Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef

posts (OPs). The ‘blue sword request’ that General Janvier signed stated that permissionhad been granted for, ‘attacks on any forces attacking the blocking UNPROFORposition south of Srebrenica and heavy weapons identified as shelling UN positions inSrebrenica Town’. Akashi added to that authorization also the authority to attack ‘forcesattacking UN OPs on the parameter of the enclave’ (see pages 2232 and 2233 of theNIOD Report). Plaintiff notes that this reveals the incorrectness given by Dutchbat andthe Dutch staff of UNPROFOR to the interpretation of the rules for Close Air Support. Ittranspires indeed that attacks were authorised on Bosnian Serbs who attacked the SafeArea and not only on Bosnian Serbs who attacked UNPROFOR. The UN and Dutchbatconsequently wrongfully withheld Close Air Support during the six days that the enclavewas under attack.134. When Air Support was authorised there were in total six supporting aircraft available(type EF-111, EA-6B, F-18C) and eight for Close Air Support (type F16 and A-10).Plaintiff notes that a single A-10 could have destroyed within a few minutes all four ofthe (very outdated) T-54/55 tanks which were available to the VRS. The aircraft for thesuppression of enemy air defences received daily authorization to fly above Bosnia ‘toaccess the environment’. The Close Air Support aircraft remained provisionally in thevicinity of the refuelling aircraft above the Adriatic Sea. The order of these aircraft wasdetermined at the airbase in Vicenza (Italy): first, the Dutch F-16s, then two flights ofAmerican F-16s and, finally, the American A-10s. The aircraft that were to attackreceived permission at 13.56 hours to carry out a bombardment. Following that, at 14.20hours, the Dutch F-16s made the first contact with the forward air controllers on theground. Only then, on 11 July 1995 at 14.42 hours, after six days of being under attack,did the first bomb fall (see page 2234 of the NIOD Report).135. Akashi reported to the UN headquarters in New York that with regard to the Dutchhostages the protection of the Dutchbat soldiers in the OPs and in the blocking positionsin any event took priority over them (see page 2236 of the NIOD Report). The protectionof the Dutchbat soldiers used in the field was in theory more important than theDutchbat soldiers who had voluntarily allowed themselves to be taken hostage. As willappear below, the reality (which was determined by Dutchbat, the Dutch UNPROFOR© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com64