AADvance Safety Manual - Tuv-fs.com

AADvance Safety Manual - Tuv-fs.com AADvance Safety Manual - Tuv-fs.com

12.07.2015 Views

AADvance Safety ManualDecommissioningThe procedure for decommissioning the system shall be defined. This procedureshould include specific requirements for the safe decommissioning of the system and,where applicable, the safe disposal or return of materials.As with commissioning, it is likely the decommissioning will be performed in a phasedmanner. The decommissioning procedure shall ensure that a plan be developed thatmaintains the functional safety whilst the corresponding hazards are present. Similarly,the physical environment of the control equipment shall be maintained whilst theequipment is required to function.The procedure for decommissioning shall address the following items: The sequence in which the hazards are to be removed. Methods which permit the removal of interactions between safety functions whilstmaintaining functional safety for the remaining potential hazards and withoutinitiating safety responses. This shall include the interaction between systems. A definition of the modules and materials which are to be returned to ICS Triplexfor safe disposal following decommissioning.Functional Safety AssessmentThe functional safety assessment shall confirm the effectiveness of the functional safetyperformance of the system. The assessment, in this context, is limited to the safetyrelatedsystem and should confirm that the system is designed, constructed andinstalled in accordance with the specified safety requirements.The assessment shall consider each required safety function and its associated safetyproperties. The effects of faults and errors within the system and application programs,failures external to the system and procedural deficiencies in these safety functions areto be considered.The assessment is to be carried out by an audit team that shall include independentassessors from outside of the project. At least one functional safety assessment shall beperformed before the start-up of the system and the introduction of any potentialhazards.Safety Integrity DesignSafety IntegrityThe architecture of the AADvance system has been designed to allow a scalable systemto be configured using standard components. The configurations available range fromsimplex fail-safe to TMR fault tolerance.3-10 Document number 553630 Issue 7: February 2010

Chapter 3 Functional Safety ManagementThe processor module has been designed to meet the requirements for SIL2 with one,two or three processor modules and SIL3 when two or three modules are fitted. Inputand output modules have been designed to meet SIL3 requirements with a singlemodule in a fail-safe mode.The processor module and the individual I/O modules have built in redundancy andhave been designed to withstand multiple faults and support a fixed on-line repair byreplacement configuration in dual and triple modular redundant configurations. Theinput and output modules support a number of architecture options; the effects of thechosen architecture should be evaluated against the system and application specificrequirements.Document number 553630 Issue 7: February 2010 3-11

<strong>AADvance</strong> <strong>Safety</strong> <strong>Manual</strong>De<strong>com</strong>missioningThe procedure for de<strong>com</strong>missioning the system shall be defined. This procedureshould include specific requirements for the safe de<strong>com</strong>missioning of the system and,where applicable, the safe disposal or return of materials.As with <strong>com</strong>missioning, it is likely the de<strong>com</strong>missioning will be performed in a phasedmanner. The de<strong>com</strong>missioning procedure shall ensure that a plan be developed thatmaintains the functional safety whilst the corresponding hazards are present. Similarly,the physical environment of the control equipment shall be maintained whilst theequipment is required to function.The procedure for de<strong>com</strong>missioning shall address the following items: The sequence in which the hazards are to be removed. Methods which permit the removal of interactions between safety functions whilstmaintaining functional safety for the remaining potential hazards and withoutinitiating safety responses. This shall include the interaction between systems. A definition of the modules and materials which are to be returned to ICS Triplexfor safe disposal following de<strong>com</strong>missioning.Functional <strong>Safety</strong> AssessmentThe functional safety assessment shall confirm the effectiveness of the functional safetyperformance of the system. The assessment, in this context, is limited to the safetyrelatedsystem and should confirm that the system is designed, constructed andinstalled in accordance with the specified safety requirements.The assessment shall consider each required safety function and its associated safetyproperties. The effects of faults and errors within the system and application programs,failures external to the system and procedural deficiencies in these safety functions areto be considered.The assessment is to be carried out by an audit team that shall include independentassessors from outside of the project. At least one functional safety assessment shall beperformed before the start-up of the system and the introduction of any potentialhazards.<strong>Safety</strong> Integrity Design<strong>Safety</strong> IntegrityThe architecture of the <strong>AADvance</strong> system has been designed to allow a scalable systemto be configured using standard <strong>com</strong>ponents. The configurations available range fromsimplex fail-safe to TMR fault tolerance.3-10 Document number 553630 Issue 7: February 2010

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!