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Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef

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air strikes going ahead with a demonstrably incorrect statement (see page 2412 <strong>of</strong> theNIOD Report). All this was in stark contrast to the statement that <strong>Van</strong> Mierlo later madebefore the Dutch Parliamentary Enquiry and which is reproduced on page 559:‘The moment at which force was requested, was when air support was refused.Everything was focused on that. I am convinced that if air support had been used to apersuasive degree, the enclave would not have fallen and we would not be sitting here.’<strong>Van</strong> Mierlo did not include in his statement that when the Close Air Support that was soessential was finally used it was halted at the express request <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> theNetherlands and himself. That request to halt the Close Air Support apparently could notbe discussed with Germany and France. To those countries The Netherlands gave theappearance that Close Air Support was not essential and that Dutchbat was holding out.There was never any question <strong>of</strong> holding out. The resistance that Dutchbat <strong>of</strong>fered wasnon-existent. If the Safe Area had not fallen, the mur<strong>der</strong> <strong>of</strong> 8,000 to 10,000 refugeescould not have taken place. For that matter, <strong>Van</strong> Mierlo appears subsequently to haveentertained a particularly exceptional interpretation <strong>of</strong> the mandate. According to <strong>Van</strong>Mierlo there were only symbolic possibilities <strong>of</strong> defending the Safe Area, which werebased on a tacit agreement with the Bosnian Serbs (see page 2378 <strong>of</strong> the NIOD Report):‘we defend symbolically, you do not attack’.142. As described above, at 15.50 hours the VRS were supposed to have threatened Dutchbatwith the mur<strong>der</strong> <strong>of</strong> the 30 Dutchbat soldiers and an attack on the compound inSrebrenica and Potocari, if the air strikes were not immediately halted. The existence <strong>of</strong>that threat is not documented in the NIOD Report by reliance on any written source orwitness statement. That is striking given that in the NIOD Report even the smallestdetails <strong>of</strong> a source are provided. The threat was apparently passed almost immediately byDutchbat to the DCBC in The Hague. Deputy Battalion Comman<strong>der</strong>, Franken, had,however, said that the threat was <strong>of</strong> no significance (see page 2241 <strong>of</strong> the NIOD Report).Nevertheless, it was decided in The Hague to do everything to get the air strikes halted(see page 2241 <strong>of</strong> the NIOD Report). Akashi stated in his interview with the NIOD thatat the time he had halted a new Close Air Support wave following a telephone request <strong>of</strong>© <strong>Van</strong> <strong>Diepen</strong> <strong>Van</strong> <strong>der</strong> <strong>Kroef</strong> Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com68

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