practices in <strong>Russia</strong>'s housing utilities sector,which are usually attributed to harsh climaticconditions.If the energy concern index in <strong>Russia</strong> is5.5-8 times lower than that of our Nordicneighbors, it is unsurprising that unit heat use forheating residential buildings in <strong>Russia</strong> (500–600kWh/m 2 per year) is several times higher than inSweden or Finland (135 kWh/m 2 per year), whereclimatic conditions are similar to the average in<strong>Russia</strong> (averaging is carried out with adjustmentfor population density, and not simply over thecountry’s territory). Table 7.8 shows heatinsulation of all premises (not only housing), asgross output of heat insulation corresponds topopulation size, rather than to floor area ofparticular premises. Severe climate is often citedto excuse higher energy costs in <strong>Russia</strong>. <strong>Russia</strong> isa northern country and much heating will berequired, even with the best possible housingutility system. But the issue is the extent, to whichhigher energy consumption is due to climate,and the extent, to which it is due to other, quiteunrelated circumstances. Estimates have shownthat the climate factor can only be used to justify25% excess of energy intensity in <strong>Russia</strong>n GDPcompared with western Europe (even if the needfor air conditioning is left out) 20 .Energy intensity of <strong>Russia</strong>n GDP at thestart of the 21 st century was 3.1 times higherthan in the European Union (prior to theadmission of new members, i.e. with 15member countries). Maintenance of a relativelyacceptable economic situation in the countrywas only possible thanks to large-scale exportof oil and natural gas at relatively high prices.This makes the <strong>Russia</strong>n economy extremelyunstable and over-dependent on the state ofglobal fuel markets. These discrepancies havebecome apparent since the 2008 globalfinancial and economic crisis. <strong>Russia</strong>n productscannot be competitive in the world marketwhen their manufacture is so energy intensive.Only industries making semi-products fromdomestic raw materials (low-level metallurgy,mineral fertilizers, timber) can keep afloatthanks to disproportions between global anddomestic energy prices. These factors cast ashadow on the long-term outlook. Long-termeconomic problems could only be addressedby efficient deployment of resources obtainedin years when the market environment washighly favorable. But trends in energy intensityof GDP in 2000–2007 show that the potential isnot being used adequately. Some reduction ofthe energy intensity index since 2000 isinsufficient and much less than observed in theWest after 1974.These points are, essentially, platitudes,and are cited here to emphasize that <strong>Russia</strong>’slong-term economic interests by no meansconflict with its environmental interests: bothnecessitate reducing the power intensity of GDPthrough energy saving and increased energyefficiency. The modernization needed for energysaving would simultaneously yield considerableeconomic benefits, because new equipment isnot just more energy efficient, but moreeconomical overall and more reliable, enablingmanufacture of better-quality products in betterconditions of work, where staff can make fulleruse of their professional skills. The latter aspect isparticularly important, since current productiontechnologies in <strong>Russia</strong> often fail to match theeducational attainment level of industrialemployees, entailing inefficient use of laborresources and negative social consequences.7.9. Social and economicconsequences of hypertrophicdevelopment of the fuel& energy sectorAs shown in previous chapters,development of fuel & energy without regard forenvironmental concerns will have seriousnegative impact on the environment. If existing20The United States spend more power for air conditioning than <strong>Russia</strong> for heating. This is partly due to the climate but partly is a result of thepower wasting attitude. It is worth noting that Table 8 takes into consideration only the ‘harshness’ of the climate, but other aspects of a climatecan also be unfavorable . Other negative climate aspects are also found in <strong>Russia</strong>, but they are less vivid and systematic in inhabited areas.132 National Human Development <strong>Report</strong> in the <strong>Russia</strong>n Federation 2009
trends continued the damage would approachcatastrophic levels. However, full significance ofthese consequences can only be grasped inconjunction with other processes, initiated,supported and intensified by hypertrophicdevelopment of the fuel & energy sector. We listall of the relevant factors (Box 7.1) without goinginto detail (such detail can be found in previouschapters of this <strong>Report</strong> and in other publications:[Danilov-Danilyan, 2001, 2003], etc.) 21 .It is easy to see that the points listed inBox 7.1 are interlinked. The first five refer mainlyto negative economic consequences ofhypertrophic development of the raw materialssector, while the other four emphasize socialconsequences of this process. The trends, whichhave been described, can undermine humandevelopment, creative social practices, and thestrengthening of civil society.7.10. Energy and environmentalmalaise and ways of overcoming itThe current state of <strong>Russia</strong>n energyproduction, characterized by unacceptably highand increasing adverse impacts of the fuel &energy industry on the environment andsquandering of energy in the economy, could bequalified as ‘energy and environmental malaise’.We have described how this situation has comeabout, but a few more important aspects areworth pointing out.The ‘big money’ to be made from oildiscourages the development of long-rangeinterests among business groups, particularlythose dealing directly with oil. Their focus onmaximum gains while market conditions arehighly favorable is understandable: they wouldhave to make much greater efforts in order toobtain many times smaller profits if world fuelprices were lower, so it is important to seize theopportunity while it is there. But this approachentails disregard for environmental protection,sustainable use of mineral resources,technological innovation, and energy andresource saving. There was no time or need forsuch details in the mid–2000s environment ofsuper-profits from record oil prices (even a priceof about USD 70 dollars per barrel triggersdisregard for nature conservation, which dropsout of account completely at higher price levels).Individual and clannish interests of oil magnatesdiverge radically from national interests. Andartificially low domestic energy prices, which,essentially, result from exorbitant world prices,undermine progress to energy saving in powerconsumingindustries.State regulation of oil production (and ofmineral resource use in general) is inefficient:licensing commitments have token status andare not properly enforced; tax issues have beenleft unresolved; distribution of resource rent doesnot meet long-term national interests or theinterests of the fuel & energy sector itself; and asearch for ‘direct’ methods of rent expropriationlead to economic deadlock (see [Danilov-Danilyan, 2004]) 22 ; the government is notimplementing any amortization policy, but haswashed its hands of the major challenges ofcapital repair and renovation (unlike the situationin developed countries, where these issues aregiven equal priority with tax collection).It is hard to expect resolution ofenvironmental problems if the government has noenvironmental policy: since abolition in 2000 of the<strong>Russia</strong>n State Committee for EnvironmentalProtection (Goskomgeologiya), there have beenalmost no attempts to define and start consistentimplementation of such a policy. Approval by thegovernment in 2002 of the <strong>Russia</strong>n EnvironmentalDoctrine has had no practical consequences andno other documents related to environmentalpolicy have been issued since 2000. The economic21E.g. see: V.I.Danilov-Danilyan, The Run for the Market: 10 Years Later, M., MNEPU, 2001, 232p.; V.I.Danilov-Danilyan, Power Efficiency-theKey Route of <strong>Russia</strong>’s Economic Development // Economic Issues of Environmental management on the Fringe of the XXI-st Century, M., TEIS,2003, pp.580-593.22See: V.I.Danilov-Danilyan, The Natural Resource Rent and Utilization of Natural resources // Economics and Mathematic Methods, 2004,vol.40, No.3, pp.3-15.133
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National Human Development Reportin
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National Human Development Reportin
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSThe authors express
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Dear Reader,You have before you the
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PREFACEThis is the 13 th National H
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country’s fuel & energy regions r
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environmental degradation and enhan
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Chapter 1The Energy Sector,the Econ
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By 2008 Russia had increased its sh
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the share of energy in the national
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exported, increased. However, this
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elimination of structural and terri
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• Establishment of competitive me
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number of developed countries, incl
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Although the United Nations Climate
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industrial region of the Urals - Sv
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2.2. Budget capacityand structure o
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(the Federal State Statistics Servi
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Immigration by young and highly ski
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energy regions exacerbate the incom
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Khanty-Mansi and Yamal-Nenets Auton
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the Ministry for Regional Developme
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various other long-term problems in
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is also associated with the fuel an
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Republic of Mordovia 8051 0.732 68.
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Legislative control of impact audit
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Chapter 3Personal Incomes, the Ener
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than any other sources of income -
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Are wages now the main instrument f
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comparison of month-on-month develo
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• The unemployed, people who aree
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Employment in the energy sector acc
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The share of household expenditures
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subsidization practices in the regi
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in power use between regions now de
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Electricity prices for households h
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• Steady decrease in the percenta
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1. The number of graduates with eng
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As well as requiring better fuelcom
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Box 4.1. The village of Kolvain Uss
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continue to use solid fuel for a lo
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