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USAID OIG Afghanistan and Pakistan Oversight Report, April-June ...

USAID OIG Afghanistan and Pakistan Oversight Report, April-June ...

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The mission’s monitoring <strong>and</strong> documentation were inadequate. Mission staff had not made anydocumented site visits after the program’s inception. In fact, both Mercy Corp <strong>and</strong> DAI projectdirectors commented that the <strong>OIG</strong> auditors were the first <strong>USAID</strong> staff who had ever visited theproject. Further, although the program agreement officer’s representative was receivingquarterly <strong>and</strong> annual progress reports, he was neither analyzing those reports nor confirmingthe accuracy of reported data. The progress reports submitted by DAI included mathematicalerrors <strong>and</strong> other inconsistencies that could have been identified by basic checks. The financialstatus of the subawards was also not monitored. For example, Mercy Corp had spent 86percent of its program budget with more than 2 years left in the program.Involvement of the host government in planning is an important component of fosteringsustainability; however, officials in several of <strong>Afghanistan</strong>’s Directorate of Agriculture,Irrigation, <strong>and</strong> Livestock offices said that they were not asked for their input into the design<strong>and</strong> planning of projects. In addition, activities had a disproportionate number of men,demonstrating that a gender balance was not maintained as required.The program’s cash-for-work projects lacked policies on worker hours, ages, <strong>and</strong> safety.Minors were illegally performing heavy labor—including one 13-year-old who weinterviewed—<strong>and</strong> implementers confirmed that hiring minors is a common practice. Further,implementing partners did not consistently provide basic personal safety equipment to theworkers.<strong>OIG</strong> made 18 recommendations to address these problems. Management decisions have beenmade on 14 recommendations, <strong>and</strong> final action has been taken on 4.Audit of <strong>USAID</strong>/<strong>Afghanistan</strong>’s Internal Controls in the Administration of the InvoluntarySeparate Maintenance Allowance (<strong>Report</strong> No. F-306-12-003-P, <strong>June</strong> 25, 2012). Theseparate maintenance allowance is a nontaxable cost-of-living allowance that <strong>USAID</strong> mayprovide to “assist an employee to meet the additional expenses of maintaining members offamily elsewhere than at the employee’s foreign post of assignment.” 1 In 2011,<strong>USAID</strong>/<strong>Afghanistan</strong> paid more than $2 million in involuntary separate maintenance allowance(ISMA) 2 to 212 people.<strong>OIG</strong> determined that the mission had not established internal controls to help ensure that ISMAapplications complied with applicable laws <strong>and</strong> regulations <strong>and</strong> that compliance wasdocumented. Staff members responsible for reviewing <strong>and</strong> approving ISMA applicationsadmitted they did not have a defined set of internal controls to apply when reviewing ISMA1 Department of State St<strong>and</strong>ardized Regulations, Section 260, “Separate Maintenance Allowance.”2 Involuntary separate maintenance allowance is used when the employee is assigned to a post where he or she isunable to bring family members.<strong>USAID</strong> <strong>OIG</strong> <strong>Afghanistan</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Pakistan</strong> <strong>Oversight</strong> <strong>Report</strong> 9

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