12.07.2015 Views

Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef

Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef

Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

he proposed to have Karremens arrested for that betrayal because he thought that suchan action might have prompted the UN to come to his aid. Suljic claimed to have had agood un<strong>der</strong>standing with Karremans prior to that. According to Suljic, Karremans dideverything in his power to save his soldiers. Moreover, Suljic observed that Karremansappeared himself to be very scared. The Bosniacs had, given the circumstances, planneda counter <strong>of</strong>fensive. Suljic later said that it would have made no difference that manywould have died as a result because everyone involved was going to be killed in anyevent (see page 2208 <strong>of</strong> the NIOD Report).127. Karremans requested ABiH Comman<strong>der</strong> Becerovic on 10 July 2005 to withdraw histroops and informed him, pointing in the direction <strong>of</strong> the southerly lying Zeleni Jadar:‘Tomorrow everything will be blown away. No one in that zone will survive’.Karremans also said that the Bosnian Serbs had been given an ultimatum (see page 2208<strong>of</strong> the NIOD Report). This also created the impression among the civilian population <strong>of</strong>Srebrenica that they would still be protected. In that same discussion Karremansinformed the ABiH that a counter-attack planned by the ABiH was very unwise becauseABiH soldiers would then also be caught up in the air strikes that would take place.After that announcement the plans for the counter-attack by the ABiH were finally called<strong>of</strong>f (see page 2208 and 2209 <strong>of</strong> the NIOD Report) and the ABiH withdrew from theirpositions in large numbers (see numbers 295 and 296 <strong>of</strong> the UN Report). The populationthus placed its fate (again) totally in the hands <strong>of</strong> the UN and Dutchbat.128. France <strong>of</strong>fered on 10 July 1995 to deliver hyper-mo<strong>der</strong>n Tigre attack helicopters withcrews should the Dutch run into further problems (see page 2291 <strong>of</strong> the NIOD Report).The State <strong>of</strong> the Netherlands saw no reason in these events to intervene nor to accept the<strong>of</strong>fered assistance. To clarify the capacity <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fered attack helicopters, Plaintiffnotes that a single Tigre attack helicopter equipped, inter alia, with eight anti-tankrockets, was capable within a few minutes <strong>of</strong> destroying several tanks and other targets.That applied with even greater force in the present case where superannuated T54/55tanks were involved. Those tanks were produced between 1946 and 1977. The VRS hadfour such tanks available to them, which in the most generous case were 18 years old.Despite this it was these antiquated tanks that were the most important reason for the© <strong>Van</strong> <strong>Diepen</strong> <strong>Van</strong> <strong>der</strong> <strong>Kroef</strong> Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com61

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!