USAID OIG Afghanistan and Pakistan Oversight Report, April-June ...

Although USAID carried out numerous displaced persons programs in Pakistan, OIG found that monitoringand evaluation methods needed improvement. Specifically, USAID’s alternative monitoring methods—usedto monitor activities in dangerous and insecure areas, like FATA—needed to be strengthened. In addition,USAID had not implemented monitoring controls that were meant to provide reasonable assurance that $44million in cash-transfer funds had actually reached 140,000 displaced families as intended.USAID/Pakistan’s Capacity Building Program for the Federally Administered Tribal AreasDevelopment Program (Report No. 5-391-10-005-P, January 28, 2010)This audit pointed to several implementation difficulties in USAID’s capacity building programs in the FATAof Pakistan. The FATA region, which is the most economically depressed area of the country, has apopulation with a literacy rate estimated at only 17 percent, and 66 percent of people live below the nationalpoverty line.Local Pakistani institutions responsible for overall governance, health care, education, and public worksprojects lack the capacity to manage services and development resources effectively. In an attempt toremedy this problem, in 2008 USAID awarded a 3-year, $46 million contract to Development AlternativesInc. to increase the capacity of these institutions.OIG’s audit found that, although the program had provided training, taken initial steps to automate FATAinstitutions, and completed some media activities, little had yet been achieved to build the capacity of FATAgovernmental institutions and NGOs responsible for providing services. The program had been in place fornearly 2 years of its 3-year planned lifespan, and it had not made significant progress with two of theprogram’s main goals: improving institutions’ capacity to govern, and improving the capacity of NGOs topromote good governance.Some of the problems could be attributed to the fact that the program had gotten off to a slow start. Duringthe first year, the contractor focused its resources on working out best approaches to designing andimplementing activities, building up relationships with FATA institutions, and developing work plans. Also,the deteriorating security situation in Peshawar and the November 2008 assassination of the chief of partyof another USAID program delayed progress in the FATA capacity building program.Moreover, although the program had implemented a few activities to address FATA NGO weaknesses, thefew FATA-based NGOs that existed lacked the human and financial resources to promote good governanceeffectively. In most instances, FATA NGOs needed to strengthen their proposal preparation skills, financialmanagement practices, and monitoring and evaluation capabilities before they could start to promote goodgovernance.Because of a high-level change of emphasis in U.S. Government strategy toward greater involvement ofPakistani organizations in implementing assistance programs, the mission began to rethink its strategy ofproviding the bulk of its program assistance through U.S.-based implementers such as DAI. As a result, inJune 2009 the mission refrained from fully funding a DAI incremental funding request of $15.3 million and, 4months later, approved only $4.7 million in additional funds. In October 2009, the mission asked DAI toconsider preparing a 90-day demobilization plan. However, as of mid-November 2009, no final decision hadbeen made as to whether the DAI contract would undertake early demobilization and termination or, ifterminated, what program implementation mechanisms would replace the U.S.-based contractor.96 USAID OIG Afghanistan and Pakistan Oversight Report