Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef

hours in the afternoon, Karremans himself submitted a new request for Close AirSupport. It is rather striking that no trace is to be found of either request in Zagreb,Sarajevo or with NATO (see page 252 of the Summary of the NIOD Report). Plaintiffwill further describe below the events surrounding the departure from the blockingpositions.118. Dutchbat soldiers witnessed the actions of the VRS halfway along the road from ZeleniJadar to Srebrenica on 10 July 1995 immediately prior to Dutchbat completely taking upposition at the blocking positions. Because of the fine weather Dutchbat soldiers couldclearly see how the VRS advanced with tanks and cleansed the villages. The VRSsystematically set alight the houses spread along the road. The pattern was that tankswould first fire a shell through the roof of a house and then hunt the fleeing people toshoot them with machine guns. House after house went up in flames in this way (seepage 2173 of the NIOD Report). Once again this was not a reason for Dutchbat and theUN to engage in military action. Nor was it a reason for Dutchbat to report thecommission of war crimes against the civilian population, which – as will be explainedbelow – it certainly should have done.119. Colonel Brantz of the Sector North East in Tuzla spoke about the situation in Srebrenicawith the Chief of Staff of the Second ABiH Corps, Budaković, on 10 July 1995.According to the minutes of the discussion Brantz provided information on the CloseAir Support procedure and, as an example of what NATO was capable of, stated thatthree aircraft could destroy about 70 targets. Brantz also told the ABiH that DutchbatCommander Karremans had given clear orders to block the VRS advance and to fire onthe VRS. That order was likewise not carried out by Dutchbat. Brantz also informedBudaković that the ABiH and the Commander of Dutchbat maintained good liaisonbetween their activities (see page 2141 of the NIOD Report). The picture painted byBrantz was incorrect.120. The Commander of blocking position Bravo 4 reported to the Commander of BCompany of Dutchbat that when the VRS infantry near the transmitter mast came downthe road, Bravo 4 and Bravo 3 would be cut off from Srebrenica. The Company© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com58