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Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef

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Brantz, to establish that there was definitely an attack that was immediately directed atUNPROFOR units (see page 2227 <strong>of</strong> the NIOD Report). Plaintiff notes that Brantz’sinterpretation contravened the mandate, which did not specify an attack on UNPROFORas a condition for Close Air Support.132. When agreement was reached on the request for Close Air Support following anextensive discussion between Dutchbat and UNPROFOR much time had already beenlost. Sarajevo then replied that no aircraft were available. The aircraft that were on theirway at that time had been or<strong>der</strong>ed to return to their bases in Italy as General Nicolai,having received so little information from Srebrenica, had assumed that the situation hadtherefore been stabilized (see page 2227 <strong>of</strong> the NIOD Report). Brantz had, however, toldNicolai that a request for Close Air Support was in the pipeline. Given the fact that – torepeat this – the attack <strong>of</strong> the Bosnian Serbs was already in its fifth day and the Serbswere advancing with some 1,200 men, the assumption <strong>of</strong> Nicolai that the situation mustbe stable is extremely implausible, particularly when account is also taken <strong>of</strong> the factthat the Safe Area would fall just a few hours later. Plaintiff notes that the or<strong>der</strong> to turnback is irreconcilable with the position that the aircraft were not available. The fact isthat the aircraft that were allegedly not available had in actual fact received the or<strong>der</strong> toreturn to their base. The result was that the Bosnian Serbs could see on their radarscreens that the aircraft had left Bosnian airspace, with the result that they could presstheir attack on Srebrenica without interference (see page 2228 <strong>of</strong> the NIOD Report).133. When the request made at 10.00 hours on the 11 th July 1995 was finally approved bySarajevo, that was the second and also the last time (<strong>of</strong> the nine requests in total forClose Air Support made in the preceding days) that such a request had not foun<strong>der</strong>ed onthe refusal <strong>of</strong> the Dutch General, Nicolai, in Sarajevo. Once the request had passedNicolai it appeared that the procedure as a whole was not elaborate or complicated. TheNIOD stated that the request was approved by the UN and NATO, without discussionand without questioning, within thirty minutes <strong>of</strong> it reaching Zagreb from Sarajevo (seepage 2232 <strong>of</strong> the NIOD Report). Three sets <strong>of</strong> target were approved by telephone,namely (1) VRS units attacking a blocking position to the south <strong>of</strong> Srebrenica, (2) heavyweapons firing on UN positions in Srebrenica, and (3) VRS units attacking observation© <strong>Van</strong> <strong>Diepen</strong> <strong>Van</strong> <strong>der</strong> <strong>Kroef</strong> Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com63

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