STF na MÃdia - MyClipp
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STF na MÃdia - MyClipp
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The New York Times/ - Politics, Sáb, 31 de Março de 2012<br />
CLIPPING INTERNACIONAL (Civil Rights)<br />
Fighting Terrorism, French-Style<br />
FRANCE and the United States have different notions<br />
of liberty, equality and fraternity, though the words look<br />
roughly the same in both languages. Methods of<br />
combating homegrown terrorism — another French<br />
word dating from 1789 — are also quite different,<br />
stemming from different histories, legal systems and<br />
conceptions of the state.<br />
The horrors in Toulouse — the murders of seven<br />
people in a bit more than a week by Mohammed<br />
Merah, a 23-year-old French citizen of Algerian-born<br />
parents who claimed membership in Al Qaeda —<br />
created a fierce debate in France about whether the<br />
police and security services failed to identify him in<br />
time. The police also failed to take him alive, making it<br />
harder to discover the true breadth of his contacts and<br />
of his path to terrorism.<br />
Mr. Merah clearly slipped through the French net,<br />
which relies heavily on human intelligence and<br />
judgment. The French are asking why, and whether he<br />
might have been more easily identified by the more<br />
automated — and expensive — American-style<br />
reliance on computerized monitoring of phone calls<br />
and the Internet. That question is u<strong>na</strong>nswerable, of<br />
course. But the differences between the two countries<br />
and their methods are considerable.<br />
“In the United States, it is the system that counts; in<br />
France, it is the men,” says Marc Trévidic, a senior<br />
investigating magistrate for terrorism in France.<br />
After 9/11, the Americans threw enormous resources<br />
of manpower, money and computer time into the<br />
“global war on terrorism,” which was also about<br />
tracking the potential terrorist at home, in a country<br />
with a tiny and mostly well-integrated Muslim<br />
population. The French, with a colonial history, have<br />
been dealing with terrorism (and Islam) for much<br />
longer. With the largest number of Muslims in Europe<br />
— nearly 10 percent of the population, often<br />
concentrated in poorer neighborhoods — and closer<br />
proximity to the Middle East and North Africa, France<br />
has focused more on preventing the recruitment of<br />
potential terrorists through a regular infiltration of<br />
mosques and radical Islamic networks.<br />
Partly because of their history and partly because of<br />
more limited budgets, the French rely more on human<br />
contacts, local intelligence and human resources and<br />
less on automated phone tapping and surveillance<br />
than the Americans do. That can make the French well<br />
informed but less systematic, less able to “connect the<br />
dots” than the Americans, who have tried to learn from<br />
their own failure to uncover the 9/11 plot before it<br />
happened. In general, Judge Trévidic said, the French<br />
have one-tenth of the resources of the Americans for<br />
any given case.<br />
The French state is highly centralized, not federal. Fed<br />
up with a series of bombings in the 1980s, France tried<br />
to better coordi<strong>na</strong>te domestic and foreign intelligence<br />
with the establishment in 1984 of the Unité de<br />
coordi<strong>na</strong>tion de la lutte anti-terroriste (the coordi<strong>na</strong>tion<br />
unit of the anti-terrorist struggle), or Uclat, and tried<br />
something similar within the Justice Ministry.<br />
French law governing intelligence was reformed in<br />
1986 and refined again after 1995 and 2001, with<br />
another reform in 2006 by Nicolas Sarkozy, then<br />
interior minister, to give even more margin of<br />
maneuver to the investigating judges and the police.<br />
The Central Directorate of Domestic Intelligence was<br />
founded in 2008 as a merger of the intelligence<br />
services of the Interior Ministry, which were<br />
responsible for counterterrorism and<br />
counterespio<strong>na</strong>ge, and of the state police.<br />
THE fight against terrorism is more decentralized in the<br />
United States. That is not without complications. The<br />
tensions among the Federal Bureau of Investigation,<br />
the Central Intelligence Agency and local or state<br />
agencies are legendary, especially between the F.B.I.<br />
and the New York Police Department, which has its<br />
own counterterrorism intelligence unit. That tension<br />
forms a sometimes entertaining, sometimes<br />
disconcerting spine for Christopher Dickey’s 2009<br />
book, “Securing the City.”<br />
“France is a country with only two police forces,” Mr.<br />
Dickey notes, “both <strong>na</strong>tio<strong>na</strong>l, so there is less rivalry<br />
among agencies.”<br />
Legally, too, the French have centralized terrorism<br />
cases in one court and tried to reintegrate procedures<br />
for fighting terrorism into regular law, but with more<br />
flexibility for terrorism investigations to act on<br />
suspicion, order wiretaps or surveillance and hold<br />
suspects for a longer period of time. The United States<br />
is still trying to reconcile due process of law with<br />
fighting terrorism — look at the difficulty in fi<strong>na</strong>lly<br />
shutting the detention center at Guantá<strong>na</strong>mo Bay, or<br />
whether to hold crimi<strong>na</strong>l trials or military tribu<strong>na</strong>ls for<br />
detainees like Khalid Shaikh Mohammed.<br />
While easy to oversimplify, the French state also has a<br />
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