Horizons - United States Special Operations Command

USSOCOM Lessons LearnedOn the Go in Iraq, Afghanistan, and theHorn of AfricaBy Mr. T. SecorDraining the Swamp:The Role of Operational Knowledge inFighting the Persistent ConflictBy Mr. P. Fortuna & Ms. J. SweezeyProposed Precepts forIrregular WarfareBy Col. L. Caporicci

Issue 3, Fall 2009Page 4Deployed Lessons LearnedActive Collection Teamsgather valuable observations,insights and lessons learnedaround the worldContentsUSSOCOM’s Lessons Learned Branch - On The Go in Iraq,Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa .................................................4Operationalizing Irregular Warfare .................................................7Irregular Warfare Implementation Progress – Part II ...............10Page 18Aviation resourcedevelopment as a keycomponent in support ofnation building strategiesPage 26Wargames provide aninvaluable opportunity tofurther develop SpecialOperations ForcesProposed Precepts for Irregular Warfare ......................................13Aviation Development in Nation-Assistance Strategies:Are We Overlooking a Critical Asymmetric Advantage? ...........18Draining the Swamp: The Role of Operational Knowledge inFighting the Persistent Conflict .....................................................22The Purpose of Wargaming .............................................................26Lessons Learned: Support to the Combat Missions NeedsStatement and SOF Capabilities Integration and DevelopmentSystem ..................................................................................................30Nexus: John Boyd, Special Operations Forces at War, and theInformation Age .................................................................................33Page 33Col. John Boyd’s legacy intoday’s SOF strategies andactivitiesFall 2009 1

Fall 2009Dear Reader,Welcome to the third edition of the SOKF magazine, Horizons. I’ve been fortunateenough to have been extended by ADM Olson as Director of the Center for Knowledge and Major General Steven J. HashemFutures for another year. I’m excited by this prospect, both because of the amazing accomplishments of the personnelof this Center and because of the opportunity to oversee further maturing of the processes and programs of SOKF.The personnel of SOKF have continued to contribute to the efforts of this Command to fully prepare the SOFwarrior for all the challenges the world of today and tomorrow will offer. Among other accomplishments, our JointInteragency Training Specialists led representatives from all staff sections in an overhaul of the Joint Mission EssentialTask Lists (JMETLs) of this Headquarters. The list was streamlined and all staff sections fully understand their part inhelping accomplish the JMETLs. Our Standardization Branch continues to work to accomplish ADM Olson’s wish tohave common and consistent joint standards of performance for tasks, such as military freefall and combat dive. Theyare beginning work on common standards for other sets of tasks; if your staff have not heard from them yet, yousoon will. Our Lessons Learned Branch has sent active collection teams to CJSOTF-A, CJTF-HOA, and CJSOTF-AP toimprove the gathering of lessons learned in those regions. They’ve also ramped up their dissemination efforts withbulletins and multiple types of reports. Our J9 personnel have helped put the finishing touches on the DefeatingTerrorist Networks Joint Integrating Concept. That concept has subsequently been approved by the Joint CapabilitiesBoard and was forwarded to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council for approval. Also in J9, our Wargaming andExperimentation folks have partnered with this Headquarters’ Science and Technology Office, Component Commands,and TSOCs to develop a process for satisfying emergent warfighter requirements in a more responsive manner.They have, in fact, tested and refined an area monitoring and detection system that holds promise as a potent forceprotection tool. Please contact J9 if you have similar requirements you’d like explored. J10 continues its work toinstitutionalize Irregular Warfare (IW) throughout DoD. They’ve made progress in getting IW documented in DoD andCJCS instructions and have a list of publications on their website on the USSOCOM portal.I hope you find that the information in this magazine increases your knowledge of SOKF. If you havethoughts or suggestions you’d like to send to us, please send them to horizons@socom.mil or call (813) 826-5710.We will ensure your thoughts are passed along to the right person.Enjoy reading this magazine and continue to keep the SOF warrior as the best trained and equipped, mostcapable warrior in the world.Steven J. HashemMajor General, U.S. ArmyCenter Director2 Horizons – Helping sHape tHe Future oF soF

SOKF MiSSiOn and ViSiOnThe Center for Knowledge and Futures recently engaged in in a series a series of of strategicworkshops to review and update its its mission and and vision, and and establish strategicgoals and objectives. The updated mission, vision, goals, goals, and and objectives provide provideoverarching strategic guidance for for the the Center, in in support of the of the USSOCOM mission, mission, and andprovide direction for the Center’s functions, products, and and services in support in support of our of Special ourSpecial Operations Operations Forces. Forces.SOKF VisionThe recognized expert in Special Operations Forces knowledge, institutionalizing irregular warfare,and developing and integrating future concepts and capabilitiesSOKF MissionDevelop and prepare fully capable Special Operations Forces for the present and into the future,ready to conduct military operations, build partner capacity and promote security engagement,through doctrine, education, and training; future concepts, wargaming, and capabilities integration;and institutionalizing irregular warfare across the joint forceFall 2009 3

USSOCOM’S LeSSOnS Learned:On The GO in iraq, aFGhaniSTan and TheBy Mr. Troy SecorhOrn OF aFriCa“ Active collection consists of activities designed to gather vitalinformation from SOF operations, contingencies, exercises,wargames, and training events in order to archive, analyze,resolve, and disseminate observations, insights and lessonslearned (OIL) that can assist the efforts of the SOF warfighterand USSOCOM doctrine, operations, training, material,leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) processes.”– USSOCOM Directive 11-3USSOCOM Lessons Learned Active CollectionTeams (LLAT) first became operational in February2008. Composed of former SOF operators, theteams were designed to collect OIL from specific real-worldoperations, training events, exercises, or experiments.After initially completing a variety of collection effortssupporting HQ USSOCOM and its Component Commands,the teams prepared to deploy to the CENTCOM andAFRICOM Areas of Operation to collect OIL emerging fromongoing activities in those theaters.“ Active collection methodsinclude: collecting directobservations, conductinginterviews, and surveyingevent-focused observationsto provide initial analysis andimmediate feedback.”– USSOCOM Directive 11-3In December 2008, and at the request of SOCCENT andSOCAFRICA, LLATs deployed to the Combined Joint SpecialOperations Task Force-Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A), CombinedJoint Special Operations Task Force-Arabian Peninsula(CJSOTF-AP), and the Special Operations Command andControl Element-Horn of Africa (SOCCE-HOA).The objectives of the LLAT are: Provide immediate feedback to the Theater SpecialOperations Command (TSOC), Components, andother organizations as appropriate, to improve jointwarfighting operations and provide information forefforts to transform the force Serve as an advocate for resolution of issues thatrequire significant levels of coordination and supportoutside the Geographic Commander’s area ofresponsibility (AOR) Serve as a resource to TSOC personnel when accessto USSOCOM areas of expertise or other elements ofsupport are requested or required Identify joint lessons learned that provide theopportunity for immediate impact on the ongoingOverseas Contingency Operations and feed them backinto the education and training systems4 Horizons – Helping sHape tHe Future oF soF

Location is EverythingIn order to meet these objectives, the LLATs need to belocated in the environment that affords them the greatestaccess to both current operations and key leaders. Byattending mission planning activities, observing operationsduring execution, and actively participating in theafter-action process, the LLATs can more easily andmore effectively identify those issues that need to berecorded and highlighted for resolution. Quality lessonslearned data requires detailed situational awareness.Second only to this is the support of key leaders. Withoutregular engagement with decision-makers at all levels ofcommand, lessons do not get learned and institutionalized.Rules of EngagementWhen dispatched to support a Subunified Commandor TSOC, collected observations, insights and lessonslearned are not released until they have been vettedby the originating Command. This ensures the OIL areaccurately reflected and leverage the expertise of the staff.Interviews are also vetted with the interviewee to validatecontext. The goal of the vetting process is to pass validOIL quickly through the SOF, conventional, and inter-agencycommunities.“ A Combatant Command mayrequest active collectionlessons learned support, eitherin the form of augmentationsupport for internal commandactive collection activities, oras a full package, externallygenerated, active collectionlessons learned activity.”– CJCS 3150.25D(JLLIS-SOF). JLLIS-SOF is accessible through theSensitive Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) at:http://www.jllis.smil.mil/ussocom. A sampling of recentcollections follows.Scan Eagle Unmanned AerialSystemsAt the request of Naval Special Warfare SupportActivity One and the CJSOTF-A and CJSOTF-AP staffs, theLLATs collected OIL on the operational use of the ScanEagle (SE) Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) in supportof SOF operations. They focused on issues pertainingto SE training, personnel, equipment and sustainment,tactical achievements and innovations, and logisticschallenges and best practices. The LLATs collected 53OIL, conducted 49 interviews, and secured more than 200supporting documents. The OIL pointed to deficienciesin training, operator qualification, and logistics support.These OIL were shared with the Center for SpecialOperations Acquisition Logistics Fixed Wing UnmannedAerial System Office who worked with the SE contractorand SOCCENT to begin corrective actions. In parallel, theOIL also highlighted tactical innovation on the part of SEoperators, leveraging the strengths of the system, andmitigating its weaknesses. These tactical innovationswere shared with the broader SE community so they didnot reside solely at one operating site.Samples of SuccessLLATs have collected on a variety of topics. Thisinformation is typically disseminated through a varietyof publications such as Lessons Learned Newsletters,Lessons Learned Bulletins, and Senior SOF LeaderExecutive Summaries, and via the Joint Lessons LearnedInformation System – Special Operations ForcesMr. David Hilliard, a Boeing mechanic operator, retrieves a BoeingScan Eagle Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) from a skyhook, a smallsuspended rope that catches the UAV out of mid-air, during thetraining exercise Desert Talon 2-06 aboard Marine Corps Air StationYuma, Ariz., June 16, 2006. (U.S. Marine Corps photo bySgt. Guadalupe M. Deanda III)Fall 2009 5

Tiba, 6, hugs a U.S. Soldier just before her trip home to Balad, Iraq. Tiba and her mother (pictured in photo on right) traveled to Portland,Maine, where Tiba received life-saving heart surgery as part of Operation Good Heart. (U.S. Army photo by staff Sgt. Carl Hudson)“Pre-deployment experience and training levels varysignificantly between the SE UAS sites. SE-specifictraining is insufficient. Although personnel were able todraw upon aviation and UAS experience, this experiencewas ad-hoc as opposed to resulting from formal training.Many contractor field service representatives (FSRs) at theSE UAS sites do not even have related backgrounds, norfamiliarity with current theater operations,” said a ScanEagle operator, Operation Iraqi Freedom.Operation Good HeartA 5-year-old Iraqi girl, Tiba, was identified as sufferingfrom a severe congenital heart defect that would havebeen fatal if not treated. She required specializedheart surgery that hospitals in Iraq were not capableof performing. Through the efforts of several 1stSpecial Forces Group Soldiers, Tiba was granted fullmedical treatment at Maine Medical Center in Portland,Maine. The success or failure of this operation from anIrregular Warfare (IW) standpoint depended upon howand when the public was informed. “A very detailedplan was developed that took into consideration everypossibility that could turn the operation into a negativemessage, including cultural and religious concerns,”said a 1SFG soldier. It was critical that every aspect ofthe story incorporated an Iraqi face, such as Tiba’s, tocommunicate and emphasize Tiba’s hope and our serviceto help in her time of need. LLATs were there to collectevery aspect of the process and ultimately wrote 19separate observations, insights and lessons learned.6 Horizons – Helping sHape tHe Future oF soFBiometricsThere are currently three primary biometrics systemsin use across Iraq and Afghanistan. One system isconsidered to have outlived its useful life, and the othertwo systems, by all appearances, have significant capabilitygaps. The first generation Special Operations IdentificationSystem (SOIDS), with the MV-5 wand, is antiquated andcumbersome in most field situations compared to newerequipment. The Cogent Fusion and Secure ElectronicEnrollment Kit (SEEK) systems, although smaller and morerugged, do not appear to have been fully field-tested priorto employment. Operators cited numerous shortcomingsof both pieces of equipment. This information was passedto the SCSO-J24 Identity Superiority Program at USSOCOMand many of the suggestions made for improvement wereaddressed and will be implemented before the next modelis issued to the force.More…In addition to these samples of success, reports on the:Rover III, the Raven UAS, SOF linguistics, Remote WeaponsSystems, MIST Training, “B” Pillar Cracks on the M113, AfghanNational Army Retention, Taliban Defeat of Mine Detection,ODA Contracting, and Command and Control of SOF Forces inthe Horn of Africa can be found on the SIPRNET at:http://www.jllis.smil.mil/ussocom.Mr. Troy Secor is the BranchManager for Lessons LearnedCollection and Analysis. A retiredCombat Controller, Mr. Secor hasbeen working in the Directorate ofJoint SOF Knowledge (J7) LessonsLearned for almost three years.Mr. Troy Secor

OperaTiOnaLizinG irreGULarWarFareBy Major Dave Blankenship, USMCThe 2008 Quadrennial Roles & Missions reviewestablished Irregular Warfare (IW) as a core missionarea for the Department of Defense (DoD). On 1December 2008, the Secretary of Defense issued guidancefor institutionalizing IW across the Department in the formof DoD Directive (DoDD) 3000.07.DoDD 3000.07 articulates Department policy for IW,assigns specific responsibilities for DoD offices and militarycomponents, and prioritizes twelve actions or activities toenable “operationalizing IW.” This term is defined by theDoD Dictionary as: “The level of war at which campaignsand major operations are planned, conducted, andsustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters orother operational areas. Activities at this level link tacticsand strategy by establishing operational objectives neededto achieve the strategic objectives, sequencing eventsto achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions,and applying resources to bring about and sustain theseevents.”IW is people-oriented, population-centric, and takesplace in the presence of an enemy. DoDD 3000.07articulates five primary and seven secondary IW activities– which are well-understood, practiced and developedcivil-military approaches for addressing the complex sociopoliticaldimensions of conflict. These activities provideA Kurdish elder demonstrates his English language knowledge, toU.S. Army Sgt. 1st Class Robert Hoff, attached to Crazyhorse Troop,4th Squadron, 9th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Heavy Brigade CombatTeam, 1st Cavalry Division, during a recent visit, to the village ofTubazawa, in Kirkuk, Iraq, May 14, 2009. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt.Gustavo Olgiati)Definition of Irregular Warfare:“A violent struggle among state and non-state actors forlegitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s).Irregular Warfare favors indirect and asymmetricapproaches, though it may employ the full range of militaryand other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’spower, influence and will.”– DoD DictionaryFall 2009 7

By Colonel Louis A. Caporicci, USAFprOpOSed preCepTS FOrirreGULar WarFareIrregular Warfare (IW) is presentlycharacterized as a violent struggle.This term is certainly strugglingto find its place in the Babel ofmilspeak.Is it a form of warfare? Does itrepresent a unique battle space? Isit offensive or defensive? Is it a legalform of warfare? Are IW subordinateactivities (e.g., unconventionalwarfare, counterinsurgency, foreigninternal defense, counterterrorism,and stability operations) exhaustive,truncated, or just flat wrong?It is clear that U.S. military forces(and perhaps other countries) havehad a difficult time countering theTaliban, AL Qaeda (AQ), AQ affiliates,‘foreign fighters,’ maritime pirates,and a variety of highly enabledrogue surrogates with our Cold Warsharpenedinstrument of war.These challenges have provedso vexing that the Department ofDefense (DoD) pointedly addressesthis new “not-major-combatoperations”conundrum in the 2006Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR),Irregular Warfare (IW) Road Map,subsequent Quadrennial Roles andMissions Review (QRM), IrregularWarfare Joint Operating Concept (IWJOC) - Version 1.0, Special Operationsand Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD/SOLIC) Guidance for the Developmentof the Force Study, and many otherstudies and projects.As indicated in many of his recentspeeches, Secretary of DefenseGates is not optimistic that theDoD and Services’ can transformto be effective in addressing thesechallenges, while maintaining ourA U.S. Marine from 1st Battalion, 24th Marine Regiment and an Indonesian marine from the2nd Indonesian Marine Infantry Battalion shake hands after the closing ceremony of the firstphase of Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) Indonesia 2009 in JampangTengah, Indonesia, July 24, 2009. (Indonesian Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Heri Substyono)Fall 2009 13

nation’s conventional dominance.To that end, U.S. Special OperationsCommand (USSOCOM) and U.S.Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM)have partnered to write the IrregularWarfare Joint Operating ConceptVersion 2.0: Countering IrregularThreats.The intent of this Joint OperatingConcept (JOC) is to answer a questionthat Secretary Gates feels we havenot resolved, “How do we utilizeour current and future force to, onorder, prevent, deter, disrupt, defeat,and/or destroy state and non-stateadversaries who adopt irregularmethods?,” as stated in his 9 July,2008 testimony to Congress.In the end, it is necessary toidentify the gaps and key capabilitiesthat will allow this joint force to beeffective, without the need for overlyspecialized or separate forces.Economically, a flexible homogeneousforce is eminently desirable. TheJOC will distill as many doctrine,organization, training and education,materiel, leadership and personnel,facilities (DOTMLPF) policy changerequests, as needed, in order toaffect the required changes.To facilitate answers to thesechallenges, JOC stakeholders havedeveloped 14 IW Precepts. Thoughthe term, “precepts” typically hasreligious and military roots and maybe perceived as authoritative, theLatin derivation, “precepts” is a termthat refers to teaching points used toadvise and guide.The precepts listed are notexhaustive, nor authoritative; theIW JOC writing team found them tobe constructive in development ofthe concept. These 14 IW Preceptsguidelines are detailed below:1: Analyze EachIrregular ThreatUniquelyThe political, social, cultural,economic, and military situationwill manifest itself differently whereirregular threats appear. Decisionmakersmust spend the effort toexamine the factors as a socialscience problem, as much as amilitary issue. They must gatheras many subject matter expertson all aspects of the problem, astime allows. Appreciation of thisU.S. Marine Corps Cpl. Domenico Fornaro, with 1st Battalion, 24th Marine Regiment, explains the M-16A4 rifle to Head Pvt. Ahmad Zulfi,from the 2nd Indonesian Marine Infantry Battalion, during the first phase of Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) Indonesia2009 in Jampang Tengah, Indonesia, July 23, 2009. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Dustin T. Schalue)14 Horizons – Helping sHape tHe Future oF soF

complexity needs to extend tothe lowest echelons of command.Operations to illuminate the details ofthe complexity must drive campaigndesign.2: Tactical Victory inMilitary EngagementsWill Not DetermineSuccessThe beliefs, acceptance, andactions of the population in the hostcountry will determine when campaigngoals are achieved. Campaignplanners and Commanders mustfocus their measures of effectivenesson how well the population supportsthe host nation government orirregular threat actors. Actions bymilitary units must be calculated tosupport all other efforts to reinforcethe legitimacy of the host nationgovernment in the eyes of thepopulation.3: Engage SovereignPartners as EqualsCampaign planners must designoperations to maximize partnerstrengths accepting short-term risksand inefficiencies. Building partnercapacity for legitimate governancetakes patience and understanding ofthe social, political and institutionalculture of their nation. Achieving thisrequires development of viable localleaders and institutions through thecombined efforts of U.S., allied, andnon-governmental agencies. While itmay be easier for U.S. military unitsto conduct operations themselves, itis better to work to strengthen localforces and institutions. Eventually, allforeign armies are seen as interlopersor occupiers. One does not have tolook further than Alexander’s, theSoviet Union’s, the British Empire’s,and the current United States’experiences in Afghanistan, as astark example. The sooner the maineffort can transition to host nationinstitutions, without unacceptabledegradation, the better.4: Allow Intelligence toDrive OperationsTimely, specific, and reliableintelligence gathered and analyzedat the lowest possible level anddisseminated throughout the Forcehelps shape effective operations.Wide-spread dispersed operationsmake individual combatant’s actionsa key generator of intelligence.Intelligence assessment includesgathering information from allpossible sources, classified andopen-source; both military and nonmilitaryin origin. Reporting by units,members of the country team, andassociated civilian agencies, are oftengreater in importance than reportingby specialized intelligence assets.5: Make Legitimacy theMain ObjectiveThe primary objective is to fosterdevelopment of effective governanceby a legitimate local government.The U.S. government achieves thisobjective by the balanced applicationof both military and non-militarymeans. All governments rule througha combination of consent andcoercion. Success in the form of asustainable peace requires restoringlegitimacy, which, in turn, requiresthe use of all instruments of nationalpower.6: Place Unity ofEffort at the Center ofOperationsUnity of effort is critical inorder to subordinate independentuncoordinated action to centralleadership, thus minimizingvulnerabilities for insurgents toexploit. Ideally, a single leaderhas authority over all governmentagencies involved in operations.Usually, however, militaryCommanders work to achieve unityof effort through liaison with leadersof a wide variety of non-militaryagencies. The U.S. Ambassadorand country team, along with seniorhost nation representatives, must bekey players in higher-level planning;and similar connections are neededthroughout the chain of command.14 Proposed Preceptsfor Irregular Warfare1. Analyze each irregular threatuniquely2. Tactical victory in militaryengagements will notdetermine success3. Engage sovereign partnersas equals4. Allow intelligence to driveoperations5. Make legitimacy the mainobjective6. Place unity of effort at thecenter of operations7. Attack the root causes of theproblem to achieve longerlasting solutions8. Establish security under therule of law9. Prepare for a long termcommitment10. Manage information andexpectations11. Use the appropriate level offorce12. Empower at the lowest levels13. Employ the appropriatemix of direct and indirectapproaches14. Work with and through adiverse range of partnersFall 2009 15

U.S. Navy Chief Engineman Edward Young speaks with a foreign naval officer on a pier in Dakar, Senegal, Feb. 4, 2009, aboard theamphibious transport dock ship USS Nashville (LPD 13). Nashville is in Senegal for Africa Partnership Station (APS) 2009, an internationalinitiative developed by Naval Forces Europe and Naval Forces Africa, which aims to work cooperatively with U.S. and international partners toimprove maritime safety and security on the African continent. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class David Holmes)7: Attack the RootCauses of the Problemto Achieve LongerLasting SolutionsStakeholders’ frustrated needs andgrievances often fuel the sources androot causes for support to irregularactors. Full understanding of thesefactors may require detailed analysisof regional history, ethnicity, culture,politics and religion. Improvedgovernance will usually bring aboutmarginalization of irregular actors to apoint where they are destroyed,co-opted or reduced to irrelevance innumbers and capability. U.S. militaryintervention may cease when successis assured, but before it is actuallyachieved.8: Establish SecurityUnder the Rule of LawWithout a secure environment,implementing permanent reformsis problematic and can lead tospreading disorder. To establishlegitimacy, Commanders seekto transition security activitiesfrom combat operations to lawenforcement, as quickly as feasible.When insurgents are seen ascriminals, they lose public support.Using a legal system establishedin-line with local culture and practicesto deal with such criminals, enhancesthe host nation government’slegitimacy. The violence levelmust be reduced enough forpolice forces to maintain orderprior to any transition; otherwise,counterinsurgency (COIN) forces willbe unable to secure the populace andmay lose the legitimacy gained by thetransition.9: Prepare for a LongTerm CommitmentAt the strategic level, gaining andmaintaining U.S. public support forcommencing military operationsis crucial, however, experienceshows that the typical timeframe forpolitical and public support is threeto five years. The irregular threat’sprimary battle is against the hostnation government, not the UnitedStates; however, U.S. support can becrucial to building public faith in thatgovernment’s viability. The Americanpublic will not actively support thehost nation government unless theyare convinced that the military’sdeployed forces have the means,ability, stamina, and will to win.16 Horizons – Helping sHape tHe Future oF soF

10: Manage Informationand ExpectationsInformation and expectations arerelated; the joint force Commandermust manage both. To limitdiscontent and build support, thehost nation government, and anyjoint forces in assistance, mustcreate and maintain a realisticset of expectations among thepopulace, friendly military forces,and the international community.Information Operations (IO), includingpsychological operations and therelated activities of public affairsand civil-military operations, are keytools to accomplish this. Campaigndesigners must use operations tocreate and maintain an appropriatemessage, thus helping to controlexpectations of the population.11: Use the AppropriateLevel of ForceIt is vital for Commanders to adoptappropriate and measured levels offorce and apply that force preciselyso that it accomplishes the mission,without causing unnecessary loss oflife or suffering.12: Empower theLowest LevelsDelegating Command authoritydown to the lowest level for missionexecution is ideally suited to themosaic nature of countering irregularthreats. Local Commanders havethe best grasp of their situations.Under mission command, they aregiven access to, or control of theresources needed to, produce timelyintelligence, conduct effective tacticaloperations, and manage IO and civilmilitaryoperations. Thus, effectiveoperations are decentralized, andhigher Commanders push as manycapabilities as possible downto their subordinates. Missioncommand encourages the initiativeof subordinates and facilitates thatthe learning that must occur atevery level. The lowest echelonsare closest to the population andtherefore, must fight, adapt andreact, at least as quickly as theirregular threats.13: Employ theAppropriate Mix ofDirect and IndirectApproachesCampaign planners need todesign operations to blend thesetwo approaches in order to bestcounter irregular threats. Together,they integrate the requirement toimmediately disrupt adversarieswhile impacting the environment inwhich the irregular threats operate.The direct approach addresses theimmediate requirement to pursuethe difficult irregular threats, theirinfrastructure and their resources.It includes actions to kill, capture andinterdict violent extremist networks,and deny their access to and use ofweapons of mass destruction. Theindirect approach focuses on enablinga diverse range of partners. It entailsa broader long-term commitment tofoster a self-sustaining indigenouscapability and capacity to providesecurity, develop governance, andpromote development.14: Work With andThrough a DiverseRange of PartnersHost nation, Geographic CombatantCommand, and Country Teamstrategies define the objectives incombating irregular threats. Planningmust coordinate an integrated theaterColonel Louis A. Caporicci is the Director of theFutures Directorate (J9). Previously, the Chiefof Concepts for J9 and Deputy Commander,SOCPAC. He is an AFSOF rotary wing commandpilot with extensive combat and contingencyexperience.Col Louis A. Caporiccieffort that is joint, inter-agency, andmulti-national to reduce inefficienciesand enhance strategy. Inter-agencycoordination during joint operationsbecomes extremely important. Thisis the best way to ensure that theefforts complement each otherand that available resources areused effectively and efficiently.Effective integration is difficult andconsists of much more than merecoordination. Ideally, endeavors suchas a well-resourced foreign internaldefense program will incorporate allinstruments in a coordinated andsupporting manner that addresseshost nation requirements, as well asU.S. national policy and interests.Are these 14 IW preceptsparticularly unique? No. They arerather a guiding imperative to devolveour joint force into something thatis better, as existed at varioustimes in our past. The joint forceof the United States is striving for aforce that functions in a distributedmanner, is not overly dependent upontechnology, can conduct operationswhen command and control failsat higher levels, leverages thepioneering and risk-taking nature ofour forefathers to forge friendshipsand liaisons to a mutual advantage,and underwrites the mistakesof junior leaders. Similar to thepast, times will dictate when theForce must come together to meetformidable challenges. Theseprecepts, if institutionalized andoperationalized across the Force, willyield a better force; and one that bestrepresents the values of this country.Fall 2009 17

Aviation Development inNation-Assistance Strategies:Are We Overlooking a Critical Asymmetric Advantage?By Mr. G. Hale LaughlinAn Mi-17 helicopter is unloaded from a Antonov AH-124 transport aircraft in Kabul, Afghanistan, Dec. 1, 2008. Three helicopters will beadded to the fleet of the Afghan National Army Air Corps. (U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Keith Brown)Contemporary conditionsinvolving complex nationalsecurity initiatives havecaused transformation in the waythat U.S. national security institutionsthink about war. Driven by analysisof current and predicted conditions,these initiatives have shifted theways and means employed tosecure U.S. interests in a complexinternational arena. U.S. strategicinitiatives have produced conceptsthat synthesize conflict theory withsecurity strategy and national policyto guide planning for force structure,resources and response options.The result is increased emphasisin categories including IrregularWarfare (IW) and Security, Stability,18 Horizons – Helping sHape tHe Future oF soFTransition and Reconstruction(SSTR) operations, grounded inactivities involving nation-assistanceagendas. Significantly, the narrativeof IW describes the legitimacy ofa government as measured in theminds of the governed. The rolethat aviation resource developmentplays in assisting nations, challengedby insurgent pressure and otherdestabilizing conditions warrantsspecific consideration in this newstrategic paradigm.Recognizing the fundamentalprinciple that integrated activities ofall U.S. instruments of national powerare the best approach to this agenda,emphasis has been placed on wholeof-governmentplanning and activities.Combined with the nation-assistancestrategy currently guiding U.S. policy,economic development of partnernations is a paramount category thatmust be factored into the equation. 1Short of a major power conflict, thisnew strategic security paradigm canbe summarized by stating that U.S.security interests will be obtained tothe extent that other nations behaveresponsibly on the international stage.The U.S. will work to obtain thisend by employing ways and meansto assist other nations to gain andmaintain their own security, stability1. Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion, Oxford University Press:2007 and Dani Rodrik, One Economics Many Recipes:Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth,Princeton University Press: 2007.

CENTER FOR KNOWLEDGE & FUTURESSOKFKNOWLEDGE IS POWER, THE FUTURE IS NOWPlease reply toour short survey below...IMPORTANT: DO NOT ENLARGE, REDUCE OR MOVE the FIM and POSTNET barcodes. They are only valid as printed!Special care must be taken to ensure FIM and POSTNET barcode are actual size AND placed properly on the mail pieceto meet both USPS regulations and automation compatibility standards.USSOCOM SOKF Horizons Survey, Fall 20091. Which category best describes you today?___ Retired Military ___ Active Officer ___ Active Enlisted___ Civilian ___ Guard/Reserve2. Please use the scale below to indicate the level with which youagree or disagree with the following statements.1=Strongly Agree 2=Agree 3=Disagree 4=Strongly Disagreea) Horizons is an effective method of communicatinginformation about SOKF. 1 2 3 4b) Before reading Horizons, I was familiar with SOKF capabilitiesand activities. 1 2 3 4c) After reading Horizons, my familiarity with SOKF capabilitiesand activities increased. 1 2 3 4d) Horizons provided me with information that I can apply to mywork. 1 2 3 43. Please use the scale below to rate the following aspects ofHorizons.1=Very Good 2=Good 3=Average 4=Poor 5=Very Poora) Content of articles 1 2 3 4 5b) Number of articles 1 2 3 4 5c) Length of articles 1 2 3 4 5d) Organization of magazine 1 2 3 4 5e) Appearance of magazine 1 2 3 4 54. What types of SOKF information would you like to see infuture issues of Horizons?___ Education Policy___ Lessons Learned___ Irregular Warfare___ Training___ Doctrine___ SOF Concepts___ Combat Capability Development___ Wargaming/ Experimentation___ Language and Cultural Sensitivity___ Professional Development OpportunitiesOther:__________________________________________6. How did you acquire this issue of Horizons?___ A copy was mailed/delivered to me.___ A copy was mailed/delivered to my office/unit.___ I picked up a copy at an office/unit.___ A copy was provided by a colleague.Other: _______________________7. How would you prefer to receive/acquire future issues ofHorizons?___Mail ___E-mail ___Website ___Pick-up print versionAdditional suggestions for distribution: ________________8. Please provide any additional comments about Horizons._______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

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your feedback.IMPORTANT: DO NOT ENLARGE, REDUCE OR MOVE the FIM and POSTNET barcodes. They are only valid as printed!Special care must be taken to ensure FIM and POSTNET barcode are actual size AND placed properly on the mail pieceto meet both USPS regulations and automation compatibility standards.USSOCOM SOKF Horizons Survey, Fall 20091. Which category best describes you today?___ Retired Military ___ Active Officer ___ Active Enlisted___ Civilian ___ Guard/Reserve2. Please use the scale below to indicate the level with which youagree or disagree with the following statements.1=Strongly Agree 2=Agree 3=Disagree 4=Strongly Disagreea) Horizons is an effective method of communicatinginformation about SOKF. 1 2 3 4b) Before reading Horizons, I was familiar with SOKF capabilitiesand activities. 1 2 3 4c) After reading Horizons, my familiarity with SOKF capabilitiesand activities increased. 1 2 3 4d) Horizons provided me with information that I can apply to mywork. 1 2 3 43. Please use the scale below to rate the following aspects ofHorizons.1=Very Good 2=Good 3=Average 4=Poor 5=Very Poora) Content of articles 1 2 3 4 5b) Number of articles 1 2 3 4 5c) Length of articles 1 2 3 4 5d) Organization of magazine 1 2 3 4 5e) Appearance of magazine 1 2 3 4 54. What types of SOKF information would you like to see infuture issues of Horizons?___ Education Policy___ Lessons Learned___ Irregular Warfare___ Training___ Doctrine___ SOF Concepts___ Combat Capability Development___ Wargaming/ Experimentation___ Language and Cultural Sensitivity___ Professional Development OpportunitiesOther:__________________________________________6. How did you acquire this issue of Horizons?___ A copy was mailed/delivered to me.___ A copy was mailed/delivered to my office/unit.___ I picked up a copy at an office/unit.___ A copy was provided by a colleague.Other: _______________________7. How would you prefer to receive/acquire future issues ofHorizons?___Mail ___E-mail ___Website ___Pick-up print versionAdditional suggestions for distribution: ________________8. Please provide any additional comments about Horizons._______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

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and economic development. It goeswithout saying that the U.S. will alsomaintain the right and the abilityto prevail in conflict if necessary tosecure this end, but that employingindirect ways and means that helpother nations gain and maintain theirown security and stability throughnation-assistance agendas are thepreferred persistent approach.Despite a complex policyenvironment, executive guidanceand logic provide that U.S. securityis the paramount strategic end. Thereal transition has taken place inthe ways and means, and resourcesand methods, in which policy makershave chosen to obtain that objective.Each Cabinet department hashad to adjust to the new strategicparadigm. Renewed emphasison inter-agency integration andcoordination are diligently beingaddressed and progress is beingmade. This presents an imperativefor the Department of Defense (DoD)to broaden its focus to include bothMajor Combat Operations (MCO),as well as the need for all servicecomponents to bring their expertise tobear in stability operations and othernation assistance agendas operatingunder complex, irregular conditions.At the dawn of the Cold War, theKennedy administration ushered inan era of nation-building strategiesas a way to thwart the domino effectof communist expansion. Havingstepped away from large scalenation-building agendas in the post-Vietnam era, the DoD again findsitself with the need to expand its owncapability to work through indirectmeans to assist other nationsto obtain and maintain their ownsecurity and stability. Unlike the eraof 1960’s, when John F. Kennedy’sresponse was to expand SpecialForces as a way to address his nationbuildingstrategy, current effortsrequire all service component forcesto balance capabilities across stabilityoperations, and security assistanceagendas that often take place underirregular conditions. Supported by theSecretary of Defense policy for severalyears, this shift requires servicecomponents to expand outsidethe well-known direct approach toobtaining security objectives andembrace the less comfortable indirectapproach of obtaining objectives byworking with and through counterpartsof other nations.Each service component iswrestling with their own uniquechallenges to meet this imperative,while maintaining the ability to defeatgreat power adversaries in large-scaleconflict. Balancing force structureand resources between conventionalMCO focus and IW operations,where the ability to advise a partnernation counterpart is as importantas employing a particular skill set inMCO, has proven to be a dauntingchallenge for U.S. Special OperationsCommand (USSOCOM) and eachcomponent. The U.S. Air Force (USAF)has also had its own unique pathdown this complex IW journey.Fall 2009 19

Responsible for securing U.S.security objectives in air, space andcyberspace domains around theglobe, the USAF performs many rolesevery hour of every day with muchof it unseen and largely unheralded,even by those who benefit from thefunctions. While many of thesefunctions operate with little needfor adaptation across the range ofwarfighting conditions, there aresome functions unique to the AirForce that require adaptation toirregular conditions and the newBuilding Partnerships (BP), BuildingPartnership Capacity (BPC), and otherrelated nation assistance agendas.Specifically related to U.S. strategicobjectives, regarding the need toassist other nations to gain andmaintain their own security, stabilityand economic development withinbroader nation assistance agendas,the role of partner nation’s aviationresources must be considered.For many, the term “air power”conjures images of fighter aircraftand bombers converging on targets todeliver massive lethal kinetic effects,and large cargo aircraft deliveringthousands of troops and tons ofcargo anywhere in the world day ornight. Within the context of nationassistance agendas, and consideringsome inter-agency partners importantto integrated plans and activities forachieving those objectives, the termhas little meaning and often producesnegative responses. In order tohelp expand the strategic templatenecessary to address roles that theUSAF provides under irregular warfareand nation assistance agendas, ithas been useful to shift the narrative.Shifting the narrative in the BP, BPCand nation assistance realm to theterm, “aviation resource capacity andcapability” has opened up a spacefor broader dialogue concerning the“ Shifting the narrative in the BuildingPartnerships, Building Partnership Capacityand nation assistance realm to the term,Aviation Resource Capacity and Capabilityhas opened up a space for dialogueconcerning the strategic asymmetricadvantage that aviation resources providea nation— any nation.”strategic asymmetric advantage thataviation resources provide a nation –any nation.The total aviation resourcecapacity and capability of a nationinvolves the sum total of all airdomain resources including humans,aircraft, processes and infrastructurein both civilian and military-securitysectors. Nation-assistance agendasfunction within a partner nation’spolitical, military-security, economic,social, infrastructure and information(PMESII) development sectors. Thequestion then becomes, “Whatrole does a nation’s total aviationresource capacity and capabilityprovide to the PMESII conditionsof a nation to provide increasedlegitimacy to the government in theminds of the people?”Given the global conditions inthe early part of the 21st century,objective analysis requiresinvestigation into whether it ispossible to have a secure and stablenation in the early 21st centurywithout at least some minimallyeffective aviation resources toconnect the government to the peopleand the people to each other; toprovide commerce critical connectionsto regional and global markets; toextend the rule of law throughout thecountry and help to secure borders;and when necessary, to provide partof the security sector necessary tocounter criminals and anti-governmentadversaries. Such analysis mightderive the premise that the security,stability and economic developmentof a nation in the early 21st centurymay be critically linked to its aviationresource capacity and capability.Answers to these questions areimportant to ensure that we do notoverlook critical options that mayweigh considerably in the balanceof effects and influence necessaryto achieve U.S. strategic ends. Forexample, although our earth is 75%water, it is also surrounded by air, yetthere are vast segments of the world’spopulation who live in regions that arenot serviced by other transportationinfrastructure (e.g., aviation/marine channels). Thus, the laggingdevelopment of aviation resourcesdoes have an impact on nationassistanceagendas. Therefore,most practitioners argue that ignoringthese aviation and maritime resourcerequirements is not a sustainablecourse of action. Addressing theseneeds is critical to developingsecurity, stability and economicdevelopment in island nations.Similarly, we do not haveexamples from modern historywhere security has been achieved incounterinsurgent warfare, without theuse of aviation resources.While historical examples providethat the use of aviation resources20 Horizons – Helping sHape tHe Future oF soF

SOKF AND AVIATIONFOREIGN INTERNALDEFENSEInitiatives in Aviation FID(AvFID) are wholly consistentwith SOKF’s exploration ofcapacity building in support ofIW activities. In many regionsof the world, communities areunderserved by road networksand are more dependent uponwater or air links. These mayprovide the only connectionsto legitimate governance andlaw enforcement. Furthermore,AvFID is a force multiplier whenthe footprint of the U.S. or othernon-indigenous force mustnecessarily be minimized.used to prevail against insurgentshave often been supplied by externalsupport interests, the critical factorconsidering current U.S. strategy, isthat building the capacity of othernations to obtain and maintaintheir own security and stability areparamount. If we apply the lessonsof successful counterinsurgencyadapted to current U.S. strategiesthen the implication is that helpingthose nations to develop their ownaviation resources is also critical.The alternatives are either to supportU.S. BPC strategy for developingaviation resources in partner nationslacking them, or to program the forcestructure and resources necessaryfor the U.S. and coalition partners touni-laterally or multi-laterally providethe aviation resources necessary toprevail against what are predicted tobe increasing magnitudes of insurgentwars and other conflicts.While the debates and efforts toclarify the current strategic narrativeand design the appropriate defensepostures necessary to ensure U.S.security continue, consideration ofthe value that aviation resourcesprovide to a nation threatened byinsurgent pressures and stagnateddevelopment should receive strongconsideration. Historically, policy hasnot supported development of aviationresources in nations that cannotafford the aircraft that the U.S. hasto offer from its advanced inventory.Current strategic conditions indicatethat the greatest threats, in termsof ungoverned sanctuaries, combinelatent strategic resources for energy(and other minerals that are becomingincreasingly scarce and important)within the territories of nations atthe lower end of the developmentscale. 2 These nations require specificattention and planning for how todevelop their aviation resources.Developing aviation resourcesin these nations often involves theneed for skill sets and knowledge forhow to advise partner nations in theemployment of foreign aircraft, as wellas the U.S. aircraft that they possess.The gap created by this inattentionprovided by the aviation developmentof these nations in past decadeshas been filled, and continues to be2. Michael T. Klare, Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: TheGeopolitics of Energy, Metropolitan Books, 2008.exploited by other powers such asRussia and China. The long-termrelationships established by thetransfer of aviation equipment andinfrastructure warrants close analysisfor U.S. industry and policy makersto determine if the ability to competein this market is important to U.S.security objectives.The USAF has taken steps toincrease its own aviation advisingcapacity and capability as a way toexecute the means to assist aviationdevelopment in partner nations.Current operations in Iraq andAfghanistan will further broaden theAir Force’s effectiveness, as lessonslearned in those operations areapplied to training and development ofnew generations of advisors. Carryingout the aviation development agendasin support of the broader nationassistancestrategies, and addressingthe civilian aspect of aviationdevelopment and the security sector,will require policy shifts and otheradaptations that allow a whole-ofnationapproach, which is necessaryto meet the demand. Further analysismay also yield that encroachment onU.S. diplomatic space by the nationsof Russia and China in regions likeAfrica, may warrant pulling from U.S.and other western nation industry todevelop aircraft capable of filling theniche market currently occupied bythe less expensive, less capable andfar more difficult to maintain Russianand Chinese aircraft, yielding a trulywhole-of-nation approach to thesecomplex security dynamics.Mr. G. Hale Laughlin serves with the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC/A8XI).Mr. Laughlin has extensive combined active duty and government service in the SpecialOperations and Combat Aviation Advisor mission areas. He holds a master’s degree ininternational management from Whitworth University and a bachelors degree in anthropologyfrom Eastern Washington University.Mr. G. Hale LaughlinFall 2009 21

draininG The SWaMp:The rOLe OF OperaTiOnaL KnOWLedGe inFiGhTinG The perSiSTenT COnFLiCTBy Mr. Peter Fortuna and Ms. Jodie SweezeyTo succeed in global operationsagainst terrorist networks,referred to by some as “TheLong War,” one must embark upona deliberate process consisting ofreconstruction and nation-buildingfocused on Foreign Internal Defense(FID), Civil Affairs (CA), Security ForceAssistance (SFA), and inter-agencyparticipation. According to USSOCOMCommander ADM Olson, this processis “the new normal, not just anaberration.”What is the future of this newnormal and its societal and culturalimplications? The National DefenseIndustrial Association’s (NDIA) 20thAnnual Special Operations/LowIntensity Conflict Symposiumand Exhibition focused on thisFilipino teachers learn the English language from U.S. Army Maj. Dave Harper, foreground, a former assistant professor in Englishcomposition and literature at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, as he instructs during an English Teacher Learning Seminar held in theSouthern Butig region of Mindanao, Republic of the Philippines, March 22, 2009. U.S. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication SpecialistRoland A. Franklin/Released)22 Horizons – Helping sHape tHe Future oF soF

subject. Held in Washington, D.C.from 9-12 February 2009, “ThePersistent Conflict: The Path Ahead”was elaborated on through whitepapers, panel discussions, andkey note speakers. This articlediscusses the subjects coveredthrough the week-long conference,that are currently being addressed bythe SOKF J7.Addressing ThePersistent ConflictThe symposium panelists andspeakers stated that some of whatconstitutes the “Persistent Conflict”has yet to be defined; but we doknow that it is ever-changing andvery different from conflicts of thepast. As it relates to ”PersistentConflict,” we need to address theapplication of unconventional warfare(UW), counter-insurgency operations(COIN), and irregular warfare (IW),because the focus is currently on CA,FID, Information Operations (IO), andPsychological Operations (PSYOP).As our leadership stated, thisnew focus will be accomplished byfighting smart to, “drain the swamp,and not just kill all the alligators”and necessitates inter-agencycooperation. This collaborativeeffort is not just between SpecialOperations Forces (SOF) and GeneralPurpose Forces (GPF) but alsobetween SOF, Other GovernmentalAgencies (OGA), InternationalGovernmental Agencies (IGA), andmulti-national forces.The SOKF-J7-OD (OperationalKnowledge, Doctrine Office) has theDoD lead to develop joint SpecialOperations (SO) doctrine andensure its integration into the bodyof all other Joint doctrine. J7-ODalso develops the enduring andfundamental principles, guidingthe employment of U.S. forces incoordinated actions toward commonobjectives. As DoD re-thinksimportant aspects of its doctrineapplicable to persistent conflict,SO doctrine reflects the uniquecapabilities extant within USSOCOMthat have particular application to the“new normal.”SO doctrine encompasses directaction, special reconnaissance,UW, FID, SFA, COIN, IO, PSYOP, CAoperations, counter-proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction, andcounterterrorism. Within SO doctrine,there is a focus on the value of the“indirect approach” that requiresthinking in terms of synchronizing,coordinating, and integrating theactivities of military, inter-agency,multi-national and non-governmentalentities to achieve a unity of effort.More specifically, SO doctrine isdeveloped for application in bothtraditional and irregular warfare. Itis particularly well suited for the“new normal” where it is applieddirectly against terrorist networksand indirectly to influence and renderglobal and regional environmentsinhospitable to terrorist networks.Additionally, as a core task of theHeadquarters staff, USSOCOMis responsible for synchronizingplanning for global operations againstterrorist networks which it does incoordination with other combatantcommands, the Services, and asdirected, appropriate U.S. governmentagencies.Preparing OurSOF ForcesPanelists also stated that in thepersistent conflict, the individualSOF warrior is the center of gravity.They are more important than thetechnology they utilize. To succeed,education and training must be both alife-long endeavor, as well as a seriesof focused occurrences to preparespecial operations personnel for theirmissions. The current growth of SOFplaces more operators in trainingwith the expectation that graduateswill still meet or exceed graduationstandards. In addition to maintaininghigh standards, it is importantthat training remains relevant,and proactive versus reactive. Asdiscussed during the Symposiumsessions, we must train our militaryto deal with potential uncertainties byteaching them how to think instead ofwhat to think.The SOKF-J7-OA (OperationalKnowledge, Assessments Branch)performs a number of tasks thatsupport SOF training in preparation fordeployment. J7-OA tracks and reportseducation and training readinessof the force, the ComponentCommander’s top readiness concernsrelated to education and training, andother issues impacting education andtraining to CDR USSOCOM. Vehiclesfor gathering this information includereporting in the Defense ReadinessReporting System (DRRS), searchingfor lessons learned within the JointLessons Learned Information System(JLLIS), and conducting on-site visitswith the Component Commands.The Branch leads the Joint SOFAssessment Team (JSAT) program toensure SOF-specific training meetsthe basic SOF standards set forthby USSOCOM in order to facilitateinteroperability.Embracing Languageand Culture VariancesOne of the panels pointed out thatthe majority of SOF operations arenon-kinetic, so our forces requiremore language and cultural knowledgeto facilitate missions and tasks. Forexample, there are regional variancesin places where SOF operates, suchas Central Command AOR, PacificCommand AOR, and SouthernFall 2009 23

U.S. Army Spc. Keicelyn Pastores, from Alpha Company, Task Force 1st Battalion, 35th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1stArmored Division, practices her Arabic language skills with Iraqi children during an operation to search for evidence of extremist activity inBezel, Iraq, July 30, 2008. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. David J. Marshall)Command AOR. Success in theseregions requires us to embracelanguage and culture, not justemphasize it. Finding and recruitingpeople who already possess theselanguage and cultural skills is difficult.The SOKF-J7-OC (OperationalKnowledge, Culture and LanguageOffice) is at the forefront of initiativesto increase USSOCOM’s capability24 Horizons – Helping sHape tHe Future oF soFand capacity. These initiativesinclude a focus on legislative andpolicy issues which are designedto broaden recruiting pools in orderto include more native speakers,as well as align Service testing andproficiency pay with SOF needs.Additionally, refinements are madeto the requirements and readinessprocesses to better define whichcapabilities and capacities need to bedeveloped. Finally, we provide bettertraining by assisting componentinstitutional and unit programs, aswell as expanding access to joint SOFlanguage training.

Enhancing Currentand Future Global SOFCapabilitiesAnother panel focused on meetingthe challenge of “Persistent Conflict”through a proactive approach toeducation and training. Using WayneGretzky as an example, a panelistsaid “we need to skate to where thepuck will be, instead of where it isnow.” This foresight, combined withlessons learned from the battlefront,allows us to provide relevant training.The SOKF-J7-OL (OperationalKnowledge, Lessons LearnedBranch) is proactively collectinglessons learned to gain ground truththat is vital to the rapid delivery ofcapability and best practices to theSOF warrior. The data collected isstored in the Joint Lessons LearnedInformation System for SpecialOperation Forces (JLLIS-SOF) andprovides a collaborative environmentto enhance current and future globalSOF capabilities throughout the DoDand its inter-agency partners. J7-OA is working closely with J7-OL totrack doctrine, training and educationissues/shortfalls, as reported inJLLIS-SOF, for resolution.Providing ForeignMilitary EducationOpportunitiesOther panel discussions at theNDIA symposium discussed theimportance of SOF interactinginternationally through fellowshipsand attending foreign schools.Presently, USSOCOM depends heavilyupon the Services’ programs to selectand send SOF members to foreignschools and programs such as theOlmsted Scholarship, which offersan opportunity to live abroad whileattending a foreign university.The SOKF J7-OE (OperationalKnowledge, Education Office) isworking with the Services andService Components on professionaldevelopment opportunities for SOF,including foreign professional militaryeducation. These efforts allowUSSOCOM to fill seats in foreignschools and build life-long relations.Building Relationshipswith Other NationsIn his keynote speech, ADM Olsonspoke of “wisdom” as being what isspecial about SOF. He noted thatSOF can be more successful throughrelationship building and interactingwith additional foreign countries.Using T.E. Lawrence, knownthroughout the world as Lawrence ofArabia, as an example, he pointedto Lawrence’s continued longevityresulting from his constant interactionwith the Arabic culture.In recent years, relationshipbuilding is key to our approach tosuccess by winning the hearts andminds of local populations. Ourinitiative to expand education andtraining opportunities abroad willenhance the SOF warrior’s outlookand gain an understanding of prioritycountries’ cultures. This continuingeffort to advance current programswill be vital to our success in “thepersistent conflict.”Ms. Jodie Sweezey is the Lessons Learned trends analyst for the Directorate of Joint SOFKnowledge (J7), a position she has held for one year. Ms. Sweezey is a Marine Corps reservist andholds a master’s degree in history .Ms. Jodie SweezeyMr. Peter Fortuna is the Deputy Chief for the Operational Knowledge Education Office in theDirectorate of Joint SOF Knowledge (J7). His current programs include the Special OperationsLegislative Affairs Program (SOLA) and the Professional Development for Special Operations ForcesProgram.Mr. Peter FortunaFall 2009 25

The pUrpOSe OF WarGaMinGBy Mr. Mike Poncin and Major Bradley Hodges, USAF“ The basic problems facing the world today are notsusceptible to a military solution.”– John F. KennedyUSSOCOM WargamesThe United States Special Operations Command(USSOCOM) participates in a variety of wargamesthat address warfighter requirements in the futureglobal environment. Wargame events are valuableopportunities for USSOCOM personnel to interactwith the joint community, inter-agency community, andcoalition partners in order to influence future joint policy,doctrine, and operational capabilities. Within USSOCOMheadquarters, the Directorate of Futures (SOKF-J9) hasthe responsibility of exploring these opportunities andserves as USSOCOM’s clearinghouse for innovative ideas.J9 uses the USSOCOM Vision and Long Range PlanningProcess to develop Special Operations Forces (SOF)future concepts, which are then wargamed in a realisticfuture environment. The resulting insights lead to limitedobjective experiments being conducted on select conceptsin order to further refine them. Wargames and follow-onexperiments are chosen carefully based on USSOCOMidentified needs. Each must have a joint contextthat allows USSOCOM to explore new SOF concepts,technologies, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)consistent with the Commander’s focus and guidance. Thevenues must have objectives and scenarios that correlatewith USSOCOM’s vision, mission, and priorities.Wargames, Exercises, andExperimentationWhat is the difference between a wargame, an exercise,and experimentation? The distinction between thesethree is not well understood. In fact, many people usethe three terms almost interchangeably. A wargame isgenerally a simulated campaign, designed to test militarystrategic and operational concepts without maneuveringactual forces. The IAW CJCSI 3010.02B wargame providesan opportunity for members within the joint conceptcommunity to compete ideas in the form of an assessmentor quantitative analysis. Wargames provide a forum to26 Horizons – Helping sHape tHe Future oF soFclosely examine the concept, formulate recommendations,and make decisions to generate more viable capabilitiesand solutions.On the other hand, an exercise usually involves theuse of actual forces to evaluate whether or not a jointor service-centric force can execute operations outlinedin OPLANs, CONPLANs, and other mandated campaignplans. Exercises are military maneuvers or simulatedwartime operations involving planning, preparation, andexecution. They are carried out for the purpose of trainingand evaluation but may provide insight to potential jointforce employment methods. Exercises are also designedas training events for warfighters from the operationalleveldown to the tactical-level to demonstrate requiredproficiency levels in military plans and operations. Thus,wargames focus on future capabilities, while exercisesfocus on current capabilities.Experimentation is the third term described and usuallyinvolves testing technical solutions to address capabilitygaps, but may also involve non-material solutions aswell. Experimentation venues or seminars are usuallyscoped to evaluate portions of concepts and capabilitiesthat will enhance the joint force in the future. Thesevenues or seminars involve concept and mission-basedexperimentation events to test new TTPs and/or technicalsolutions that meet the future challenges of a rapidlychanging global environment.Wargames and experimentation reinforce the factthat critical thinking is necessary to develop capabilitiesin support of future requirements. Properly plannedwargames and their outputs can be used to explore andilluminate, or simulate, some feature or aspect of humanbehavior that directly bears on the conduct of war. AtUSSOCOM, a wargame planner seeks to design a gameevent that helps frame, examine, and refine key aspects orcapabilities to conduct special operations both now and inthe future.

SOKF J9 – Directorate of Futures“Building Tomorrow’s Capabilities Today”Concept Development Division (J9-C) Concept Development Division (J9-E) Concept Development Division (J9-I)Develops SOF- specific andJoint Operating Concepts inaccordance with the USSOCOMFuture Concept Development PlanLeads USSOCOM’s wargame andexperimentation activities inaccordance with CommanderapprovedWargame andExperimentation Campaign PlanDevelops and implements USSOCOMLong Range Planning Process (LRPP)Manages USSOCOM Future ConceptsJoint Capabilities Integration andDevelopment System (JCIDS) analysisFuture OperatingEnvironmentUSSOCOM Long Range Planning ProcessConcept DevelopmentWargaming &ExperimentationCapabilities Based PlanningReview and RevisionStrategic PlanningProcessJCIDS records to J&R InitialCapabilities Documents (ICD)and doctrine, organization,training, material, leadershipand education personnelfacilities, and policy (DOTMLPF)change requestsUSSOCOM and SOKF: An Integrated Capability Development ApproachIntegrated Functional TeamsUSSOCOM addresses future challenges by by identifyingcapability requirements for SOF utilizing its its J9 J9 Concepts,Integration, and Wargame/Experimentation Divisions. While Whiledeveloping concepts are written, they are are tested through aa wargaming and and experimentation process to validate to validate ideas orideas discover or flaws. discover Integrated flaws. Integrated Functional Functional Teams (IFTs) Teams consisting (IFTs)consisting of members of from members all three from J9 Divisions all three work J9 Divisions together work totogether integrate to their integrate processes their necessary processes to necessary develop, test, to develop, andtest, wargame and future wargame concepts. future concepts. The IFTs closely The IFTs coordinate closelycoordinate activities to activities more quickly to more identify quickly required identify future required capabilities,future capability capabilities, gaps, and capability recommended gaps, solutions, and recommended to drive moresolutions, expeditious to changes drive more in doctrine, expeditious organization, changes training,doctrine,organization, materiel, leadership, training, education, materiel, personnel, leadership, facilities, education, andpersonnel, policy (DOTMLPF-P). facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P).Extensive knowledge of of joint concepts and and the the ongoingwork of the J9 Integration Division, in in concert with with the the IFTs,are IFTs, critical are critical to to successful wargaming and and the the outputs theyprovide. they provide. Equally Equally important is the is the development of of a method afor method data for collection data collection and analysis, and analysis, which is which the is center the center ofof gravity for for successful wargaming. Data collection andanalysis plans are designed to to capture information that thatsupports the development of of future concepts and and must mustbe directly linked to to the capabilities-based assessment(CBA) process. Data collection plans must must be be focused toto address capability gaps. gaps. The The final final reports reports that are that produced areproduced provide the provide joint community the joint community and inter-agency and inter-agency organizationsorganizations a better understanding a better understanding of special operations of special and joint operations forceand capabilities joint force and capabilities how those forces and how should those be forces employed. should The beemployed. final reports The also final highlight reports capability also highlight gaps and capability proposed gapsand solutions proposed to address solutions these to gaps. address these gaps.Service Title 10 WargamesEach of the Services has a a responsibility to to plan plan and andconduct its own Title 10 10 wargame, as as a venue a for for analysis ofof its its own own future future concepts. The The J9 staff J9 staff participates participates in each ofin these each Service-sponsored of these Service-sponsored wargames and wargames associated and planningassociated events. This planning participation events. allows This USSOCOM participation to ensure allows SOFUSSOCOM is represented to ensure appropriately SOF is in represented the Service event appropriately and to inthe familiarize Service the event joint and community to familiarize with SOF the TTPs. joint communitywith SOF TTPs.Fall 2009 27

Unified Quest 09USSOCOMco-sponsored the U.S.Army’s Title 10 wargame,Unified Quest 09 (UQ09).The USSOCOM objectivefor UQ09 was to identifyhow SOF and GPF shouldenable, support, andsustain each otherin order to achievestrategic agility andidentify the capabilitiesthat each requires. This objective was monitored atseveral venues, but particularly at the USSOCOM event,which was dedicated to that objective. The output wasa list of planning considerations for enablers, includingrecommendations on Command and Control (C2),Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR), lift,logistics, and medical capabilities.Global 09USSOCOM alsosupported the U.S.Navy’s Title 10 wargame,Global 09. Global 09 wasdesigned to investigatethe rationale and assessthe impact of varyingcapabilities and coursesof action (COAs) forassigned forces withregard to their ability togain and maintain seacontrol in a challenging anti-access environment. Theintent was to develop a better understanding of sea controland its importance to and relationship with the joint fight.The game examined the nexus between potential COAs(ways) and Capabilities (means) in order to gain insightsinto the “realm of the possible.”Unified Engagement 08USSOCOM recentlyattended UnifiedEngagement 2008(UE08), the Air Force’sTitle 10 wargame. TheUSSOCOM analyticalteam collected data andsolicited answers fromwargame participantsregarding SOF andjoint force capabilities.Through observing operational game play and engagingin active discourse with the air, land, and maritimecomponents, analysts identified strategic, operational, andtactical level challenges that either supported or suggestedfurther study of the ideas in the Irregular Warfare (IW)Joint Operating Concept (JOC). This method of collectionand observation also enabled quality examination of theinteraction and interdependency that exists among GeneralPurpose Forces (GPF), SOF, and partner entities. Detailedfindings and recommendations were collected and analyzedin the areas of DOTMLPF-P changes that were necessaryto effectively employ conventional and unconventionalcapabilities in support of irregular warfare. The findingswere provided to the IW JOC core writing team and the J9Integration Division to help validate ongoing capabilitiesbased assessments.Expeditionary Warrior 08U.S. Marine Corp’sTitle 10 wargame,Expeditionary Warrior,explored the morepressing challenges ofthe USMC. Becauseof the closely alliedrelationship betweenUSSOCOM and theUSMC, J9 has beenvery successful inleveraging this event toexplore IW challenges. For the first time in the history ofUSSOCOM, Expeditionary Warrior included a USSOCOMlimited objective experiment to gather information andvalidate ideas for the Foreign Internal Defense (FID) JointIntegrating Concept (JIC) currently in development.USSOCOM Seminar WargameUSSOCOM also hosted its own 2-part seminar wargame25-27 August and 22-24 September 2009. The purpose ofthis wargame was to help participants better understandthe nature of the future operating environment, as outlinedin the Joint Operating Environment (JOE), USSOCOM’sStrategic Appreciation, and presentations from a variety ofkey note speakers and subject matter experts.Break-out groups were organized with a cross-section ofO-6 level participants from USSOCOM and its Components,TSOCs, the Services, Joint staff, JFCOM, ASD SO/LIC IC,inter-agency representatives, and subject matter experts28 Horizons – Helping sHape tHe Future oF soF

development of SOF document (GD-SOF). Results fromUSSOCOM’s wargame will also influence the developmentof follow-on wargames and seminar workshops to addressthe future.Future Development of SpecialOperations Forcesfrom across academia. The break-out groups discussedglobal challenges and determined the implications sharedby the SOF and joint community. Focused discussionsinvolved looking at global challenges associated withmigration, economic trends, crime, and extremism.SOKF will take the findings and recommendationsand integrate them across USSOCOM to inform a varietyof processes and products to include: next year’sposture statement and strategic communication plan,concept, strategy, and doctrine development; followonexperimentation and CBAs; future revisions of theJOE; strategic appreciation; Capstone Concept for JointOperations (CCJO); strategic planning process; warfighterchallenges; and USSOCOM’s draft guidance for theWargames are instrumental in the future developmentof our SOF, driving DOTMLPF(P) changes and ensuringthat the SOF warrior, joint forces, and partners have therequired capabilities to meet the future challenges of theglobal environment. The wargames hosted and co-hostedby USSOCOM allow the command to address criticalwarfighter challenges and test the sufficiency of developedand developing concepts. These events provide a venuefor USSOCOM to educate the joint, inter-agency, andinternational community on special operations capabilities,requirements, shortfalls, overlaps, and gaps to ensureoperational effectiveness and efficiency in a “whole ofgovernment” and “populace-centric” approach to operatingin the future environment. Wargames have picked up agreat deal of momentum since 9/11, and will continue toprovide an outstanding venue to test concepts, evaluatecapability requirements, and ensure the future force cansuccessfully address its nation’s interests.Thoughts or suggestionsfor future issues of Horizons?Email us!horizons@socom.milMr. Mike Poncin is a Special Operations Futures Analyst in the Futures Directorate (J9).Mr. Poncin is a former First Sergeant in the Army.Mr. Mike PoncinMajor Bradley Hodges is a Wargaming Branch Plans Officer, SOKF J9. He was previously Chiefof the Operations Development & Analysis Branch at The Space Innovation and DevelopmentCenter and is an Air Force Space Operations Officer.Maj. Bradley HodgesFall 2009 29

Lessons Learned:Support to Combat Mission Needs Statement andSOF Integration and Development SystemBy Mr. Rod CristThe United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Special Operations Forces Lessons Learned Program(SOFLLP) aided by the Joint Lessons Learned Information System – Special Operations Forces (JLLIS) supportsurgent warfighter requirements in one of two ways: Observations, insights and lessons learneddeveloped through the implementation of SOFLLPcan be used to document a critical capability gapand thus become the genesis of a Combat MissionNeeds Statement (CMNS) Analysis of observations, insights and lessonslearned resident in the JLLIS-SOF database supportthe mission needs assessment phase of the CMNSprocess and may serve to validate a critical capabilitygap identified through some other means30 Horizons – Helping sHape tHe Future oF soF

The USSOCOM CMNS rapid response process is knownas Special Operations Forces Capabilities Integrationand Development System – Urgent (SOFCIDS-U), andis described in USSOCOM Directive 71-4. A CMNS“documents a critical capability need or gap that mightrequire a fast track solution which may include rapidsystem development, acquisition and fielding.” Thisprocess is used when a SOF unit identifies an “urgent andcompelling new or existing capability gap or requirementduring preparation for active SOF combat or contingencyoperations” that meets one of two criteria of unacceptablerisk, mission failure or force protection. These risksmust be “substantiated with objective analysis or otherquantifiable information.” The observations, insightsand lessons learned found in the JLLIS-SOF databaseand subsequent analysis provided by Lessons LearnedSpecialists can provide this necessary quantifiableinformation to support the CMNS process.When a warfighter identifies a capability gap, it isdocumented and entered into the JLLLIS-SOF database asa lessons learned observation. Then, if an urgent solutionis required, the lessons learned observation couldbecome the basis for a CMNS.In a recent example, the Combined Joint SpecialOperations Air Component (CJSOAC) Operation EnduringFreedom – Operation Iraqi Freedom (OEF-OIF) identifieda requirement for a classified capability for the AC-130[JLLIS-SOF Lesson ID 18031]. The lesson learnedobservation recommended “the creation of a Joint UrgentOperational Needs Statement (JUONS), or equivalentquick-reaction mechanism” (CMNS, in this case) todevelop and field this capability. Almost immediately,the CJSOAC initiated the CMNS process through amessage to Special Operations Command Central(SOCCENT) and USSOCOM. Following the proceduresoutlined in USSOCOM Directive 71-4 Center for SpecialOperations Resources and Requirements (SORR)-J8-R,the gatekeeper of the CMNS process, convened a RapidResponse Team (RRT) composed of subject matterexperts from the headquarters staff. The RRT consideredthe operational merit of the mission need, assessedthe materiel solutions for feasibility and developed aresourcing plan. The RRT’s recommended course ofaction was approved by the Deputy Commander andsent to SOAL for implementation within 180 days. Thus,a lesson learned observation was used to identify acapability gap, and form the genesis of the CMNS.In the second case, lessons learned analyses wereused to support a CMNS during the mission needassessment phase of the rapid response process. Oneexample of this analysis support is illustrated by a recentSOCCENT CMNS requesting concealable body armor. TheSOKF representative to the RRT conducted a JLLIS-SOFsearch on concealable body armor and the countries inthe SOCCENT area of responsibility for threat information.The most applicable observations were made availableto the RRT for use in evaluating the mission need (JLLIS-SOF Lesson IDs 140, 3483, 3985, 3995, 4100, 13016).While the details are classified, these lessons learnedobservations concerned availability of level 4 concealablebody armor and the wearing of indigenous clothing andlevel 4 body armor when traveling to and from the hotellobby, embassy, and training locations. Level 4 bodyarmor is designed to protect a person from a singlearmor piercing projectile. The concealable nature helpsthe teams maintain a lower profile. In addition, thelessons learned analysis supported the J-2 intelligenceassessment of the threat. The RRT considered theseTSOC/ComponentAssessmentSORR-J8-RCharters/ChairsRapid ResponseTeam (RRT) toEvaluateNeed/GapResourcesSolutionsJ3CertifiesPackageCenterDirectorsCoordinateSORR-J8ValidatesDCDRApprovesAcquisitionExecutiveExecutes UrgentDeploymentAcquisitionI:INITIAL ASSESSMENTII:RRT ASSESSMENTIII:CERTIFICATION/VALIDATIONIV:APPROVAL/EXECUTION09-xxx_02Special Operations Forces Capabilities Integration and Development System - Urgent (SOFCIDS-U) Staffing ProcessFall 2009 31

In another recent example, Air Force Special OperationsCommand Lessons Learned Branch (AFSOC/A9L) providedan analysis to support the SOCCENT CMNS for MineResistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Remote WeaponsSystem (RWS) upgrades for Joint Terminal AttackController (JTAC) operations. The JLLIS-SOF databasecontained numerous observations (JLLIS-SOF LessonIDs 15341, 16327, 16331, 16556, 17026, 18902)that “reflected the problems encountered by JTACs inregard to the MRAP and recommendations for alleviatingthe problems.” The AFSOC/A9L analysis point paperwas included as part of the official staffing package.Ultimately, the RRT recommended that AFSOC develop along-term materiel solution for this capability gap usingthe normal SOFCIDS process.The USSOCOM Lessons Learned Program has grownconsistently over the last two years. With a cadre ofover 100 Lessons Learned Specialists located at theheadquarters and throughout the Component Commandsand TSOCs, the Lessons Learned program is playingan important role in the requirements process. TheseLessons Learned Specialists, principally assigned tothe O-6 command level throughout USSOCOM, collectobservations from ongoing operations, perform analysisfor their respective commands, educate the SOFcommunity on the capabilities of SOFLLP, and networkwith each other to ensure emergent observations arespread broadly across the force. As demonstrated in theCMNS and SOFCIDS-U processes, their analysis directlysupports the implementation of material and nonmaterialsolutions to identified capability gaps.observations during deliberations to assess the needfor the materiel solution proposed in the CMNS. Inthe end, the need was validated and approved by theDeputy Commander. Specifically, the Deputy Commanderapproved the rapid acquisition for SOCCENT and directedthe Center for Special Operations to determine theoperational needs across the Theater Special OperationsCommands (TSOCs).Of note, beginning in January 2009, SOKF-J7-OLassigned a full time analyst to SORR-J8-R to lead lessonslearned support to the requirements process.Please contact Mr. Rod Crist, DSN 299-1402 or Commercial813-826-1402, rodney.crist.ctr@socom.mil, with anyquestions. The lessons learned observations cited in thisarticle can be found on the SIPRNET atwww.jllis.smil.mil/ussocom/.Mr. Rod Crist is the Lessons Learned Liaison Officer to the Special Operations Center for Resources andRequirements (J8). Mr. Crist is a former Air Force pilot and Olmsted scholar. He holds a master’s degreein public administration from Harvard University.32 Horizons – Helping sHape tHe Future oF soFMr. Rod Crist

nexUS: JOhn BOyd, SpeCiaL OperaTiOnSFOrCeS aT War, and The inFOrMaTiOn aGeBy Major General (Ret) Geoffrey C. Lambert, USAAcontinual presence andinfluential actor at U.S.Special Operations Command(USSOCOM), U.S. Army, and U.S.Marine Corps wargames since 9/11,has been the work of the late U.S.Air Force Colonel John Boyd, thecreator of the famous observation,orientation, decision and action(OODA) loop. Colonel Boyd contendedthat civilian and military organizationsthat complete the OODA cycle fasterthan adversaries retain a decisiveedge. Due to war’s ongoing processof action-reaction, slower adversariesalways have a distorted and timelapsedpicture of reality and are atdistinct disadvantage when trying toadapt to conditions on the battlefield.In addition, he encouraged continuousevolution of U.S. thought processes tocope with uncertainty, acknowledgingthat anyone’s view of reality can onlybe partially correct and temporary.Ultimately, he concluded thatindividuals and organizations thatcan best learn and adapt will thrive inambiguous environments.Boyd also sensed the differencesbetween tactical and strategicapplication of his theories. The higherthe level of the struggle, the morelikely confrontation would move moreheavily into the cognitive domain,and adaptation would be slower andmore indirect, dealing with ideology,psychological, diplomatic, economic,and societal and systemic issues.Since 9/11, USSOCOM and itsSpecial Operations Forces (SOF) havefought today’s enemies in virtuallockstep with John Boyd’s theories.In Afghanistan, Theater SOFcoupled with Central IntelligenceAgency operatives went intoAfghanistan with an unconventionalwar plan similar to the World WarII model to build rapport, gainunderstanding, and discoverA B-25J Mitchell, a World War II-era bomber, flies over the crowd at the Sioux Gateway Airport Aug. 2, 2009, in Sioux City, Iowa. This B-25,named Miss Mitchell, flew 130 missions over North Africa and Italy and will be on display at the Air and Ag Show hosted by the 185th AirRefueling Wing. (U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Bill Wiseman)Fall 2009 33

MG Lambert as a Senior SOF MentorMG Lambert is a senior mentor for USSOCOM and spends his personal and professional time traveling throughoutthe world and engaging senior leaders and contemporary shapers of industry, society, and government.He has a unique capacity to draw not only from his experiences but also from historical work, to inform how SOFevolves to remain relevant and more importantly, maintain a leadership role, as a change agent for Americanstewardship.opportunities to defeat the Taliban.After precarious infiltrations tolink with Afghan indigenous forcesin opposition to the Taliban,USSOCOM’s Special Forces A-Teamsmade friends, appraised Afghanunit readiness, called for supplies,and, as opportunities unfolded,made uncharted, unplanned, andunfettered decisions on-the-fly to fighta campaign that caused the Taliban tocollapse and flee, in short order.The speed of success wasunanticipated. WWII unconventionalwarfare had been coupled withinformation age communications,unhindered ability to see and fightat night, and precision air support.It was classic Boyd. Once SOFobserved and understood, operatorswere capable of decision and action.In Iraq, National SOF, adopting aVietnam era construct to attackAl-Qaeda, explored and experimentedwith different approaches, rapidlyprocured new equipment, andstreamlined and radically changedinter-agency informational exchangeand staffing processes, resulting inan OODA loop that John Boyd wouldenvy. Boyd’s OODA is now SOF’s find,fix, finish, exploit, and assess (3FEA)process. Coupled with informationage technology that swirls informationand amplifies understanding inincreasingly rapid and tightercircles, 3FEA is a marvelous toolto keep adversaries in recoil,disjointed, paranoid, and incapableof little, beyond survival and low-leveldisruptive and propaganda operations.34 Horizons – Helping sHape tHe Future oF soFGeneral Purpose Forces (GPF) havealso greatly improved their capabilityto adapt. Since 9/11, U.S. Army andMarine forces, as well as SOF, havesped acquisition procedures, rapidlyexplored historical counter-insurgencydoctrine, and found ways to changetraining, tactics and procedures atvirtual light speed due to informationage reach-back from Afghanistanand Iraq. Simultaneously, SOF iscapturing lessons from less visibleoperations in Colombia, OperationEnduring Freedom in the Philippines,and Trans-Sahel Africa.Since 9/11, Colonel Boyd’s workshave been validated and appear tobe unassailable; however, the warand information are cause for somereflection on the margins.Nation-states without a“psychological anchor” may beundermined by ever-faster learningand adaptation. Boyd’s inherentassumption that the U.S. would befree to act unilaterally in the nationaldefense may be at risk. Increasinglyadaptive business organizations,striving to compete in the globalmarketplace, will diminish nationstateability to react in the nationaldefense. Intertwined economies,with executives and corporationsindefinable regarding national originor loyalty, with global overlappingOODAs, may change the strategiclevel of war. As the economicimpact of war increasingly limits U.S.strategic options, other countrieswith “manifest destiny-like” solidpsychological anchors, will be muchmore likely to take risk to achievetheir national vision. Anchors couldinclude strong racial and languageidentification, a history of greatempire and/or repression, territorialdesigns on others, and the like.Slowly grinding, subliminally imbeddedstrategic OODAs of this nature mayenvision change in centuries, an arenain which the real-time United Statescannot compete.The levels of war (tactical,operational, and strategic) are lessand less distinct. Boyd emphasizedthe differences between operatingat the tactical versus strategic level.Due to modern communications,the compression of the tactical,operational, and strategic levelsof conflict weaves psychological,moral and ideological threadsthroughout the fabric of conflict.USSOCOM is increasingly realizingthat mutually supporting SOFcapabilities must range from thetactical to the strategic to ensureoptimal situational understandingand appreciation of the operationalenvironment. ADM Olson, USSOCOMCommander, has changed SOF’sstrategic focus from direct actionto a strategy of both direct andindirect action, acknowledging inCongressional testimony the needto have the world’s best counterterrorforce, as well as the world’sbest advisors, trainers, and mastersof Foreign Internal Defense. Anadditional realization is thatSOF capabilities may operate onsignificantly different timelines, as

Boyd mentioned, regarding the slowerprocess of change at the strategiclevel.When resources are constrained,organizations can use education tosustain an adaptive and learningculture. Prior to 9/11, USSOCOM hadspent its first thirteen years fixing thefailed raid into Iran to rescue Americanhostages. Guided by the HollowayCommission’s findings, SOF resolvedaviation shortfalls, intelligence gaps,communications support, logisticalagility, authorities, inter–agencycoordination, and training andequipment shortfalls. The result wasthe world’s finest counter-terror force.Conversely, due to the imperativeto fix the Iran raid, indirect SOFwas used as a bill payer to assist.Aviation assets were taken away,signal intelligence units lessened insize, support units cut, fire supportmechanisms eliminated, and theability to change severely constrained.However, indirect SOF, through thethirteen years, finished the finalfour years of conflict in El Salvador,maintained a healthy educational andoverseas Joint Combined ExerciseTraining Program, and took advantageof USSOCOM programs at theNaval Postgraduate School and JFKSpecial Warfare Center and Schoolto train leaders to be comfortablewith ambiguity and study counterinsurgency,language and culture,and guerrilla warfare. Innovationsincluded low-cost concepts such asCoalition Support Teams, SpecialOperations Command and ControlElements, and the Combined JointSpecial Operations Task Forces,that are common on the battlefieldtoday. A parallel could be the U.S.Army’s investment in the Army WarCollege, Command and GeneralStaff College and the Infantry Schoolduring the 1930s. Even thoughsoldiers were trained to minimalstandards, at times with riflescarved of wood, the institution of theArmy was professionally educatedand intellectually prepared for thechallenge of World War II.Increasing agility and adaptabilitymay endanger the military “sweetspot.” The current climate is idealfor adaptation. The U.S. military hasunquestioned superiority in space,air, and at sea. On land, the U.S. hasdominance in the times and placesit chooses. Congress providesvirtually unlimited resources and thedefense industry is running hot andready to react. The enemy has beenforced underground and the U.S. hasaccess to almost all of the physicalterrain where the enemy operates.These conditions result in countermafiastyle operations and stabilityoperations enabled by moderntechnology – mostly conducted wherethe U.S. can operate virtually atwill.As the U.S. adapts and evolvesto fight this unique war, it would bedangerous to assume that theseconditions will often be repeated.It is highly unlikely that the UnitedStates will again execute a strategyof collapsing governments with nofollow-through and blind assumptionthat all will be well for U.S. policyafterwards. Overreacting by building a30,000 man advisory corps and othersuggested Iraq/Afghanistan specificsolutions would be unwise, althoughtempting, given our current climateof barely bounded resources andadaptability.The proper approach for SOF andGPF is to find the “sweet spot” (aterm used by General Dempsey,Commander of the U.S. Army Trainingand Doctrine Command) for unitdesign and capability that allowsfor optimal agility after problemsarise. The enabling requirement isto develop institutional capacity toquickly observe and orient on newcrises to provide azimuth for adroitunit modification.Colonel John Boyd would bepleased to see that the U.S. Armyis adopting the Commander’sAppreciation and Campaign Design, ameasure specifically designed to forceresearch, exploration, observation,orientation, and extensive discourseprior to development of military plans.USSOCOM has already installed asimilar process in its J5.In sum, one can sense that inthe upcoming decades globalization,artificial intelligence, geneticengineering, increasing effect ofMoore’s Law, and yet unknownfactors, may someday heavily impactJohn Boyd’s theories. But for now,Colonel John Boyd still guides us well.Major General (Ret) Geoffrey C. Lambert of Quantum Technology Sciences, Inc., was a career SOFofficer serving multiple tours in the 75th Ranger Regiment and Special Forces. A former Director ofOperations for USSOCOM, his last two assignments on active duty were as Commander of the U.S.Army Special Forces (Airborne) and the JFK Special Warfare Center and School.MG (Ret) Geoffrey C. LambertFall 2009 35

USSOCOM Special OperationsCenter for Knowledge and Futures (SOKF)For additional information on SOKF,visit http://www.socom.mil/sokfCENTER FOR KNOWLEDGE & FUTURESUNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMANDSOKFQUIET PROFESSIONALS, LEADING THE WAYKNOWLEDGE IS POWER, THE FUTURE IS NOWThe SOKF coin provides a symbolic representationof the Center’s people and mission. The SOKF coinis presented to those who achieve exceptional levelsof performance and enhance not only the Center forKnowledge and Futures and U.S. Special OperationsCommand, but most importantly, provide for thecontinued excellence of the special operations warriorsat the tip of the spear and reinforce the SOF truths.The front side of the coin consists of the USSOCOMseal, flanked by the seals of the ComponentCommands within USSOCOM: United States ArmySpecial Operations Command, Naval Special WarfareCommand, Air Force Special Operations Command,Marine Special Operations Command, and the JointSpecial Operations Command. The outer ring ofpurple notifies all who hold the coin that USSOCOMis a joint command, maximizing the synergy createdby all Service special operations components workingtoward a common goal.36 Horizons – Helping sHape tHe Future oF soFThe back side of the coin symbolizes the Center,specifically. The focal point is the Eye of Providenceor the all-seeing eye, a symbol which represents theenlightened few, separated from the base of thepyramid, representing the rest of human kind. To theleft of the eye is a burning oil lamp, a symbol datingback to ancient times used to express knowledgeand learning, in this case the Center’s J7. Right ofthe eye is a futuristic logo for USSOCOM, comprisedof an inverted spearhead and pathway to the future.This symbol signifies what is still to come in specialoperations, led largely by the Center’s J9. Belowthe pyramid are the stars representing the currentrank of the Center Director. The outer ring of greenhighlighting the Center’s motto, “Knowledge is power,the Future is now,” illustrates the current Service ofthe Director.We want to hear from you!For suggestions & feedback on future issues of Horizons,please fill out our short web survey:http://tinyurl.com/SOKFsurvey

◆CENTER FOR KNOWLEDGE & FUTURESSOKF◆KNOWLEDGE IS POWER • THE FUTURE IS NOWSpecial Operations Center forKnowledge and Futures (SOKF)U.S. Special Operations Command7701 Tampa Point BlvdMacDill Air Force Base, FL 33621