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Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef

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military predominance <strong>of</strong> the Bosnian Serbs, given that the ABiH had divested itself <strong>of</strong>its heavier weapons to the UN troops. The destruction <strong>of</strong> the tanks would without doubthave brought the Serb advance to a halt.Events on 11 July 1995129. Dutchbat drew upon 11 July 1995 around 04.00 hours, in consultation with the SectorNorth East, a list <strong>of</strong> 40 targets which were to be attacked by airstrikes at 06.50 hours.However, this did not happen (see number 298 <strong>of</strong> the UN Report), which Plaintiff findsincomprehensible.130. Dutchbat again requested Close Air Support on 11 July 1995 around 8.00 hours.Dutchbat heard for the umpteenth time from Dutch General Nicolai in Sarajevo inresponse to its request that the conditions had not been met because Dutchbat had notbeen attacked and the town was not un<strong>der</strong> fire (see page 2226 <strong>of</strong> the NIOD Report). Thatreasoning was incorrect and incomprehensible and can only be explained by the evidentdisinclination to permit Close Air Support. Indeed, the Safe Area had been attacked forfive days and observation post after observation post had been captured. There weremany dead and injured un<strong>der</strong> the civilian population that was to have been protected.The Bosnian Serbs had taken a number <strong>of</strong> Dutch soldiers hostage, which in itself shouldhave been reason to intervene. The facts show that the conditions for Close Air Supporthad been met. That is also admitted in retrospect by the UN, as will be extensivelydiscussed below. For now Plaintiff reproduces here the central consi<strong>der</strong>ation on thismatter <strong>of</strong> the UN Report (un<strong>der</strong> number 480):‘Even in the most restrictive interpretation <strong>of</strong> the mandate the use <strong>of</strong> close air supportagainst attacking Serb targets was clearly warranted.’131. Karremans submitted another request for Close Air Support around 10.00 hours on thatday. The request only included a single target, namely, a tank south <strong>of</strong> Srebrenica (seepage 2226 <strong>of</strong> the NIOD Report). According to Dutch Colonel Brantz, the request shouldhave been submitted in writing, a formal position that was greeted by Dutchbat withamazement. It was the task <strong>of</strong> the responsible staff <strong>of</strong>ficer in Sarajevo, according to© <strong>Van</strong> <strong>Diepen</strong> <strong>Van</strong> <strong>der</strong> <strong>Kroef</strong> Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com62

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