Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef

(…) the absence of a reaction from the troops of the UN prompted the Serbs to extendtheir attack.(…) and it is the absence of a reaction from the international community on that day – inparticular the absences of air strikes – that explains the decision taken on the 9 th to takethe enclave.]112. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague in its judgment of 26 February2007 in the case Bosnia-Herzegovina against Serb and Montenegro (legal consideration283 together with 294 and 295) copied the aforementioned conclusion of the UN Reportand took it for granted.113. It is therefore certain that the entire Safe Area could be overrun because the observationposts (OPs) crewed by Dutchbat were seized without struggle and that no seriousmilitary response from Dutchbat and the UN followed. As a result the VRS couldachieve all its objectives, including the murder of the (predominantly male) populationin the Safe Area.114. General Nicolai informed the VRS on 9 July 1995 that the VRS must withdraw withintwo hours otherwise UNPROFOR would be compelled to use all available meansagainst the VRS. Moreover, the VRS was informed that Dutchbat had been ordered totake up blocking positions. Akashi and Janvier had decided that if the VRS attackedtheir blocking positions Close Air Support should be deployed. The UN now intended‘to slug it out’ (to engage the enemy), and as the log book of the Fifth Allied Air Forcein Vicenza also stated: ‘If unsuccesful NATO Close Air Support/Air Strike will be used’(see page 2154 of the NIOD Report).115. Consistently with that the formal order to take up the blocking positions – drawn up inDutch – was issued at 22.00 hours on 9 July 1995 from Sarajevo (see page 2160 of theNIOD Report):© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com56