Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef
Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef
there even any attempt made of a defence against the attacks of the VRS, let alone that adefence with all possible means took place.150. Moreover, the order of 11 July 1995 from Sarajevo was to:‘provide medical assistance and assist local medical authorities.’Despite this, Dutchbat did not appear to be prepared to provide injured refugees withadequate medical assistance. On the basis of a memorandum of 10 July 1995 of the mostsenior medical officer of Dutchbat III, priority was given to the preservation of the socalled‘iron rations’ for the benefit of possible Dutchbat casualties. The provision ofhumanitarian relief to the civilian population was to be kept to the absolute minimumand that meant that only restrictive and selective use could be made of the existingsupplies. The lowest point was reached in this connection with the order of DutchbatCommander Karremans that no operations were to be carried out on refugees. Theoperating theatres had to stand ready for possible Dutch casualties and the operationmateriel needed for such operations was not to be opened (see pages 32 and 54respectively of the NIOD Report, Dutchbat III en de bevolking: medischeaangelegenheden, (Dutchbat III and the civilian population: medical matters), D.C.L.Schoonoord).151. A distressing example that can be cited in this connection is the fact that the localsurgeon in Srebrenica, Pilav, faxed Dutchbat on 11 July 1995 to request assistance. Atthat moment the Dutchbat sick bay had only two patients, namely, a UNMO (who hadundergone a minor medical intervention on 1 July 1995 but who had remained on thecompound; see page 2699 of the NIOD Report and page 334 of the Summary of theNIOD Report) and a sergeant with a back complaint. In the meantime 25 seriouslyinjured persons had arrived at surgeon Pilav’s hospital, all of whom required surgerymostly for serious injuries, including severed arms. Surgeon Pilav had the capacity in hishospital to treat only five or six casualties. Moreover, Pilav lacked a whole range ofmedicines and equipment (see page 43 of the NIOD Report, Dutchbat III and the civilian© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com72
population: medical matters (Dutchbat III en de bevolking: medische aangelegenheden),D.C.L. Schoonoord). Despite this, Pilav’s request for help to Dutchbat was refused.152. Another distressing example concerns a seriously injured woman with stomach and legwounds resulting from grenade fragments, who requested medical assistance on 11 July1995 around 15.00 hours. Dutchbat medics gave no treatment but only morphinebecause the supply position of the drugs was the decisive factor. Then the injuredwoman was referred to the hospital in Srebrenica, this being ‘the humanitarianconsideration to allow the woman to die in her own surroundings’ (see page 263 of theSummary of the NIOD Report).153. Another example concerned a man who had lost his arm on 12 July 1995 and fromDutchbat learned that he did not qualify to be placed on the casualty list. Other seriouslyinjured persons met the same fate (see pages 2678 and 2679 of the NIOD Report).154. Dutchbat did in the light of (its own assessment of) its own best interests exactly theopposite of what it was ordered, as set out in the order of General Gobilliard of 11 July1995. Instead of the provision of humanitarian relief and medical assistance,consideration was paid exclusively to its own position. That attitude is to be regarded aseven more blameworthy given that there were no Dutch casualties to mourn.Surrender of the remaining observation posts (OPs)155. After the fall of the enclave there were still seven OPs crewed by Dutchbat, namely,OP-A, OP-C, OP-M, OP-N, OP-P, OP-Q and OP-R. Dutchbat received the order on 11July 1995 to leave all the observation posts and to centre their forces in Potoćari, as wellas to take all possible measures to protect the refugees. This order would also not befollowed (as will be discussed below). Instead of withdrawing to the compound andthere employing every means to protect the refugees, developments were awaited at theOPs (see page 2624 of the NIOD Report). The clearance of the remaining OPs will bediscussed in brief below. The number of Dutchbat soldiers who would fall into the handsof the VRS during these activities would eventually rise to 55 (see page 2251 of the© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com73
- Page 21 and 22: …Should UNPROFOR’s presence pro
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- Page 25 and 26: UN and the State of the Netherlands
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- Page 29 and 30: 43. The choice in favour of deploym
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- Page 35 and 36: Potocari/Srebrenica. This chain of
- Page 37 and 38: 63. As appears from the above, and
- Page 39 and 40: eference to the failure to act of D
- Page 41 and 42: ‘I have been directed, today 29 M
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- Page 45 and 46: observation post was not carried ou
- Page 47 and 48: attack on the Safe Area on 6 July 1
- Page 49 and 50: single shot being fired and OP-F wa
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- Page 53 and 54: know what Dutchbat itself would do
- Page 55 and 56: that the enclave was continuously e
- Page 57 and 58: ‘You are to use all means at your
- Page 59 and 60: Commander therefore gave the order
- Page 61 and 62: he proposed to have Karremens arres
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- Page 67 and 68: had any purpose to go ahead with th
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- Page 75 and 76: OP-N161. The capture of OP-N is des
- Page 77 and 78: Brantz (Tuzla)↕Karremans, Franken
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- Page 81 and 82: 180. Plaintiff Mujić states (see E
- Page 83 and 84: The flight to the UN compound189. D
- Page 85 and 86: 193. It is incomprehensible that Du
- Page 87 and 88: soldiers let that be known when the
- Page 89 and 90: Other points concerned forced evict
- Page 91 and 92: ‘On 12 and 13 July 1995, upon the
- Page 93 and 94: statements put in the proceedings a
- Page 95 and 96: lying on a wagon. The Dutchbat sold
- Page 97 and 98: 228. Only one Dutchbat officer was
- Page 99 and 100: ‘UNMO source about 1,000 men take
- Page 101 and 102: night-time. I did not dare to leave
- Page 103 and 104: 239. Plaintiff Hotič states (see E
- Page 105 and 106: People had no food or water, nor we
- Page 107 and 108: During all of this the Dutch soldie
- Page 109 and 110: group and they were raped. I was ve
- Page 111 and 112: four or five Dutchbat soldiers were
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- Page 117 and 118: ‘We were deported to Tuzla later
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there even any attempt made <strong>of</strong> a defence against the attacks <strong>of</strong> the VRS, let alone that adefence with all possible means took place.150. Moreover, the or<strong>der</strong> <strong>of</strong> 11 July 1995 from Sarajevo was to:‘provide medical assistance and assist local medical authorities.’Despite this, Dutchbat did not appear to be prepared to provide injured refugees withadequate medical assistance. On the basis <strong>of</strong> a memorandum <strong>of</strong> 10 July 1995 <strong>of</strong> the mostsenior medical <strong>of</strong>ficer <strong>of</strong> Dutchbat III, priority was given to the preservation <strong>of</strong> the socalled‘iron rations’ for the benefit <strong>of</strong> possible Dutchbat casualties. The provision <strong>of</strong>humanitarian relief to the civilian population was to be kept to the absolute minimumand that meant that only restrictive and selective use could be made <strong>of</strong> the existingsupplies. The lowest point was reached in this connection with the or<strong>der</strong> <strong>of</strong> DutchbatComman<strong>der</strong> Karremans that no operations were to be carried out on refugees. Theoperating theatres had to stand ready for possible Dutch casualties and the operationmateriel needed for such operations was not to be opened (see pages 32 and 54respectively <strong>of</strong> the NIOD Report, Dutchbat III en de bevolking: medischeaangelegenheden, (Dutchbat III and the civilian population: medical matters), D.C.L.Schoonoord).151. A distressing example that can be cited in this connection is the fact that the localsurgeon in Srebrenica, Pilav, faxed Dutchbat on 11 July 1995 to request assistance. Atthat moment the Dutchbat sick bay had only two patients, namely, a UNMO (who hadun<strong>der</strong>gone a minor medical intervention on 1 July 1995 but who had remained on thecompound; see page 2699 <strong>of</strong> the NIOD Report and page 334 <strong>of</strong> the Summary <strong>of</strong> theNIOD Report) and a sergeant with a back complaint. In the meantime 25 seriouslyinjured persons had arrived at surgeon Pilav’s hospital, all <strong>of</strong> whom required surgerymostly for serious injuries, including severed arms. Surgeon Pilav had the capacity in hishospital to treat only five or six casualties. Moreover, Pilav lacked a whole range <strong>of</strong>medicines and equipment (see page 43 <strong>of</strong> the NIOD Report, Dutchbat III and the civilian© <strong>Van</strong> <strong>Diepen</strong> <strong>Van</strong> <strong>der</strong> <strong>Kroef</strong> Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com72