Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef

Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef

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there even any attempt made of a defence against the attacks of the VRS, let alone that adefence with all possible means took place.150. Moreover, the order of 11 July 1995 from Sarajevo was to:‘provide medical assistance and assist local medical authorities.’Despite this, Dutchbat did not appear to be prepared to provide injured refugees withadequate medical assistance. On the basis of a memorandum of 10 July 1995 of the mostsenior medical officer of Dutchbat III, priority was given to the preservation of the socalled‘iron rations’ for the benefit of possible Dutchbat casualties. The provision ofhumanitarian relief to the civilian population was to be kept to the absolute minimumand that meant that only restrictive and selective use could be made of the existingsupplies. The lowest point was reached in this connection with the order of DutchbatCommander Karremans that no operations were to be carried out on refugees. Theoperating theatres had to stand ready for possible Dutch casualties and the operationmateriel needed for such operations was not to be opened (see pages 32 and 54respectively of the NIOD Report, Dutchbat III en de bevolking: medischeaangelegenheden, (Dutchbat III and the civilian population: medical matters), D.C.L.Schoonoord).151. A distressing example that can be cited in this connection is the fact that the localsurgeon in Srebrenica, Pilav, faxed Dutchbat on 11 July 1995 to request assistance. Atthat moment the Dutchbat sick bay had only two patients, namely, a UNMO (who hadundergone a minor medical intervention on 1 July 1995 but who had remained on thecompound; see page 2699 of the NIOD Report and page 334 of the Summary of theNIOD Report) and a sergeant with a back complaint. In the meantime 25 seriouslyinjured persons had arrived at surgeon Pilav’s hospital, all of whom required surgerymostly for serious injuries, including severed arms. Surgeon Pilav had the capacity in hishospital to treat only five or six casualties. Moreover, Pilav lacked a whole range ofmedicines and equipment (see page 43 of the NIOD Report, Dutchbat III and the civilian© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com72

population: medical matters (Dutchbat III en de bevolking: medische aangelegenheden),D.C.L. Schoonoord). Despite this, Pilav’s request for help to Dutchbat was refused.152. Another distressing example concerns a seriously injured woman with stomach and legwounds resulting from grenade fragments, who requested medical assistance on 11 July1995 around 15.00 hours. Dutchbat medics gave no treatment but only morphinebecause the supply position of the drugs was the decisive factor. Then the injuredwoman was referred to the hospital in Srebrenica, this being ‘the humanitarianconsideration to allow the woman to die in her own surroundings’ (see page 263 of theSummary of the NIOD Report).153. Another example concerned a man who had lost his arm on 12 July 1995 and fromDutchbat learned that he did not qualify to be placed on the casualty list. Other seriouslyinjured persons met the same fate (see pages 2678 and 2679 of the NIOD Report).154. Dutchbat did in the light of (its own assessment of) its own best interests exactly theopposite of what it was ordered, as set out in the order of General Gobilliard of 11 July1995. Instead of the provision of humanitarian relief and medical assistance,consideration was paid exclusively to its own position. That attitude is to be regarded aseven more blameworthy given that there were no Dutch casualties to mourn.Surrender of the remaining observation posts (OPs)155. After the fall of the enclave there were still seven OPs crewed by Dutchbat, namely,OP-A, OP-C, OP-M, OP-N, OP-P, OP-Q and OP-R. Dutchbat received the order on 11July 1995 to leave all the observation posts and to centre their forces in Potoćari, as wellas to take all possible measures to protect the refugees. This order would also not befollowed (as will be discussed below). Instead of withdrawing to the compound andthere employing every means to protect the refugees, developments were awaited at theOPs (see page 2624 of the NIOD Report). The clearance of the remaining OPs will bediscussed in brief below. The number of Dutchbat soldiers who would fall into the handsof the VRS during these activities would eventually rise to 55 (see page 2251 of the© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com73

there even any attempt made <strong>of</strong> a defence against the attacks <strong>of</strong> the VRS, let alone that adefence with all possible means took place.150. Moreover, the or<strong>der</strong> <strong>of</strong> 11 July 1995 from Sarajevo was to:‘provide medical assistance and assist local medical authorities.’Despite this, Dutchbat did not appear to be prepared to provide injured refugees withadequate medical assistance. On the basis <strong>of</strong> a memorandum <strong>of</strong> 10 July 1995 <strong>of</strong> the mostsenior medical <strong>of</strong>ficer <strong>of</strong> Dutchbat III, priority was given to the preservation <strong>of</strong> the socalled‘iron rations’ for the benefit <strong>of</strong> possible Dutchbat casualties. The provision <strong>of</strong>humanitarian relief to the civilian population was to be kept to the absolute minimumand that meant that only restrictive and selective use could be made <strong>of</strong> the existingsupplies. The lowest point was reached in this connection with the or<strong>der</strong> <strong>of</strong> DutchbatComman<strong>der</strong> Karremans that no operations were to be carried out on refugees. Theoperating theatres had to stand ready for possible Dutch casualties and the operationmateriel needed for such operations was not to be opened (see pages 32 and 54respectively <strong>of</strong> the NIOD Report, Dutchbat III en de bevolking: medischeaangelegenheden, (Dutchbat III and the civilian population: medical matters), D.C.L.Schoonoord).151. A distressing example that can be cited in this connection is the fact that the localsurgeon in Srebrenica, Pilav, faxed Dutchbat on 11 July 1995 to request assistance. Atthat moment the Dutchbat sick bay had only two patients, namely, a UNMO (who hadun<strong>der</strong>gone a minor medical intervention on 1 July 1995 but who had remained on thecompound; see page 2699 <strong>of</strong> the NIOD Report and page 334 <strong>of</strong> the Summary <strong>of</strong> theNIOD Report) and a sergeant with a back complaint. In the meantime 25 seriouslyinjured persons had arrived at surgeon Pilav’s hospital, all <strong>of</strong> whom required surgerymostly for serious injuries, including severed arms. Surgeon Pilav had the capacity in hishospital to treat only five or six casualties. Moreover, Pilav lacked a whole range <strong>of</strong>medicines and equipment (see page 43 <strong>of</strong> the NIOD Report, Dutchbat III and the civilian© <strong>Van</strong> <strong>Diepen</strong> <strong>Van</strong> <strong>der</strong> <strong>Kroef</strong> Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com72

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