Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef

officers and the State of the Netherlands) was different. The Dutchbat soldiers who hadso freely allowed themselves to be taken hostage by the VRS appeared to be moreimportant to them than the ten thousand civilians in the Safe Area.136. After the start of the Close Air Support operation, Vicenza made available another fourF-18s to prepare themselves for the provision of Close Air Support after the AmericanA-10s. This shows that there was more than enough capacity available to give effect tothe requests for Close Air Support. In military terms a heavy – if not destructive – blowcould have been inflicted on the VRS. The first Dutch F-16 released a bomb at 14.42hours. The second F-16 released both its bombs simultaneously. At that momentAmerican F-16s and A-10s were flying above the Safe Area and F-18s were in readinessto enter the target area (see page 2239 of the NIOD Report). As will be explained furtherbelow, Plaintiff finds it incomprehensible that those aircraft did not likewise press homethe attack.137. From the first wave of attacks the Dutch government employed every effort to halt theair strikes for which authority had already been granted by both the UN and NATO.Heavy telephone traffic from The Netherlands to the UN started soon after the authorityfor the air strikes was granted some hours earlier. Minister Voorhoeve told Akashi thathe feared for the position of Dutchbat and requested an evacuation plan for Dutchbat(see page 2235 of the NIOD Report). In the presence of Voorhoeve the Dutch Chief ofthe Defense Staff, Van den Breemen, informed Kolsteren in Zagreb from The Hague,that the safety of Dutchbat had absolute priority (see page 2236 of the NIOD Report).Presumably those in The Hague thought that the safety of Dutchbat would beendangered by the air strikes. That these interventions were successful may be deducedfrom the fact that the air strikes were no longer carried out and eventually would becancelled. This appeared also from the television interview transmitted on 10 July 2006by the NCRV with the Dutch F-16 pilot (who was the first to drop a bomb over theVRS), together with original images and recordings from the cockpit, that the air forcehad then been informed that the attack should be broken off because of the Dutchhostages.© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com65