USAID OIG Afghanistan and Pakistan Oversight Report, April-June ...

Assistance under the program was generally provided in the form of goods and services to those who havesuffered losses—a farmer might receive a tractor or livestock and a grocer might receive merchandise torestock his store. At the midpoint of the program, just over 800 of the more than 6,000 eligible families inthe program were receiving assistance, about 13 percent. As of January 22, 2009, the implementer reportedthat it had assisted only about 40 percent of families included in its revised recovery plan, which had beensubmitted just after the implementation midpoint.In addition, until the program was halfway through, USAID officials had very limited involvement in theprogram and little information about its progress. Officials had not followed up regularly on the status ofthe implementer’s implementation plan, monitoring and evaluation plan, or quarterly program reports. Themission also had not made sufficient site visits to evaluate the program’s progress and had not properlymonitored the staffing of positions for the implementing organization.Security concerns contributed to the program’s understaffing, which continued to be a challenge at the timeof the audit. As of January 2009, a subcontractor for the implementer had hired only 56 of the 86 employeesthat it believed necessary to meet program targets. At the time of the audit, the implementer’s documentsindicated that its subcontractor was still in the process of hiring 30 staff members for the six regional officeswhere the program was being implemented. In addition, the implementer had not taken advantage ofopportunities to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the program, such as limiting the program’seligibility period and requiring beneficiaries to present Afghan national identification cards.Audit of USAID/Afghanistan’s Power Sector Activities Under Its Afghanistan InfrastructureRehabilitation Program (Report No. 5-306-10-002-P, November 10, 2009)Providing electrical power to the Afghan population is crucial to Afghanistan’s development. As a key topolitical stability, sufficient, reliable electrical power is especially important for both the capital city of Kabuland the southern agricultural provinces of Helmand and Kandahar. To improve the availability of electricityin these areas, USAID/Afghanistan awarded two major task orders under its Afghanistan InfrastructureRehabilitation Program to the Louis Berger Inc./Black and Veatch Special Projects Corp. Joint Venture.OIG’s audit report highlighted problems faced by two power projects in Afghanistan—building a 105-megawatt plant in Kabul and making improvements in the Kajakai Dam—which were intended to supplypower to key cities and provinces.The audit concluded that, because of construction delays, USAID had not increased reliable power suppliesto these two areas within the planned timeframes. For the Kabul Power Plant, the delays were caused by aninitial inability to obtain adequate title to land for the power plant, an ambiguous statement of workresulting in poor planning and implementation, subcontractor performance problems, a lack of onsitequality assurance, and problems clearing equipment and material through customs. For the Kajakai Damproject, deteriorating security in southern Afghanistan and inconsistent contractor performance contributedto the delay.By May 2009, the USAID-funded projects had completed construction of generators with the ability toproduce only 12 megawatts of power out of the original goal of 140 megawatts—and this increase in powerhad not actually been delivered to the Afghan population. As a result, the economic benefits anticipated forKabul and the southern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar were not being realized. Additionally, theUSAID OIG Afghanistan and Pakistan Oversight Report 85