USAID OIG Afghanistan and Pakistan Oversight Report, April-June ...

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assessments of potential first-time recipients. The intent of these assessments is to determine whether therecipients can effectively manage and account for these funds.OIG’s audit on USAID/Pakistan’s management of preaward assessments found that mission’s preawardprocess provided a reasonable basis for identifying significant financial management vulnerabilities;however, the audit noted weaknesses in the mission’s management of the preaward process. The missiondid not prioritize or follow up on significant vulnerabilities identified in assessments. Of the 28 assessmentreports completed during fiscal year 2010, the 8 selected for testing noted over 250 weaknesses in thepotential recipients’ ability to manage funds properly. The mission included 55 of the reported weaknessesin the recipients’ agreements and stipulated that the weaknesses should be adequately addressed before orafter the initial disbursement of funds. The mission did not include or otherwise address the remaining 195weaknesses because it did not have a comprehensive plan for prioritizing and determining which of the 250weaknesses should or should not be prioritized.Many weaknesses resulted from the mission not including in the recipients’ agreements information on therecipients’ payment mechanisms and systems for procurement, accounting and overall monitoring andassessment.Audit of USAID/Pakistan’s Flood Relief Efforts as Administered by Local NongovernmentalOrganizations (Report No. G-391-11-003-P, January 24, 2011)Heavy rainfall in multiple regions of Pakistan led to devastating flooding in July 2010. The flooding affected82 of Pakistan’s 122 districts and displaced 12 million people, half of whom required humanitarianassistance.USAID/Pakistan committed $10 million for emergency flood relief efforts through cooperative agreements.Five million dollars was awarded to two Pakistani NGOs: the Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF) andRural Support Programmes Network.The two NGOs were to provide immediate relief in the provinces of Balochistan, Punjab, Sindh, and KhyberPakhtunkhwa in the form of food hampers and hygiene kits, and medical supplies to an affected populationof 190,058 people.OIG conducted this audit to determine whether USAID/Pakistan’s flood relief efforts were meeting theimmediate needs of the flood victims. To answer the audit objective, we reviewed mission documentationrelated to managing and monitoring the program, including implementation plans, implementing partneragreements, performance measures, and performance results.Auditors found that USAID/Pakistan’s implementing partners delivered food hampers, hygiene kits, andmedical supplies to meet the immediate needs of the flood victims. As of November 15, 2010, the twoimplementers reported distributing food and hygiene kits to 80,098 households and administering medicalsupplies and treatment to an affected population of 159,620 people and 307,116 livestock.Auditors observed that PPAF issued food hampers and hygiene kit tokens to each household. PPAFestablished separate teams for token registration, token distribution, and distribution of the relief items. InUSAID OIG Afghanistan and Pakistan Oversight Report 91
establishing a distribution policy, PPAF gave priority to households that had not received any aid from otherdonors.Auditors observed that PPAF teams followed the organization’s distribution policy. First, the teamresponsible for distribution of the relief items matched recipients’ tokens and Pakistani national identitycards to recipients’ names on the master token distribution list. Second, the team directed recipients to acounter where they exchanged their tokens for food hampers and hygiene kits. Lastly, the team collectedrecipients’ signatures or thumb impressions to record the transaction.Audit of USAID/Pakistan’s Livelihood Development Program for the Upper Region of the FederallyAdministered Tribal Areas (Report No. G-391-11-002-P, December 10, 2010)FATA has high unemployment, widespread poverty, and separate legal structures. Located in northwesternPakistan, FATA shares its rugged and mountainous border with Afghanistan. Extremist and terrorist groupstake advantage of the geographic and social isolation and lack of governing systems to exert their influenceon the people of this region. Development in FATA has become vital to Pakistan’s progress in fightinginsurgents.The main goal of the Livelihood Development Program is to provide social and economic stabilization inFATA to counter the growing influence of extremist groups. The program has three components: 1) creatingjobs, increasing incomes, and teaching employable skills with a focus on unemployed youth, 2) revitalizingcommunity infrastructure and essential services, and 3) supporting established businesses and developingnew sustainable businesses.After a review of the first 2 years of activities, OIG found that the program has not achieved its main goal ofsocial and economic stabilization to counter the growing influence of extremist and terrorist groups inupper FATA. The mission had no baseline data to determine progress toward countering the influence ofthese groups. In addition, the program had executed only 53 percent of planned activities, and programoutcomes were weak.Security issues were the main cause of the delays and poor performance. Specific incidents included theassassination of the chief of party for the implementer working in lower FATA, the kidnapping of an aidworker, and threats to monitoring teams. Allegations of wrongdoing also impeded progress. Theimplementer stated that program activities were delayed because the implementer had to counter theseallegations and because of additional tiers of oversight put in place to ensure greater accountability.Moreover, program activities stopped for 6 months until security measures were improved and a new chiefof party was appointed.Two additional factors contributed to program delays. First, USAID/Pakistan used program resources toprovide humanitarian and disaster assistance to flood victims and internally displaced persons fleeingconflict areas of FATA. The assistance began in August 2008, only months after the upper FATA programstarted, and continued until the implementer’s termination. Mission officials acknowledged that the workdiverted time and resources from Livelihood Development Program activities. Second, in September 2009the U.S. Department of State (State Department) initiated a shift in strategy toward using more Pakistaniinstitutions to implement USAID programs. During this time, all USAID/Pakistan incremental funding92 USAID OIG Afghanistan and Pakistan Oversight Report
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Audit ProgramOIG auditors, certifie
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Most OIG investigations are conduct
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site visits. In the past, building
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applications. In fact, the former s
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Financial Audit of Costs Incurred b
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investigation. While the employee h
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This field was cultivated under USA
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eceived payments. OIG’s review of
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program is improving the capacity o
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Under Cooperative Agreement No. 391
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Financial Audit of USAID Funds Mana
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OIG Investigation Results in Employ
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Other ExclusionsWalker, Scott Antho
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ReportDateReport Title*Recommendati
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ReportDateReport Title*Recommendati
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Date Report Recommendation TargetAc
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Date Report Recommendation TargetAc
Page 45 and 46: DateReport Title and NumberAmountAu
Page 61 and 62: 10/10/11 F-306-12-002-N Financial A
Page 63 and 64: 02/25/10 5-306-10-002-NFinancial Au
Page 65 and 66: 08/10/06 5-306-06-004-D Financial A
Page 67 and 68: 03/26/04 5-306-04-003-N Financial A
Page 69 and 70: 06/23/11 G-391-11-003-Q Quality Con
Page 71 and 72: 04/30/09 5-391-09-008-R Financial A
Page 73 and 74: 09/26/06 5-391-06-003-Q Quality Con
Page 75 and 76: The project had many successes, inc
Page 77 and 78: complicated process, and OIG could
Page 79 and 80: The objective of the audit was to d
Page 81 and 82: According to information provided b
Page 83 and 84: OIG’s audit found that the univer
Page 85 and 86: Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's Altern
Page 87 and 88: and DOD PSCs in Afghanistan because
Page 89 and 90: Afghanistan has one of the highest
Page 91 and 92: contractor estimated that cost over
Page 93 and 94: Audit of USAID/Pakistan’s Energy
Page 95: Audit of USAID/Pakistan’s Road Re
Page 99 and 100: planned results was hindered by a s
Page 101 and 102: Although USAID carried out numerous
Page 103 and 104: AbbreviationsAACCAEDATVIAUAfCERPDAB
Page 106: USAID Office of Inspector General13
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