USAID OIG Afghanistan and Pakistan Oversight Report, April-June ...

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esearch grants with an average value of $9,000 to teaching institutions in 2011. These shortfalls occurredin part because key personnel hired to manage the program did not have the necessary management skills.Another contributing factor was the change in implementers. Even though the mission awarded the newagreement the day after terminating the AED agreement, EDC still needed time to hire additional staff, findnew office space, develop work plans, and establish internal controls.In addition, the mission’s technical office had many competing priorities and lacked time to provideadequate oversight. During the period under review, the mission assigned one agreement officer’srepresentative to manage Pre-STEP’s $75 million agreement. This individual was assigned to manage threeother projects whose average budget was $9 million. This situation contributed to the missed targets.Audit of USAID’s Pakistan Transition Initiative Program (Report No. G-391-12-003-P, February 3, 2012)Assisting the Government of Pakistan in bringing peace and security to the unstable regions of Pakistan—FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa—is pivotal to U.S. foreign policy objectives and national security. Toachieve this goal, USAID awarded a 3-year, $102 million contract in September 2009 to implement a portionof the Pakistan Transition Initiative in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. USAID’s OTI manages the programwith a staff of seven located at USAID/Pakistan.OIG confirmed that the program is a quick, efficient mechanism to deliver projects that the localcommunities want—like the suspension bridge pictured on the next page—and it has allowed theGovernment of Pakistan to cultivate trust and confidence in its services. Key accomplishments include48,000 meters of streets paved, 22,800 meters of drainage and sanitation piping constructed, and 7,000meters of retaining walls built to withstand flooding.The program formed committees for each project that were made up of community representatives whothen conducted inspections and evaluations throughout project implementation. For example, the auditteam interviewed the community members who had overseen the installation of a water supply system.They explained that, after extremists destroyed portions of their water system, villagers had been forced toget water from a distant well, exposing themselves to danger along the path. After the Pakistani militarycleared the area, the program installed a new water tank and pumps.An overarching goal of the program is to improve relations between the Government of Pakistan andcommunities in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, thereby reducing violence and extremism. In addition tothe infrastructure projects, the program rehabilitated 92 educational facilities, including the GovernmentGirls’ High School. After the school closed for several months to house displaced persons during militaryoperations and sustained significant damage, the program rehabilitated the school and provided schoolsupplies.However, OIG found that the mission had not developed a formal written plan with clear criteria linking theimplementation of program activities with long-term activities planned for FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.As a result, OTI officials agreed that, if funding stops, the program would collapse.USAID OIG Afghanistan and Pakistan Oversight Report 87
Audit of USAID/Pakistan’s Energy Efficiency and Capacity Program (Report No. G-391-12-002-P,November 23, 2011)To help address power blackouts and other severe supply shortages, USAID/Pakistan awarded a 3-year,$23.5 million contract in March 2009 to the International Resources Group to focus on training in the energysector and on a variety of conservation activities throughout Pakistan. In April 2010, in response to a shift inU.S. Government strategy, the mission modified the program’s goal to focus on reducing energy demandthrough an activity to improve the efficiency of tube wells. This activity was designed to replace irrigationpumps used by farmers with more energy-efficient models.In the first year of the program, OIG found that the mission had not achieved the majority of its targets. Ithad not helped any distribution companies implementing conservation strategies or any energy companiesevaluating energy efficiency, upgrading equipment, or with energy conservation plans.It also had trained less than half the energy sector individuals intended.After the shift in strategy, the mission planned to install 11,000 energy efficient irrigation pumps. Althougha pilot phase determined that the activity was unlikely to succeed, the mission proceeded with the program.By September of 2011, less than 1,000 pumps, or 9 percent, had been installed. This was the result ofmultiple problems, including the mission setting unrealistic goals and budgets. For instance, the missionbudgeted almost $1,500 per pump, but in actuality paid almost $9,000. In addition, partners andbeneficiaries often did not participate as intended. The regional energy distribution company, a key partner,did not fully support the program and farmers would not pay the additional cost of installing the pumps,including the costs of masonry and electrical work.Audit of USAID/Pakistan’s Firms Project (Report No. G-391-12-001-P, November 3, 2011)To help improve Pakistan’s economic stability, USAID/Pakistan awarded a 4-year, $89.8 million contract toChemonics International to implement the Firms Project. In 2010, 14 months after the project began, USAIDmodified the project goal to promote economic development in vulnerable areas as an alternative toextremism.Despite the mission’s attempt to increase sales and employment in a number of sectors—leather, livestock,textile, dates, and mangoes—project activities did not increase sales or employment. Efforts to boost salesand jobs were stalled, and activities to improve competitiveness through economic policy reform werebehind schedule. This is in part because of shifts in the mission’s strategy that resulted in the cancellation ofthese activities. In addition, the mission did not set realistic targets. For example, though Chemonics wastasked with working with the Government of Pakistan to enact regulatory reform, they are not expected toachieve this by 2013. According to Chemonics, long term reform is a 10- to 12-year process because of all ofthe stakeholders involved.The mission also focused activities around increasing sales and production of mangoes, but these activitieswere a year behind schedule. Further, the implementer intended to supply processing equipment to themango farmers, but did not deliver them on schedule. One farmer did receive all of the equipment promised,but was unable to operate it because a design flaw prevented its assembly.88 USAID OIG Afghanistan and Pakistan Oversight Report
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Audit ProgramOIG auditors, certifie
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site visits. In the past, building
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Financial Audit of Costs Incurred b
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investigation. While the employee h
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eceived payments. OIG’s review of
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program is improving the capacity o
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Under Cooperative Agreement No. 391
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Financial Audit of USAID Funds Mana
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OIG Investigation Results in Employ
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Other ExclusionsWalker, Scott Antho
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ReportDateReport Title*Recommendati
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Page 45 and 46: DateReport Title and NumberAmountAu
Page 61 and 62: 10/10/11 F-306-12-002-N Financial A
Page 63 and 64: 02/25/10 5-306-10-002-NFinancial Au
Page 65 and 66: 08/10/06 5-306-06-004-D Financial A
Page 67 and 68: 03/26/04 5-306-04-003-N Financial A
Page 69 and 70: 06/23/11 G-391-11-003-Q Quality Con
Page 71 and 72: 04/30/09 5-391-09-008-R Financial A
Page 73 and 74: 09/26/06 5-391-06-003-Q Quality Con
Page 75 and 76: The project had many successes, inc
Page 77 and 78: complicated process, and OIG could
Page 79 and 80: The objective of the audit was to d
Page 81 and 82: According to information provided b
Page 83 and 84: OIG’s audit found that the univer
Page 85 and 86: Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's Altern
Page 87 and 88: and DOD PSCs in Afghanistan because
Page 89 and 90: Afghanistan has one of the highest
Page 91: contractor estimated that cost over
Page 95 and 96: Audit of USAID/Pakistan’s Road Re
Page 97 and 98: establishing a distribution policy,
Page 99 and 100: planned results was hindered by a s
Page 101 and 102: Although USAID carried out numerous
Page 103 and 104: AbbreviationsAACCAEDATVIAUAfCERPDAB
Page 106: USAID Office of Inspector General13
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