Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef
Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef
Hague) (see pages 2635 and 2636 of the NIOD Report). In all of these instances UNCommand and Control was breached and The Hague was involved in the decisions.170. Another example of The Hague setting aside UN Command and Control is described onpage 2236 of the NIOD Report, where it emerges that the Dutch Chief of the DefenseStaff, Van den Breemen, prompted in this by Voorhoeve, on 11 July 1995 around noongave the order by telephone to Kolsteren (Zagreb) that the safety of Dutchbat hadabsolute priority.171. The initial failure by the Dutch officers of UNPROFOR to accept requests for Close AirSupport and the later halting of the air strikes on the instructions from The Hague, asraised above, constituted an important and fundamental breach of UN Command andControl – with disastrous consequences for the refugees in the Safe Area.172. As the pressure in Srebrenica increased, so information increasingly went from Sarajevoto the Defence Crisis Management Centre (DCBC) in The Hague (see page 2279 of theNIOD Report). The NIOD Report (see page 2281) records that the atmosphere in theDCBC at the time of the fall was pretty tense due to concern for the Dutch soldiers.Concern for the fate of the civilian population came only many days later when theDutch soldiers had left the Safe Area. At the same time increasingly less informationwent to the UN and the DCBC increasingly busied itself with operational matters (seepage 2276 of the NIOD Report).173. Also the then Secretary-General of the UN, Boutros-Ghali, stated on 14 July 1995 that itwas the Dutch government who had requested the UN no longer to deploy air power (seepage 2317 of the NIOD Report).174. The American diplomat and negotiator, Richard Holbrooke, also judged that it was theState of the Netherlands that was to blame for the fact that there were no mass airstrikes. Holbrooke pointed out that the United States had despairingly urged thedeployment of air power but that the State of the Netherlands had refused.© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com78
‘The first line of resistance to any action was the Dutch government, which refused toallow air strikes until its soldiers were out of Bosnia (…)’and:‘For a week I called our Ambassador in the Netherlands, Terry Dornbush, instructinghim to press the Dutch to allow air strikes but to no avail’,records Holbrooke in his memoirs (R. Holbrooke, To End A War, New York 1998).175. The above provides sufficient evidence that the State of the Netherlands breached UNCommand and Control. At the same time Plaintiff notes that it was nevertheless for theUN to stick to the mandate and to press ahead with the air strikes for which permissionhad been granted.I.8. The fate of the civilian population from 11 July 1995176. During the fall of the Safe Area on 11 July 1995 the people who had fled wererepeatedly told by Dutchbat that they would be safe on the compound in Potocari.Moreover, they were encouraged to flee to the UN compound (see, for example, point123 of the Decision of the Yugoslavia Tribunal at first instance against former VRSGeneral, R. Krstic). Dutchbat soldiers often advised the male population, however, toflee into the woods. Plaintiff will discuss a number of witness statements concerningthis.177. Plaintiff Fejzič states about that (see Exhibit 1):‘The Serbs entered the city on 11th July 1995. Chaos broke out. The Dutch soldiers toldthe population, amongst whom were my husband, my son and myself, that we must go tothe UN compound in Potočari. There, according to the soldiers, we would be safe. Wewere later informed by the soldiers, through megaphones and by hand signals, thatthere were two routes to take, either to the woods or to the compound in Potočari. As a© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com79
- Page 27 and 28: Brigade. In addition, the State of
- Page 29 and 30: 43. The choice in favour of deploym
- Page 31 and 32: The government parties replied to t
- Page 33 and 34: population during the training as
- Page 35 and 36: Potocari/Srebrenica. This chain of
- Page 37 and 38: 63. As appears from the above, and
- Page 39 and 40: eference to the failure to act of D
- Page 41 and 42: ‘I have been directed, today 29 M
- Page 43 and 44: leaders (Milosevic, Karadzic and Ml
- Page 45 and 46: observation post was not carried ou
- Page 47 and 48: attack on the Safe Area on 6 July 1
- Page 49 and 50: single shot being fired and OP-F wa
- Page 51 and 52: immediate and robust reaction Nicol
- Page 53 and 54: know what Dutchbat itself would do
- Page 55 and 56: that the enclave was continuously e
- Page 57 and 58: ‘You are to use all means at your
- Page 59 and 60: Commander therefore gave the order
- Page 61 and 62: he proposed to have Karremens arres
- Page 63 and 64: Brantz, to establish that there was
- Page 65 and 66: officers and the State of the Nethe
- Page 67 and 68: had any purpose to go ahead with th
- Page 69 and 70: Voorhoeve (see also number 307 of t
- Page 71 and 72: y VRS soldiers in Dutch uniform and
- Page 73 and 74: population: medical matters (Dutchb
- Page 75 and 76: OP-N161. The capture of OP-N is des
- Page 77: Brantz (Tuzla)↕Karremans, Franken
- Page 81 and 82: 180. Plaintiff Mujić states (see E
- Page 83 and 84: The flight to the UN compound189. D
- Page 85 and 86: 193. It is incomprehensible that Du
- Page 87 and 88: soldiers let that be known when the
- Page 89 and 90: Other points concerned forced evict
- Page 91 and 92: ‘On 12 and 13 July 1995, upon the
- Page 93 and 94: statements put in the proceedings a
- Page 95 and 96: lying on a wagon. The Dutchbat sold
- Page 97 and 98: 228. Only one Dutchbat officer was
- Page 99 and 100: ‘UNMO source about 1,000 men take
- Page 101 and 102: night-time. I did not dare to leave
- Page 103 and 104: 239. Plaintiff Hotič states (see E
- Page 105 and 106: People had no food or water, nor we
- Page 107 and 108: During all of this the Dutch soldie
- Page 109 and 110: group and they were raped. I was ve
- Page 111 and 112: four or five Dutchbat soldiers were
- Page 113 and 114: shocked by what he had evidently se
- Page 115 and 116: follows:‘An alternative position
- Page 117 and 118: ‘We were deported to Tuzla later
- Page 119 and 120: I arrived at the barrier shortly th
- Page 121 and 122: encountered objections from the Dut
- Page 123 and 124: 277. Plaintiff Hasanović was born
- Page 125 and 126: Subašić282. Plaintiff Subašić w
- Page 127 and 128: IILegal characterisationIntroductio
Hague) (see pages 2635 and 2636 <strong>of</strong> the NIOD Report). In all <strong>of</strong> these instances UNCommand and Control was breached and The Hague was involved in the decisions.170. Another example <strong>of</strong> The Hague setting aside UN Command and Control is described onpage 2236 <strong>of</strong> the NIOD Report, where it emerges that the Dutch Chief <strong>of</strong> the DefenseStaff, <strong>Van</strong> den Breemen, prompted in this by Voorhoeve, on 11 July 1995 around noongave the or<strong>der</strong> by telephone to Kolsteren (Zagreb) that the safety <strong>of</strong> Dutchbat hadabsolute priority.171. The initial failure by the Dutch <strong>of</strong>ficers <strong>of</strong> UNPROFOR to accept requests for Close AirSupport and the later halting <strong>of</strong> the air strikes on the instructions from The Hague, asraised above, constituted an important and fundamental breach <strong>of</strong> UN Command andControl – with disastrous consequences for the refugees in the Safe Area.172. As the pressure in Srebrenica increased, so information increasingly went from Sarajevoto the Defence Crisis Management Centre (DCBC) in The Hague (see page 2279 <strong>of</strong> theNIOD Report). The NIOD Report (see page 2281) records that the atmosphere in theDCBC at the time <strong>of</strong> the fall was pretty tense due to concern for the Dutch soldiers.Concern for the fate <strong>of</strong> the civilian population came only many days later when theDutch soldiers had left the Safe Area. At the same time increasingly less informationwent to the UN and the DCBC increasingly busied itself with operational matters (seepage 2276 <strong>of</strong> the NIOD Report).173. Also the then Secretary-General <strong>of</strong> the UN, Boutros-Ghali, stated on 14 July 1995 that itwas the Dutch government who had requested the UN no longer to deploy air power (seepage 2317 <strong>of</strong> the NIOD Report).174. The American diplomat and negotiator, Richard Holbrooke, also judged that it was theState <strong>of</strong> the Netherlands that was to blame for the fact that there were no mass airstrikes. Holbrooke pointed out that the United States had despairingly urged thedeployment <strong>of</strong> air power but that the State <strong>of</strong> the Netherlands had refused.© <strong>Van</strong> <strong>Diepen</strong> <strong>Van</strong> <strong>der</strong> <strong>Kroef</strong> Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com78