Glendale (PDF) - Hazard Mitigation Web Portal - State of California

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Natural Hazards Mitigation PlanCity of Glendale, CaliforniaSection 7 – Wildfirescompliant because they are dead-end streets more than 1/2-mile long, or do not have aturnaround at their end. There are several non-compliant residential streets off of East ChevyChase Drive, and in the southeastern corner of the city, off of Adams Street. Several other roadsin the eastern and southern Verdugo Mountains are also narrow and do not have properturnarounds. The streets that do not meet Glendale’s Municipal Code requirements are shownon Plate 4-3. Although not shown on the map, the City’s Fire Department also considers theeast end of Glenoaks Boulevard, east of the Glendale Freeway as a potentially hazardous roadbecause it does not have a secondary outlet. A wildland fire, earthquake or another disaster inthe area could place a substantial number of people at risk of not being able to evacuate thisneighborhood if and when necessary.Water Supply:Fire fighters at the urban/wildland interface may be faced by limited water supply and lack ofhydrant taps. Rural areas are characteristically outfitted with small-diameter pipe watersystems, inadequate for providing sustained fire-fighting flows.Areas at higher elevations may also be serviced by water that is pumped up to the higherelevations. In the event of a fire, there may be insufficient water pressure to do so. Emergencywater storage is also critical, especially when battling large wildland fires. During the 1993Laguna Beach (Orange County) fire, “water streams sprayed on burning houses sometimes fellto a trickle” (Orange County Fire Department, 1994), primarily because most water reservoirsin Laguna were located at lower elevations, and the water district could not supply water to thehigher elevations as fast as the fire engines were using it. Leaks and breaks in the waterdistribution system, including leaking irrigation lines and open valves in destroyed homes alsoreduced the amount of water available to the fire fighters. A seven-day emergency storagesupply is recommended, especially in areas likely to be impacted by fires after earthquakes, dueto the anticipated damage to the main water distribution system as a result of ground failure dueto fault rupture, liquefaction, or landsliding.Interface Fire Education Programs and Enforcement:Fire protection in urban/wildland interface areas relies more heavily on landowners takingmeasures personally to protect their properties. Property owners are more likely to take theinitiative if they are informed of the risk. Therefore, public education and awareness should playa greater role in interface areas. In those areas with strict fire codes, property owners whoresist maintaining the minimum brush clearances on their property should be cited for failure toclear brush.The Need for Mitigation Programs:Continued development into the urban/wildland interface will have a growing impact on thewildfire risk of the area. Wildfires in southern California occur periodically, often withcatastrophic results, with the history of deadly and expensive fires going back decades, if not acentury. Continued growth and development underscores the increased need for naturalhazards mitigation planning in southern California.Fires After an Earthquake – The Threat of Urban Conflagration:Although this section deals primarily with the hazard of wildfires, there is another type of firehazard that needs to be addressed. Specifically, large fires following an earthquake in an urbanregion, although rare, have the potential to cause great losses. The two largest peace-timeurban fires in history, the 1906 San Francisco and 1923 Tokyo, were both caused byearthquakes. The conflagration in San Francisco after the 1906 earthquake was the singlelargest urban fire, and the single largest earthquake loss, in U.S. history. Three days of firesconsumed more than 28,000 buildings within a 12-square-kilometer area. The cost isstaggering: $250 million in 1906 dollars, or about $5 billion at today’s prices. Although the2006 PAGE 7 - 15
Natural Hazards Mitigation PlanCity of Glendale, CaliforniaSection 7 – Wildfiresthreat that existed in San Francisco was and is far greater than that in Glendale today, there aresome sections of Glendale where, due to ground failure as a result of either fault rupture orliquefaction, breaks in the gas mains and the water distribution system could lead to asignificant fire-after-earthquake situation. Refer to the maps in Appendix H for informationregarding those areas of the city susceptible to surface fault rupture and liquefaction.The 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake, the 1994 Northridge earthquake, and the 1995 Kobe, Japanearthquake all demonstrate the current, real possibility of a fire-following-an earthquakedeveloping into a conflagration. In the United States, all the elements that would hamper firefightingcapabilities are present: density of wooden structures, limited personnel and equipmentto address multiple fires, debris blocking the access of fire-fighting equipment, and a limitedwater supply.Of the examples above, let’s look at the earthquake closest to home. The moderately sized,M6.7 Northridge earthquake of 1994 caused several structural fires, many the result of brokengas mains: the earthquake caused 15,021 natural gas leaks that resulted in three street fires, 51structural fires (23 of these caused total ruin) and the destruction by fire of 172 mobile homes.In one incident, the earthquake severed a 22-inch gas transmission line and a motorist ignitedthe gas while attempting to restart his stalled vehicle. Response to this fire was impeded by theearthquake’s rupture of a water main; five nearby homes were destroyed. Elsewhere, one mobilehome fire started when a downed power line ignited a ruptured transmission line. In many ofthe destroyed mobile homes, fires erupted when inadequate bracing allowed the homes to slipoff their foundations, severing gas lines and igniting fires. There was a much greater incidenceof mobile home fires (49.1 per thousand) than other structure fires (1.1 per thousand).The damages from the 1994 earthquake reminded researchers of the findings of a studypublished in 1988 by the California Division of Mines and Geology (Toppozada and others,1988). This study identified projected damages in the Los Angeles area as a result of anearthquake on the Newport-Inglewood fault. The earthquake scenario estimated that thousandsof gas leaks would result from damage to pipelines, valves and service connections. This studyprompted the Southern California Gas Company to start replacing their distribution pipelineswith flexible plastic polyethylene pipe, and to develop ways to isolate and shut off sections ofsupply lines when breaks are severe. Nevertheless, as a result of the 1994 Northridgeearthquake, the Southern California Gas Company reported 35 breaks in its natural gastransmission lines and 717 breaks in distribution lines. About 74 percent of its 752 leaks werecorrosion related. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the earthquake, 122,886 gas meters wereclosed by customers or emergency personnel. Thankfully, most of the leaks were small andcould be repaired at the time of service restoration, but the costs and time associated with theserepairs were considerable.History indicates that fires following an earthquake have the potential to severely tax the localfire suppression agencies, and develop into a worst-case scenario. Earthquake-induced fires canplace extraordinary demands on fire suppression resources because of multiple ignitions. Theprincipal causes of earthquake-related fires are open flames, electrical malfunctions, gas leaks,and chemical spills. Downed power lines may ignite fires if the lines do not automatically deenergize.Unanchored gas heaters and water heaters are common problems, as these readily tipover during strong ground shaking (State law now requires new and replaced gas-fired waterheaters to be attached to a wall or other support).Many factors affect the severity of fires following an earthquake, including ignition sources,types and density of fuel, weather conditions, functionality of the water systems, and the abilityof firefighters to suppress the fires. Casualties, debris and poor access can all limit fire-fightingeffectiveness. Water availability in Los Angeles County following a major earthquake will most2006 PAGE 7 - 16
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City CouncilDave Weaver, MayorRafi
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Natural Hazards Mitigation PlanCity
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Table 4-2: STAPLEE Ranking of Actio
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NOTES:This map is intended for gene
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City of GlendaleUpdateHazard Mitiga
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Similar to Safety ElementIncludesEa
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HospitalsPartnershipsWithin City an
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Impact on CityMost significant area
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