Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef

The flight through the woods186. The approximately 10,000 to 15,000 refugees, virtually all men, who – often at thedirection of Dutchbat – fled into the woods were for the most part unarmed (see page2480 of the NIOD Report and point 61 in the Decision of the Yugoslavia Tribunal in thecase Krstic at first instance). To the extent that these refugees did have weapons theywere light weapons or improvised weapons. This instruction by Dutchbat to the men toflee into the woods can only be explained by the fear entertained by Dutchbat for thelives of the male refugees should they fall into the hands of the VRS. This fear waspossibly prompted in part by earlier experiences in that regard, for example, the murderof 762 men who fell into VRS hands on 1 June 1992 in Zvornik. Moreover, it should betaken into account that this flight through the woods cut straight through territorycontrolled by the Bosnian Serbs, an area, moreover, that was infested with mine fields.All this being taken into account Dutchbat still viewed it as preferable being taken by theVRS.187. A large proportion of the refugees did not arrive in Tuzla. The majority were killed bymines, were shot dead by Serbs or were taken prisoner. After capture most of the menwere immediately or shortly thereafter murdered. The Yugoslavia Tribunal establishedin 2001 that not less than 7,475 persons were missing, that about 6,000 men were takenprisoner and that in July 1995 between 7,000 and 8,000 men were murdered (see points81, 83 and 84 of the Decision of the Yugoslavia Tribunal in the case Krstic at firstinstance). The decision in the case Krstic further reveals that the core of these executionstook place between 14 and 17 July 1995 (see also NIOD Report page 2545). Manyexecutions – on a smaller scale – took place for weeks after 17 July 1995.188. Plaintiff notes in respect of the above that, given the real danger that the refugees ranand the fact that Dutchbat was aware of that danger, it was the responsibility of Dutchbatto sound the alarm over the fate of these refugees and to action. If such steps had beentaken on 11 July 1995, or subsequently, then it is virtually certain that many of themcould have been saved. What is certain is that Dutchbat raised no alarm and took noaction.© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com82