Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef

‘You are to use all means at your disposal to establish blocking positions to preventfurther advances of VRS units in the direction of the town of Srebrenica. You are to doeverything in your power to reinforce those positions, including the use of weapons.’The UN now appeared finally to be prepared to engage in combat with the BosnianSerbs. NATO was also prepared to do so. However, the Commander of B Company ofDutchbat gave the order an incomprehensible interpretation, entirely contrary to theorder as cited above. In place of finally putting up a fight he decided on the contrary toprevent escalation and to try de-escalating action. There would be resort to self-defenseonly in the event of a direct attack, and that only if it were necessary (see page 2167 ofthe NIOD Report). The order that the Commander of B Company gave to the personnelof the blocking positions on opening fire was first to fire over the heads. The soldierswere briefed that only in self-defence were they to shoot to kill. Preference was onceagain, even against the orders of UNPROFOR, without question to allow personal safetyto prevail and not to carry out the assigned duties – the protection of the civilianpopulation.Events on 10 July 1995116. The apparent readiness of the UN to engage in combat was not translated by Dutchbatinto deeds. On the contrary, Dutchbat repeatedly gave up its positions without struggle,and did so entirely from considerations of its own personal safety that otherwise mightbe at risk.117. The blocking positions taken up early on the morning on 10 July 1995 were abandonedthe very same day without any defence or response being offered. No aimed fire wasdirected at the VRS (see page 2187 of the NIOD Report). Even now the UN andDutchbat could see no reason for military intervention. Close Air Support was indeedrequested but again refused by the Dutch officers within UNPROFOR. Deputy BattalionCommander Franken had submitted a request for Close Air Support at 8.55 hours.Franken was maintaining contact with Tuzla that day because he had understood thatDutchbat Commander Karremans was temporarily indisposed with a cold. Whatever thereality of that, after the VRS had resumed the bombardment of the town at about 15.00© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com57