USAID OIG Afghanistan and Pakistan Oversight Report, April-June ...

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Assistance under the program was generally provided in the form of goods and services to those who havesuffered losses—a farmer might receive a tractor or livestock and a grocer might receive merchandise torestock his store. At the midpoint of the program, just over 800 of the more than 6,000 eligible families inthe program were receiving assistance, about 13 percent. As of January 22, 2009, the implementer reportedthat it had assisted only about 40 percent of families included in its revised recovery plan, which had beensubmitted just after the implementation midpoint.In addition, until the program was halfway through, USAID officials had very limited involvement in theprogram and little information about its progress. Officials had not followed up regularly on the status ofthe implementer’s implementation plan, monitoring and evaluation plan, or quarterly program reports. Themission also had not made sufficient site visits to evaluate the program’s progress and had not properlymonitored the staffing of positions for the implementing organization.Security concerns contributed to the program’s understaffing, which continued to be a challenge at the timeof the audit. As of January 2009, a subcontractor for the implementer had hired only 56 of the 86 employeesthat it believed necessary to meet program targets. At the time of the audit, the implementer’s documentsindicated that its subcontractor was still in the process of hiring 30 staff members for the six regional officeswhere the program was being implemented. In addition, the implementer had not taken advantage ofopportunities to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the program, such as limiting the program’seligibility period and requiring beneficiaries to present Afghan national identification cards.Audit of USAID/Afghanistan’s Power Sector Activities Under Its Afghanistan InfrastructureRehabilitation Program (Report No. 5-306-10-002-P, November 10, 2009)Providing electrical power to the Afghan population is crucial to Afghanistan’s development. As a key topolitical stability, sufficient, reliable electrical power is especially important for both the capital city of Kabuland the southern agricultural provinces of Helmand and Kandahar. To improve the availability of electricityin these areas, USAID/Afghanistan awarded two major task orders under its Afghanistan InfrastructureRehabilitation Program to the Louis Berger Inc./Black and Veatch Special Projects Corp. Joint Venture.OIG’s audit report highlighted problems faced by two power projects in Afghanistan—building a 105-megawatt plant in Kabul and making improvements in the Kajakai Dam—which were intended to supplypower to key cities and provinces.The audit concluded that, because of construction delays, USAID had not increased reliable power suppliesto these two areas within the planned timeframes. For the Kabul Power Plant, the delays were caused by aninitial inability to obtain adequate title to land for the power plant, an ambiguous statement of workresulting in poor planning and implementation, subcontractor performance problems, a lack of onsitequality assurance, and problems clearing equipment and material through customs. For the Kajakai Damproject, deteriorating security in southern Afghanistan and inconsistent contractor performance contributedto the delay.By May 2009, the USAID-funded projects had completed construction of generators with the ability toproduce only 12 megawatts of power out of the original goal of 140 megawatts—and this increase in powerhad not actually been delivered to the Afghan population. As a result, the economic benefits anticipated forKabul and the southern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar were not being realized. Additionally, theUSAID OIG Afghanistan and Pakistan Oversight Report 85
contractor estimated that cost overruns attributable to the delays would amount to $39 million to completethe Kabul Power Plant by December.The audit also found that the host government might not be able to afford to operate the Kabul Power Plantbecause of the rising cost of diesel fuel and the government’s inability to collect revenue for the generatedelectricity. Further complicating operation of the power plant is the configuration of the Kabul transmissionsystem, which does not allow for the use of other power sources at times of year when those power sourcesare more competitive.With regard to subcontractor performance on the Kabul power plant, the audit found that the contractor hadcharged USAID for subcontractor costs that the contractor had not paid. The contractor had not paid thesecosts because of disputes and questionable claims in subcontractor invoices. The total amount thecontractor received from USAID for these questionable costs (including contractor overhead, fixed fees, andimputed interest) amounted to an overbilling of USAID by $2.1 million.As for the Kajakai Dam project, the original subcontractor left after its personnel received kidnappingthreats, and the project could not be completed until a new subcontractor is selected. USAID had to continuepaying the fixed costs of securing and maintaining the facility until work on the plant can be resumed. Thesefixed costs amount to an estimated $1 million per month, even though none of the 35 extra megawatts ofpower had been delivered.PakistanAudit of USAID/Pakistan’s Pre-Service Teacher Education Program (Report No. F-306-11-003-P,March 16, 2012)To improve teacher education in Pakistan, in September 2008 USAID/Pakistan awarded a $37 millioncooperative agreement to the Academy for Educational Development (AED) to implement the Pre-ServiceTeacher Education Program (Pre-STEP). After the Government of Pakistan terminated its memorandum ofunderstanding with AED, USAID canceled the cooperative agreement as well and awarded the program toEDC.In its first 3 years, the program made progress toward achieving improved teacher education by developingand helping the Pakistani Government implement education policy reforms. The Higher EducationCommission approved two new education degree programs based in part on Pre-STEP recommendations.These programs, introduced with USAID’s support, should ultimately affect teacher training colleges anduniversities throughout Pakistan and help improve the overall quality of education. In part because of Pre-STEP’s efforts, 16 Pakistani teaching institutions have adopted the new degree programs. Pre-STEP plans toincrease the number of colleges and universities offering the new degrees over the next 2 years bysupporting their implementation at target colleges and universities and expanding the number of studentsenrolled in the new degree programs.Despite the progress in developing and implementing policy reforms at the provincial and national levels,the program did not achieve most of its targets. For example, USAID funded only 410 of 2,297 plannedscholarships to students enrolled in the new teaching curriculum and distributed only 10 of 36 planned86 USAID OIG Afghanistan and Pakistan Oversight Report
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Audit ProgramOIG auditors, certifie
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Most OIG investigations are conduct
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site visits. In the past, building
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In recent years, OIG has covered a
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applications. In fact, the former s
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Financial Audit of Costs Incurred b
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investigation. While the employee h
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This field was cultivated under USA
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eceived payments. OIG’s review of
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program is improving the capacity o
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Under Cooperative Agreement No. 391
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Financial Audit of USAID Funds Mana
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OIG Investigation Results in Employ
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A billboard advertises the Anti-Fra
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Other ExclusionsWalker, Scott Antho
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ReportDateReport Title*Recommendati
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Page 41 and 42: Date Report Recommendation TargetAc
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Page 45 and 46: DateReport Title and NumberAmountAu
Page 61 and 62: 10/10/11 F-306-12-002-N Financial A
Page 63 and 64: 02/25/10 5-306-10-002-NFinancial Au
Page 65 and 66: 08/10/06 5-306-06-004-D Financial A
Page 67 and 68: 03/26/04 5-306-04-003-N Financial A
Page 69 and 70: 06/23/11 G-391-11-003-Q Quality Con
Page 71 and 72: 04/30/09 5-391-09-008-R Financial A
Page 73 and 74: 09/26/06 5-391-06-003-Q Quality Con
Page 75 and 76: The project had many successes, inc
Page 77 and 78: complicated process, and OIG could
Page 79 and 80: The objective of the audit was to d
Page 81 and 82: According to information provided b
Page 83 and 84: OIG’s audit found that the univer
Page 85 and 86: Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's Altern
Page 87 and 88: and DOD PSCs in Afghanistan because
Page 89: Afghanistan has one of the highest
Page 93 and 94: Audit of USAID/Pakistan’s Energy
Page 95 and 96: Audit of USAID/Pakistan’s Road Re
Page 97 and 98: establishing a distribution policy,
Page 99 and 100: planned results was hindered by a s
Page 101 and 102: Although USAID carried out numerous
Page 103 and 104: AbbreviationsAACCAEDATVIAUAfCERPDAB
Page 106: USAID Office of Inspector General13
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