Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef

Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef

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Hague) (see pages 2635 and 2636 of the NIOD Report). In all of these instances UNCommand and Control was breached and The Hague was involved in the decisions.170. Another example of The Hague setting aside UN Command and Control is described onpage 2236 of the NIOD Report, where it emerges that the Dutch Chief of the DefenseStaff, Van den Breemen, prompted in this by Voorhoeve, on 11 July 1995 around noongave the order by telephone to Kolsteren (Zagreb) that the safety of Dutchbat hadabsolute priority.171. The initial failure by the Dutch officers of UNPROFOR to accept requests for Close AirSupport and the later halting of the air strikes on the instructions from The Hague, asraised above, constituted an important and fundamental breach of UN Command andControl – with disastrous consequences for the refugees in the Safe Area.172. As the pressure in Srebrenica increased, so information increasingly went from Sarajevoto the Defence Crisis Management Centre (DCBC) in The Hague (see page 2279 of theNIOD Report). The NIOD Report (see page 2281) records that the atmosphere in theDCBC at the time of the fall was pretty tense due to concern for the Dutch soldiers.Concern for the fate of the civilian population came only many days later when theDutch soldiers had left the Safe Area. At the same time increasingly less informationwent to the UN and the DCBC increasingly busied itself with operational matters (seepage 2276 of the NIOD Report).173. Also the then Secretary-General of the UN, Boutros-Ghali, stated on 14 July 1995 that itwas the Dutch government who had requested the UN no longer to deploy air power (seepage 2317 of the NIOD Report).174. The American diplomat and negotiator, Richard Holbrooke, also judged that it was theState of the Netherlands that was to blame for the fact that there were no mass airstrikes. Holbrooke pointed out that the United States had despairingly urged thedeployment of air power but that the State of the Netherlands had refused.© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com78

‘The first line of resistance to any action was the Dutch government, which refused toallow air strikes until its soldiers were out of Bosnia (…)’and:‘For a week I called our Ambassador in the Netherlands, Terry Dornbush, instructinghim to press the Dutch to allow air strikes but to no avail’,records Holbrooke in his memoirs (R. Holbrooke, To End A War, New York 1998).175. The above provides sufficient evidence that the State of the Netherlands breached UNCommand and Control. At the same time Plaintiff notes that it was nevertheless for theUN to stick to the mandate and to press ahead with the air strikes for which permissionhad been granted.I.8. The fate of the civilian population from 11 July 1995176. During the fall of the Safe Area on 11 July 1995 the people who had fled wererepeatedly told by Dutchbat that they would be safe on the compound in Potocari.Moreover, they were encouraged to flee to the UN compound (see, for example, point123 of the Decision of the Yugoslavia Tribunal at first instance against former VRSGeneral, R. Krstic). Dutchbat soldiers often advised the male population, however, toflee into the woods. Plaintiff will discuss a number of witness statements concerningthis.177. Plaintiff Fejzič states about that (see Exhibit 1):‘The Serbs entered the city on 11th July 1995. Chaos broke out. The Dutch soldiers toldthe population, amongst whom were my husband, my son and myself, that we must go tothe UN compound in Potočari. There, according to the soldiers, we would be safe. Wewere later informed by the soldiers, through megaphones and by hand signals, thatthere were two routes to take, either to the woods or to the compound in Potočari. As a© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com79

‘The first line <strong>of</strong> resistance to any action was the Dutch government, which refused toallow air strikes until its soldiers were out <strong>of</strong> Bosnia (…)’and:‘For a week I called our Ambassador in the Netherlands, Terry Dornbush, instructinghim to press the Dutch to allow air strikes but to no avail’,records Holbrooke in his memoirs (R. Holbrooke, To End A War, New York 1998).175. The above provides sufficient evidence that the State <strong>of</strong> the Netherlands breached UNCommand and Control. At the same time Plaintiff notes that it was nevertheless for theUN to stick to the mandate and to press ahead with the air strikes for which permissionhad been granted.I.8. The fate <strong>of</strong> the civilian population from 11 July 1995176. During the fall <strong>of</strong> the Safe Area on 11 July 1995 the people who had fled wererepeatedly told by Dutchbat that they would be safe on the compound in Potocari.Moreover, they were encouraged to flee to the UN compound (see, for example, point123 <strong>of</strong> the Decision <strong>of</strong> the Yugoslavia Tribunal at first instance against former VRSGeneral, R. Krstic). Dutchbat soldiers <strong>of</strong>ten advised the male population, however, t<strong>of</strong>lee into the woods. Plaintiff will discuss a number <strong>of</strong> witness statements concerningthis.177. Plaintiff Fejzič states about that (see Exhibit 1):‘The Serbs entered the city on 11th July 1995. Chaos broke out. The Dutch soldiers toldthe population, amongst whom were my husband, my son and myself, that we must go tothe UN compound in Potočari. There, according to the soldiers, we would be safe. Wewere later informed by the soldiers, through megaphones and by hand signals, thatthere were two routes to take, either to the woods or to the compound in Potočari. As a© <strong>Van</strong> <strong>Diepen</strong> <strong>Van</strong> <strong>der</strong> <strong>Kroef</strong> Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com79

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