AADvance Safety Manual - Tuv-fs.com
AADvance Safety Manual - Tuv-fs.com AADvance Safety Manual - Tuv-fs.com
AADvance Safety ManualField Loop Circuit for 4-Wire Analogue InputSensor ConfigurationsIn safety critical input applications using a single sensor, it is important that the sensorfailure modes be predictable and well understood, so there is little probability of afailed sensor not responding to a critical process condition. In such a configuration, itis important the sensor be tested regularly, either by dynamic process conditions thatare verified in the AADvance system, or by manual intervention testing.The function of a signal shall be considered when allocating the module and channelwithin the system. In many cases, redundant sensor and actuator configurations maybe used, or differing sensor and actuator types provide alternate detection and controlpossibilities. Plant facilities frequently have related signals such as start, and stop signals.In these cases it is important to ensure that failures beyond the system's fault-tolerantcapability do not result in either inability to respond safely or in inadvertent operation.In some cases, this will require that channels be allocated on the same module, toensure that a module failure results in the associated signals failing-safe.However, in most cases it will be necessary to separate the signals across modules.Where non-redundant configurations are employed, it is especially important to ensurethat the fail-safe action is generated in case of failures within the system.5-16 Document number 553630 Issue 7: February 2010
Chapter 5 AADvance Functional Safety SystemImplementationActuator ConfigurationsField loop power should be considered in the allocation of signals to input channels andmodules. For normally energized input configurations, field loop power failure will leadto the fail-safe reaction. As with the allocation of signals to modules, there may berelated functions (for example start and stop signals) where loss of field power shouldbe considered in the same manner as the signal allocation.In safety-critical applications using a single actuator, it is important that theactuator failure modes be predictable and well understood, so that there is littleprobability of a failed actuator not responding to a critical process condition.In such a configuration, it is important that the actuator be tested regularly, either bydynamic process conditions that are verified in the AADvance system, or by manualintervention testing.The function of a signal shall be considered when allocating the module and channelwithin the system. In many cases, redundant actuator configurations may be used, ordiffering actuator types can provide alternate control and mitigation possibilities. Plantfacilities frequently have related signals; in these cases it is important to ensure thatfailures beyond the system's fault-tolerant capability do not result in either an inabilityto respond to safety demands or in inadvertent operation.In some cases, this will require that channels be allocated on the same module, toensure that a module failure results in the associated signals failing-safe. However, inmost cases, it will be necessary to separate the signals across modules. Where nonredundantconfigurations are employed, it is especially important to ensure that thefail-safe action is generated in case of failures within the system.Field loop power should be considered in the allocation of signals to output channelsand modules. For normally energized configurations, field loop power failure will leadto the fail-safe reaction. As with the allocation of signals to modules, there may berelated functions where loss of field power should be considered in the same manneras the signal allocation. Where signals are powered from separate power groups, it isimportant that this separation be maintained when allocating the signals to modules, i.e.that inadvertent coupling between power groups, and particularly return paths, are notgenerated.Calculations of Probability of Failure upon Demand,Systems that are configured to meet the needs of IEC 61508 will require theProbability of Failure upon Demand (PFD) for the safety instrumented functions to becalculated.For information regarding the calculation and for PFD numbers allocated for theAADvance system pleased refer to the TÜV approved PFD calculation document listedin the approved version list.Document number 553630 Issue 7: February 2010 5-17
- Page 11 and 12: IntroductionChapter 1This chapter p
- Page 13 and 14: Chapter 1 IntroductionAssociated Do
- Page 15 and 16: The AADvance SystemChapter 2.An AAD
- Page 17 and 18: Chapter 2 The AADvance SystemThe AA
- Page 19 and 20: Functional Safety ManagementChapter
- Page 21 and 22: Chapter 3 Functional Safety Managem
- Page 23 and 24: Chapter 3 Functional Safety Managem
- Page 25 and 26: Chapter 3 Functional Safety Managem
- Page 27 and 28: Chapter 3 Functional Safety Managem
- Page 29 and 30: Chapter 3 Functional Safety Managem
- Page 31 and 32: AADvance System ArchitecturesChapte
- Page 33 and 34: Chapter 4 AADvance System Architect
- Page 35 and 36: Chapter 4 AADvance System Architect
- Page 37 and 38: Chapter 4 AADvance System Architect
- Page 39 and 40: Chapter 4 AADvance System Architect
- Page 41 and 42: Chapter 4 AADvance System Architect
- Page 43 and 44: Chapter 4 AADvance System Architect
- Page 45 and 46: Chapter 5AADvance Functional Safety
- Page 47 and 48: Chapter 5 AADvance Functional Safet
- Page 49 and 50: Chapter 5 AADvance Functional Safet
- Page 51 and 52: Chapter 5 AADvance Functional Safet
- Page 53 and 54: Chapter 5 AADvance Functional Safet
- Page 55 and 56: Chapter 5 AADvance Functional Safet
- Page 57 and 58: Chapter 5 AADvance Functional Safet
- Page 59: Chapter 5 AADvance Functional Safet
- Page 63 and 64: Chapter 5 AADvance Functional Safet
- Page 65 and 66: Chapter 5 AADvance Functional Safet
- Page 67 and 68: Chapter 5 AADvance Functional Safet
- Page 69 and 70: Chapter 5 AADvance Functional Safet
- Page 71 and 72: Chapter 5 AADvance Functional Safet
- Page 73 and 74: Chapter 5 AADvance Functional Safet
- Page 75 and 76: Chapter 5 AADvance Functional Safet
- Page 77 and 78: Chapter 5 AADvance Functional Safet
- Page 79 and 80: Chapter 5 AADvance Functional Safet
- Page 81 and 82: Chapter 5 AADvance Functional Safet
- Page 83 and 84: ChecklistsChapter 6This chapter con
- Page 85 and 86: Chapter 6 ChecklistsEngineering Che
- Page 87 and 88: Chapter 6 ChecklistsInput/Output Mo
- Page 89 and 90: Chapter 6 Glossary of TermsGlossary
- Page 91 and 92: Chapter 6 Glossary of Termscoverage
- Page 93 and 94: Chapter 6 Glossary of TermsIEC 6150
- Page 95 and 96: Chapter 6 Glossary of Termsprogram
- Page 97: Chapter 6 Glossary of Termsvoting s
Chapter 5 <strong>AADvance</strong> Functional <strong>Safety</strong> SystemImplementationActuator ConfigurationsField loop power should be considered in the allocation of signals to input channels andmodules. For normally energized input configurations, field loop power failure will leadto the fail-safe reaction. As with the allocation of signals to modules, there may berelated functions (for example start and stop signals) where loss of field power shouldbe considered in the same manner as the signal allocation.In safety-critical applications using a single actuator, it is important that theactuator failure modes be predictable and well understood, so that there is littleprobability of a failed actuator not responding to a critical process condition.In such a configuration, it is important that the actuator be tested regularly, either bydynamic process conditions that are verified in the <strong>AADvance</strong> system, or by manualintervention testing.The function of a signal shall be considered when allocating the module and channelwithin the system. In many cases, redundant actuator configurations may be used, ordiffering actuator types can provide alternate control and mitigation possibilities. Plantfacilities frequently have related signals; in these cases it is important to ensure thatfailures beyond the system's fault-tolerant capability do not result in either an inabilityto respond to safety demands or in inadvertent operation.In some cases, this will require that channels be allocated on the same module, toensure that a module failure results in the associated signals failing-safe. However, inmost cases, it will be necessary to separate the signals across modules. Where nonredundantconfigurations are employed, it is especially important to ensure that thefail-safe action is generated in case of failures within the system.Field loop power should be considered in the allocation of signals to output channelsand modules. For normally energized configurations, field loop power failure will leadto the fail-safe reaction. As with the allocation of signals to modules, there may berelated functions where loss of field power should be considered in the same manneras the signal allocation. Where signals are powered from separate power groups, it isimportant that this separation be maintained when allocating the signals to modules, i.e.that inadvertent coupling between power groups, and particularly return paths, are notgenerated.Calculations of Probability of Failure upon Demand,Systems that are configured to meet the needs of IEC 61508 will require theProbability of Failure upon Demand (PFD) for the safety instrumented functions to becalculated.For information regarding the calculation and for PFD numbers allocated for the<strong>AADvance</strong> system pleased refer to the TÜV approved PFD calculation document listedin the approved version list.Document number 553630 Issue 7: February 2010 5-17