Cutileirovom planusuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1zasnovana na apsolutnoj ili relativnoj nacionalnoj većini u svakoj općini biti će osnova za rad radnegrupe i biti će predmet modifikacija koje se mogu verificirati gore pomenutim kriterijima. Kopijakarte je priključena Izjavi o principima.F) PRELAZNE ODREDBE1. U cilju definiranja konstitutivnih jedinica u skladu sa budućim uređenjem prema odjeljkuE ove Izjave o principima biti će donesen ustavni zakon, u koji će biti ugrađeni navedeni principii prezentirani Skupštini što je moguće prije, o čemu će se građani izjasniti na referendumu podmeđunarodnom kontrolom.OVAJ JE TEKST OSNOVA BUDUĆIH PREGOVORASarajevo, 18. ožujak 1992.Dogovoreno s čelnicima SDA, SDS i HDZ u petoj rundi razgovora o budućem ustavnomuređenju za Bosnu i Hercegovinu u okviru mirovne Konferencije EZ-a.3.2. Oblik državnog uređenja Bosne iHercegovine po Cutileirovom planuU Cutileirovom planu nigdje nije bilo izričitonavedeno koji oblik državnog uređenja predviđaza BiH. Do saznanja o tome moglo se doći tekposredno, analizom njegovog sadržaja. U tomje smislu treća točka prvog odjeljka („NEZAVIS-NOST“), u kojoj se govorilo o nositeljima suverenosti(najviše vlasti) unutar BiH trebala biti mjerodavni,posredni pokazatelj predviđanog oblika bosanskohercegovačkogunutrašnjeg uređenja. 11 Da ponovimo,u njoj je stajalo sljedeće: „Suverenitet počivana građanima muslimanske, srpske i hrvatske nacionalnosti,kao i drugih nacija i nacionalnosti koje tosvoje pravo ostvaruju kroz građansku participacijuu konstitutivnim jedinicama i centralnimorganima republike.“Nažalost, svojom nedorečenom, dvosmislenomkombinatorikom građanskog i nacionalnogodređenja nositelja suverenosti spomenuta točka,izdvojeno promatrana, nije dopuštala donošenjejasnijih zaključaka o obliku unutrašnjeg uređenjaBiH. Očigledno da je njena nedorečenost proizlazilaiz potrebe usklađivanja, nerijetko krajnjesuprotstavljenih političkih realiteta. Primjerice,činjenice da je BiH po svom Ustavu imala bitidržavom triju suverenih i jednakopravnih naroda tj.Hrvata, Srba i Muslimana/Bošnjaka, ali i da jepraktično funkcionirala kao unitarna tvorevina;potrebe usklađivanja hrvatskih i srpskih zahtjevaza uređenjem BiH kao (kon)federativne tvorevine tebošnjačkih za njenom ustavnom transformacijom uunitarnu državu; opredjeljenja međunarodne za-11 o pojmu suverenosti v. kod: Jovanović, 1990; Perić,1992; Stres, 2001; Trnka, 2000jednice da očuva državni integritet BiH i da je istodobnoučini državom prihvatljivom svim njenimnarodima, itd.U svakom slučaju, do preciznijeg uvidau predviđani oblik unutrašnjeg uređenja BiH,takvog koji bi u konačnici pojasnio i značenjetreće točke prvog odjeljka vodili su drugi, relevantnidijelovi Cutileirova plana. Iz analize njihovasadržaja lako se dalo zaključiti da po njemuBiH nije zamišljana kao unitarna, centraliziranaili decentralizirana država. S druge strane, istomse lakoćom nije moglo ustvrditi je li isti planpredviđao BiH kao konfederativnu tvorevinu ili kaofederativnu državu. Zapravo u planu su pojedinetočke išle u prilog jednom, a pojedine drugomodređenju BiH.Elementi Cutileirovog plana iz kojih jeproizlazilo da bi BiH imala biti svojevrsnom konfederacijomsnažno su se očitovali u prvoj točkiprvog odjeljka u kojoj je stajalo: „Bosna i Hercegovinabiti će država sastavljena od tri konstitutivnejedinice zasnovane na nacionalnom principu i uzuvažavanje ekonomskih, zemljopisnih i drugihkriterija.“ Dakle, navedena je točka govorila oBiH kao „sastavljenoj“ državi, odnosno o državi,podesnije bi bilo reći političko-teritorijalnom entitetu,koju formiraju tri konstitutivne jedinice.Takve koje nisu trebale biti „stvorene“ od stranesredišnje vlasti (slučaj federativne države) već kojesu udružene trebale stvarati entitet koji se nazivadržavom BiH (slučaj konfederativne „države“).O tome da je BiH po Cutileirovom planuimala biti svojevrsnom konfederativnom tvorevinomgovorila je, pored navedene, i druga točkatrećeg odjeljka („VLADA I PARLAMENT BIH“). Unjoj je, pored ostalog, stajalo da će središnje institucijevlasti unutar BiH „imati kompetencije da, u svojstvucentar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr56

Saša Mrduljaš: Oblik državnog uređenja BiH po Cutileirovom planusuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1zakonodavca, razmatra(ju) i usklađuje(ju) prijedlogekonstitutivnih jedinica…“ Drugim riječima, izove je točke proizlazilo da bi tek ono što predložekonstitutivne jedinice moglo postati predmetomzakonodavnog razmatranja i usklađivanjasredišnjih tijela BiH. Pri tome je u istoj točki dananaznaka da bi se vitalna pitanja imala rješavatikvalificiranom većinom (4/5 zastupnika) i to uVijeću naroda BiH. U osnovi, da bi se rješavalakonsenzusom postignutim između predstavnikatriju konstitutivnih jedinica. Iz priloženog, jezgrovitoguvida može se zaključiti da je po Cutileirovomplanu bosansko-hercegovačka središnjavlast imala biti izvedena iz vlasti konstitutivnih jedinicakoju bi one svojevoljno „prenijele“ na BiH.S druge pak strane, odgovor na pitanje onositeljima suverenosti unutar konstitutivnih jedinicaindirektno je pružala četvrta točka četvrtogodjeljka („KONSTITUTIVNE JEDINICE“) u kojojje stajalo: „Pripadnici nacionalnosti koja će biti umanjini u nekoj konstitutivnoj jedinici uživati ćeprava slična onim iz članka 2 (3) nacrta Konvencije.“Iz navedene je točke proizlazilo da bi unutarkonstitutivnih jedinica, formiranih na temeljupolitičke odluke po kojoj unutar svake od njihpojedini bosansko-hercegovački narod ima bitibrojčanom većinom – pripadnici brojčano manjinskihetničkih skupina trebali imati zaštićenamanjinska prava. Naime, članak 2 (3) već spomenutognacrta Konvencije govorio je o načinuzaštite takvih zajednica u republikama (bivše)Jugoslavije. 12 Sukladno rečenom, iz citiranetočke Cutileirovog plana slijedi da su brojčanomanjinske etničke skupine unutar konstitutivnihjedinica de facto trebale imati statuse nacionalnihmanjina, odnosno da su same jedinice zamišljanekao unitarne tvorevine zasnovane na suverenostisvojih građana.Sve u svemu, BiH se moglo zvatidržavom, uvelike je mogla funkcionirati i djelovatikao takva, no esencijalno je imala biti savezomtriju država. Sukladno tome, određeni vidsuverenosti državnog saveza BiH nije niti mogaobiti (direktno) izveden iz građanske suverenosti.Zapravo, nje na bosansko-hercegovačkojrazini ne bi niti bilo u okolnostima unutar kojihsuverenost BiH proizlazi iz one koju su na njuprenijele konstitutitivne jedinice.No, formalno gledano, po Cutileirovomplanu, niti nacionalna suverenost nije moglaodređivati karakter političko-pravnog identitetaBiH i konstitutivnih jedinica. Jer dok je bosansko-hercegovačkasuverenost imala proizlazitiiz suverenosti konstitutivnih jedinica njihova se12 v. sadržaj nacrta Konvencije kod: Degan, 2002: 319-329suverenost, kao što je navedeno, imala temeljitina suverenosti građana tih jedinica. Unutar njihovihokvira nikakva etnička grupa, pa niti najbrojnija,nije imala biti formalno određenim nositeljem suverenosti.Ipak, time što je unutar svake jedinicepojedina etnička skupina imala biti brojčanomvećinom, time što je unitarno uređenje konstitutivnihjedinica trebalo omogućiti većinskimskupinama apsolutnu vlast unutar njih – one sufaktično imale biti nacionalnim tvorevinama „svojih“najbrojnijih nacionalnih zajednica. Uzme li se to uobzir, zatim činjenica da se državnost BiH imalazasnivati na državnosti konstitutivnih jedinicakoje bi konsenzualno oblikovale bosansko-hercegovačkipolitičko-pravni identitet – može se reći daje BiH, mada ne formalno, faktično ipak imala bititvorevinom zasnovanom na nacionalnoj suverenostitriju nacija.Unatoč tome što je po Cutileirovomplanu BiH u esencijalnom smislu trebala biti konfederacijom,njene su značajke uvelike imaleodstupati od značajki kakve bi po definiciji konfederacijatrebala imati. Ukratko, po ustaljenojpercepciji konfederacija bi bila savez suverenihdržava na koji je prenesen uzak broj ovlasti tekojim na temelju suglasnosti njenih članica rukovodiodređeno, zajednički formirano tijelo. Upravopo navedenom, stalnom „središnjem“ tijelukonfederacije se razlikuju od običnih savezakakvi su nastajali ili koji nastaju među državama(Perić, 1992: 125). Nasuprot tome, po Cutileirovomplanu BiH je ne samo izričito nazivanadržavom i republikom već je po svojim središnjimorganima (vlada, dvodomni parlament) te poširokom opsegu pitanja koja bi posredstvomnjih konstitutivne jedinice zajednički rješavale(„centralna banka i monetarna politika, vanjskiposlovi, obrana, ekonomska politika i odnosi,transport, energetika, plinovodi i vodoprivreda,zastava, grb, visoko obrazovanje, religijska pitanja,odnosi BiH i susjednih država biće,...“) –uvelike približavala karakteristikama federativnedržave.Napokon, uzimajući u obzir da je po svojimbitnim karakteristikama trebala biti savezomdržava te da je u funkcionalnom smislu imaladjelovati gotovo kao savezna država moglo bise konstatirati da je po Cutileirovom planu BiHzamišljana kao izrazito integrirana konfederacija.Svakako, rečeni je plan predstavljao tek osnovuza kreaciju konkretnog, daleko opsežnijegmodela unutrašnjeg uređenja BiH. Taj, finaliziranimodel, zasigurno bi se po regulaciji pojedinihpitanja značajno razlikovao od te osnove.Štoviše, do bitnih udaljavanja od inicijalnihrješenja Cutileirovog plana došlo je već krajemcentar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr57

Saša Mrduljaš: Oblik državnog uređenja BiH po Cutileirovom planusuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1ožujka 1992. Tada je primjerice odlučeno da sepri definiciji teritorija svake od triju konstitutivnihjedinica, ne daje, kako je prvotno zamišljenoprevladavajući značaj samo relativnim ili apsolutnimvećinama pojedinih naroda po općinamaBiH (1991.) već da se podjednaka važnost da,kako je izjavljivao predsjednik HDZ-a BiH dr.Milenko Brkić, „gospodarskim, demografskim,prirodnim, kulturnim, sakralnim, prometnim i ostalimnačelima“ (Slobodna Dalmacija, 2.4.1992.:13; 23.8.1992.: 8-9). U skladu s prikazanim,moglo se očekivati daljnje, bitne promjene naCutileirevom planu. Zbog protivljenja brojčanomanjinskih naroda te promjene vjerojatno nebi dovele u pitanje određenje BiH kao konfederacijetriju konstitutivnih jedinica. No, sukladnočvrstom međunarodnom opredjeljenju za opstojnosti funkcionalnost BiH više je nego izvjesnoda bi bile afirmativne za daljnje jačanje federativnihznačajki njenog ustrojstva.4. Zaključno razmatranjeNesumnjivo je kako su političke prilikekoje su tijekom veljače i ožujka 1992. vladaleu BiH i njenom neposrednom susjedstvuimale utjecaja na međunarodni pristuprješenju bosansko-hercegovačke problematike iunutrašnjem uređenju BiH. S time u vezi, na nastanaki karakter Cutileirovog plana svakako trebagledati i u kontekstu činjenice da su tadašnjimeđunacionalni odnosi u BiH bili izrazito naelektrizirani;da je srpska vojno-tehnička nadmoć,uzrokovana srbizacijom JNA, u okolnostima nepostojanjaravnoteže snaga, lako mogla dovestido otpočinjanja velikosrpske agresije i u tojzemlji; da je u Hrvatskoj intenzivna velikosrpskaoružana agresija zaustavljena početkom 1992.(Sarajevsko primirje); da je za rezultat imala okupacijučetvrtine njenog teritorija, itd.Međutim, uzimajući u obzir sve dimenzijepolitičkih pritisaka s kojima se praktički svipokušaji iznalaska rješenja za BiH suočavajunakon izbijanja, trajanja i okončanja rata unjoj – može se reći da se upravo početkom1992. međunarodno djelovanje na apsolviranjubosansko-hercegovačke problematike odvijalou najpovoljnijem ozračju. Primjerice, to što jemeđunarodna zajednica posredstvom kreacije iponude Cutileirovog plana dala podršku formiranjuBiH kao izrazito integrirane konfederativnetvorevine nije izazivalo niti značajnije odobravanjeniti značajnije negodovanje na međunarodnojsceni. Nasuprot tome, svi kasniji međunarodniplanovi i pristupi bili su ekstremno opterećenikritičkim, najčešće političko-interesnim ili idejno-trendovskimdeterminiranim stavovima (pojedinihsegmenata) međunarodne zajednice i uvjetnorečeno međunarodne javnosti. Činjenica datakvog čeg prilikom nastanka Cutileirovog plana uosnovi nije bilo uvelike je omogućila da taj plan,za razliku od drugih u daleko većoj mjeri budezasnovan na ustavnom određenju BiH kao državetriju konstitutivnih, suverenih i jednakopravnih narodate na balansiranom, etički utemeljenom pristupu.Onom koji je pri kreaciji rješenja za bosanskohercegovačkuproblematiku polazio od podjednakoguvažavanja i zakidanja pozicija svihtriju bosansko-hercegovačkih naroda. Ujedno,uzimajući u obzir tadašnje okolnosti te načelakojima se rukovodila prilikom kreacije Cutileirovogplana može se reći da je međunarodna zajednicatijekom svog djelovanja u relativno normalnom,predratnom ozračju, držala da bi uređenjeBiH kao izrazito integrirane konfederativne tvorevinenajadekvatnije utjecalo na harmonizacijumeđunacionalnih odnosa u BiH, a time i na očuvanjemultietničkog karaktera bosansko-hercegovačkogdruštva.centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr58

Saša Mrduljaš: Oblik državnog uređenja BiH po Cutileirovom planusuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1LiteraturaAmandmani LIX – LXXX na Ustav Socijalističke Republike Bosne i Hercegovine (1990.), Sarajevo:Novinsko-izdavačka organizacija Službeni list Socijalističke Republike Bosne i Hercegovine,Begić, K.I. (1997.): Bosna i Hercegovina od Vanceove misije do Daytonskog sporazuma 1991.-1996.,Sarajevo: Bosanska knjigaBilandžić, D. (1999.): Hrvatska moderna povijest, Zagreb: Golden marketingČekić, S. (1994.): Agresija na Bosnu i Hercegovinu i genocid nad Bošnjacima 1991-1993., Sarajevo:LjiljanDegan, V. Đ. (2002.): Hrvatska država u međunarodnoj zajednici, Zagreb: Globus.Filandra, Š. (1998.): Bošnjačka politika u XX. Stoljeću, Sarajevo: SejtarijaFilipović, M. (2000.): Bio sam Alijin diplomata, knjiga 1., Bihać: DeltaGelo, J.,Grizelj, M., Akrap, A. (priredili) (1995.): Stanovništvo Bosne i Hercegovine – narodnosni sastavpo naseljima, Zagreb: Republika Hrvatska – Državni zavod za statistikuHerceg, N., Tomić, Z. (1998.): Izbori u Bosni i Hercegovini, Mostar: Sveučilište u Mostaru, Centar zastudije novinarstvaIvanović, V. (2000.): Raspad Jugoslavije i stvaranje BiH 1990. – 1995. (doktorska disertacija), Zagreb:Fakultet političkih znanostiIzetbegović, A. (2001.): Sjećanja, Sarajevo: TDK ŠahinpašićJavorović, B. (1995.): Velikosrpska najezda i obrana Hrvatske, Zagreb: DEFIMIJovanović, S. (1990.): Država, knjiga 1., Beograd: Beogradski izdavačko-grafički zavodJović, D. (2003.): Jugoslavija – država koja je odumrla, Zagreb: PrometejKasapović, M. (2005.): Bosna i Hercegovina: podijeljeno društvo i nestabilna država, Zagreb: PolitičkakulturaKrmpotić, M., Tomljanović, I., Makovička, E. (istražili i pripremili) (1998.): Kronologija rata – Hrvatska iBosna i Hercegovina 1989.-1998., Zagreb: Hrvatski informativni centarMarkešić, I. (2004.): Kako smo sačuvali Bosnu i Hercegovinu, Zagreb, Sarajevo: Hrvatsko narodnovijećePerić, B. (1992.): Država i pravni sustav, Zagreb: Narodne novineStres, A. (2001.): Sloboda i pravednost, Zagreb: Kršćanska sadašnjostTrnka, K. (2000.): Konstitutivnost naroda, Sarajevo: Vijeće Kongresa bošnjačkih intelektualacaTuđman, M. (priredio) (2005.): Istina o Bosni i Hercegovini (dokumenti), Zagreb: Slovo MUstavi i ustavni zakoni (1974.): Zagreb: InformatorValenta, A. (1991.): Podjela Bosne i borba za cjelovitost, Vitez: HKD „Napredak“Vudvord, S. (1997.): Balkanska tragedija, Beograd: Filip VišnjićDnevne novine i tjednici:Bosanski pogledi (Sarajevo)NIN (Beograd)Oslobođenje (Sarajevo)Slobodna Bosna (Sarajevo)Slobodna Dalmacija (Split)centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr59

Saša Mrduljaš: Oblik državnog uređenja BiH po Cutileirovom planusuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1International Community Polity Proposal forBosnia and Herzegovina according to Cutileiro’sPlan (March 18, 1992) 13∗SAŠA MRDULJAŠInstitute of Social Sciences Ivo Pilar - Centre SplitDuring the final phase of the breakup of Yugoslavia, in circumstanceswhich have led to independence of its republics and were largelycharacterised by Serbian hegemonic aggression towards Croatia, a finalchrystallisation of political goals of the three Bosnian-Herzegovinian ethnicites.By the end of 1991, Serbs agree to the creation of a Serbian politicalentity on two thirds of Bosnian-Herzegovinian territory with a possibilityof merging with Serbia. On the contrary, the two other ethnicities optedfo an independent BaH. However, while the Croats saw the future stateas a complex (con)federal republic of three national-territorial entities, withthe Croatian entity comprising one third of state territory, Bosnian Muslims/Bosniaks seeked a unitary state, which would, considering the conditionsof the soon-to-be-reached Bosnian Muslim/Bosniak absolute demographicdominance, function as a de facto Bosnian Muslim/Bosniak national state.In order to coordinate the political goals of the three Bosnian-Herzegovinianethnicites and to harmonise their mutual relations, the international communitystarted its direct involvement in BaH beginning of 1992, part of whichwas the drafting of the international/Cutileiro’s plan for Bosnian-Herzegovinianpolity. This is the only plan of the international community which wasnot created in an atmosphere determined by the state of war (April 1992 –November 1995) and the traumatic experiences which impact the post-warpolitical reality of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Due to this fact, the internationalcommunity and Cutileiro’s plan could take into account the Constitution ofthe Socialist Republic of BaH which defined the state as a polity governedby three constituent, sovereign and equal ethnicites (Croats, Serbs andBosnian Muslims/Bosniaks) to a much greater extent. In doing so, the internationalcommunity could pay equal respect to the needs and whishesof all three ethnicities. The analysis of this plan shows that the internationalcommunity, wishing to harmonise and stabilise interethnic relations in BaHenvisaged a highly integrated confederal state.Key words: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croats, Serbs, Bosnian Muslims/Bosniaks,international community, Cutileiro’s Plan, confederation13 This paper was written as part of the research project "Croatian Identity and Mediterranean multiculturalism in the Age of Globalisation“- code: 194-1941560-1546centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr60

Maja Sahadžić: The Electoral System of Bosnia and Herzegovinasuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1UDK: 342.84:324(497.6)327.56($+73:497.6)Pregledni radPrimljeno: 27. 8. 2009.The Electoral System of Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Short Review ofPolitical Matter and/or Technical PerplexionMAJA SAHADŽIĆFaculty of Law, University of Zenica, Bosnia and HerzegovinaThe Dayton Proximity Talks were held in the Wright - Patterson AirForce Base in Ohio, USA from 1-21 November 1995. They resulted with theGeneral Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (e.g.Dayton Peace Accords, Dayton Peace Agreement) that was signed by the Republicof Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republicof Yugoslavia and witnessed by USA, UK, Germany, France, Russia andan EU special negotiator. The Dayton Peace Accords ended the conflict in Bosniaand Herzegovina and shaped a basis for peace. But, the most importantissues for democratic functioning of the state have not become conciliated withinternational legal standards; such as elections and the electoral system. TheDayton Peace Accords arose from compromises and different trade-offs whichaccount for many open questions regarding the Bosnian electoral system.Key words: electoral system, Bosnia and Herzegovina, political and technicalissues, elections, Dayton Peace Agreement1. IntroductionFrom a scientific view, elections are exceptionallyinteresting, since they constitute avery important decision that, once brought, innext several years, depending on a concreteElectoral Law in an individual country, determinesthe repository of political power. In that actof electoral commitment, the whole national history,certain regions, political traditions of familyand reference groups, the actual political situation,effects of concrete life conditions, politicalsocialisation of an individual, activity of electoralcampaign so as interested political parties andcandidates, the role of mass media and manymore unpredictable effects that compress in, atthe fist look, simple decision of choosing a certainlist, party or candidate are reflected (Šiber,2003: 88-103).centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr61

Maja Sahadžić: The Electoral System of Bosnia and Herzegovinasuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1An electoral system is a “unity of electoralprinciples and mechanisms of their achievementwhich is conducted as a part of the overallpolitical and constitutional system of a certainstate” (Đorđević, 1975: 697). For the purposesof this analysis, we will mention only the differencesbetween the proportional and the pluralityelectoral system and their influence on politicalparticipation. Proportional electoral systems areconsiderably more responsive to different politicalprogrammes; they enable representation ofsmaller political parties in representative bodies,which means taking a variety of interests of theelectorate into consideration. Majority systemsaspire to decrease the number of political parties,especially in the plurality systems. From theperspective of voters’ motivation, proportionalsystems are considered more motivating, becausethey make it possible for even some minorinterests to be represented, based on a certainnumber of votes (Šiber, 2004: 3-27). In the frameworkof proportional election systems, the meaningof the electoral threshold is also worth noting,i.e. the percentage of votes that is required forthe participation in the distribution of mandates.Logically, a high electoral threshold is explicitlydiscouraging, while a low one gives the smallerparties and their potential voters the chance toparticipate in sharing the “electoral cake” (Šiber,2004: 8). Generally speaking, all institutions, aswell as electoral systems, are designed and governedby laws and regulations, which are draftedby national or international actors. Nevertheless,this design can derive from different origins ofsocial and political change, being driven by accident,evolution or intention (Goodin, 1998: 24-30). Finally, previous experiences acknowledgethat effects of electoral systems are contingentlyconditioned and that they can be apprehendedonly by a historical-empirical analytic approach(Kasapović, 2002: 3-19).2. Historic BackgroundNot to be prejudiced and spacious, thisis how authors Belloni and Deane describe endingwar in Bosnia and Herzegovina: the BosnianWar lasted from April 1992 until November 1995,when a peace agreement was reached at Dayton,Ohio, after three weeks of intense negotiationsconducted under the aegis of the UnitedStates. The end of the war came about as aresult of three interrelated episodes. First, theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conductedthe Operation “Deliberate Force” in September1995, effectively undermining the BosnianSerb war machine. Second, ethnic cleansingwas practically completed. With most (but notall) Bosnians living in ethnically defined areas,nationalists had achieved their goal of securingcontrol of territory by destroying the ethnic mixcharacterising Bosnia prior to the outbreak of theconflict. Third, Serbia and Croatia were ready toterminate their support for their ethnic cousinsin Bosnia. Serbia was desperate to obtain thelifting of the United Nations sanctions imposedearlier on. Croatia wanted to regain control of itseastern region of Slavonia taken by the Serbsin 1991, and gain international legitimacy for itsnewly acquired independent state. Both Serbianand Croatian leaders negotiated and signedthe peace at Dayton on behalf of their Bosniancounterparts. A massive international peace operationwas deployed in early 1996 to help theparties implement the agreement. Implementingthe Dayton Peace Agreement has been very difficult,and no clear exit strategy has yet emergedfor international organisations and humanitarianagencies in the country. The primary reason forthis is that the Dayton Peace Agreement wasnegotiated with the same ethnic leaders likelyto boycott its full implementation (Belloni andDeane, 2005: 219-243).Elections played a particularly importantrole in attempts to manage ethnic tensionsin plural societies such as Bosniaand Herzegovina. Debates about electoralsystems have traditionally revolvedaround the desirability of the major idealtypes. Majoritarian electoral systemsare designed to promote accountablesingle-party government, by awardingthe greatest representation to the twoleading parties with the most votes. Proportionalelectoral systems aim to generateinclusive and consensual powersharing,by producing parliaments thatreflect the vote shares of multiple parties.During the 1990s debates turnedincreasingly towards the pros and consof “combined” (or “mixed”) electoral systems,incorporating features of each ofthe major ideal types (Søberg Shugartand Wattenberg, 2001: chap 5).The Law for Protection of the Rights ofNational Minorities was adopted in 2003; however,its implementation still has not commenced.According to the Helsinki Committee for HumanRights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the economicand social rights of the members of minoritycentar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr62

Maja Sahadžić: The Electoral System of Bosnia and Herzegovinasuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1groups are more frequently violated then thoseof constituent peoples. Procedural obstaclesmade it impossible for national minorities to electtheir representatives to local assemblies in 2004local elections; subsequently this group remainsdeprived of opportunities to influence politicaldevelopments (Bieber, 2006: 46). Minorities andethnic groups, unless geographically concentrated,tend to be better represented in proportionalsystems, while majoritarian systems tend to permanentlyexclude dispersed minorities from representation(Harris and Reilly, 1998: 193-199).The formal dominance of religious institutionshas decreased in recent years; for example,the emphasis of the Serbian OrthodoxChurch in the Republic of Srpska, mentioned inthe constitution of this entity, has promoted theexclusion of Croats and Bosniaks in the past.Constitutional amendments and changes to legislationeliminated this form of discrimination in2002. Informally, however, religious institutionscontinue to significantly influence Bosnian politics.Religious leaders’ extensive involvementin politics was exposed during the pre-electioncampaign for general elections in 2002 and municipalelections in 2004. In both cases, the HelsinkiCommittee for Human Rights in Bosnia andHerzegovina reported on the significant influenceof religious leaders on election outcomes, exercisedby directing the electorate toward three nationalparties: Srpska demokratska stranka (SerbianDemocratic Party), Stranka demokratskeakcije (Democratic Action Party) and Hrvatskademokratska zajednica (Croatian DemocraticUnion). The interference of religion in politicsproduces a twofold effect: the ethnic religiouselites have grown into influential interest groupsin Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political discourse,often impacting policy outcomes; and the fragmentationof the political agenda along ethnicnationalist lines, and subsequently the processof ethnic homogenisation are being perpetuated(Bieber, 2006: 46).There is a democratic system in thesense that there are democratic elections, butthe result of the elections is that they give the advantageto one ethnic group over another. This isonly a continuation of the war with other means(Chandler, 2000: 111-112). Due to the ethnicelectorates of the parties, they do not competewith each other, but with the opposition parties,and all three nationalist parties possess strongauthoritarian and paternalistic instincts towardtheir respective constituency (Bieber, 2006:57). Framing elections around the promise ofEuropean Union accession, however, will be achallenge given the proven power of ethnic fearand zero-sum ethnic polarisation in Bosnia andHerzegovina. The country still faces significantchallenges, but the next ten years are likely tobe much more progressive and dynamic for thecountry than the past decade because of the EuropeanUnion accession process. With EuropeanUnion membership possible on the twentiethanniversary of Dayton, there may eventually besomething to celebrate on November 21 for all ofBosnia and Herzegovina’s citizens (Ó Tuathail,O’Loughlin and Djipa, 2006: 61-75).3. Electoral Legislation in Bosnia andHerzegovina 1The grounds for elections and the electoralsystem of Bosnia and Herzegovina havebeen arranged by the Dayton Peace Accords forBosnia and Herzegovina and the Electoral Lawof Bosnia and Herzegovina.a) Dayton Peace Accords for Bosnia andHerzegovina – about elections and electoralsystemConsidering the meaning of the DaytonPeace Accords, much attention has been dedicatedto the regulation of the electoral system inBosnia and Herzegovina. But, many compromisesinfluencing the electoral system have beenmade. These compromises are based on thecombination of two principles: the constituent 2people’s principle and the national sovereigntyprinciple. International democratic standardsrelated to electoral systems (universal suffrage,right to stand for elections, equal right to vote,direct ballot, secret ballot, etc.) have been incorporatedin the Dayton Peace Accords. Initially,the Dayton Peace Accords specified electionspursuit in shorter periods of time. This was laterprolonged until 2002; even it was anticipatedto last only for elections that were held in 1996and 1998. The Dayton Peace Accords addresselections and the electoral system of Bosnia andHerzegovina in several instances.1 On constitutional foundations related to elections see morein: Dmičić, M. (2003): Ustavnopravni osnov funkcionisanjaBosne i Hercegovine na osnovu slobodnih i demokratskihizbora, http://www.soros.org.ba/docs_pravo/ustav_txt/dr_mile_dmicic.doc2 Various authors differentiate between the terms constituentand constitutive. On this difference see: Sahadžić, M. (2009):Priroda političkog sistema u Bosni i Hercegovini, in: Uvod upolitički sistem Bosne i Hercegovine, Sarajevo: Sarajevskiotvoreni centar and Fondacija Konrad Adenauer, 37-39centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr63

Maja Sahadžić: The Electoral System of Bosnia and Herzegovinasuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1Annex III of Dayton Peace Accords(Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina) is directlyrelated to the electoral system and elections inBosnia and Herzegovina. The Republic of Bosniaand Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia andHerzegovina and the Republic of Srpska haveagreed to establish elections in accordance withthe relevant documents of the Organization forSecurity and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).Annex III of Dayton Peace Accords explicitly andspecifically assesses requirements to promotefree, fair, and democratic elections and to laythe foundations for a representative governmentand to ensure the progressive achievement ofdemocratic goals in Bosnia and Herzegovina inArticle 1 (1) of Annex III of Dayton Peace Accords3 . These are also premises for the establishmentof an effective electoral system. But,the electoral system that was created by thisAnnex was merely temporary. It was supposedto last for a short time after the war in Bosniaand Herzegovina with the support of OSCE, yetit was prolonged until 2002.Annex IV of Dayton Peace Accords (Constitutionof Bosnia and Herzegovina) dedicated muchattention to elections and the electoral systemBosnia and Herzegovina. Article I (2) states thatBosnia and Herzegovina shall be a democraticstate, which shall operate under the rule of lawand with free and democratic elections. In ArticleII (1) related to human rights and fundamentalfreedoms it is stated that Bosnia and Herzegovinaand both Entities shall ensure the highest levelof internationally recognized human rights andfundamental freedoms. In Article II (2) related tointernational standards it is stated that the rightsand freedoms set forth in the 1950 EuropeanConvention for the Protection of Human Rightsand Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocolsshall apply directly in Bosnia and Herzegovina.These shall have priority over all other law. Inparticular, a separate point has been made onrights related directly or indirectly to elections inArticle II (3) 4 . Also, in Article II (7) related to internationalagreements it is stated that: Bosnia3 The Parties shall ensure that conditions exist for the organisationof free and fair elections, in particular a politically neutralenvironment; shall protect and enforce the right to votein secret without fear or intimidation; shall ensure freedom ofexpression and of the press; shall allow and encourage freedomof association (including of political parties); and shallensure freedom of movement (Annex III, Article 1(1), DaytonPeace Accords).4 The rights to liberty and security of person, freedom of thought,conscience, and religion, freedom of expression, freedomof peaceful assembly and freedom of association withothers etc (Annex III, Article II (3), Dayton Peace Accords).and Herzegovina shall remain or become partyto the international agreements listed in Annex Ito this Constitution. 5 By including a large numberof international documents on human rights andfundamental freedoms in Constitution of Bosniaand Herzegovina, it can be noted that Bosniaand Herzegovina accepted the internationalstandards related to electoral legislation.Annex VI of Dayton Peace Accords(Agreement on Human Rights) is considerablydedicated to elections and the electoral systemin Bosnia and Herzegovina. Besides humanrights and fundamental freedoms mentioned inAnnex I of Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina(Annex IV of Dayton Peace Accords), AnnexVI is also related to the protection of humanrights and fundamental freedoms which affectselections and the electoral system legislation.b) The Electoral Law of Bosnia andHerzegovina – about Elections and ElectoralLegislationOn the other hand, we have the ElectoralLaw of Bosnia and Herzegovina 6 that was adoptedby the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia andHerzegovina at the House of Representativessession held on August 21, 2001 and the Houseof Peoples session held on August 23, 2001. Byadopting the Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina,all criteria and requirements neededhave been met to ensure the holding future electionsaccording to international and domesticlegal regulations. But, the adoption of this lawwas accompanied by different compromises andcompensations of political parties which participatedin the work of the Parliamentary Assemblyof Bosnia and Herzegovina. It should be mentionedthat the adoption of this law was followedwith credentials that the passing of this legislatureis a prerequisite for admission to Council ofEurope. In the end, the Electoral Law of Bosniaand Herzegovina did not offer significant changesto the temporary electoral system based on5 Annex I of Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina correspondto fifteen human rights agreements to be applied in Bosniaand Herzegovina where some are directly or indirectlyrelated to elections and electoral systems: 1951 Conventionrelating to the Status of Refugees and the 1966 Protocol thereto,1965 International Convention on the Elimination of AllForms of Racial Discrimination, 1966 International Covenanton Civil and Political Rights and the 1966 and 1989 OptionalProtocols thereto, 1966 Covenant on Economic, Social andCultural Rights, 1994 Framework Convention for the Protectionof National Minorities, etc.6 see: Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 23/01,23/01, 7/02, 9/02, 20/02, 25/02, 4/04, 20/04, 25/05, 52/05,65/05, 77/05, 11/06, 24/06, 32/07, 33/08 and 37/08.centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr64

Maja Sahadžić: The Electoral System of Bosnia and Herzegovinasuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1the Dayton Peace Accords. But, in order to seethe differences, we have to give an overview ofthe temporary electoral system in Bosnia andHerzegovina.4. The Temporary Electoral System ofBosnia and HerzegovinaThe temporary electoral system of Bosniaand Herzegovina was based on Annex IIIof Dayton Peace Accords (Elections in Bosniaand Herzegovina). In compliance with this Annex,Article II (1) defines the role of the OSCEin elections. This role requested the parties ofagreement to adopt and put in place an electionsprogramme for Bosnia and Herzegovina,to supervise the preparation and conduction ofelections for legislative and executive governmentbodies in Bosnia and Herzegovina (state,entity, cantonal and municipal level). Article V ofDayton Peace Accords defined the agreementof Parties to create a permanent Election Commissionwith responsibilities to conduct futureelections in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Accordingto Article II (3), the OSCE was to establish aProvisional Election Commission in Bosnia andHerzegovina.In accordance with Article III (1) the ProvisionalElection Commission adopted a largenumber of rules and regulations related to theregistration of political parties and independentcandidates; the eligibility of candidates and voters;the role of domestic and international electionobservers; the ensuring of an open and fairelectoral campaign; as well as the establishment,publication and certification of final electionresults. Those rules and regulations hadpriority over domestic rules and regulations.The Provisional Election Commission had wideresponsibilities. 7 According to Article III (3), theProvisional Election Commission consisted ofthe Head of the OSCE Mission, the High Representativeor his or her designee, representativesof the Parties, and other persons as the Head ofthe OSCE Mission, in consultation with the Parties,may have decided. The Head of the OSCEMission was also Chairman of the Commission.In the event of disputes within the Commission,the decision of the Chairman was final.7 Those responsibilities can be described as supervision ofthe electoral process in order to obtain free and fair elections,determine provisions for voter registration, ensure compliancewith the electoral rules and regulations establishedpursuant Dayton Peace Accords, accredit observers frominternational organisations and foreign and domestic nongovernmentalorganisations, etc. (Annex III, Article III(2),Dayton Peace Accords).According to Annex III of the DaytonPeace Accords, the Provisional Election Commissionadopted the Electoral Rules and Regulationsfor the Elections on Local and HigherLevel in Bosnia and Herzegovina 8 in 1996 andthe Electoral Rules and Regulations for MunicipalElections in Bosnia and Herzegovina 9in 1997. Those rules regulated the process ofregistration and voting of displaced persons andrefugees. It has to be mentioned that the ProvisionalElection Commission also adopted theElectoral Rules and Regulations 10 in 2000 thatwere used to hold elections in Bosnia and Herzegovinauntil the Electoral Law of Bosnia andHerzegovina was introduced.General electoral principles have beensettled in the Attachment to Annex III on Electionsby the Document of the Second Meetingof the Conference on the Human Dimension ofthe Conference on Security and Cooperation inEurope, Copenhagen, 1990 (called the Copenhagenregulations) in Paragraph 7. 11Annex III of Dayton Peace Accords andRules and regulations of the Provisional ElectionCommission have been applied to the electionsfor: the House of Representatives of the ParliamentaryAssembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina,the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, theHouse of Representatives of the Parliament ofthe Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, theNational Assembly of the Republic of Srpska 12 ,8 see: Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 22/96,25/96, 29/96, 21/969 see: Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 10/97,15/9710 see: Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1/0011 By Copenhagen regulations elections are free held at reasonableintervals, as established by law; regulations permitall seats in at least one chamber of the national legislatureto be freely contested in a popular vote; guarantee universaland equal suffrage to adult citizens; ensure that votes arecast by secret ballot or by equivalent free voting procedure,and that they are counted and reported honestly with the officialresults made public; respect the right of citizens to seekpolitical or public office, individually or as representatives ofpolitical parties or organisations, without discrimination; fullfreedom of political parties or other political organisation;ensure conducting political campaigning in a fair and freeatmosphere; ensure equal access to the media on a non –discriminatory basis for all political groupings and individualswishing to participate in the electoral process; ensure thatcandidates who obtain the necessary number of votes requiredby law are duly installed in office and are permittedto remain in office until their term expires or is otherwisebrought to an end in a manner that is regulated by law inconformity with democratic parliamentary and constitutionalprocedures.12 Additional intervening but independent house named Councilof Peoples of the Republic of Srpska has been establishedby High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovinacentar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr65

Maja Sahadžić: The Electoral System of Bosnia and Herzegovinasuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1the President and Vice-president of Republicof Srpska 13 , as well as cantonal and municipalassemblies (Pobrić, 2000: 201). The rules andregulations related to parliamentary electionsin Bosnia and Herzegovina introduced a systemof proportional representation, the so-calledD’Hondt system. However, an exception to therule of proportional representation was introducedas well. This was in a situation where theformula for proportional representation could notbe applied. In that case, the Chairman of theProvisional Election Commission had to determinewhich kind of formula was to be appliedand then forwarded his conclusion to the Commissionfor adoption (Pobrić, 2000: 203). Thesupervision of the electoral process has beendone through submitting a Complaint or Appealto the Election Appeals Sub-commission thatwas formed in 1996 by the Provisional ElectionCommission. Its task was interpreting, strengtheningand improving of the above mentionedRules and Regulations.“The first post-war elections were heldon 14 September 1996, including presidentialand parliamentary elections on national level, aswell as entity level. The first local elections werepostponed a year” (Trnka, 2006: 200). In thenext two years, the implementation of DaytonPeace Accords has seen some progress. However,the international community found that theconditions for permanent electorate system conditionwere not yet met, so that the next elections(against Dayton Peace Accords provisions) wereheld on 12 and 13 September 1998, accordingto Rules and Regulations of Provisional ElectionCommission, respectively organized by OSCE.This routine was continued until presidential andparliamentary elections held in 2002 (Trnka,2000: 200). The first round of post-war elections(from 1996 to 1998) helped to consolidate ethnicexclusivism with little impact on the promotion ofpeace building and democratization. As the localelections of 1996 demonstrated, in conditionsof group insecurity and mutual distrust, with noincentive for politicians to appeal beyond theirown ethnic con stituencies, elections predictablyturned into an ethnic census. By granting constitutionalguarantees to protect the safety andsurvival of all three national groups and ensuretheir representation at all levels of govern ance,the DPA [Dayton Peace Accords] played into theintervention in 2000.13 By later amendments of Constitution of Republic of Srpskathis has changed to President and two Vice – Presidentsof Republic of Srpska, each from different constituent peoplesmembers.hands of the ethno-nationalist parties who conductedthe war. These parties were quick to takeadvantage of the post – war electoral processto legitimize them and occupy the newly establishedinstitutions by democratic means (Belloni,2004: 337).The 2000 elections differed from theprevious elections in three important aspects.First, open lists and multi – member constituencieswere intro duced. Second, a preferential votingsystem was adopted for the election of theRS (Republic of Srpska) Presidency. Third, newrules for the election of members of the Houseof Peoples in the Federation were introduced. Ofthe three inno vations, the first did not specificallyfoster inter – ethnic accommodation but ratherdisadvantaged multi – ethnic and civic parties;the second and the third, both inspired by anintegrationist approach, backfired because ofthe timing and method of their adoption. As theexperience of the 2000 elections shows, thereis a narrow line between fine – tuning electionrules and manipulating them. The internationalcommunity’s approach, leaning more towardsmanipulation, backfired (Belloni, 2004: 340) 14 .The 2000 elections differed from theprevious elections in three important aspects.First, open lists and multi – member constituencieswere intro duced. Second, a preferential votingsystem was adopted for the election of theRS (Republic of Srpska) Presidency. Third, newrules for the election of members of the Houseof Peoples in the Federation were introduced. Ofthe three inno vations, the first did not specificallyfoster inter – ethnic accommodation but ratherdisadvantaged multi – ethnic and civic parties;the second and the third, both inspired by anintegrationist approach, backfired because ofthe timing and method of their adoption. As theexperience of the 2000 elections shows, thereis a narrow line between fine – tuning electionrules and manipulating them. The internationalcommunity’s approach, leaning more towardsmanipulation, backfired (Belloni, 2004: 340) 15 .Open lists at 2000 elections implied thatup to that point citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovinacould only vote for a party, not for candidatesso lists were based on closed list system. In2000 Electoral Rules and Regulations deliveredopen list system so voters were able to vote for14 On this topic see: Belloni, R. (2004): “Peacebuilding andConsociational Electoral Engineering in Bosnia and Herzegovina”,International Peacekeeping, 11 (2): 334-35315 On this topic see: Belloni, R. (2004): “Peacebuilding andConsociational Electoral Engineering in Bosnia and Herzegovina”,International Peacekeeping, 11 (2): 334-353centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr66

Maja Sahadžić: The Electoral System of Bosnia and Herzegovinasuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1a party, but also for a candidate on that specificparty list which became a norm in latter ElectoralLaw of Bosnia and Herzegovina. “However, thissystem does not take into account the uniquenessof a society divided along ethnic lines.Open lists might increase accountability but donot necessarily favour moderation. Nor do theypromote multiethnicity and multi – ethnic parties– both explicit goals that the Electoral Lawwas supposed to achieve” (Belloni, 2004: 340).On the other side multi – member constituenciesat 2000 elections were effectuated for theParliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovinaand the National Assembly of the Republicof Srpska elections. But, there were someflaws. “While sensible in theory, to improve accountability,in practice its impact on fosteringinter–ethnic moderation is small. Indeed, theway the MMCs [multi–member constituencies]were drawn up (preserving a clear ethnic majoritywithin each constituency) made it unlikelythat candidates would seek support across ethniclines. Furthermore, the sheer complexity ofthe system was likely to be difficult for votersto understand, and thus discourage electoralparticipation. Finally, compensatory mandatesincrease the number of parties represented inparliament, encouraging political fragmentationat the expense of stable government (…)” (Belloni,2004: 340-341). In the Republic of Srpskapreferential voting was accepted for the electionof the President and Vice – President of the Republicof Srpska. “Nevertheless, preferential votingfor the RS Presidency was unlikely to be areliable test for at least for two reasons. First,this system is unlikely to produce conciliatory behaviorwhere ethnic groups are concentrated inparticular geographic regions. In these instances,the politicians’ incentive to seek support fromvarious groups depends on the presence andsize of minority groups. Because the RS electoratewas not ethnically heterogeneous, onlyunder the most unusual circumstances couldAV [alternative votes/voting] have influenced theresults” (Belloni, 2004: 342). House of Peoplesof the Parliament of Federation was about to beelected through Cantonal Assemblies in a mannerthat member of different community can votefor each other and not by the same communityelected members. This rule was known as a BarryRule 16 . “The main Croat nationalist party, theCroatian Democratic Union (HDZ) objected vigorously.It argued that when all members of the16 US Ambassador Robert Barry, who imposed this rule,was appointed Head of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia andHerzegovina from 1998-2001Canton Assembly elected the delegates in oneelection, there would be an influence of the majoritygroup – the Bosniaks – on the selection ofthe delegates from the smaller groups. The HDZbegan its 2001 rebellion against internationalpolicy as a protest against the Barry Rule, leadingto a major confrontation between the partyand international peacebuilders” (Belloni, 2004:343). This does not downgrade the fact that bythis very Rule Bosniaks intrinsically influencedCroat member’s conformation in the House ofPeoples of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,and thereby political and legal dimensionsof Bosniak-Croat relation concernment inthe Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.In 2002, the Bosnian and Herzegovinianelectoral commission, rather than the OSCE,organized general elections for the first time autonomouslywithout major problems. Electionsfor municipal councils, mayors and the Districtof Brčko were held without significant incidentsin October 2004. For the first time, mayors weredirectly elected in the country, as was a unifiedcity council in previously divided Mostar. Someincidents of fraud, nevertheless, have occurred.As the OSCE notes, the electoral system is verycomplex and often not understood by voters. Thegovernment has the power to govern in principle,but its ability to govern is constrained by the continuedintervention of the Office of High Representativein Bosnia and Herzegovina (OHR), thefragmentation of public authority in the entitiesand regions, as well as the extensive veto rightsat state and entity level (Bieber, 2006: 43-64).5. Permanent Electoral System in Bosnia andHerzegovinaIn 2001 Parliamentary Assembly of Bosniaand Herzegovina adopted Electoral Law ofBosnia and Herzegovina. “The draft ElectoralLaw was prepared by international OSCE staffand legitimized firstly as national project throughthe involvement of the seven-strong IndependentExperts Commission appointed by the HR(High Representative) and, secondly, as an internationallysanctioned document through theapproving comments of the Council of Europe’sVenice Commission. The EL (Electoral Law)took long time to pass through Parliamentary Assemblyof Bosnia and Herzegovina. One of themain reasons was that the OSCE meant for itto clearly favor in the electoral competition non– nationalist parties that have multiethnic leadershipand membership, that respect the GFAPcentar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr67

Maja Sahadžić: The Electoral System of Bosnia and Herzegovinasuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1[General Framework Agreement for Peace] provisionsthat stand for issue politics and reconciliationand reject separatism and politics of exclusion.The final version was considerably toneddown from this ambitious intention, containingonly the uncontested provision banning ICTY[International Criminal Tribunal for the formerYugoslavia] – indicted war criminals to hold anyfunctional position in the candidate parties (Article1.6), and nothing in its Chapter 4 (Certificationand Candidacy for Elections) requiring partiesto present reconciliatory platforms or to havemultiethnic membership. With regard to this theoutcome of the last general elections is a hardlysurprising indication of both the strength of theexclusive nationalist appeal within the countryand the lack of potential for attracting politicianscapable of mustering voter’s support under thebanner of reconciliation and civic nationalism”(Bojkov, 2003:57).We emphasized earlier that this law didnot make any significant changes by comparisonto temporary electoral system based on DaytonPeace Accords. But, even if it did not provideconsiderable and distinctive transformation,Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina remainedwithin framework of Constitution of Bosniaand Herzegovina (Annex IV, Dayton PeaceAccords). Certain authors refer to “basic characteristicsof permanent electoral system” (Trnka,2006: 201-203) in Bosnia and Herzegovina:a) election of the Parliamentary Assemblyof Bosnia and Herzegovina and membersof the Presidency of Bosnia andHerzegovina has been regulated;b) 2/3 of members of the House of Representativesof the Parliamentary Assemblyand members of the Presidency ofBosnia and Herzegovina from the lineof Bosniak and Croat peoples are beingelected on territory of Federation of Bosniaand Herzegovina. 1/3 of membersof this house of parliament and memberof the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovinafrom the line of Serb peoples arebeing elected on territory of Republic ofSrpska;c) conditions for acquirement of right tovote has been also regulated;d) voters have right to vote in person or inabsence in municipality where they hadresidence according to 1991 populationcensus;e) a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovinawho has dual citizenship have right tovote only if Bosnia and Herzegovina isthe country his or her permanent residence;f) person that was accused or sentencedby International Tribunal for former Yugoslaviafor serious violations of humanitarianlaw cannot be elected forany function on territory of Bosnia andHerzegovina;g) principle of incompatibility is regulated;h) cumulating of functions is disabled;i) mandate belongs to candidate not toparty or coalition on which list candidatewas;j) permanent terms for conduction of electionswere stipulated.If we take closer look at the list of basiccharacteristics we can make a short analysis ofpermanent electoral system in Bosnia and Herzegovina:Point (a) is referring to Article 1.1 ofElectoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina whichdefines that this law shall regulate the electionof members and delegates of the ParliamentaryAssembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of themembers of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovinaand shall stipulate the principles governingthe elections at all levels of authority inBosnia and Herzegovina. On one side, it has tobe noted that precise regulations on this havebeen provided by entities. On the other side,Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina usedbroad approach in regulating principles whichnarrows range of entities regulation.Point (b) is referring to Article IV(2) andArticle V(1) of the Constitution of Bosnia andHerzegovina (Annex IV, Dayton Peace Accords)which are regulating election of the House ofRepresentatives of the Parliamentary Assemblyof Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Presidencyof Bosnia and Herzegovina. Consequence ofthis constitutional regulation is that all citizens ofBosnia and Herzegovina cannot elect all membersof those two. For disproportional numberof voters, equal right to vote is doubtful. On theother side, this is not in accordance with 1950European Convention for the Protection of HumanRights and Fundamental Freedoms andits Protocols that shall apply directly in Bosniaand Herzegovina by Article II(2) of Constitutionof Bosnia and Herzegovina (Annex IV of DaytonPeace Accords) and Article 1.3 of ElectoralLaw which defined that election of members ofall bodies of government is based on free electionsand universal suffrage and equal right tocentar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr68

Maja Sahadžić: The Electoral System of Bosnia and Herzegovinasuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1vote and by secret balloting.Point (c) is referring to Articles 1.4 and1.5 of Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina.Each citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina whohas attained eighteen years of age shall havethe right to vote and to be elected pursuant tothis law. To exercise his or her right to vote, acitizen must be enlisted in Central Voters Register.Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovinadetermined conditions for acquirement of rightto vote: citizenship, eighteen years of age andenlistment in Central Voters Register. Until 2006there was a model of active registration appliedwhich implied obligation of voters to register.In 2006 model of passive registration appliedwhich means that state bodies manage CentralVoters Register ex officio by using official recordof place of residence. Every citizen who appliedfor the ID before August 17 was registered in aCentral Voters Register. However, the systemdid not apply to certain/special categories ofvoters. Refugees and voters living temporarilyabroad who wished to vote out – of – countryhad to submit an application to the Central ElectionCommission before July 18, but voters registeredto vote out – of – country were allowed tovote in Bosnia and Herzegovina on election daywith tendered ballots in the municipality of theirpermanent residence. 17Point (d) refers to Article 1.5 of ElectoralLaw of Bosnia and Herzegovina which definesthat all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina whohave the right to vote, pursuant to this law, shallhave the right to vote in person in the municipalityof their permanent residence. A citizen of Bosniaand Herzegovina who is temporarily residingabroad and has the right to vote, is entitled tovote in person (by appearing at an appropriatepolling station in Bosnia and Herzegovina or ata diplomatic and consular representation officeof Bosnia and Herzegovina abroad) or by mail(by sending the voting ballot by mail) for the municipalitywhere the person had the permanentplace of residence prior to his or her departureabroad. Displaced persons, according to ArticleIII of Dayton Peace Accords can vote in municipalitywhere they reside at present time undercondition that they have permanent residence inthat municipality for at least six months.Point (e) also refers to Article 1.5 ofElectoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina thatis related to citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovinawho has dual citizenship pursuant to Article I(7)17 For more information refer to: OSCE (2007), GeneralElections 1 October 2006, OSCE/ODIHR Election ObservationMission Final Report, Warsaw 6 February 2007.(d) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina.This citizen does not have right to active and/or passive election right if he or she resides inother state.Point (f) refers to Articles 1.6 and 1.7 ofElectoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Noperson who is serving a sentence delivered bythe International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,and no person who is under indictment bythe Tribunal and who has failed to comply withan order to appear before the Tribunal, may berecorded in the Central Voters Register or standas a candidate (the candidate for the purposeof this Law refers to persons of both genders)or hold any appointive, elective or other publicoffice in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.Also, no person who is serving a sentence deliveredby a Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina,courts of the Republic of Srpska, courts of theFederation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and courtof the District of Brčko or has failed to complywith an order to appear before a Court of Bosniaand Herzegovina, courts of the Republic ofSrpska, courts of the Federation of Bosnia andHerzegovina and courts of the District of Brčkofor serious violations of humanitarian law wherethe International Criminal Tribunal for the formerYugoslavia has reviewed the file prior to arrestand found that it meets international legal standardsmay not be recorded in the Central VotersRegister or stand as a candidate or hold anyappointive, elective or other public office in theterritory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.Point (g) refers to Article 1.8 of ElectoralLaw of Bosnia and Herzegovina and it relates toprinciple of incompatibility. Members of legislative,executive, judicial branch, members of police,military forces, diplomatic and consular representativescannot hold two public functions.Point (h) also refers to Article 1.8 ElectoralLaw of Bosnia and Herzegovina and it relatesto cumulating of functions disability. Thismeans that nobody can hold more than oneelected function.Point (i) refers to Article 1.9 of ElectoralLaw of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A mandate belongsto the elected holder and not the politicalparty, coalition or list of independent candidates,which nominated him or her on the candidateslist. The mandate cannot be terminated exceptwhere prescribed by law. Should an electedholder, during his/her term of office, withdrawfrom a political party, coalition or list of independentcandidates that participated in the electionsor nominated him/her on its candidates list, theelected holder shall become an independentcentar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr69

Maja Sahadžić: The Electoral System of Bosnia and Herzegovinasuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1representative.Point (j) refers to Article 1.14 of ElectoralLaw of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The electionsat all levels of authority in Bosnia and Herzegovinashall be held on the first Sunday in Octoberunless that date conflicts with observance of areligious holiday of one of the constituent peoplesof Bosnia and Herzegovina. Any electionthat cannot be held on the first Sunday in Octoberbecause of a conflict with a religious holidayshall be scheduled by the Central Election Commissionof Bosnia and Herzegovina for the Sundayclosest to the first Sunday in October, whichdoes not conflict with a religious holiday.The Authorities responsible for the conductof elections in permanent electoral systemof Bosnia and Herzegovina, according to ElectoralLaw of Bosnia and Herzegovina are CentralElection Commission, Municipal Election Commissionsand the Polling Station Committees.The composition of those authorities should bemultiethnic, reflecting population of constituentpeoples and others in accordance the most recentpopulation census.1. The Central Election Commission is consistedof seven members: two Croats, twoBosniaks, two Serbs, and one Other 18 member(Article 2.5). The election commissionmember is appointed for a period of sevenyears (Article 2.4). The President of the CentralElection Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovinais elected from amongst its members.One Croat, one Bosniak, one Serb andOther member of the Central Election Commissionof Bosnia and Herzegovina serve asthe President for one fifteen month rotationin a five year period (Article 2.6). The CentralElection Commission is independent body,which derives its authority from and reportsdirectly to, the Parliamentary Assembly ofBosnia and Herzegovina. The Central ElectionCommission of Bosnia and Herzegovinahas its tasks regulated in Article 2.9 19 ;18 In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Others are refering to nationalminorities and nationally indeterminated people.19 By this article Central Commission tasks are following:coordinate, oversee and regulate the lawful operation of allelection commissions and Polling Station Committees inaccordance with this law; issues administrative Regulationsfor the implementation of this law; is responsible for accuracy,update and overall integrity of the Central Voters Registerfor the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina; certifies the participationof political parties, coalitions, lists of independentcandidates and independent candidates for all levels of directelections in Bosnia and Herzegovina; verifies and certifythe lists of candidates for all levels of direct and indirectelections in Bosnia and Herzegovina covered by this law; is2. A Municipal Election Commission shall consistof three, five or seven members. Themember of the Municipal Election Commissioncan be: president or judge of a regularcourt, the Secretary of the Municipal Council/MunicipalAssembly and City Council,persons professionally employed in Municipaladministration (Article 2.12). This Commissionis appointed for a period of sevenyears (Article 2.4). The Municipal ElectionCommission shall have it tasks regulated inArticle 2.13 20 ;3. The Polling Station Committee shall consistof three or five members of whom one shallbe appointed as President. The Presidentand members of the Polling Station Committeeshall have deputies. The appointmentof the President and members of the PollingStation Committee and their deputies shallbe made by the Municipal Election Commissionno later than thirty days prior to the dateof the election (Article 2.19).Certification andCandidacy for the Elections is also definedin Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina.In order to participate in the elections politicalparties, independent candidates, coalitionsand lists of independent candidatesshall certify their eligibility with the CentralElection Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina(Article 4.1). In order to be certifiedfor the elections for all bodies of authorityat all levels in Bosnia and Herzegovina, anindependent candidate or a candidate on apolitical party, list of independent candidatesor a coalition’s candidates list shall meet reresponsiblefor the timely printing, distribution and securityof ballots and forms for all levels of direct elections in Bosniaand Herzegovina; defines the contents and the form of theballot for all levels of direct elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina;determines and verify election results for all direct andindirect elections covered by this Law, certify that electionswere conducted in accordance with this Law and publish resultsof all direct and indirect elections covered by this Law;and perform all other duties as authorized by law.20 By this article Municipal Election Commission tasks includefollowing: monitor and supervise (control) the work ofthe Voters Register Center; designate Polling Stations in theterritory of the municipality for voting on all levels of authorityin Bosnia and Herzegovina; conduct the appointment procedure,appoint and train the members of the Polling StationCommittee; be responsible for the proper conduct of the countingof ballots at Polling Stations and municipal countingcenters; compile the results of elections from all Polling Stationsin the municipality, separately for each body for whichelections were administered and forward the results to theCentral Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina;and perform all other tasks as authorized by law and by theRegulations of the Central Election Commission of Bosniaand Herzegovina.centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr70

Maja Sahadžić: The Electoral System of Bosnia and Herzegovinasuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1quirements numerated in Article 4.2 21 . In orderto participate in the elections, a politicalparty must be registered with the competentauthority in accordance with the law as regulatedin Article 4.3 22 . Rules of Conduct in theElection Campaign are regulated in Article7.1 23 .The Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovinaspecified elections for different levelsof executive and legislative branches of government:21 The candidate must be recorded in the Central VotersRegister in the municipality in which he or she is standingfor office or in the municipality found within the boundariesof the electoral unit if he or she is standing for office at thehigher levels of authority, no later than by the day when theelections are announced; and the candidate may only run foroffice in one electoral unit at any level of authority and mayappear only on one political party, coalition or list of independentcandidates.22 Three thousand (3,000) signatures of voters recorded inthe Central Voters Register for the elections for the membersof the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina; threethousand (3,000) signatures of voters recorded in the CentralVoters Register for the elections for the members of theHouse of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly ofBosnia and Herzegovina; two thousand (2,000) signatures ofvoters recorded in the Central Voters Register for the electionsfor the members of the House of Representatives ofthe Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovinaor for the members of the National Assembly of the Republicof Srpska or for the elections for the President and Vice –Presidents of Republic of Srpska; five hundred (500) signaturesof voters recorded in the Central Voters Register forelections for the delegates of the Cantonal Assemblies of theFederation of Bosnia and Herzegovina; one hundred (100)signatures of voters recorded in the Central Voters Registerfor the elections for the Municipal Council/Municipal Assemblyand for the Head of Municipality in a municipality wherethe number of voters recorded in the Central Voters Registeron the day when the elections are announced did notexceed ten thousand (10,000) voters, or two hundred (200)signatures for the election in the municipality in which thisnumber exceeded ten thousand (10,000) voters recordedin the Central Voters Register; (5)% of signatures of votersrecorded in the Central Voters Register for the election ofMunicipal Council or Municipal Assembly and for the Headof Municipality, in a municipality where the number of votersrecorded in the Central Voters Register on the day when theelections are announced did not exceed a thousand (1000)voters recorded in the Central Voters Register; supportingsignatures submitted for the higher level of authority shallalso be applicable to the lower levels of authority included inthe higher level of authority.23 Political parties, coalitions, lists of independent candidatesand independent candidates have the right to: conductthe election campaign in a peaceful environment; organiseand hold public meetings in which they can freely expresstheir positions in order to gain support from the voters; andpublish and distribute placards, posters and other materialsrelated to the election campaign. For the purposes of publicmeetings permits from the competent body shall not be required,but the organiser shall notify the competent body responsiblefor public order and peace twenty – four (24) hoursprior to holding such an event.1. The Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovinais a collective head of state which is constitutedof three members of each constituentpeople: one Bosniak, one Croat and oneSerb. Preferential voting system is appliedwith plurality principle in mandates distribution.“Still, with regard to way of their election,expression of constituent peoples willis mediated trough entities, and by thatsignificantly damaged” (Trnka, 2006: 207).“Annex 4 of the Constitution of Bosnia andHerzegovina prescribes a split of citizens interms of voting rights. Article V of the Constitutionreads: the Presidency of Bosnia andHerzegovina shall consist of three Members:one Bosniak and one Croat, each directlyelected from the territory of the Federa tion,and one Serb directly elected from the territoryof the Republika Srpska“ (Scholdan,2000: 35). Many citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovinado not have opportunity to electmembers of Presidency from national groupthey belong. In this way, Bosniaks and Croatswith permanent residence in Republicof Srpska cannot cast a vote for election ofBosniak or Croat Presidency member. Onthe other side, Serbs with permanent residencein Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovinacannot cast a vote for Serb memberof Presidency. This is conditioned by a factthat this constitutional solution is not consistentwith constitutional principles but also internationaldemocratic standards related toelections and electoral systems 24 ; and this isnot contributing to integration of Bosnia andHerzegovina. On the other hand, certain repercussionson election of Croat member ofthe Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovinaoccurred in 2006 elections. Electoral systemof Bosnia and Herzegovina facilitatedthat Bosniaks, on a basis of their most part24 According to Article 8.1 of Electoral Law of Bosnia andHerzegovina, members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovinadirectly elected from the territory of the Federationof Bosnia and Herzegovina – one Bosniak and one Croatshall be elected by voters recorded in the Central VotersRegister to vote for the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.A voter recorded in the Central Voters Register to vote inthe Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina may vote for eitherthe Bosniak or Croat Member of the Presidency, not forboth. The Bosniak and Croat member that gets the highestnumber of votes among candidates from the same constituentpeople shall be elected. The member of the Presidencyof Bosnia and Herzegovina that shall be directly elected fromthe territory of RS – one Serb shall be elected by voters recordedin the Central Voters Register to vote in the Republicof Srpska. Candidate who gets the highest number of votesshall be elected. The mandate for the members of the Presidencyof Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be four (4) years.centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr71

Maja Sahadžić: The Electoral System of Bosnia and Herzegovinasuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1had significant and essential leverage onCroat member of the Presidency of Bosniaand Herzegovina (Željko Komšić). Politicalparties as representatives of their peoplereacted bitterly stating that Croats did notchoose Željko Komšić as a member of thePresidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina.In counterpart Croats hold minor influenceupon Bosniak member of the Presidencyof Bosnia and Herzegovina election. In theend, changes in electoral system should enablesimilar way and conditions of electionsin the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovinaand Republic of Srpska. Yet, in present andmomentarily state of affairs, constitutionalreform is under way of attempt and if it happens,members of political parties as representativesof their people will surely reflecton electoral system of Bosnia and Herzegovina.2. The Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia andHerzegovina is constituted of House of Representativesof the Parliamentary Assemblyof Bosnia and Herzegovina and House ofPeoples of the Parliamentary Assembly ofBosnia and Herzegovina. House of Representativesof the Parliamentary Assemblyof Bosnia and Herzegovina is consisted of42 members that are being directly electedby citizens. 25 Each entity is one electoralunit/constituency where candidates are beingelected on a basis of compensatory listwhich gives compensatory mandates. Entitiesare being divided to smaller electoral25 By Article 9.1 of the Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovinathe House of Representatives of the ParliamentaryAssembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall consist of forty-two (42) members, twenty-eight (28) of whom shall be directlyelected by voters registered to vote for the territoryof the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and fourteen(14) of whom shall be directly elected by voters registered tovote for the territory of the Republic of Srpska. The mandateof members of the House of Representatives of the ParliamentaryAssembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be four(4) years. Of the twenty – eight (28) members who shall bedirectly elected by voters registered to vote for the territoryof the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, twenty – one(21) shall be elected from multi-member constituencies underthe proportional representation formula set forth in Article9.5 of this law, and seven (7) shall be compensatorymandates elected from the territory of the Federation as awhole according to Article 9.6 of this law. Of the fourteen (14)members who shall be directly elected by voters registeredto vote for the territory of the Republic of Srpska, nine (9)shall be elected from multi-member constituencies under theproportional representation formula set forth in Article 9.5 ofthis law, and five (5) shall be compensatory mandates electedfrom the territory of the Republic of Srpska as a wholeaccording to Article 9.6 of this law. A voter shall have oneballot for the proportional representation mandates in themulti-member constituency for which the voter is registered.units/constituencies which give the rest of2/3 of mandates. Electoral Law adoptedhalf-open list system which is more democraticbut connected with difficulties of votescounting. When it comes to mandates distribution,proportional representation formulahas been adopted according to the Saint-Laguë method of the highest average. 26Also, as a correction there is compensatorymandate system applied. 27 This houseshould express interests of all citizens onwhole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.But, this kind of election of members is disablingexpression of will of all citizens of Bosniaand Herzegovina. House of Peoples ofthe Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia andHerzegovina is consisted of 15 delegates ofwhom 2/3 from the Federation of Bosnia andHerzegovina (five Croats and five Bosniaks)and 1/3 from the Republic of Srpska (fiveSerbs) that are indirectly delegated by entity26 By Article 9.5 of the Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovinamandates are allocated in each constituency in thefollowing manner: for each political party and coalition, thetotal number of valid votes received by that political party orcoalition shall be divided by 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, et seq., as longas necessary for the allocation in question. The numbers resultingfrom this series of divisions shall be the “quotients”.The number of votes for independent candidates is the quotientfor that candidate. The quotients shall be arranged inorder from the highest quotient to the lowest quotient. Mandatesshall be distributed, in order, to the highest quotientuntil all the constituency mandates for the body have beendistributed. Political parties, coalitions, lists of independentcandidates and independent candidates cannot participatein the allocation of mandates if they do not win more than 3%of the total number of valid ballots in an electoral unit.27 By Article 9.6 of the Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovinacompensatory mandates shall be allocated in thefollowing manner: only political parties and coalitions, whichwon more than 3% of the total number of valid ballots forthe territory of the entity for which the compensatory list ismade193 may take part in the distribution of compensatorymandates. First, the total number of mandates for the legislativebody to be allocated for the territory of the respectiveEntity, reduced by the number of mandates won by independentcandidates, is distributed according to the formula setforth in Article 9.5 of this law. From the number of mandatesa list of a political party or coalition has won according to thisprocedure, the number of mandates won by the same partyor coalition, according to the procedure set forth in Article 9.5of this law, is deducted. The remaining number is the numberof compensatory mandates the list wins. If a political party orcoalition receives a negative number of mandates accordingto the procedure in the previous paragraph, the political partyor coalition keeps the mandates won in the constituencies,but does not receive any compensatory mandates. In caseone or more lists get a negative number of mandates, themandates to be distributed according to the procedure of thisarticle is decreased correspondingly to preserve the correctnumber of mandates in the House of Representatives of theParliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina electedfrom the territory of the respective Entity.centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr72

Maja Sahadžić: The Electoral System of Bosnia and Herzegovinasuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1parliaments. 28 Mandate distribution is beingdone trough proportional representationformula so as in House of Representatives.Usually, (in federal states) upper house ofparliament is consisted of member that representsfederal units. But, that is not case inBosnia and Herzegovina where constituentpeople (along with entities) are being representedto be able to maintain equality ofthree constituent peoples.3. The President of the Federation of Bosniaand Herzegovina is head of executive governmentand is accompanied with two Vice –Presidents. They are being elected indirectlyby the Parliament of Federation of Bosniaand Herzegovina 29 , and each has to be from28 By Article 9.12a of the Electoral Law of Bosnia and HerzegovinaCroat and Bosniak Delegates to the House of Peoplesof the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovinafrom the Federation shall be elected by the Croat andBosniak Caucus of Delegates as appropriate to the House ofPeoples of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croatand Bosniak Delegates to the House of Peoples of the Parliamentof the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina shallelect delegates from their respective constitutive people.Serb Delegates and Delegates of the Others to the Houseof Peoples of the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia andHerzegovina shall not participate in the process of electingBosniak and Croat Delegates for the House of Peoples of theParliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina from theFederation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Delegates from theRepublic of Srpska (5 Serbs) to the House of Peoples of theParliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall beelected by the National Assembly of the Republic of Srpska.29 By Article 9.13 of the Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovinain election of the President and Vice-presidentsof the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at least onethird of the delegates of the constituent peoples caucusesto the House of Peoples of the Federation shall nominatedelegates for the office of the President and Vice-presidents.By Article 9.14 the joint slates for the office of President andVice-presidents of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovinashall be formed from among the candidates referred to inArticle 9.13. The House of Representatives of the Parliamentof the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall vote onone or several joint slates composed of three candidates includingone candidate from among each constituent peoples.The slate which receives the majority of votes in the Houseof Representatives of the Parliament of 72 the Federation ofBosnia and Herzegovina shall be elected if it gets majority ofvotes cast in the House of Peoples of the Parliament of theFederation of Bosnia and Herzegovina including majority ofvotes of each constituent peoples caucuses. By Article 9.15if the joint slate presented by the House of Representativesdoes not receive the necessary majority in the House of Peoples,this procedure will be repeated. If in the repeated procedurethe joint slate which receives majority of votes in theHouse of Representatives is rejected again in the House ofPeoples that joint slate shall be considered to be elected. ByArticle 9.16 delegates to the House of Peoples of the Parliamentof the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina from therank of Others may participate in the election of candidatesfor the President and Vice-president. However, on this occasion,no caucus of Others shall be formed and their vote shallnot be counted in calculating the specific majority in the caudifferentconstituent people. National consensushad to be reached in order to gainplace.4. The Parliament of the Federation of Bosniaand Herzegovina is constituted of Houseof Representatives of the Parliament of theFederation of Bosnia and Herzegovina andHouse of Peoples of the Federation of Bosniaand Herzegovina. House of Representativesof the Parliament of the Federationof Bosnia and Herzegovina is constituted of98 members that are being elected directlyby citizens of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.30 Mandates distribution is done inthe same way as in House of Representativesof Parliamentary Assembly of Bosniaand Herzegovina. What is important is thatConstitution of Bosnia and Herzegovinaregulates that at least four members of eachconstituent people has to be represented inthis house. But, this is also non-consistentto nature of this house that has to representinterests of citizens of whole territoryof Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovinaalthough, theoretically it is justified by presentconditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina.House of Peoples of the Parliament of theFederation of Bosnia and Herzegovina isconsisted of 58 delegates that are being indirectlydelegated by cantonal assemblies. 31cuses of the constituent peoples. By Article 9.17 mandate ofthe President and Vice-president shall be for four (4) yearsprovided that the mandate does not expire earlier.30 By Article 10.1 of the Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovinathe House of Representatives of the Parliament of theFederation of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall consist of ninetyeight (98) members, directly elected by voters registered tovote for the territory of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.The mandate of members of the House of Representativesof the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovinashall be four (4) years. A certain number of members shallbe elected from multi-member constituencies under the proportionalrepresentation formula set forth in Article 9.6 of thislaw. There shall be compensatory mandates from the territoryof the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a wholeaccording to Article 9.7 of this law. The House of Representativesof the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia andHerzegovina shall determine, based solely on the guidelinesset forth in Article 10.2 of this law, what shall be the numberof mandates and boundaries for multi-member constituenciesand the number of compensatory mandates. A minimumnumber of four (4) members of each constituent people shallbe represented in the Federation House of Representatives.A voter shall have one ballot for the proportional representationmandates in the multi-member constituency for whichthe voter is registered. This ballot shall also count for theallocation of compensatory mandates under Article 10.5 ofthis law.31 By Article 10.10 of the Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovinathe Cantonal Legislature shall elect fifty-eight (58)delegates to the House of Peoples, seventeen (17) fromcentar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr73

Maja Sahadžić: The Electoral System of Bosnia and Herzegovinasuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1Mandate distribution is being done by proportionalrepresentation formula. Number ofdelegates from each canton is proportionalto the number of voters and national structureof each canton is determined by populationcensus from 1991. It has to be bared inmind that demographic and national structureof Bosnia and Herzegovina is severelychanged during war and ethnic cleansing1992 – 1995. In this manner, there has tobe done new population census to be ableto determine real national structure of eachcanton.5. The President of and two Vice-presidentsof Republic of Srpska are being elected directlyby citizens registered to vote in Republicof Srpska. 32 Mandate distribution isbeing done by plurality principle applyingpreferential voting, so as in election of Presidencyof Bosnia and Herzegovina. In fact,Sumantra Bose suggests that the AlternativeVote system used for the Republic ofSrpska presidential elections poses considerableproblems that it is probably fortunatethat the designers of Bosnia’s Electoral Laweventually decided not to make the electionsto the tripartite Bosnia and Herzegovinastate presidency dependent on an AV[alternative voting] type multiple/preferentialvoting system (Bose: 2002: 238).6. The National Assembly of the Republic ofSrpska consists of 83 members, who areamong Bosniaks, seventeen (17) from among Serbs, seventeen(17) from among Croats and seven (7) delegates fromthe rank of Others. By Article 10.11 the representatives fromamong Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs and Others in each Canton’sAssembly shall elect delegates of their respective constituentpeoples in that Canton. Each party represented in therespective caucuses of the constituent peoples and Othersor each member of one of these caucuses shall be entitledto nominate one or more candidates on a list for election ofdelegates of that particular caucus from that Canton. Eachlist can include a larger number of candidates than is thenumber of delegates to be elected on the condition that thelegislature of the Canton has a larger number of delegatesfrom among Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs and Others than is thenumber of delegates from amongst Bosniaks, Croats, Serbsand Others that ought to be elected to the House of Peoples.32 By Article 12.1 of the Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovinathe President and two (2) Vice-presidents of Republicof Srpska shall be directly elected from the territory ofRepublic of Srpska by voters registered to vote for Republicof Srpska. By Article 12.2 voters registered to vote for thePresident of the Republic of Srpska may vote for one candidateonly. By Article 12.3 candidates from each constituentpeople receiving the highest number of votes shall be elected.Among these three (3) candidates, one from each constituentpeople, the candidate receiving the highest numberof votes shall be elected President and the two candidatesreceiving the second and third highest number of votes shallbe elected Vice-presidents.being directly elected by voters registeredto vote for the Republic of Srpska. Proportionalrepresentation formula of mandatedistribution is applied along with distributionof compensatory mandates. 337. The Council of Peoples of Republic of Srpskais consisted of 28 delegates, 8 fromamong Bosniaks, 8 from among Serbs, 8from among Croats and 4 representativesof Others elected by their caucuses in theNational Assembly of the Republic of Srpska.This council is parity-based so thateach constituent people can have the samenumber of delegates. 34 This house was es-33 By Article 11.1 of the Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovinathe National Assembly of the Republic of Srpskashall consist of eighty-three (83) members, who shall be directlyelected by voters registered to vote for the Republicof Srpska. A certain number of members shall be electedfrom multi – member constituencies under the proportionalrepresentation formula set forth in Article 9.5 of this law.There shall be compensatory mandates from the Republicof Srpska as a whole according to Article 9.6 of this law.The National Assembly of the Republic of Srpska shall determine,based solely on the guidelines set forth in Article11.2 of this law, what shall be the number of mandates andboundaries for multi-member constituencies and the numberof compensatory mandates. A minimum number of four (4)members of each constituent people shall be represented inthe National Assembly of Republic of Srpska. A voter shallhave one ballot for the proportional representation mandatesin the multi-member constituency for which the voter is registered.The mandate of members of the National Assembly ofthe Republic of Srpska shall be four (4) years. By Article 11.2the National Assembly of the Republic of Srpska shall determine,based solely on the guidelines set forth in this article,the number of mandates and boundaries for multi-memberconstituencies and the number of compensatory mandates.Of the eighty-three (83) mandates for the National Assembly,between twenty-three percent (23%) and twenty-seven percent(27%) shall be compensatory mandates. The remainingmandates shall be allocated in multi-member constituencies.There shall be a minimum of six (6) multi-member constituencies.A multi-member constituency shall have a minimumof four (4) members and a maximum of fifteen (15) members.The Brčko District shall be included in one of the multi-memberconstituencies. The number of mandates for a constituencyshall be determined as follows: the number of registeredvoters for the Republic of Srpska, as determined by theCentral Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina,shall be divided by the total number of constituency mandatesto be allocated. The number of registered voters for aconstituency shall be divided by the quotient resulting fromthe previous division to determine the number of mandatesto which the constituency is entitled. Mandates which cannotbe allocated based on whole numbers shall be allocated toconstituencies on the basis of the highest remainders.34 By Article 11.11 of the Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina,the members of the Council of Peoples shall beelected by their respective caucus in the National Assembly.In the event that the number of members elected toone caucus of the Council of Peoples exceeds the numberof the representatives of the respective caucus of the NationalAssembly, an additional number of members shall beelected by a caucus to be established for that purpose fromcentar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr74

Maja Sahadžić: The Electoral System of Bosnia and Herzegovinasuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1tablished by High Representative for Bosniaand Herzegovina intervention in 2002,but solution that was imposed is not symmetricalto Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.This house can be apprehended asintervening house, but National Assembly ofthe Republic of Srpska still makes decisionsas unicameral body while House of Peoplesof the Parliament of the Federation of Bosniaand Herzegovina acts as equal to Houseof Representatives of the Parliament of theFederation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.8. We have to be aware that there are alsoelections for Cantonal Assemblies, MunicipalCouncils/Assemblies, and City Councils/Assemblies so as elections for Brčko Districtand City of Mostar that will not be discussedhere for the limited length of paper.Bosnia’s peculiar constitutional structurehas the effect of segmenting the electoral marketplacealong ethnic lines. At the same time,it creates a patchwork quilt of political arenas,each with varying degrees of ethnic integrationand each with different rules for promoting ethnicintegration. In all of Bosnia’s elections, however,parties tend to compete for the votes of asingle ethnic community. No politician needs thesupport of anyone from another ethnic group inorder to get elected. There are certain officesfor which the system is structured to ensure thatmembers of a given ethnic group vote only fortheir own representatives (Manning, 2004: 71).6. ConclusionThe fundaments of the electoral systemin Bosnia and Herzegovina are based on theConstitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Annexamong all members of the appropriate constituent peoplesin the Municipal Assemblies in Republic of Srpska. By Article11.12 any political party represented in the caucuses of thetheir respective constituent peoples and the Others or anymember of one of these caucuses, including ad hoc memberselected in accordance with Article 11.11, Paragraph 2,shall have the right to propose one or more candidates onthe list for election of members of that relevant caucus. Anylist may contain a number of candidates that is larger thanthe number of members to be elected. No delegate in theNational Assembly or councilor of the Municipal Assemblymay be a candidate. Each delegate in the National Assemblyshall cast one vote for a list within his or her caucus. The voteshall be cast as a secret ballot. By Article 11.13 the results ofthe votes shall be communicated to the Election Commissionfor the final allocation of seats. Mandates shall be distributed,one by one, to the lists or candidate with the highestquotients resulting from the proportional allocation formulaprovided for in Article 9.5. of the Electoral Law of Bosnia andHerzegovina. When a list wins a mandate, the mandate shallbe allocated from the top of the list.IV, Dayton Peace Accords) and the ElectoralLaw of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We can percievethat there are two normative frames of regulatingan electoral system. Constitutional provisionson elections are very brief and short whichleads us to the point that we can determine worthinessand effects of the electoral system onlyon grounds of the Electoral Law of Bosnia andHerzegovina as a specific legal document relatedto elections and the electoral system.During the temporary electoral systemin Bosnia and Herezgovina, electoral legislationwas not adopted by authorised bodies but by theProvisional Election Commission, with supportof the OSCE. Rules and regulations were oftenchanged which affected voters and political partiesand candidates.It is not common that the Electoral Lawand related terms are at least in principles distinctedand specified in an constitution. Also,concerning the legal nature of Dayton Peace Accords,it is not strange that provisions of this kindare not explicitly and/or specifically part of ArticleII (Human rights and Fundamental Freedoms)of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina(Annex IV, Dayton Peace Accords). Concerninghuman rights and fundamental freedoms, ithas to be said that there is no integrative andconsistant approach in application of the Constitutionof Bosnia and Herezgovina in respectto international human rights standards namedespecially in the 1950 European Conventionfor the Protection of Human Rights and FundamentalFreedoms, 1966 International Covenanton Civil and Political Rights and 1989 OptionalProtocols thereto that form an integral part of thelegal system of Bosnia and Herzegovina throughAnnex I (Additional Human Rights Agreementsto be Applied in Bosnia and Herzegovina) ofConstitution of Bosnia and Herezgovina (AnnexIV, Dayton Peace Accords). The electoral procedurefor election of members of the Presidencyof Bosnia and Herzegovina and/or House ofPeoples of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosniaand Herezgovina is not in accordance withthe documents mentioned. Bosniaks and Croatson Republic of Srpska territory cannot elect theirrepresentatives and Serbs in the Federation ofBosnia and Herzegovina cannot elect their representativesin those institutions. On the otherside, the electoral system of Bosnia and Herzegovinashows national and ethnic representation.The representation of Others is not defined,especially when it comes to elections forthe Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina andthe House of Peoples of the Parliamentary As-centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr75

Maja Sahadžić: The Electoral System of Bosnia and Herzegovinasuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1sembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Others are“disqualified” and “neutralised” in their representationby the Constitution and the Electoral Law.Further analysis shows that Bosnia andHerzegovina still does not have a complete andintegral and yet democratic electoral system.This system is based on different categories ofelectoral rights titulars that do not for differentstatus materialise their rights in equal way (e.g.refugees, displaced persons, migrants, citizensof entities that can not elect all members of thegovernment, etc.).In the present electoral system of Bosniaand Herzegovina, it seems that there areno available instruments and mechanisms thatwould give citizens the opportunity to influenceelections. Citizens are not able to decide anddetermine the lists of candidates. This is donethrough political parties. Also, citizens vote forcandidates that are elected by a political partyan placed on list of candidates which meansthat citizens do not have the opportunity to electcandidates outside of the list of candidates presentedby political party. In this way, citizens donot have power to decide to elect the most competentpersons. Elected candidates are not resposibleto citizens because citizens do not havepower to revoke them. Elected candidates areresponsible to the political party they belong toand to other elected candidates.The electoral system of Bosnia and Herezgovinauses different models and principles ofmandate distribution. There are elements of bothdirect and indirect elections applied; plurality andproportional system tampered in electorates;proportional representation formula, compensatorymandates etc. Some authors are “convincedof the soundness of this and believe that the currentelectoral system of proportional representationthrough party/coalition lists (list PR) is theappropriate choice for Bosnia and Herzegovina.Nonetheless, it is conceivable that elements ofthe integration through electoral engineeringapproach, based on multiple preferential votingand/or ethnic vote distribution requirements forcertain executive posts at various levels of government,can be introduced with some success,albeit in a very limited way, in the foreseeablefuture. This should not be ruled out as permanentlyinfeasible – times change and conditionscan change with time” (Bose, 2005: 328).The electoral system of Bosnia and Herezgovinainsufficiently and poorly mirrors theconstitutional, legal, national, political and ethnicstructure of Bosnia and Herezgovina. The electoralsystem change, in line with premises andstandpoints presented in this paper, should beanticipated and expected as well as implied andinherent. The legal system of both state and thetwo entities has to be transformed and modifiedto comply with democratic electoral procedures.As a brakedown, we should state that the goalshould be such that would encompass solid andfull citizen equality, without any form of discriminationin the electoral system of Bosnia and Herzegovina.centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr76

Maja Sahadžić: The Electoral System of Bosnia and Herzegovinasuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1ReferencesBieber, F. (2006): Bosnia-Herzegovina: Slow Progress towards a Functional State, Southeast Europeanand Black Sea Studies, 6 (1): 43-64Belloni, R. (2004): “Peacebuilding and Consociational Electoral Engineering in Bosnia and Herzegovina”,International Peacekeeping, 11 (2): 334-353Belloni, R., Deane, S. (2005): From Belfast to Bosnia: Piecemeal Peacemaking and the Role ofInstitutional Learning, Civil Wars, 7 (3): 219-243Bojkov, V.D. (2003): Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Post-1995 Political System and itsFunctioning, Southeast European Politics, 4 (1): 41-67Bose, S. (2002): Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention, London:HurstChandler, D. (2000): Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton, London: Pluto PressDmičić, M. (2003): „Ustavnopravni osnov funkcionisanja Bosne i Hercegovine na osnovu slobodnih idemokratskih izbora“, http://www.soros.org.ba/docs_pravo/ustav_txt/dr_mile_dmicic.docĐorđević, J. (1975): Ustavno pravo. BeogradGoodin, R.E. (1998): The Theory of Institutional Design. Cambridge: Cambridge University PressHarris, P. and Reilly, B. (1998): Democracy and Deep – Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators.Stockholm: International IDEAKasapović, M. (2002): Obrasci izbornih reformi u stabilnim demokracijama: Novi Zeland, Italija i Japan,Politička misao, 39 (3): 3-19Manning, C. (2004): Elections and Political Change in Post-War Bosnia and Herzegovina, Democratization,11 (2): 60-86OSCE (2007): General Elections Oct. 1, 2006, OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report,Warsaw, 6 February 2007ÓTuathail, G., O’Loughlin, J., Djipa, D. (2006): Bosnia-Herzegovina Ten Years after Dayton: ConstitutionalChange and Public Opinion, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 47 (1): 61-75Pobrić, N. (2000): Ustavno pravo, Mostar: SlovoSahadžić, M. (2009): Priroda političkog sistema u Bosni i Hercegovini, in: Uvod u politički sistem Bosnei Hercegovine, Sarajevo: Sarajevski otvoreni centar, Fondacija Konrad AdenauerScholdan, B. (2000): Democratization and electoral engineering in post-ethnic conflict societies, ThePublic, 7 (1): 25-40Šiber, I. (2003): Tri klasična pristupa istraživanju ponašanja birača, Politička misao, 40 (2): 88-103Šiber, I. (2004): Interest in Elections and Electoral Participation, Politička misao, 41 (5): 3-27Søberg Shugart, M., Wattenberg, M.P. (eds) (2001): Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best ofBoth Worlds?, New York: Oxford University PressTrnka, K. (2006): Ustavno pravo. Sarajevo: Fakultet za javnu upravuDocumentsDayton Peace Accords, http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/bosagree.html (26.08.2009)Electoral Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 23/01, 23/01,7/02, 9/02, 20/02, 25/02, 4/04, 20/04, 25/05, 52/05, 65/05, 77/05, 11/06, 24/06, 32/07, 33/08,37/08Electoral Rules and Regulations for Municipal Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Official Gazette ofBosnia and Herzegovina, 10/97, 15/97Electoral Rules and Regulations for the Elections on Local and Higher Level in Bosnia and Herzegovina,Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 22/96, 25/96, 29/96, 21/96Electoral Rules and Regulations, Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1/00centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr77

Maja Sahadžić: The Electoral System of Bosnia and Herzegovinasuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1Izborni sustav Bosne i Hercegovine: Kratki prikaz političkog pitanjai/ili tehničkog nesuglasjaMAJA SAHADŽIĆPravni fakultet, Sveučilište u Zenici, Bosna i HercegovinaDaytonski mirovni pregovori održani su u zračnoj bazi Wright-Pattersonu Ohiju, SAD, od 1.-21. studenog 1995. godine. Rezultirali su Općimokvirnim sporazumom za mir u Bosni i Hercegovini (Daytonski mirovni sporazum)koji su potpisali predstavnici Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, RepublikeHrvatske, Federalne Republike Jugoslavije, a svjedočili su predstavniciSjedinjenih Američkih Država, Velike Britanije, Njemačke, Francuske, Rusije iposebnog izaslanika Europske unije. Daytonski mirovni pregovori okončali susukob u Bosni i Hercegovini i postavili osnove za ponovno uspostavljanje mira.Međutim, najvažnija pitanja demokratskog funkcioniranja države nisu se usuglasilas međunarodnopravnim standardima, poput izbora i izbornog sistema.Daytonski mirovni sporazum nastao je kao kompromis različitih ustupaka štose odražava posebno kada se govori o izborima i izbornom sustavu Bosne iHercegovine.Ključne riječi: izborni sustav, Bosna i Hercegovina, politički i tehnički problemi,izbori, Daytonski sporazumcentar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr78

Ivana Grubešić: Usklađenost pravnih propisa o dioničkim društvima u BiHsuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1UDK: 347.721(497.6: 4 EU)Pregledni radPrimljeno: 1. 9. 2009.Usklađenost pravnih propisa o dioničkimdruštvima u Bosni i Hercegovini s Uredbom ostatutu europskog društva 1 u svjetlu izmjenanacionalnog zakonodavstva o trgovačkimdruštvimaIVANA GRUBEŠIĆPravni fakultet, Sveučilište u Zenici, Bosna i HercegovinaS ciljem uspješne integracije u unutrašnje tržište Europske unije,Bosna i Hercegovina se 16.6.2009., potpisujući Sporazum o stabilizaciji ipridruživanju, obvezala poduzeti propisane mjere koje će omogućiti uspostavljanjefunkcionalnog tržišnog gospodarstva putem osnivanja jedinstvenog ekonomskogprostora temeljenog na četirima slobodama kretanja. Stoga će intenziviranjedosadašnjih napora koji su učinjeni na polju harmonizacije domaćihpropisa s komunitarnim biti usmjereno prema usklađivanju propisa statusnogposlovnog prava, ostvarujući jednu od sloboda kretanja – slobodu poslovnognastana. Samo na taj način priznat će se trgovačka društva osnovana na jedinstvenomekonomskom prostoru Bosne i Hercegovine, stvarajući konkurentnijipoložaj na unutrašnjem tržištu EU. Osnovano je pretpostaviti da će osnivanjei poslovanje europskih društava na jedinstvenom ekonomskom prostoru BiHbiti odlučujući korak u ostvarenju potpune integracije bosanskohercegovačkogtržišta u unutrašnje tržište nakon što BiH postane država članica. Europskodruštvo kao prvi nadnacionalni oblik trgovačkog društva na unutrašnjem tržištuveć je pokazalo zavidne komparativne prednosti spram društava reguliranihnacionalnim propisima. U tu svrhu potrebno je utvrditi koje su promjene većizvršene u zakonodavstvu BiH i koliko su učinkovito provedene, te koje korakeće biti potrebno učiniti kako bi dioničko društvo u BiH moglo biti osnovano kaoeuropsko društvo koje će uspješno poslovati kako na teritoriju BiH, tako i nateritoriju cijele Europske unije.Ključne riječi: usklađivanje, europsko pravo trgovačkih društava, unutrašnjetržište, europsko društvo (SE), Sporazum o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju, jedinstveniekonomski prostor1 SE – Societas Europaeacentar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr79

Ivana Grubešić: Usklađenost pravnih propisa o dioničkim društvima u BiHsuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 11. UvodU posljednjih petnaest godina došlo jedo presudnih promjena u zakonodavstvu Bosnei Hercegovine radi ostvarenja članstva u Europskojuniji. Unutrašnje tržište Europske unije razvijase već 50 godina te su mnoga pitanja još uvijeknedovoljno regulirana. Stoga je usklađivanjenacionalnog zakonodavstva s postojećim komunitarnimpropisima kompleksan proces u kojemse mora uzeti u obzir potpuno drugačiji gospodarskisustav koji je postojao sve do devedesetihgodina u Bosni i Hercegovini, ali i tendencijemodernog tržišta.Stvaranje i razvijanje unutrašnjeg tržištaEU zasniva se na harmonizaciji propisa državačlanica, a najviše se postiže uredbama i smjernicama.Pravo trećih država je da mogu takođerprovoditi usklađivanje nacionalnih propisa s komunitarnimiako još nisu pristupile EU, ili uopćenemaju to za svoj cilj. Ovakva harmonizacijapropisa zove se još i dobrovoljna harmonizacija,a može se javiti u tri oblika, zakonodavnom, upravnomi sudskom (Bodiroga-Vukobrat, 1999:45). Da bi se postigla odgovarajuća razina harmonizacijeu konkretnoj državi nečlanici, potrebnoje stvoriti odgovarajući pravni okvir, koji ćeomogućiti provođenje četiriju osnovnih slobodatržišta EU: slobode kretanja ljudi, kapitala, robai usluga, a koji se prvenstveno odnosi na „pravovlasništva, ugovorno pravo, pravo tržišnognatjecanja i pravo društava“ (Bodiroga-Vukobrat,1999: 40).Još je Bijelom knjigom iz 1995. godine 2utvrđen jedan od osnovnih ciljeva - modernizacijai ujedinjenje tržišta država istočne i središnjeEurope - gdje se posebno naglasila i potrebaza modernizacijom prava trgovačkih društava,predlažući nove zakone o trgovačkim društvimakoji će biti u skladu sa smjernicama iz područjastatusnog poslovnog prava. Na jednakim principimadonesena je i Bijela knjiga iz 2000. godine.Značaj Bijele knjige iz 2000. godine ogledase u tome što se njome „definiše programza udovoljavanje obavezama koje namećeunutrašnje tržište…koji identificira ključne mjereu svakom sektoru i predlaže redosljed aktivnostiu procesu približavanja“ 3 . Njome se predviđa os-2 U radu je korišten prijevod u izdanju Ministarstva vanjskihposlova Bosne i Hercegovine: Bijela knjiga – pripremepridruženih zemalja centralne i istočne Evrope za integracijuu unutrašnje tržište Unije, Komisija Europske zajednice,COM (95) 163 final, 3.5.1995, Bruxelles3 Europska komisija, Bijela knjiga Evropske Unije – jedinstveniekonomski prostor, preuzeto s: http://www.dei.gov.nivanje „jedinstvenog ekonomskog prostora“ 4 uBiH, koji će se postići ostvarenjem tzv. ključnihmjera, podijeljenih u dvije faze, gdje se „u prvojfazi sprovode one mjere čiji je cilj stvaranješireg okvira za detaljnu legislativu, a vezane suza fundamentalne principe ili one koje regulišuosnovne procedure, a koje su preduslov zadjelotvorno funkcionisanje unutrašnjeg tržišta uodgovarajućem sektoru“ 5 .Ostvarivanje jedinstvenog ekonomskogprostora u BiH, kako je i predviđeno Procesomstabilizacije i pridruživanja, omogućit ćelakše priključivanje unutrašnjem tržištu EU nakonšto BiH postane članica EU, te zadovoljavanjeminimalnih standarda koje ono nameće.Iako je odredbom članka 1. stavka 4. UstavaBiH predviđeno postojanje četiriju sloboda kaoi komunitarnim propisima o unutrašnjem tržištuEU, ipak je potrebno usuglasiti zakonodavstvo spostojećim komunitarnim pravom u području poslovnihodnosa. Tako neki autori navode pojedinapodručja koje je potrebno usuglasiti na prvommjestu kako bi se zadovoljili minimalni standardi(Cenić, 2008: 43), a za pravo trgovačkih društavana prvom mjestu je, pored usuglašavanja zakonana entitetskoj razini, moderniziranje upravljanjatrgovačkih društvima i veća transparentnost upogledu poslovanja.Potpisivanjem Sporazuma o stabilizacijii pridruživanju 16.6.2008. godine (u nastavku:SSP), Bosna i Hercegovina se obvezala poduzetikorake kojima će se okončati uspostavljanjejedinstvenog ekonomskog prostora. Vodećise ovim promjenama koje moraju uslijediti u BiH,pored transformacije vlasništva, potrebno je naprvom mjestu izvršiti i promjene u pogledu korporativnogupravljanja, čime će se omogućitikonkurentnost bosanskohercegovačkih tvrtki naunutrašnjem europskom tržištu. Stoga su izmjenezakona o trgovačkim društvima u posljednjihnekoliko godina bile neminovne. S obziromda na državnoj razini ne postoji jedinstveni zakono trgovačkim društvima, izvršene su izmjenei dopune entitetskih zakona o trgovačkimdruštvima. Dok je u Republici Srpskoj stupio nasnagu novi Zakon o privrednim društvima 6 , uba/bih_i_eu/najvazniji_dokumenti/dokumenti_eu/?id=1230(22.04.2009.), str. 34 Prijevod sintagme single economic space preuzet je odAjanovića i ostalih (2006: 86)5 Europska komisija, Bijela knjiga Evropske Unije – jedinstveniekonomski prostor, preuzeto s: http://www.dei.gov.ba/bih_i_eu/najvazniji_dokumenti/dokumenti_eu/?id=1230(22.04.2009.), str. 36 Zakon o privrednim društvima, („Službeni glasnik RS“br.128/08) (u daljnjem tekstu: ZPD RS).centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr80

Ivana Grubešić: Usklađenost pravnih propisa o dioničkim društvima u BiHsuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1Federaciji BiH je stupilo na snagu nekoliko izmjenai dopuna Zakona o privrednim društvimau FBiH 7 . Cilj novih izmjena i dopuna zakona otrgovačkim društvima, kako u RS, tako i u FBiH,je usklađivanje sa smjernicama komunitarnogprava iz područja prava trgovačkih društava.2. Značaj usklađivanja nacionalnih pravnihpropisa o dioničkim društvima s Uredbombr. 2157/2001 i Smjernicom br. 2001/86/ECProvođenje svih mjera predviđenih SSPomtreba biti okončano najviše šest godina odpotpisivanja SSP-a 2008. godine (čl. 8. SSP-a),gdje će se primarno provoditi mjere kojima će seusklađivati nacionalni pravni propisi s pravnomtečevinom koja regulira unutrašnje tržište EU (čl.70. st. 3. SSP-a). Na ovaj način provest će seprimarni cilj, jedinstveni ekonomski prostor na tluBiH, čime će biti ostvarena bitna pretpostavkačlanstva za EU. U tom cilju izvršene su izmjene idopune zakona o trgovačkim društvima, odnosno,njihovo usklađivanje sa smjernicama pravatrgovačkih društava EU. Ukoliko se ovaj postupakokonča uspješno, po ostvarenju članstvaBiH u EU, izbjeći će se sukobi prilikom primjenesmjernica, uredbi i drugih pravnih akata kaosekundarnih pravnih izvora acquis communitairei nacionalnih pravnih propisa. Ostvarenjem ovogcilja omogućit će se bosanskohercegovačkimtvrtkama konkurentan položaj na unutrašnjemeuropskom tržištu po ostvarenju članstva BiH uEU.Nove poslovne mogućnosti za tvrtkeotvorit će se i njihovim osnivanjem u posebnimgospodarskim oblicima predviđenim uredbamai smjernicama europskog prava trgovačkihdruštava, koje do sada nisu bile predmet regulacijenacionalnog zakonodavstva, a koje ćeomogućiti tvrtkama stjecanje istinskog europskogkaraktera. Riječ je o europskoj ekonomskojinteresnoj grupaciji (Uredba br. 2137/85), europskomdruštvu (Uredba br. 2157/2001 i Smjernica2001/86/EC), europskom uzajamnom udruženju(Uredba br. 1435/2003 i Smjernica 2003/72/EC)te europskom privatnom društvu (prijedlog statutaeuropskog privatnog društva još nije usvojen).Od posebnog značaja za razvijanje unutrašnjegtržišta pokazalo se europsko društvo, jer je usamo pet godina primjene Uredbe br. 2157/2001o statutu europskog društva osnovano nekolikostotina tvrtki u ovom gospodarskom obliku.S obzirom da je pravni status europskogdruštva reguliran putem dvaju pravnih akata,uredbom i smjernicom, posljedice po nacionalnazakonodavstva u kojima će se one primjenjivatisu različite. Uredba ima direktnu primjenuu nacionalnim zakonodavstvima, te pravni aktkoji se u tom slučaju donese od strane državečlanice ima uglavnom deklarativni karakter upogledu odnosa uredbe i nacionalnih pravnihakata, kojim se utvrđuje koje nacionalne propisekoristiti u pogledu pitanja koja nisu detaljnouređena uredbom. To znači da će se po ostvarenjučlanstva BiH u EU Uredba o statutu europskogdruštva direktno primjenjivati, dok ćenacionalni propisi koji su u suprotnosti sa Uredbombiti izvan pravne snage. Da bi se preduhitrilaovakva situacija, potrebno je poduzeti mjerekojima će se uskladiti, u ovom slučaju, odredbeo dioničkim društvima (s obzirom na činjenicu daje europsko društvo dioničko društvo – članak1. Uredbe). Olakšavajuća okolnost u ovoj situacijije ta da su Uredbom u velikoj mjeri općenitoregulirana pitanja u pogledu europskog društva,te se u mnogim pitanjima upućuje na primjenunacionalnih propisa o dioničkim društvima,usklađenih smjernicama trgovačkih društava. Sdruge strane, u pogledu primjene Smjernice br.2001/86/EC, potrebno je donijeti odgovarajućepravne propise kojima će se implementirati istau nacionalno zakonodavstvo.Dakle, uspješnim ostvarenjem postupkausklađivanja propisa kojima je reguliran pravnistatus dioničkih društava s odgovarajućim smjernicamatrgovačkih društava omogućit će se potpunoostvarenje jedinstvenog ekonomskog prostoraBosne i Hercegovine, čime će se ostvariti ipretpostavka za stjecanje članstva u EU. Nakonšto BiH postane država članica, primjena Uredbei Smjernice kojima se regulira status europskogdruštva moći će se uspješno ostvariti i najedinstvenom ekonomskom prostoru BiH, čimeće se intenzivirati priključivanje unutrašnjemtržištu EU.Stoga je ovaj rad posvećen razmatranjuu kojoj mjeri je pozitivno zakonodavstvo BiHdo sada usklađeno s pravnim propisima kojimase regulira osnivanje i poslovanje europskogdruštva te koje mogućnosti osnivanje europskogdruštva na jedinstvenom ekonomskom prostoruBiH može pružiti, nakon što BiH postane članicaEU.7 Zakon o privrednim društvima, („Službene novine FBiH“,br. 23/99, 45/00, 2/02, 6/02, 29/03, 68/05, 91/07, 85/08) (udaljnjem tekstu: ZPD FBiH).centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr81

Ivana Grubešić: Usklađenost pravnih propisa o dioničkim društvima u BiHsuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 13. Prednosti primjene Uredbe br. 2157/2001 iSmjernice br. 2001/86/ECOsnovni razlog za donošenje Uredbe ostatutu europskog društva (SE) i Smjernice kojadopunjava statut europskog društva u pogleduparticipacije zaposlenika usvojene u listopadu2001. godine u Nici 8 je ekonomskog karaktera.Kao što se navodi u točki 7. preambule Uredbe,primarni cilj je bio omogućiti osnivanje nadnacionalnogtrgovačkog društva kroz jedan organizacijskioblik, a ne kao u dotadašnjoj praksi, osnivanjempodružnica, koncerna, holdinga i sl. Time suse u velikoj mjeri smanjili troškovi osnivanja 9 teomogućila jednostavnija organizacija i efikasnijeposlovanje. S druge strane, donošenje Statutapredstavlja korak naprijed u harmonizaciji pravatrgovačkih društava u Europskoj uniji, čija jezadaća bila ujednačiti različite prakse nacionalnihposlovnih prava te stvoriti jedinstvene principeposlovanja i time omogućiti stvaranje jedinstvenogeuropskog tržišta, čiji će poslovni subjektibiti konkurentni onima na američkom i japanskomtržištu, vodećima u svjetskoj ekonomiji. BrojSE tvrtki na samom početku bio je veoma mali,ali proučavanje prednosti ovog oblika dioničkogdruštva te upoznavanje trgovačkopravnih subjekatana tržištu s komparativnim prednostimaeuropskog društva polučilo je pozitivne rezultate.Danas postoji nekoliko stotina SE tvrtki(Stollt, 2009: par.1), a njihov broj se iz godine ugodinu sve više povećava. Stoga je opravdanopostaviti pitanje: čemu SE tvrtka duguje ovolikupozornost i primjenu?Analiza pravnog statusaeuropskog društva pokazuje je da SE ima četiriprednosti koje za nacionalne kompanije nisupredviđene propisima, a također nisu svojstveneni drugim nadnacionalnim oblicima trgovačkihdruštava:8 Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 of October 2001on the Statute for a European company (SE), Official JournalL294, 10/11/2001 p. 0001-0021 (u nastavku: Uredba);Council Directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October supplementingthe Statute for a Europan company with regard to the involvementof employees, Official Journal L294, 10/11/2001p. 0022-0032 (u nastavku: Smjernica).9 Prije donošenja Uredbe morali su se plaćati posebnotroškovi prestanka postojanja i brisanja tvrtke iz nacionalnogregistra te troškovi osnivanja nove tvrtke u drugoj državičlanici ( o tome će biti riječ u nastavku teksta).1. promjena registriranog sjedišta2. nadnacionalna fuzija3. sloboda izbora sustava uprave trgovačkogdruštva te4. sloboda pregovora sa zaposlenicima.Ključ uspjeha europskog društva krije sezapravo u njenoj nadnacionalnoj prirodi, koja seogleda kako u pravnoj regulaciji, svakodnevnomposlovanju, tako i u četirima navedenima prednostima.Iako su joj mnogi uskraćivali priznanjeo nadnacionalnoj prirodi (Marychurch, 2002: 8),navodeći da pravna regulacija nije čisto nadnacionalnogkaraktera, ova tvrdnja je nesumnjivoopovrgnuta činjenicom da je europsko društvoregulirano Uredbom kao pravnim sredstvom kojese direktno primjenjuje u državama članicama,te Smjernicom, koja je svojevrsni kompromisizmeđu postojećih različitosti koje postoje uslučaju reguliranja pravnog položaja zaposlenikau trgovačkim društvima, a koji predstavljaprvi korak k usklađivanju divergentnosti zakonodavstavadržava članica po ovom pitanju 10 . Niprimjena nacionalnih propisa u pogledu pitanjakoja nisu regulirana Uredbom ili Smjernicom nijeu suprotnosti s tvrdnjom da je pravna regulacijaeuropskog, a ne nacionalnog karaktera, jer nacionalnipropisi koji se primjenjuju u konkretnimsituacijama su već usklađeni sa smjernicamatrgovačkih društava te se tada može govoritisamo o usklađenim nacionalnim propisima, ane o nacionalnim propisima. Ovako utvrđenimpravnim okvirom omogućilo se i nadnacionalnoposlovanje europskog društva bez uobičajenihnacionalnih ograničenja fizičke, pravne, ili ekonomskeprirode.Iako je predviđena svjetla budućnostSE, ekonomski tokovi europskog i svjetskogtržišta, te legislativa kojom se regulira pravotrgovačkih društava nakon donošenja Uredbeu velikoj mjeri će utjecati na primjenu ove Uredbeprilikom osnivanja trgovačkih društava ubudućnosti. Stoga je opravdano i prednosti SE10 Najveća kočnica u donošenju pravnih propisa bila je participacijaradnika u upravljanju. S obzirom na činjenicu da ueuropskim zemljama postoji nekoliko sustava sudjelovanjaradnika u upravljanju, od onih u kojima je već uspostavljenatradicija sudjelovanja radnika, do onih gdje uopće nijepredviđeno sudjelovanje, bilo je jako teško utvrditi modelkoji će se primjenjivati u svim zemljama Europske unije.Nakon trideset godina truda, ostvaren je kompromis u vidusmjernice koja, s jedne strane utvrđuje obavezne odredbezajedničke za sve države članice, kao što je pregovaranjes radnicima i prije osnivanja europskog društva, a s drugestrane, ostavlja mogućnost državama da same reguliraju topodručje nacionalnim propisima, koji, također moraju biti uskladu sa Smjernicom.centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr82

Ivana Grubešić: Usklađenost pravnih propisa o dioničkim društvima u BiHsuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1promatrati kroz prizmu vjerojatnih promjena kojeće uslijediti pod utjecajem dvaju faktora:1. Izvješće o primjeni Uredbe te mogući izmjenei dopune iste, koje će Komisija uputitiVijeću u Parlamentu, pet godina nakon štoUredba stupi na snagu (do kraja 2009. godine)- Izvješćem će Komisija utvrditi u kojojmjeri je SE prihvaćena na europskom i nacionalnomtržištu, koje su negativne stranestatuta SE, a također je predviđeno i predlaganjeizmjena i dopuna statuta SE, poodređenim pitanjima (čl.69. Uredbe).2. Legislativa u području europskog pravatrgovačkih društava donesena nakon stupanjaUredbe na snagu.države članice bi nastojale privući nadnacionalnetvrtke da se osnuju na njihovom teritoriju,ipak je malo vjerojatno da će to dovesti doDelawareovog efekta u EU, „utrke prema dnu“odnosno, kontinuiranog ograničavanja strogihuvjeta predviđenih za osnivanje i poslovanjetvrtki s ciljem privlačenja većeg broja investitorakoji će na posve jednostavan način osnovatitvrtku, zbog činjenice da je pravo trgovačkihdruštava već u velikom segmentu harmonizirano.13 S obzirom da je prijedlog 14. Smjernice onadnacionalnom prijenosu registriranog sjedištaodbijen, europsko društvo će (za sad) i dalje ostatijedini oblik trgovačkog društva (dioničkog)koji ima mogućnost transfera registriranogsjedišta. 14Usvajanjem Uredbe SE po prvi put upovijesti omogućilo se tvrtkama premještanjeregistriranog sjedišta iz jedne države u drugubez prestanka njihovog pravnog postojanja(čl.8. st.1. Uredbe). Nesumnjiva komparativnapredost se ogleda u činjenici da tvrtke u ovomslučaju imaju pravni kontinuitet iako su registriranosjedište premjestile iz jedne države članice udrugu, uz nesrazmjerno manje troškove u odnosuna one koje bi imale da premještaju registriranosjedište primjenjujući nacionalne propise 11 ,čime se povećava i pravna sigurnost slobodekretanja trgovačkih društava 12 . Otežavajućaokolnost u pogledu slobodnog premještanjaregistriranog sjedišta je obaveza da i stvarnoi registrirano sjedište mora biti smješteno u istojdržavi članici, s ciljem sprječavanja mogućihtzv. pseudo-tvrtki (McCahery i dr., 2005: 788).Ovakvo uređenje je protivno pravu nastanatrgovačkih društava, a s druge strane, smatrase da kao takvo smanjuje konkurentnost SEpostavljanjem ovako strogog uvjeta. To je prvo,a ujedno i najkontroverznije pitanje o kojem ćeKomisija podnijeti izvješće, u smislu ponovnograzmatranja te moguće promjene, s ciljem da seomogući europskim društvima da imaju stvarnoi registrirano sjedište u različitim državamačlanicama. Iako bi se time povećala konkurentnosteuropskog društva, u smislu većeg brojaosnovanih tvrtki u ovom obliku, a s druge strane,11 Troškovi prestanka postojanja i brisanja trgovačkogdruštva iz nacionalnog registra, te troškovi osnivanja novogtrgovačkog društva u drugoj državi članici.12 Veća pravna sigurnost ogleda se u činjenici da ukolikobi se premještanje registriranog sjedišta vršilo primjenomnacionalnih propisa, tada bi država članica u kojoj se želiponovno osnovati kompanija mogla odbiti registraciju iste, ilipostaviti strožije uvjete osnivanja.Činjenica da je najveći broj SE tvrtkiosnovan putem fuzije dovoljan je pokazateljda je jedna od najvećih prednosti ovog oblikadioničkog društva upravo međunarodna fuzija 15 .Regulirana po prvi put Uredbom 16 , međunarodnafuzija predstavlja mogućnost jednostavnijegnadnacionalnog povezivanja i organiziranjatvrtki te smanjenja troškova poslovanja kako uEuropi tako i u svijetu (ovdje se prvenstvenomisli na porezne obaveze). Stoga se opravdanimsmatra da se pitanje međunarodne fuzijerazmotri u izvješću Komisije, te proširi konceptfuzije. Članak 17. stavak 2. Uredbe poziva sena dva postojeća načina ostvarivanja fuzije,odnosno, na dvije vrste fuzije: fuzija pripajanjemi fuzija spajanjem, kako je i regulirano 3. Smjernicom.Također Uredba predviđa još jedan oblikfuzije, koji nije previđen 3. Smjernicom 17 , aradi se o fuziji od strane holdinga, gdje tvrtkakoja prestaje postojati, bez vršenja likvidaci-13 pogledati više o tome u: McCahery et al., 200514 Pored SE, mogućnost transfera registriranog sjedištapostoji i u slučaju europskog uzajamnog društva, čl. 7. Uredbebr. 1435/2003 (europsko uzajamno društvo, za razlikuod SE, može u statutu propisati i neograničenu odgovornostdioničara, pa prema tome nije klasično dioničko društvo kaoSE (čl. 2. st. 2. Uredbe br. 1435/2003) (Council Regulation(EC) No 1435/2003 of 22 July 2003 on the Statute for a EuropeanCooperative Society (SCE), Official Journal L 207,18/08/2003, p. 1-24)15 Pored međunarodne fuzije kao načina osnivanja europskogdruštva, uredbom su predviđena još tri načina: osnivanjeSE u vidu holdinga, u obliku supsidijarne tvrtke drugogdioničkog društva, te transformacijom dioničkog društva uSE (čl. 2. Uredbe).16 Čl. 17.-31. Uredbe reguliraju nadnacionalnu fuziju.17 Third Council Directive 78/855/EEC of 9 October 1978based on the Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty concerning mergersof public limited liability companies, Official Journal L295, 20.10.1978., čl. 3-4centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr83

Ivana Grubešić: Usklađenost pravnih propisa o dioničkim društvima u BiHsuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1je, svu svoju aktivu i pasivu prenosi na drugutvrtku, koja već drži sve vrijednosne papire,odnosno dionice osnivačkog kapitala te tvrtke.Ovaj vid fuzije je predviđen kasnije i Smjernicomo međunarodnoj fuziji, u čl. 2. st. 2. točkac). Međutim, Uredbom se predviđa razmatranjei drugih mogućih načina izvršenja fuzije, osimgore navedenih. U tu svrhu potrebno je uzeti uobzir moguće novine koje budu predviđene udrugim direktivama, usvojenim nakon Uredbe,međutim, za sada nije predložen drugačiji načinfuzije, osim tri navedena, pa ni u Smjernici omeđunarodnim fuzijama.Mogućnost slobodnog odabira izmeđujednoslojnog i dvoslojnog sustava uprave (štodo sada nije bio slučaj u državama članicama,osim u nekoliko njih 18 ) jedan je od razloga osnivanjavelikog broja SE tvrtki (članak 38. Uredbe).Time je omogućena veća konkurentnostnaspram drugih oblika trgovačkih društava, štose posebno može primijetiti u državama gdje jeosnovan veliki broj europskih društava sa sustavomuprave koji je drugačiji od onog koji jedominantan u toj državi članici 19 . Nesumnjivoje da će ovakva uprava tvrtke dovesti i do konvergencijerazličitih sustave uprave koji postojeu EU na način što će se tvrtke uvijek priklanjationom načinu upravljanja koji je podobniji zaposlovanje i na jedinstvenom europskom i nasvjetskom tržištu. Ovdje se ne smije zanemaritičinjenica da je do velikih promjena u pogleduupravljanja kompanijama došlo kako u svijetu,tako i u EU. Posljednje desetljeće je desetljećekorporativnog upravljanja, pa su se na područjueuropskog prava trgovačkih društava izvršilevelike promjene po pitanju korporativnog upravljanja.Uzimajući u obzir dva postojeća sustavauprave koja postoje u EU, jednoslojni i dvoslojnisustav uprave, te odnose dioničara, nadzornogi upravnog odbora, odlučeno je da je potrebnoizvršiti usuglašavanje ovih propisa. Do prvepromjene je došlo nakon što je odlučeno dase pri izvršenju promjena koristi tzv. „otvorenametoda koordinacije“, 20 a nakon toga je formi-18 Italija i Francuska, preuzeto iz: Horak, Dumančić, 2007:13719 Od ukupnog broja tvrtki koje su se odlučile za jednoslojnisustav uprave, oko 50% ih je prešlo s dotadašnjeg dvoslojnogsustava koji je dominantan u državi u kojoj su registriranena jednoslojni sustav uprave (najviše u Njemačkoj), dokse svega nekoliko tvrtki odlučilo za dvoslojni sustav upraveumjesto jednoslojnog sustava koji dominira u državi njeneregistracije (Austrija) (podaci preuzeti iz: Schwimbersky,2007).20 više o tome kod: Mavrommati i Papathanassiou, 2006rana grupa stručnjaka pod nazivom „WinterGroup“ (Baums, 2007: 2), koja je imala za ciljrazviti akcijski plan za pravo trgovačkih društavakoji je uključivao i niz mjera o promjenama korporativnogupravljanja. Na osnovi izvješća ovegrupe stvoren je akcijski plan „Moderniziranjeprava trgovačkih društava i jačanje korporativnogupravljanja u Europskoj uniji – plan zanapredovanje“, kojim su predviđene dvadeset ičetiri mjere koje su se trebale implementirati ukraćim i dužim rokovima u sljedećih nekoliko godina(Baums, 2007: 3). Ovim akcijskim planomnastoji se izvršiti i simplifikacija prava trgovačkihdruštava jer je grupa stručnjaka utvrdila danema potrebe za opsežnom legislativom koja ćesamo stvarati nove troškove, nego je potrebnodopuniti već postojeću legislativu te primjenjivatione mjere koje neće uzrokovati velike troškovedržava članica prilikom procesa modernizacije 21(što je od velikog značaja za Bosnu i Hercegovinu,koja, pored usklađivanja s već postojećomkomunitarnom legislativom, mora uzimati u obziri tekuće promjene kao i mogućnost budućihpromjena na polju korporativnog upravljanja).Ono što je zaključeno, nakon analizetrenutnog stanja i ciljeva postavljenih akcijskimplanom, je to da nije potreban jedinstveni europskizakon koji će regulirati područje korporatvnogupravljanja 22 , jer time se ne bi postigao osnovnicilj – „efikasnost i konkurentnost poslovanja, tejačanje prava dioničara i trećih osoba“ 23 . Smatrase da nacionalna zakonodavstva i dalje imajuveliki utjecaj na kompanijsko upravljanje, te daje divergentnost u sustavu korporativnog upravljanjapotrebna između država članica jer se takosamo potiče konkurentnost te će budućnost pokazatikoji model upravljanja je i najprivlačniji potencijalniminvestitorima i osnivačima. Analizompredviđenih mjera, može se primijetiti da je na21 tzv. „The SLIM-plus – Simpler Legislation for the InternalMarket“ (više o tome pogledati u: Saenger, 2005: 31622 Do identičnog zaključka došle su i međunarodne organizacijeOECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment) i ICGN (International Cocrporate Governancenetwork) donošenjem međunarodnih standarda o korporativnomupravljanju, zaključivši da je nemoguće utvrditi sistemuprave kompanije koji će odgovarati svim kompanijama naglobalnom tržištu (više o tome pogledati u: Monks et.al.,2004: 298.)23 Commission of the European Communities (2003): Communicationfrom the Commission to the Council and theEuropean Parliament – Modernising Company Law andEnhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union –A plan to Move Forward, COM(2003)284 (final), Brussels,URL= http://www.gurn.info/en/topics/corporate-governance/industrialised-countries/industrialized-countries/the-ec-communication-modernising-company-law-and-enhancing-corporate-governance-in-the-european-union-a-plan-to-moveforward-may-2003(13.04.2009.)centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr84

Ivana Grubešić: Usklađenost pravnih propisa o dioničkim društvima u BiHsuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1području korporativnog upravljanja predviđenoprovođenje korporativnih ciljeva akcijskog planaputem smjernica 24 i preporuka 25 . Evidentno jeda će upravljanje europskim društvom, usprkossvojoj inovativnosti i prihvaćenosti na europskomtržištu, doživjeti određene promjene, slijedećipostojeće moderne tokove tržišta, s ciljem ostvarenjaveće konkurentnosti naspram drugihnadnacionalnih oblika trgovačkih društava.Posljednja, ali ne i manje bitna, prednostSE je sloboda pregovaranja sa zaposlenicima.S obzirom na postojeće različitosti u državamačlanicama u pogledu pravnog položaja zaposlenikau tvrtkama 26 , uređenje statusa zaposlenikasmjernicom u slučaju SE tvrtki je bilo od presudnogznačaja, jer se nije nametnuo jedinstvenisustav regulacije njihovog položaja, negoje svakoj državi članici omogućeno da doneseodgovarajuća rješenja uzimajući u obzir postojećisustav sudjelovanja zaposlenika u upravljanju.Stoga neće u svakoj SE tvrtki postojati uvijekparticipacija zaposlenika, kao jedan od tri oblikasudjelovanja koje regulira Smjernica (informiranje,konzultiranje i participacija) 27 , ali informiranje24 Predviđeno je da smjernicama a budu regulirana sljedećapitanja iz područja korporativnog upravljanja: jačanje načelajavnosti u radu uprave, jačanje položaja dioničara, odgovornostčlanova uprave za financijski obračun, jačanje načelajavnosti u pogledu ulaganja investitora, mogućnost slobodnogizbora između jednoslojnog i dvoslojnog sustava uprave,jačanje odgovornosti članova uprave, Commission ofthe European Communities (2003): Communication from theCommission to the Council and the European Parliament –Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governancein the European Union – A plan to Move Forward,COM(2003)284 (final), Brussels, URL= http://www.gurn.info/en/topics/corporate-governance/industrialised-countries/industrialized-countries/the-ec-communication-modernising-company-law-and-enhancing-corporate-governancein-the-european-union-a-plan-to-move-forward-may-2003(13.04.2009.)25 Predviđeno je da sljedeća pitanja budu regulirana preporukama:jačanje uloge neovisnih neizvršnih direktora, razvojodgovarajućeg sustava plaćanja direktora, Commissionof the European Communities (2003): Communication fromthe Commission to the Council and the European Parliament– Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governancein the European Union – A plan to Move Forward,COM(2003)284 (final), Brussels, URL= http://www.gurn.info/en/topics/corporate-governance/industrialised-countries/industrialized-countries/the-ec-communication-modernising-company-law-and-enhancing-corporate-governancein-the-european-union-a-plan-to-move-forward-may-2003(13.04.2009.)26 Prije donošenja Smjernice osamnaest država članica jenacionalnim propisima reguliralo direktnu ili indirektnu participacijuzaposlenika u odlučivanju, devet država članica nijepropisima reguliralo participaciju zaposlenika, iako je u nekimaod njih (Italija i Belgija) postojala praksa da predstavnicizaposlenika sudjeluju u radu upravnog odbora tvrtke (podacipreuzeti iz: Kluge, Stollt, 2004: 4.).27 Navedeni pojmovi su definirani odredbama članka 2.i konzultiranje su obavezujući. Iako ovakav načinuređenja položaja zaposlenika ostavlja dojamda prava zaposlenika nisu dovoljno zaštićena,Smjernicom je ipak utvrđena donja granica u pogleduprava koju ne smiju preći države članiceprilikom implementacije Smjernice u svoja zakonodavstva,u obliku standardnih pravila (čl. 7.Smjernice). Njima je utvrđen minimalan sadržajprava na informiranje, konzultacije te participacijuzaposlenika, kojima se u znatnoj mjeri štiti i jačapoložaj zaposlenika. Rješenja o pitanju položajazaposlenika možda nisu dobila svoj konačan obliku Smjernici, stoga je potrebno naglasiti da supo prvi put Smjernicom regulirana sva tri pravazaposlenika (za razliku od dosadašnjih rješenja,gdje je npr. Smjernicom o europskim radničkimvijećima regulirana samo prava na informiranje ikonzultiranje) te je i na ovaj način učinjen velikikorak u pogledu približavanja različitih sustavareguliranja položaja zaposlenika.Svjestan nesavršenosti Uredbe, zakonodavacje predvidio i razmatranje te mogućeizmjene u cilju poboljšanja pravnog položajaeuropskog društva čl. 8. st. 16. Uredbe, kojipredviđa nadležnost države članice u kojojje bilo smješteno registirano sjedište prijepremještanja registriranog sjedišta SE u drugudržavu članicu, u slučaju dizanja tužbe premaSE prije premještanja sjedišta. Člankom 69. st.1. točka (c) predviđeno je da se ova odredbatreba promijeniti u slučaju bilo kakvi promjena,odnosno umetanja novih odredbi u Briselskukonvenciju iz 1968. godine, odnosno, ukoliko sedonese drugi pravni akt kojim će se zamijenitiova konvencija. U svjetlu ovih promjena, smatrase za shodno razmotriti i mogućnost dopuštanjaodredbi u statutima SE, prihvaćenih od stranedržava članica o izvršenju njihovih nadležnosti,bilo od strane Uredbe ili drugog zakona koji sudoneseni radi lakše primjene Uredbe, bez obzirajesu li te odredbe u skladu s ovim zakonima, čaki ukoliko takve odredbe nisu dopuštene u statutimadruštava s ograničenom odgovornoščuu tim državama članicama (čl. 69. st. 1. točka(d) Uredbe). Time bi se omogućilo da statut SEsadrži i odredbe koje su u skladu sa najnovijimkretanjima tržišta, bez obzira što kao takve nisudopuštene u statutima domaćih tvrtki, čime bi iatraktivnost ovog oblika trgovačkog društva poraslate omogućila širu primjenu na svjetskomtržištu.Smjernicecentar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr85

Ivana Grubešić: Usklađenost pravnih propisa o dioničkim društvima u BiHsuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 14. Usklađenost nacionalnih pravnih propisa odioničkim društvima s Uredbom br. 2157/2001o statutu europskog društvaNa osnovi dosadašnje analize pravnogstatusa europskog društva te činjenice da SE imaoblik dioničkog društva, jednostavno je zaključitida je jedini usporedivi oblik od četiriju predviđenihZakonom o privrednim društvima u FBiH, odnosnopo Zakonu o privrednim društvima u RS-u 28 ,dioničko društvo. Iako je izvršen veliki pomaku usklađivanju propisa u pogledu pravnog statusadioničkih društava u posljednjih godinudana, još uvijek se nije razmatralo pravno sredstvoputem kojeg će se implementirati Smjernica2001/86/EC, odnosno omogućiti primjena Uredbe2157/2001 nakon što BiH postane državačlanica. Uobičajena praksa država članica jedonošenje dvaju zakona 29 , gdje se jednim vršiimplementacija Smjernice 2001/86/EC, dok sedrugim uređuje primjena Uredbe. U ovakvomslučaju zakon kojim se regulira primjena Uredbeisključuje primjenu bilo kakvih nacionalnihpropisa koji su mu u suprotnosti, te djeluje kaolex specialis naspram propisa kojim se regulirapoložaj nacionalnih trgovačkih društava, kao lexgenerali propisa.S obzirom da u BiH još nije donesenodgovarajući propis o primjeni Uredbe iSmjernice, potrebno je utvrditi u kojoj mjeri suusklađeni entitetski zakoni i propisi kojima seregulira pravni status europskog društva.5. Odnos europske kompanije i dioničkogdruštva u pozitivnom zakonodavstvu Bosnei HercegovineKao i u slučaju europskog društva,dioničko društvo u BiH ima osnivački kapitalpodijeljen na dionice, gdje su dioničari odgovorniza obaveze društva samo do visine vrijednostisvojih dionica (čl.107. ZPD FBiH, odnosno,čl.179. ZPD RS). Na osnivanje SE primjenjujuse nacionalni propisi koji se odnose na dionička28 U odredbi članka 3. Zakona o privrednim društvimau FBiH, predviđena su četiri oblika trgovačkih društava(društvo s neograničenom solidarnom odgovornošću, komanditnodruštvo, dioničko društvo i društvo s ograničenomodgovornošću), a jednak broj trgovačkih oblika predviđenje i u odredbi članka 2. Zakona o privrednim društvimau RS-u (ortačko društvo, komanditno društvo, društvo sograničenom odgovornošću i dioničko društvo).29 pogledati više o tome na: URL= http://www.worker-participation.eu/European-Company/Countries-Transposition(08.10.2009.)društva te države, te je nužno u ovom segmentuuskladiti nacionalno zakonodavstvo s 1.Smjernicom, 30 čime će se zadovoljiti zahtjev upogledu transparentnosti osnivanja i poslovanjaprivrednih društava u BiH. Ali, najveći problemkoji se postavlja u ovoj situaciji nije taj jesu li zakoniu BiH usklađeni s 1. Smjernicom, nego je lipitanje registriranja trgovačkih društava reguliranona entitetskoj razini, a ne na državnom (što jeposljedica činjenice da su i zakoni o trgovačkimdruštvima na entitetskoj razini). Iz ovog razlogadioničko društvo osnovano u jednom entitetu,ukoliko želi poslovati u drugom entitetu, obaveznoje osnovati podružnicu, što je istaknuto kaojedan od vodećih problema u području pravatrgovačkih društava u Izvješću o napretku Bosnei Hercegovine u 2009. godini, koje je KomisijaEuropskih zajednica dostavila Europskom parlamentui vijeću (Komisija Europskih zajednica2009: 38) (dvostruki troškovi osnivanja jednogdioničkog društva koje želi poslovati u oba entiteta).Osnivanje i SE i dioničkih društavau BiH provodi se upisom u registar trgovačkihdruštava 31 , čime društvo stječe pravnu sposobnost,te odgovara za svoje obaveze od tog trenutka(čl.5. ZPD FBiH, čl.8. ZPD RS). Jednakorješenje problema predviđa se kako Uredbomtako i našim nacionalnim propisima, ukolikoneka osoba preuzme obaveze u ime društva prijenjegovog osnivanja. Tada ta osoba, odnosnoosobe, odgovaraju za preuzete obaveze, a nedruštvo koje kasnije budu registrirali (čl.12. ZPDRS kao i čl.5. ZPD FBiH u usporedbi s čl.16.st.2.Uredbe).Osnovni elementi osnivačkog akta,odnosno statuta dioničkog društva, te podatci kojise upisuju u registar društava predviđeni u BiH,usklađeni su također s 1. Smjernicom koja se uovom slučaju primjenjuje na europsko društvo.Kao što se u BiH prilikom registracije dioničkogdruštva u nazivu mora navesti skraćenica „d.d.“,tako se i prilikom osnivanja europskog društva,u nazivu mora navesti skraćenica „SE“ čimese daje na znanje trećim osobama da se radio dioničkom društvu jer se SE može osnovati30 više o tome: Kasagić, 2007.31 Za europska društva nije predviđen poseban registar,nego se vrši upis u registar trgovačkih društava na nacionalnojrazini, ali se u isto vrijeme objavljuju podaci o registracijiSE u Službenom listu Europske unije. Također je potrebnonapomenuti da je 1992. godine započet projekt o jedinstvenomEuropskom trgovačkom registru, koji danas uvezujeregistre 21 države iz Europe, te na taj način olakšava informiranjeo pojedinim trgovačkim društvima, uz omogućavanjepristupa bitnim dokumentima koji se nalaze u evidenciji(Meškić, Reichelt, 2008: 172).centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr86

Ivana Grubešić: Usklađenost pravnih propisa o dioničkim društvima u BiHsuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1samo u obliku dioničkog društva (čl.13. st.4.ZPD FBiH i čl.18. st.4. ZPD RS u usporedbi sčl.11. st.1. Uredbe).Zajednička karakteristika SE i dioničkihdruštava u BiH je činjenica da postoji minimalaniznos osnivačkog kapitala. Dok je za SEpredviđen u vrijednosti od 120 000 eura, u FBiHje predviđeno za zatvorena dionička društvaosnivački kapital u vrijednosti od 50 000 KM(čl.127. ZPD FBiH), a za otvorena dioničkadruštva 4 000 000 KM (čl.6. Zakona o izmjenamai dopunama zakona o privrednim društvima), dok je u RS-u predviđeni osnivački kapital zazatvoreno dioničko društvo 20 000 KM, a za otvorenou vrijednosti od 50 000 KM (čl.228. ZPDRS). S obzirom na činjenicu da se posljednjimizmjenama i dopunama zakona u BiH predviđenedvije vrste dioničkih društava, otvorena i zatvorena,europsko društvo po svom karakteruodgovaralo bi otvorenim dioničkim društvima, aline na temelju kriterija broja dioničara ili visineosnivačkog kapitala, nego na temelju činjeniceda se SE kao dioničko društvo uvrštava na burzute se dionice nude putem javne ponude. U pogleduosnivačkog kapitala, njegovog povećanja,smanjenja, potrebno je uzeti u obzir 2. Smjernicukojom su regulirana ova pitanja, a na kojuse Uredba poziva (čl.5. Uredbe). Kao i u slučajuSE, i u BiH se predviđa postojanje više različitihklasa dionica, koje nose sa sobom određenaprava dioničarima (čl.199. ZPD RS, odnosnočl.195. ZPD FBiH u usporedbi sa čl.60. Uredbe).Prilikom osnivanja europskog društva, alii dioničkih društava u BiH, ulog dioničara možebiti u novcu, ili u stvarima čija vrijednost je jednakavrijednosti dionica čiji oni postaju vlasnici,ali nikada u obliku obaveza ili usluga (čl. 187.ZPD RS, odnosno čl. 128. ZPD FBiH).Uredbom SE predviđeni su skupštinadioničara i organ ili organi uprave kao organitvrtke. U tom smislu, Uredba predviđa, kao štoje prije spomenuto i jednoslojni i dvoslojni sustavuprave u SE, tako da se tvrtke u državamačlanicama mogu osnovati i s onim oblikom upravekoji nije predviđen nacionalnim zakonodavstvom.U BiH je predviđen dvoslojni sustavuprave kao dominantan. Dakle, u ovom segmentuzakoni o trgovačkim društvima u entitetimanisu usklađeni s Uredbom, što je potrebnododatno uskladiti donošenjem posebnog zakonao primjeni Uredbe o europskom društvu.Kao osnovni organ društva u BiH jepredviđena skupština dioničara. Nadležnostiskupštine, tj. odluke koje ona donosi reguliranesu čl. 246. ZPD FBiH, odnosno, čl. 281. ZPDRS, a koje ne odstupaju u pogledu ovlaštenjakoje ima skupština SE. Ovo pitanje je u jednomdijelu regulirano i nacionalnim propisima, kako jeutvrđeno Uredbom, tako da će se pitanja reguliranaentitetskim zakonima o trgovačkim društvimaprimjenjivati ukoliko se europsko društvo osnujena teritoriju BiH (nakon što BiH postanečlanica EU) u situaciji kada to pitanje već izričitonije stavljeno pod nadležnost skupštine samomUredbom. I Uredbom i zakonima je predviđenonajmanje jednom godišnje sastajanje skupštine,uz mogućnost i izvanrednih sjednica. Na jednaknačin je riješeno i pitanje kvoruma te donošenjaodluka: kvorum čine dioničari koji posjeduju višeod 50% dionica s pravom glasa (čl. 57. Uredbe,odnosno čl. 248. ZPD FBiH i čl. 283. ZPDRS), a odluke se donose običnom većinom,osim u iznimnim situacijama kada je potrebnadvotrećinska većina (čl. 284. ZPD RS i čl. 248.ZPD FBiH, dok se u Uredbi navodi konkretnasituacija u kojoj je potrebna dvotrećinska većinaprisutnih dioničara, a to je donošenje izmjena idopuna statuta SE, mada se člankom 57. Uredbenavodi da će se postupiti prema nacionalnimpropisima ukoliko oni predviđaju i veću većinu zaizglasavanje određene odluke).Pored osnovnih imovinskih pravapredviđenih Uredbom i zakonima u BiH 32 ,predviđaju se i upravna prava koja su ujedno i instrumentizaštite dioničara u tvrtki 33 Sudjelovanjemu radu skupštine, u smislu donošenja odluka,sazivanja skupštine, predlaganje dnevnogreda, predlaganja izmjena dnevnog reda, informiranjemo radu dioničkog društva, predlaganjemi imenovanjem članova nadzornog odborai odbora za reviziju (Dautbašić, 2004: 24),dioničari omogućavaju uspješnije poslovanjetvrtke te veći profit, kao i dividende, a jednakaprava predviđena su i Uredbom o SE, člancima54-59.Zakonom o privrednim društvima FBiHpredviđen je dvoslojni sustav uprave, odnosno,postojanje nadzornog i upravnog odbora,dok se u RS predviđa jednak sustav uprave, snešto drugačijim nazivima: upravni odbor (kojiima nadzornu funkciju) i izvršni odbor. Kao štoje predviđeno i čl. 40. st. 2. Uredbe, članovinadzornog odbora su imenovani od straneskupštine dioničara, a na jednak način je ovopitanje riješeno i u BiH (čl. 246. st. 1. točka 12.ZPD FBiH, odnosno, čl. 300. ZPD RS). Intere-32 O imovinskim pravima predviđenim gospodarskim zakonimau BiH, u koje ubrajamo pravo na dividendu, pravoprvenstva pri kupovini dionica, pravo na dio likvidacijske ilistečajne mase pogledati više u: Dukić, 2004.; Dautbašić,2004.33 više o tome kod: Muhadžić, 2001.centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr87

Ivana Grubešić: Usklađenost pravnih propisa o dioničkim društvima u BiHsuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1santno je napomenuti i to da se novim Zakonomo privrednim društvima RS predviđa i obavezaupravnog odbora da formira dvije komisije kojeće pomoći u izvršavanju obaveza upravnogodbora, dok isto nije predviđeno Zakonom oprivrednim društvima FBiH. To su komisija zaimenovanje i komisija za naknade (čl. 308. ZPDRS), što je danas uobičajena praksa u poslovanjutrgovačkih društava u EU da putem osnivanjaposebnih komisija olakšaju rad članova upravekoji vrše nadzor nad poslovanjem tvrtke. Dakle,po ovom pitanju nije izvršeno usklađivanje entitetskihzakona o trgovačkim društvima, kao nitipotpuno usklađivanje s komunitarnim propisima.Kao što je regulirano Uredbom, članoveupravnog odbora u FBiH, odnosno članoveizvršnog odbora u RS, imenuju i razrješavajufunkcije nadzorni odbor u FBiH (čl. 269. st.1.točka 5. ZPD FBiH), odnosno upravni odbor u RS(čl. 304. st. 1. točka 2. ZPD RS). Osnovna obvezaupravnog odbora u FBiH, odnosno izvršnogodbora u RS, svakodnevno je poslovanje tvrtke,odnosno donošenje odluka o svakodnevnomposlovanju tvrtke, što je također predviđeno kaoosnovna obveza upravnog odbora SE.Posebno je od značaja naglasiti da jepredviđena solidarna odgovornost i Uredbom izakonima o trgovačkim društvima u BiH članovauprave u slučaju nanošenja trgovačkom društvuuslijed neizvršavanja ili neurednog izvršavanjasvojih obveza (čl. 51. Uredbe u usporedbi sa čl.271. i 272. ZPD FBiH i čl. 319. ZPD RS). Takođerpostoji i obveza čuvanja podataka u tajnosti naodređeni vremenski rok i nakon što osoba buderazriješena funkcije u upravi (čl. 49. Uredbe uusporedbi sa čl. 32. i čl. 33. ZPD FBiH i čl. 38.ZPD RS).Kao što je za poslovanje trgovačkihdruštava, a samim time i SE od velikog značajaPreporuka u pogledu uloge neovisnih članovauprave te ostale preporuke koje se odnose na korporativnoupravljanje 34 , u BiH su također donesenistandardi o organima dioničkih društava,kojima se nastoji olakšati i poboljšati izvršavanjenjihovih obveza. 2002. godine u FBiH 35 kao i u34 Commision recommendation 2005/162/EC of 15 February2005 on the role of non-executive or supervisory directorsof listed companies and on the committees of the (supervisory)board, Official Journal L 52, 25.02.2005., p. 51-63.;Commission recommendation 2004/913/EC of 14 December2004 fostering an appropriate regime for the remunerationof directors of listed companies, Official Journal L 385,14.12.2004., p. 55-59.35 Standardi upravljanja dioničkim društvima („Službenenovine FBiH“, br.32/01, 17/02.), te kasnije donesena Pravilaupravljanja dioničkim društvima („Službene novine FBiH“,24/06, 30/07.)RS 36 , Komisija za vrijednosne papire dobila jeovlaštenje za utvrđivanje standarda upravljanjadioničkim društvima, čiji je cilj unaprjeđenje korporativnogupravljanja, u smislu jačanja pravadioničara, prava i obveza članova uprave.Potrebno je napomenuti i to da su ovi standardidoneseni od strane neprivatnopravnog tijela i dasu nepravnog karaktera (Rajčević, 2007: 446),ali iako u najvećoj mjeri sadrže preporuke, ipakimaju i odredbe koje su obvezujućeg karaktera,a koje imaju osnovu u zakonima te time ispunjavajusvoj cilj – dopunu postojećih obveznih zakonskihpropisa. Dionička društva nisu obveznaprihvatiti ih i primjenjivati, ali u tom slučaju morajudati obvezno obrazloženje o neprihvaćanjustandarda. Ovo je inače uobičajena praksa u EUu pogledu pravno neobvezujućih akata kao štosu preporuke, a kojima se nastoji uskladiti praksau različitim državama članicama. I u ovompogledu BiH je otišla još jedan korak bliže EU,uspostavljajući jednake standarde korporativnogupravljanja na unutrašnjem tržištu.S obzirom na činjenicu da je Uredbomdosta oskudno regulirano i pitanje prestankapostojanja SE, gdje se upućuje na primjenu nacionalnihzakonodavstava, odredbe o prestankupostojanja dioničkih društava primjenjivat će se iu ovoj situaciji na SE (čl. 71. ZPD FBiH i čl. 336.ZPD RS).6. Načini osnivanja europskog društva injihov odnos sa statusnim promjenamatrgovačkih društava u BiHOd četiriju načina osnivanja europskogdruštva, dva načina predstavljaju statusne promjene.Radi se o osnivanju SE fuzijom i osnivanjeSE transformacijom dioničkog društva u SE (čl.2. st. 1. i st. 4. Uredbe). Zakonima o trgovačkimdruštvima u BiH predviđena je fuzija kao jednaod statusnih promjena 37 , a čijom primjenom bise mogla osnovati SE na teritoriju BiH (nakonšto BiH postane država članica EU) 38 . Kao i uUredbi, i ZPD FBiH i ZPD RS predviđaju dvaoblika fuzije, odnosno spajanja: spajanje uz pripajanjei spajanje uz osnivanje (čl. 18. Zakona36 Standardi upravljanja akcionarskim društvima (“Službeniglasnik RS”, br.3/06.)37 „Statusne promjene privrednog subjekta podrazumijevajuprovođenje niza faktičkih i pravnih radnji koje, u skladu sazakonom, imaju dejstvo na izmjenu pravnog i ekonomskogidentiteta društva i univerzalnu sukcesiju imovinedruštva.“(definicija preuzeta iz: Čović, 2003: 112).38 Da bi se osnovalo SE putem fuzije u BiH, potrebno jerazmotriti i dodatne uvjete predviđene 3. Smjernicom o fuzijidioničkih društava i 10. Smjernicom o međunarodnoj fuziji.centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr88

Ivana Grubešić: Usklađenost pravnih propisa o dioničkim društvima u BiHsuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1o izmjenama i dopunama zakona o privrednimdruštvima, čl. 372. ZPD RS), gdje su definicijei jednog i drugog sadržajno identične onoj navedenoju čl. 17. Uredbe. Postupak osnivanjadioničkog društva putem nekog od dvaju navedenihnačina spajanja odvija se na isti načinkao što je predviđeno Uredbom u pogledu osnivanjaSE putem fuzije, gdje skupština dioničarasvakog društva donosi odluku o fuziji na temeljupredloženog nacrta ugovora o spajanju uz obveznoizvješće neovisnog revizora. Dioničariimaju pravo izvršiti uvid u sve relevantne dokumenteu pogledu spajanja prije donošenjaodluke, dok vjerovnici dioničkog društva imajupravo na obeštećenje i namirenje. Pravne posljedicespajanja stupit će na snagu od dana upisau registar društava 39 . Ono što nije predviđenoZPD FBiH, a postoji po zakonodavstvu RS, jepostojanje još jednog oblika fuzije, tzv. spajanjauz pripajanje dioničkog društva u pojednostavljenompostupku, koje sadržajno odgovara tzv.fuziji u holding, reguliranoj čl. 25. st.3. Uredbe.Zakonima o trgovačkim društvima uBiH predviđaju se i promjena oblika trgovačkihdruštava, tako da svaki od predviđenih oblikatrgovačkih društava, osim društva sneograničenom solidarnom odgovornošću,mogu izvršiti promjenu statusa u dioničko društvodruštvo (čl. 427.-429. i čl. 431. ZPD RS, čl. 62.ZPD FBiH). Uredbom je predviđen kao jedan odnačina osnivanja SE transformacija dioničkogdruštva osnovanog po nacionalnom pravu u europskodruštvo, gdje postoje određene sličnostiizmeđu ovog postupka i onih predviđenih zakonimau BiH u pogledu promjene statusnog oblika,ali, s tom razlikom da kod transformacijedioničkog društva u SE ne dolazi zapravo dopromjene pravnog statusa, budući da je i SEdioničko društvo, nego dolazi do promjene u poslovanjute činjenici da je europsko društvo reguliranona prvom mjestu Uredbom i Smjernicom,kao i drugim pravnim propisima komunitarnogkaraktera.39 Postupak spajanja je reguliran u FBiH čl. 63.-69. i čl.291.-296. ZPD FBiH, te čl. 19.-22. Zakona o izmjenama i dopunamazakona o privrednim društvima („Službene novineFBiH“, br. 29/03), a u RS čl. 375.-393. i čl. 399. ZPD RS.7. Odnos europskog društva i povezanihdruštava u bosanskohercegovačkomzakonodavstvuPored osnivanja SE putem fuzije i transformacijeu SE, Uredbom je predviđeno osnivanjeeuropskog društva u obliku holdinga 40 i supsidijarnogdruštva, koji omogućavaju prednosti umeđunarodnom poslovanju u vidu jednostavnijegosnivanja, poreznih olakšica i sl. Stoga je odvelikog značaja nacionalnim zakonodavstvomregulirati pravni položaj povezanih društava.Posljednjim izmjenama i dopunama zakona otrgovačkim društvima u BiH reguliran je pojampovezanih društava, načini povezivanja, odgovornostvladajućeg društva kao i ovisnog (čl. 2.-11. Zakona o izmjenama i dopunama zakona oprivrednim društvima, čl. 357.-367. ZPD RS). UFBiH nije podrobno reguliran pojam povezanihdruštava, nego se samo navode koja su društvaobuhvaćena tim pojmom, navodeći definicijesvakog od njih, dok se u RS navodi da su todva ili više društava koja su povezana kapitalom,ugovorom ili na oba načina istovremeno (čl. 357.ZPD RS).U pogledu pojma vladajućih i ovisnihdruštava, u RS i FBiH navedeni su jednaki uvjetipod kojima će se neko društvo smatrativladajućim, odnosno ovisnim 41 . Ovako definiranpojam vladajućeg ili kontrolnog društva odgovarapojmu istog definiranog čl. 3. st. 2.-7. Smjernice94/45/EC, a na koju navodi čl. 2. st. 1. točka(c) Smjernice, jer pojam kontrolnog/vladajućegdruštva i supsidijarnog/ovisnog nisu reguliraniUredbom.Prema definiciji navedenoj u Zakonuo privrednim društvima u FBiH (čl.6. Zakona oizmjenama i dopunama zakona o privrednimdruštvima), odnosno u RS (čl. 357. st. 5. ZPDRS), holding je vladajuće društvo koje, na osnovizaključenog ugovora o vođenju poslova,obavlja djelatnost upravljanja i financiranja ovisnihdruštava. U Uredbi nije navedena izričito40 Hrvatski Zakon o trgovačkim društvima (čl. 476.) umjestotermina holding, predviđenog bosanskohercegovačkim entitetskimzakonima, koristi naziv koncern.41Pod pojmom vladajućeg društva smatra se društvo koje,posredno ili neposredno, u drugom poduzeću ima 50%osnivačkog kapitala, i 50% glasova u skupštini dioničara(čl. 6. Zakona o izmjenama i dopunama zakona o privrednimdruštvima). Pored pojma većinskog udjela u ovisnomdruštvu, u literaturi se navodi i pojam značajnog udjela uovisnom društvu (više o tome kod: Kostadinović, 2004: 177).Ovaj pojam se spominje i u Zakonu o privrednim društvimau RS, u čl. 358. gdje se navodi da značajan udjel u kapitaluovisnog društva ima ono društvo koje ima više od 20% glasovau skupštini.centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr89

Ivana Grubešić: Usklađenost pravnih propisa o dioničkim društvima u BiHsuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1definicija holdinga te se u tom slučaju europskodruštvo prilagođava značenju ovog pojma premanacionalnim propisima 42 .Bilo da se radi o holdingu ili o ovisnomdruštvu, entitetski su zakoni predvidjeli odgovornostza učinjenu štetu ovisnom društvu (čl.9. Zakona o izmjenama i dopunama zakona oprivrednim društvima, odnosno, čl. 32.-34. i čl.36.-37. ZPD RS). Također, vladajuće društvoodgovorno je za obveze ovisnog društva njegovimvjerovnicima u slučaju insolventnostiovisnog društva (Čović, 2003: 13). Potrebno jenapomenuti i činjenicu da je zakon u RS detaljnijepropisao obavezu pisanja konsolidiranihizvješća od strane vladajućeg društva (čl. 363.te situaciju kada jedno društvo putem poslovnogugovora prenosi dio dobiti na drugo društvo (čl.364.-367.). Predviđanjem povezanih društavaentitetskim zakonima, otvara se mogućnost osnivanjatvrtke u obliku SE, primjenjujući propisekoje se odnose na dionička društva, a koji suusklađeni sa smjernicama prava o trgovačkimdruštvima EU.Međutim, još uvijek nisu usvojeni propisi kojimabi se uskladilo zakonodavstvo sa Smjernicomkoja dopunjava statut o europskom društvu upogledu sudjelovanja zaposlenika u upravljanjutvrtkom, niti se usvojio propis, kao u susjednojHrvatskoj, o primjeni europskih društava nadomaćem tržištu, koji će stupiti na snagu onogdana kada se ostvari članstvo u EU. Dodatniproblem koji se nameće u primjeni Uredbe iSmjernice kojima se regulira pravni položaj europskogdruštva je i postojanje različitih zakonao trgovačkim društvima i drugih propisa kojimakojima se reguliraju ostala pitanja trgovačkihdruštava na entitetskoj razini u BiH. Kao logičnorješenje nameće se donošenje jednog, tzv.„krovnog“ zakona o trgovačkim društvima na raziniBosne i Hercegovine, kojim će se potpunouskladiti postojeći entitetski zakoni, te potpomoćiuspješno uspostavljanje jedinstvenog ekonomskogprostora u BiH. To bi u isto vrijeme olakšaloi donošenje zakona o primjeni Uredbe i implementiranjeSmjernice o europskom društvu nadržavnoj razini, čime bi se omogućilo i maksimalnoiskorištavanje komparativnih prednostikoje pruža europsko društvo.8. ZaključakOpravdano je zaključiti na osnovi prikazanihprednosti i budućih promjena, da je europskodruštvo efikasan instrument razvoja jedinstvenostieuropskog tržišta te kao takvo potičepovećanje konkurentnosti nadnacionalnih tvrtkiiz Europske Unije na svjetskom tržištu. Stoga jeusklađivanje propisa u Bosni i Hercegovini kojimase regulira pravo trgovačkih društava prvikorak prema stvaranju odgovarajućih uvjetaza osnivanje i poslovanje europskih društava ina bosanskohercegovačkom tržištu nakon štoBiH postane država članica, što će rezultiratikako povoljnijim položajem domaćih tvrtki naunutrašnjem tržištu EU, tako i povećanjem investicijskogkapitala od strane inozemnih kompanija.Donošenjem novog Zakona o privrednimdruštvima u RS-u, te izmjenama i dopunamapostojećeg Zakona o privrednim društvima uFBiH, u jednom dijelu se uspješno se uskladiloBH-zakonodavstvo sa smjernicama o pravutrgovačkih društava komunitarnog prava.42 Prema našem zakonodavstvu, holding može obavljatisamo čistu „holding djelatnost“. tj. može osnivati novadruštva, financirati ovisna društva te upravljati ovisnimdruštvima. Pored ove djelatnosti, postoji i tzv. „mješovitadjelatnost“ holdinga, gdje holding može obavljati i druge samostalnedjelatnosti (više o tome kod: Milić, Trifković, 1999:246).centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr90

Ivana Grubešić: Usklađenost pravnih propisa o dioničkim društvima u BiHsuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1LiteraturaAjanović J., Alkalaj, A., Drašković N. i dr. (ur.) (2006.): Strategija integriranja Bosne i Hercegovine uEvropsku Uniju, Vijeće ministara Bosne i Hercegovine, Sarajevo: Direkcija za evropske integracijeBodiroga-Vukobrat, N. (1999.): Harmonizacija prava tranzicijskih zemalja sa europskim pravom, Pravnamisao, 11-12: 39-47Cenić, S. (2008.): Bosanskohercegovačka privreda – mogući pokretač ili faktor blokade u procesuevropskih integracija, u: Bosna i Hercegovina i proturječnosti procesa EU, Sarajevo: FondacijaHeinrich Böll, Ured za Bosnu i HercegovinuČović, Š. (2003.): Poslovno pravo – statusno pravo i pravo privrednih društava, Sarajevo: Pravni fakultetUniverziteta u SarajevuČović, Š. (2003.): Povezana privredna društva, Pravna misao, 11-12: 8-17Dautbašić, S. (2004.): Funkcionisanje i organi dioničkog društva, Pravna misao, 9-10: 41-54Dukić, V. (2004.): Prava i obaveze akcionara, Pravni savjetnik, 6: 72-78Horak H., Dumančić, K. (2007.): Europsko društvo - societas europea: novota u hrvatskom pravu,Zbornik Ekonomskog fakulteta u Zagrebu, godina 5: 128-152Kasagić, R. (2007.): Unifikacija međunarodnog trgovinskog zakonodavstva sa posebnim osvrtom natrgovinsko zakonodavstvo Republike Srpske, Godišnjak Pravnog fakulteta u Banjoj Luci, 30: 247-264Kostadinović, D. (2004.): Osnove privrednog prava, Beograd: Fakultet za trgovinu i bankarstvo „Janićijei Danica Karić“Mavrommati S., Papathanassiou C. (2006): A modified open method of coordination in corporategovernance, European Business Law Review, 17 (6): 1637-1649McCahery A. J., Vermeulen, P. M. E. (2005): Does the european company prevent the “Delawareeffect“?, European law journal, 11(6): 785-801Meškić Z., Reichelt G. (2008.): Evropsko privatno pravo, Zenica, Beč: Univerzitet u Zenici, Sveučilišteu BečuMonks A. G. R., Minow, N. (2004): Corporate governance (third edition), Oxford: BlackwellMuhadžić, E. (2001): Zaštita dioničara prema propisima u Federaciji BiH, Pravni savjetnik, 4: 5-14Rajčević, M. (2007.): Pojam i priroda korporativnog upravljanja, Pravna riječ, 10: 435-447Saenger, I. (2005): Recent developments in european company and business law, Deakin Law Review,10 (1): 297-318Simić, M., Trifković, M. (1999.): Poslovno pravo: osnovi prava i obligacija, privredna/trgovačka društva,Sarajevo: Ekonomski fakultet Univerziteta u SarajevuIzvoriCouncil Directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October supplementing the Statute for a Europan company withregard to the involvement of employees, Official Journal L294, 10/11/2001: 22-32Council Regulation (EC) No. 2157/2001 of October 2001 on the Statute for European company (SE),Official Journal L294, 10/11/2001: 1-21Council Regulation (EC) No. 1435/2003 of 22 July 2003 on the Statute for a European CooperativeSociety (SCE), Official Journal L 207, 18/08/2003: 1-24Pravila upravljanja dioničkim društvima, Službene novine FBiH, 24/06, 30/07Standardi upravljanja dioničkim društvima, Službene novine FBiH, 32/01, 17/02Third Council Directive 78/855/EEC of 9 October 1978 based on the Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treatyconcerning mergers of public limited liability companies, Official Journal L 295, 20.10.1978Zakon o privrednim društvima, Službene novine FBiH, 23/99, 45/00, 2/02, 6/02, 29/03, 68/05, 91/07,85/08Zakon o privrednim društvima, Službeni glasnik RS, 128/08centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr91

Ivana Grubešić: Usklađenost pravnih propisa o dioničkim društvima u BiHsuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1Mrežni izvori:Akcijski plan provođenja Privremenog sporazuma i Sporazuma o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju,Baums, T. (2007): European company law beyond the 2003 Action Plan - ECGI Law Working Paper No.81/2007., URL= SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=973456 (22.06.2009)Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council and theEuropean Parliament – Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in theEuropean Union – A plan to Move Forward, COM (2003) 284 final, Brussels, 2003., URL= http://www.gurn.info/en/topics/corporate-governance/industrialised-countries/industrialized-countries/the-ec-communication-modernising-company-law-and-enhancing-corporate-governance-in-theeuropean-union-a-plan-to-move-forward-may-2003(13.04.2009.)Europska komisija: Bijela knjiga Evropske Unije – jedinstveni ekonomski prostor, URL= http://www.dei.gov.ba/bih_i_eu/najvazniji_dokumenti/dokumenti_eu/?id=1230 (22.04.2009.)Kluge, N., Stollt, M. (2004): Workers participation in the European Company – an aditional referencein european industrial relations, European Trade Union Institute, URL=http://www.seeuropenetwork.org/homepages/seeurope/file_uploads/benchmarking_text_en.pdf2004.(06.09.2008)Privremeni sporazum o trgovini i trgovinskim pitanjima između Evropske Zajednice, s jedne strane iBosneHercegovine, s druge strane, URL= http://www.dei.gov.ba/bih_i_eu/ssp/doc/Default.aspx?id=766&template_id=14&pageIndex=1, (30.05.2009.)Komisija Europske zajednice: Radni dokument Komisije: Izvještaj o napretku Bosne i Hercegovine u2009. godini – prilog uz saopštenje Evropskom parlamentu i savjetu/vijeću, SEC (2009) 1338,14.10.2009., Bruxelles, URL- http://www.dei.gov.ba/bih_i_eu/najvazniji_dokumenti/dokumenti_eu/?id=2459Komisija Europske zajednice: Bijela knjiga – pripreme pridruženih zemalja centralne i istočne Evropeza integraciju u unutrašnje tržište Unije, COM (95) 163 final, 3.5.1995, Sarajevo: Ministarstvovanjskih poslova Bosne i HercegovineMarychurch, J. (2002): Societas Europaea – harmonization or proliferation of corporations law in theEuropean Union, Faculty of faw – Papers, Faculty of law, University of Wollongong, URL= http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1025&context=lawpapers (13.07.2009)Schwimbersky, S.: SEs in Europe - etablished, in preparation, announced interest, sold shelfs,transformed, liquidated and failed, European Trade Union Institute (ETUI-REHS) co-fundedby Hans Bockler Foundation, last update 27.04.2007, URL=http:www.seeuropenetwork.orghomepagesseeuropefile_uploadssefactsheets052007.pdf, (30.01.2009)Sporazum o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju između Evropskih zajednica i njihovih država članica, s jednestrane i Bosne i Hercegovine, s druge strane, URL= http://www.dei.gov.ba/bih_i_eu/ssp/doc/Default.aspx?id=743&template_id=14&pageIndex=1, (11.03.2009.)Stollt, M. (2009): European Companies (SE) – News from the SE Factsheet Database (March 2009),URL=http://www.worker-participation.eu/European-Company/se-companies-news/europeancompanies-se-news-from-the-se-factsheet-database-march-2009.(27.06.2009)URL= http://www.dei.gov.ba/Default.aspx?template_id=37&pageIndex=1, (30.05.2009.)URL=http://www.worker-participation.eu/European-Company/Countries-Transposition (8.10.2009)centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr92

Ivana Grubešić: Usklađenost pravnih propisa o dioničkim društvima u BiHsuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1Coordination between the regulation of public limitedliability companies in Bosnia and Herzegovinaand the Council Regulation on the Statute for anEuropean company 43 in the light of amendments ofnational legislation on companiesIVANA GRUBEŠIĆFaculty of Law, University of Zenica, Bosnia and HerzegovinaWith the goal of successfully integrating into the internal EU market inmind, by becoming a signatory of Stabilisation and Association Agreement onJune 16, 2009, Bosnia and Herzegovina took on the responsibility of undertakingprescribed measures to enable a functional market economy to take rootsby establishing a single economic space based on four freedoms of movement.Hence, current efforts to harmonise the local regulations with acquiscommunautaire will be intensified and attention given to the harmonisation ofcompany law regulations, thus ensuring one of the four mentioned freedoms –the freedom of establishment. This is the only manner in which companies establishedin the single economic space in BiH can endeavour to be recognised,gaining a more competitive status in the internal EU market.It is reasonable to maintain that establishing European companiesand their conducting of business in the single economic space of BaH willprove to be a decisive step towards complete integration of Bosnian marketinto the internal EU market after BaH becoming a Member State. The first supranationalform of company in the internal market, witnessed in the ascent ofEuropean company (SE), has already yielded many advantages in comparisonto companies governed by national regulations.Acting towards these ends, it is a prerequisite to ascertain whatchanges have already been done to the national legislation and just how efficientlythey have been implemented, followed by determining the next courseof action in making it possible for the joint-stock company to be establishedas a SE capable of successful business activities in BaH, as well as on EUterritory.Key words: harmonisation; European company law, Internal market, Europeancompany (SE), Stabilisation and Association Agreement, single economicspace43 SE – Societas Europaeacentar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr93

Anđelko Milardović: Future Scenarios for Bosnia and Herzegovinasuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1The International Community and Future Scenarios for Bosnia andHerzegovinaANĐELKO MILARDOVIĆPolitical Science Research Centre, ZagrebInstitute for Migration and Ethnic Studies, ZagrebThis conference paper, presented at Panel 3 “The future role of the InternationalCommunity in Bosnia and Herzegovina” as part of the internationalconference “Bosnia & Herzegovina - a Road towards Stabilization, Prosperityand European Integration“ organised by the Hungarian Institute of InternationalAffairs and held on November 5-6, 2009 in Budapest, Hungary, deals with possiblefuture scenarios of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the role of key internationalactors will play in each of these cases.1. Status QuoThis scenario would effectively mean the continuance of internal political conflicts between Sarajevoand Banja Luka, as well as asymmetrical relations between the Croat and Bosniak parts of theFederation. A status quo scenario would see a prolongation of the Dayton political system, without optionsfor its improvement or reconstitution. Such a situation would mean further socioeconomic stagnationand degradation of mutual trust and respect among major political forces in the country and wouldprovide fertile ground for escalation of ethnic strives. With Prud and Butmir negotiations proving unsuccessful,this scenario is highly probable.2. FederalisationAs the Bosnian-Herzegovinian political architecture already features the division into two separate,self-governing entities, the Croat-Bosniak Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (further dividedinto ten cantons/counties) and the Republic of Srpska, with Brčko District being governed by both entities,further federalisation remains an open political issue. The present political system does not providestability and unity, nor does it represent a stable basis for economic progress, as the multiple divisionsof the Bosnian state create a heavy administrative burden that hampers development initiatives. Whilethe dominant politics of Republic of Srpska show the tendency to further federalisation and relativisationof the common Bosnian state, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is destabilized by a strongunitarist approach of the Bosniak political elite in Sarajevo, which in turn fuels aspirations for furtherfederalisation and creation of a third entity in Croat majority areas.The current model of Bosnian-Herzegovinian federalism has so far proven not viable, as it is aresult of a temporary solution created by the Dayton Peace Treaty which has over time become a permanentstate of affairs. There remains a question whether different models of federalism might proveapplicable in the Bosnian case.centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr94

Anđelko Milardović: Future Scenarios for Bosnia and Herzegovinasuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 12. a) The Belgian CaseThe Belgian example of federalism, based on ethnolinguistic political and administrative communities,itself shows deep internal problems and cannot effectively be transposed to Bosnia and Herzegovina.This model would mean the division of Bosnia into three autonomous entities (Serb, Croat andBosniak), along ethnic lines.2. b) The Swiss ModelThe stability of the Swiss federal system which is based on a long tradition of direct democracy,subdivision into small, self-governing cantons and coalition governments, is highly unlikely to beachieved in Bosnia and Herzegovina as the Swiss model predates the existence of modern nationsand nationalism which play a dominant role in Bosnian society and politics. This model would mean thedissolution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of Republic of Srpska and the creation ofself-governing cantons on the whole Bosnian territory.3. Modernisation and EU AccessionPolitical modernisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, although from today’s standpoint not verylikely, should include strengthening of capacities of institutions of the Bosnian central state. While thisprocess is, with limited extent and success, already under way, it is met with significant opposition fromthe Serb side as Prime Minister of Republic of Srpska, Milorad Dodik strives to maintain and furtherincrease the autonomous and almost sovereign position of the Serb-dominated entity. Political modernisationis not necessarily synonymous with centralisation and unitarism, as it federalist solutions couldalso be combined with political reforms that would strengthen the state as a whole and bring Bosniacloser to European political standards. The Croat side shows voices that both support the creation ofa third entity (which would further federalize the country), but could also favor the disolution of entitiesand the creation of a decentralized state with regions not necessarily based on ethnic divisions whichcould provide a certain level of autonomy for all three parties. There is no clear way to modernisation(and thus to bringing Bosnia closer to the EU) that would be acceptable to the political elites of all threeBosnian national groups. As nation-formation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is already a vastly finishedprocess it is highly unlikely that a pan-Bosnian national identity and a political culture stemming from itcould be created (at least not one that would not be seen by Serbs and Croats as Bosniak nationalismmasked as pan-Bosnianism). A civic culture that would accept the multinational character of Bosnia andHerzegovina (this means adopting some elements of Belgian political culture, while seeing the adoptionof Swiss solutions as impossible) could provide a stable option for modernization efforts.4. Renewed Armed ConflictAlthough the levels of sports violence with ethnic and political backgrounds (Croat-Bosniak conflicts)do show some potential for low-intensity armed struggle in Bosnia and Herzegovina and dubiousmilitary and police cooperation arrangements between Banja Luka and Belgrade leave a lot of questionsto be answered, a renewed escalation of armed conflict in Bosnia is not very likely. Taking in accountthat Serbia is economically too exhausted to launch a war campaign and Croatia, being a NATO memberand a EU accession candidate, would not engage in armed conflict without consent from Westernpartners and allies, external factors are not strong enough to transform internal Bosnian contradictionsinto armed conflict.centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr95

Anđelko Milardović: Future Scenarios for Bosnia and Herzegovinasuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 15. Dissolution of the Bosnian StateRepublic of Srpska Prime Minister, Milorad Dodik, uses threats of separation of his entity fromBosnia and Herzegovina for purposes of daily politics, but, without sufficient support from Belgrade(which is not likely to be shown in near future), the dissolution of Bosnia and Herzegovina is not avery likely scenario. Separatist tendencies remain high both among Bosnian Serbs and many BosnianCroats, yet the political strength to turn such ideas into reality is not present.6. The Role of the United StatesThe US foreign policy has since the War on Terror and the Invasion of Iraq lost interest in theBalkans region. Despite American military presence in Kosovo, as well as Bosnia and Macedonia, USdiplomats have delegated the ongoing political problem-solving to the European Union. The US generallysupport the modernisation of Bosnia and its Europeanisation and would thus object to dissolution of theBosnian state. Its military presence should prevent any possibility of renewed military conflict. The USdo not show a clear preference for any type of political system in Bosnia.7. The Role of the European UnionThe European Union, while offically supporting further modernisation and Bosnia’s EU aspirations,does not have political capacity and will to actually fullfil this mission. While the EU Copenhagen criteriado represent a clear framework for political reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina, internal disagreementsand particularist interests in EU members states do not allow a single position the future of Bosnia whichwould prove fruitful. The EU, however strongly opposes the dissolution of the Bosnian state and is thussuspicious of further decentralisation and federalisation of the country.8. The Role of RussiaRegarding Bosnia, Russia clearly supports the Serb side, due both to Belgrade’s ties withMoscow, as well as to Russian economic interests in privatisation and investment opportunities,especially in the energy sector in the Republic of Srpska. Russia provides support to Milorad Dodik’sopposition to centralisation and the abolition of Bosnian federal entities and could even back up the Serbside in the case of dissolution of the Bosnian state, in order to counterbalance the changes in Euro-Atlantic international relations that have been created by the declaration of independence of Kosovo.9. The Role of TurkeyTurkey has interest in the stabilisation of the Bosnian state and has interests in strengtheningof the Bosniak position in Bosnian politics. It also sees Bosnia as political and economic ground forfurthering Turkish influence on European politics.10. The Role of Arab CountriesArab countries, especially the oil-wealthy Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia and the United ArabEmirates have shown great support for the Bosniak cause during the War in Bosnia and are trying tomaintain their economic, political and religious influence in the country. They would vehemently opposethe dissolution of the Bosnian state and favor further centralisation and stabilisation of Bosnia andHerzegovina.centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr96

Anđelko Milardović: Future Scenarios for Bosnia and Herzegovinasuvremene TEME, (2009.) God. 2, Br. 1CONTEMPORARY issues, (2009) Vol. 2, No. 1Međunarodna zajednica i scenariji budućnosti za Bosnu iHercegovinuANĐELKO MILARDOVIĆCentar za politološka istraživanja, ZagrebInstitut za migracije i narodnosti, ZagrebOvo izlaganje sa skupa predstavljeno je na Panelu 3 “The future roleof the International Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina” na međunarodnomskupu “Bosnia & Herzegovina - a Road towards Stabilization, Prosperity andEuropean Integration“koji je 5. i 6. studenog 2009. organizirao Mađarski institutza međunarodne odnose u Budimpešti. Izlaganje se bavi mogućim scenarijimabudućnosti za Bosnu i Hercegovinu te ulogom koju će u njima imati ključnimeđunarodni akteri.centar za politološka istraživanjathe political science research centrewww.cpi.hr97