Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef
Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef
hours in the afternoon, Karremans himself submitted a new request for Close AirSupport. It is rather striking that no trace is to be found of either request in Zagreb,Sarajevo or with NATO (see page 252 of the Summary of the NIOD Report). Plaintiffwill further describe below the events surrounding the departure from the blockingpositions.118. Dutchbat soldiers witnessed the actions of the VRS halfway along the road from ZeleniJadar to Srebrenica on 10 July 1995 immediately prior to Dutchbat completely taking upposition at the blocking positions. Because of the fine weather Dutchbat soldiers couldclearly see how the VRS advanced with tanks and cleansed the villages. The VRSsystematically set alight the houses spread along the road. The pattern was that tankswould first fire a shell through the roof of a house and then hunt the fleeing people toshoot them with machine guns. House after house went up in flames in this way (seepage 2173 of the NIOD Report). Once again this was not a reason for Dutchbat and theUN to engage in military action. Nor was it a reason for Dutchbat to report thecommission of war crimes against the civilian population, which – as will be explainedbelow – it certainly should have done.119. Colonel Brantz of the Sector North East in Tuzla spoke about the situation in Srebrenicawith the Chief of Staff of the Second ABiH Corps, Budaković, on 10 July 1995.According to the minutes of the discussion Brantz provided information on the CloseAir Support procedure and, as an example of what NATO was capable of, stated thatthree aircraft could destroy about 70 targets. Brantz also told the ABiH that DutchbatCommander Karremans had given clear orders to block the VRS advance and to fire onthe VRS. That order was likewise not carried out by Dutchbat. Brantz also informedBudaković that the ABiH and the Commander of Dutchbat maintained good liaisonbetween their activities (see page 2141 of the NIOD Report). The picture painted byBrantz was incorrect.120. The Commander of blocking position Bravo 4 reported to the Commander of BCompany of Dutchbat that when the VRS infantry near the transmitter mast came downthe road, Bravo 4 and Bravo 3 would be cut off from Srebrenica. The Company© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com58
Commander therefore gave the order for the demolition of blocking positions 3 and 4,instead of maintaining those positions, with all means, in conformity with the ordergiven (see page 2183 of the NIOD Report). As a result two of the three blockingpositions were immediately abandoned.121. At blocking position Bravo 1 the Commander of that blocking position gave the crewthe order to fire over the heads of the Bosnian Serbs with the .50 machine gun. Then aVRS tank (type T-54/55) opened fire and a mortar shell fell close to an APC (anadvanced infantry fighting vehicle). No-one was injured. Despite this the Commander ofthat blocking position decided immediately to abandon this (by now the) last position(page 2187 of the NIOD Report).122. The objective of the blocking positions was to draw a line and, if necessary, go intocombat if that line were crossed. Dutchbat had already withdrawn from two of the threeblocking positions before combat could be commenced or a shot had been fired atDutchbat. The last blocking position was left after the first shot was fired at Dutchbat.Here again, Dutchbat withdrew without any form of opposition being offered.Eventually every soldier and all the materiel of the blocking positions would bewithdrawn during the night of 10 to 11 July 1995 to the market square of Srebrenica.That position would also be abandoned the following day without resistance whenDutchbat withdrew in the direction of the compound.123. Close Air Support was again requested in the evening of 10 July 1995, by now theumpteenth time (see pages 2189, 2190 and 2191 of the NIOD Report). For the first timethis request did not encounter the refusal of the Dutch General Nicolai in Sarajevo. Eventhe NATO concurred. General Janvier, however, hesitated to approve the request forClose Air Support.124. Shortly thereafter, at about 21.25 hours, Janvier spoke with Mladic to inform him thatthe situation was no longer tenable. Janvier by his own account did everything to avoidthe use of force, but in his view even here there were limits. In the light of thecircumstances described above there was little evidence of that attitude being a© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com59
- Page 7 and 8: 8. The fate of the civilian populat
- Page 9 and 10: IV Tender of evidence 446I Facts5.
- Page 11 and 12: NIOD. This Report is referred to as
- Page 13 and 14: 12. The Yugoslav People’s Army (o
- Page 15 and 16: ‘Prior to departing, he addressed
- Page 17 and 18: - UN resolution 816 (31 March 1993)
- Page 19 and 20: No. 4:Decides to ensure full respec
- Page 21 and 22: …Should UNPROFOR’s presence pro
- Page 23 and 24: 30. To reiterate here, the question
- Page 25 and 26: UN and the State of the Netherlands
- Page 27 and 28: Brigade. In addition, the State of
- Page 29 and 30: 43. The choice in favour of deploym
- Page 31 and 32: The government parties replied to t
- Page 33 and 34: population during the training as
- Page 35 and 36: Potocari/Srebrenica. This chain of
- Page 37 and 38: 63. As appears from the above, and
- Page 39 and 40: eference to the failure to act of D
- Page 41 and 42: ‘I have been directed, today 29 M
- Page 43 and 44: leaders (Milosevic, Karadzic and Ml
- Page 45 and 46: observation post was not carried ou
- Page 47 and 48: attack on the Safe Area on 6 July 1
- Page 49 and 50: single shot being fired and OP-F wa
- Page 51 and 52: immediate and robust reaction Nicol
- Page 53 and 54: know what Dutchbat itself would do
- Page 55 and 56: that the enclave was continuously e
- Page 57: ‘You are to use all means at your
- Page 61 and 62: he proposed to have Karremens arres
- Page 63 and 64: Brantz, to establish that there was
- Page 65 and 66: officers and the State of the Nethe
- Page 67 and 68: had any purpose to go ahead with th
- Page 69 and 70: Voorhoeve (see also number 307 of t
- Page 71 and 72: y VRS soldiers in Dutch uniform and
- Page 73 and 74: population: medical matters (Dutchb
- Page 75 and 76: OP-N161. The capture of OP-N is des
- Page 77 and 78: Brantz (Tuzla)↕Karremans, Franken
- Page 79 and 80: ‘The first line of resistance to
- Page 81 and 82: 180. Plaintiff Mujić states (see E
- Page 83 and 84: The flight to the UN compound189. D
- Page 85 and 86: 193. It is incomprehensible that Du
- Page 87 and 88: soldiers let that be known when the
- Page 89 and 90: Other points concerned forced evict
- Page 91 and 92: ‘On 12 and 13 July 1995, upon the
- Page 93 and 94: statements put in the proceedings a
- Page 95 and 96: lying on a wagon. The Dutchbat sold
- Page 97 and 98: 228. Only one Dutchbat officer was
- Page 99 and 100: ‘UNMO source about 1,000 men take
- Page 101 and 102: night-time. I did not dare to leave
- Page 103 and 104: 239. Plaintiff Hotič states (see E
- Page 105 and 106: People had no food or water, nor we
- Page 107 and 108: During all of this the Dutch soldie
Comman<strong>der</strong> therefore gave the or<strong>der</strong> for the demolition <strong>of</strong> blocking positions 3 and 4,instead <strong>of</strong> maintaining those positions, with all means, in conformity with the or<strong>der</strong>given (see page 2183 <strong>of</strong> the NIOD Report). As a result two <strong>of</strong> the three blockingpositions were immediately abandoned.121. At blocking position Bravo 1 the Comman<strong>der</strong> <strong>of</strong> that blocking position gave the crewthe or<strong>der</strong> to fire over the heads <strong>of</strong> the Bosnian Serbs with the .50 machine gun. Then aVRS tank (type T-54/55) opened fire and a mortar shell fell close to an APC (anadvanced infantry fighting vehicle). No-one was injured. Despite this the Comman<strong>der</strong> <strong>of</strong>that blocking position decided immediately to abandon this (by now the) last position(page 2187 <strong>of</strong> the NIOD Report).122. The objective <strong>of</strong> the blocking positions was to draw a line and, if necessary, go intocombat if that line were crossed. Dutchbat had already withdrawn from two <strong>of</strong> the threeblocking positions before combat could be commenced or a shot had been fired atDutchbat. The last blocking position was left after the first shot was fired at Dutchbat.Here again, Dutchbat withdrew without any form <strong>of</strong> opposition being <strong>of</strong>fered.Eventually every soldier and all the materiel <strong>of</strong> the blocking positions would bewithdrawn during the night <strong>of</strong> 10 to 11 July 1995 to the market square <strong>of</strong> Srebrenica.That position would also be abandoned the following day without resistance whenDutchbat withdrew in the direction <strong>of</strong> the compound.123. Close Air Support was again requested in the evening <strong>of</strong> 10 July 1995, by now theumpteenth time (see pages 2189, 2190 and 2191 <strong>of</strong> the NIOD Report). For the first timethis request did not encounter the refusal <strong>of</strong> the Dutch General Nicolai in Sarajevo. Eventhe NATO concurred. General Janvier, however, hesitated to approve the request forClose Air Support.124. Shortly thereafter, at about 21.25 hours, Janvier spoke with Mladic to inform him thatthe situation was no longer tenable. Janvier by his own account did everything to avoidthe use <strong>of</strong> force, but in his view even here there were limits. In the light <strong>of</strong> thecircumstances described above there was little evidence <strong>of</strong> that attitude being a© <strong>Van</strong> <strong>Diepen</strong> <strong>Van</strong> <strong>der</strong> <strong>Kroef</strong> Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com59
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