PETER GEACH VIRTUAL ISSUE NO. 1 Truth and God

Peter Geach The Aristotelian Society Virtual Issue No. 1not like an empty name; for it, unlike an empty name meant to be takenstraightforwardly, can be an integral part of a sentence with truth-value.'Pointing towards' and 'pointing away from' are of course metaphors,but what they are metaphors for cannot be informatively explained; aninchoate understanding of these relations is involved in all informativediscourse, and this understanding can be clarified, or sharpened, bylogical and philosophical training, but there can be no question ofanalysis or explicit definition.Here I had better quickly clear up the puzzle we had about suchapparent names as 'Fermat's Last Theorem'. What we get here, I hold,are not names but mere abbreviations for that clauses: the apparentname 'Fermat's Last Theorem' is not related to the clause 'that for nonon-zero integers x, y, z, n do we get x n+2 + y n+2 = z n+2 ’ as a proper nameis to a definite description. A proper name is not an abbreviation for adefinite description (I have argued this elsewhere, and shall not do sohere); but expressions like 'Fermat's Last Theorem' are mereabbreviations. What a sentence signifies (or better: how a sentencesignifies things to be) can be signified only by a complex sign; thusmedievals rightly spoke here of complexe significabilia; an abbreviationis a mere proxy for such a complex sign. Were it otherwise, 'I believePop and he believes Pip' could be a plainer way of conveying thedifferent belief-relations in which I and he stand; it would be a pis allerto describe the entity Pop by the rigmarole 'that the Earth is round' andthe entity Pip by the rigmarole 'that the Earth is flat'. (A reduction, Ihope, of latent nonsense to patent nonsense.) And so we may forgetabout Dummett's puzzle which thing is meant by 'Fermat's LastTheorem' in 'Fermat's Last Theorem is true' and his heroic solution thathere it stands for a truth-value, though elsewhere for a thought.To what, then, do a pair of contradictories alike relate – one pointingtowards it, and the other away from it? There are many reasons forrejecting the answer: A fact. Facts, as I said, are entia non grata becauseof their uncertain individuation; and moreover I think the appearance ofthe construction 'the fact that…' always points to a need to split up thesentence, so as to exhibit the content of the that clause in a separateassertion (see my Logic Matters, pp. 21-23 and 259-261). But moreoverit is easy to wield Ockham's razor drastically here. Frege, with only onesemantic relation for sentences used straightforwardly to bear, could cutdown what sentences relate with to just two objects, the True and theFalse. If we recognize a duality of semantic relations for sentences, wecan account for their semantics in terms of just the True: all truepropositions point towards this, all false ones away from it.Here, as I said, no informative analysis is possible: similes may help.In a world where all roads lead to one place, to Rome, let us say,travellers who face Rome will all meet there if they follow the road,travellers whose backs are towards Rome will be scattered to all! 10