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The New York Times/ - Politics, Sáb, 31 de Março de 2012<br />

CLIPPING INTERNACIONAL (Civil Rights)<br />

Fighting Terrorism, French-Style<br />

FRANCE and the United States have different notions<br />

of liberty, equality and fraternity, though the words look<br />

roughly the same in both languages. Methods of<br />

combating homegrown terrorism — another French<br />

word dating from 1789 — are also quite different,<br />

stemming from different histories, legal systems and<br />

conceptions of the state.<br />

The horrors in Toulouse — the murders of seven<br />

people in a bit more than a week by Mohammed<br />

Merah, a 23-year-old French citizen of Algerian-born<br />

parents who claimed membership in Al Qaeda —<br />

created a fierce debate in France about whether the<br />

police and security services failed to identify him in<br />

time. The police also failed to take him alive, making it<br />

harder to discover the true breadth of his contacts and<br />

of his path to terrorism.<br />

Mr. Merah clearly slipped through the French net,<br />

which relies heavily on human intelligence and<br />

judgment. The French are asking why, and whether he<br />

might have been more easily identified by the more<br />

automated — and expensive — American-style<br />

reliance on computerized monitoring of phone calls<br />

and the Internet. That question is u<strong>na</strong>nswerable, of<br />

course. But the differences between the two countries<br />

and their methods are considerable.<br />

“In the United States, it is the system that counts; in<br />

France, it is the men,” says Marc Trévidic, a senior<br />

investigating magistrate for terrorism in France.<br />

After 9/11, the Americans threw enormous resources<br />

of manpower, money and computer time into the<br />

“global war on terrorism,” which was also about<br />

tracking the potential terrorist at home, in a country<br />

with a tiny and mostly well-integrated Muslim<br />

population. The French, with a colonial history, have<br />

been dealing with terrorism (and Islam) for much<br />

longer. With the largest number of Muslims in Europe<br />

— nearly 10 percent of the population, often<br />

concentrated in poorer neighborhoods — and closer<br />

proximity to the Middle East and North Africa, France<br />

has focused more on preventing the recruitment of<br />

potential terrorists through a regular infiltration of<br />

mosques and radical Islamic networks.<br />

Partly because of their history and partly because of<br />

more limited budgets, the French rely more on human<br />

contacts, local intelligence and human resources and<br />

less on automated phone tapping and surveillance<br />

than the Americans do. That can make the French well<br />

informed but less systematic, less able to “connect the<br />

dots” than the Americans, who have tried to learn from<br />

their own failure to uncover the 9/11 plot before it<br />

happened. In general, Judge Trévidic said, the French<br />

have one-tenth of the resources of the Americans for<br />

any given case.<br />

The French state is highly centralized, not federal. Fed<br />

up with a series of bombings in the 1980s, France tried<br />

to better coordi<strong>na</strong>te domestic and foreign intelligence<br />

with the establishment in 1984 of the Unité de<br />

coordi<strong>na</strong>tion de la lutte anti-terroriste (the coordi<strong>na</strong>tion<br />

unit of the anti-terrorist struggle), or Uclat, and tried<br />

something similar within the Justice Ministry.<br />

French law governing intelligence was reformed in<br />

1986 and refined again after 1995 and 2001, with<br />

another reform in 2006 by Nicolas Sarkozy, then<br />

interior minister, to give even more margin of<br />

maneuver to the investigating judges and the police.<br />

The Central Directorate of Domestic Intelligence was<br />

founded in 2008 as a merger of the intelligence<br />

services of the Interior Ministry, which were<br />

responsible for counterterrorism and<br />

counterespio<strong>na</strong>ge, and of the state police.<br />

THE fight against terrorism is more decentralized in the<br />

United States. That is not without complications. The<br />

tensions among the Federal Bureau of Investigation,<br />

the Central Intelligence Agency and local or state<br />

agencies are legendary, especially between the F.B.I.<br />

and the New York Police Department, which has its<br />

own counterterrorism intelligence unit. That tension<br />

forms a sometimes entertaining, sometimes<br />

disconcerting spine for Christopher Dickey’s 2009<br />

book, “Securing the City.”<br />

“France is a country with only two police forces,” Mr.<br />

Dickey notes, “both <strong>na</strong>tio<strong>na</strong>l, so there is less rivalry<br />

among agencies.”<br />

Legally, too, the French have centralized terrorism<br />

cases in one court and tried to reintegrate procedures<br />

for fighting terrorism into regular law, but with more<br />

flexibility for terrorism investigations to act on<br />

suspicion, order wiretaps or surveillance and hold<br />

suspects for a longer period of time. The United States<br />

is still trying to reconcile due process of law with<br />

fighting terrorism — look at the difficulty in fi<strong>na</strong>lly<br />

shutting the detention center at Guantá<strong>na</strong>mo Bay, or<br />

whether to hold crimi<strong>na</strong>l trials or military tribu<strong>na</strong>ls for<br />

detainees like Khalid Shaikh Mohammed.<br />

While easy to oversimplify, the French state also has a<br />

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