12.07.2015 Views

Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef

Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef

Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

immediate and robust reaction Nicolai decided that evening to do nothing, a decisionthat was, however, contrary to an advice that covered the situation from a member <strong>of</strong>Nicolai’s staff who had previously advised Nicolai to pre-sign a request for Close AirSupport and to submit it to Zagreb. The thrust <strong>of</strong> that advice was to have a ‘preapproved’request, for which the continuation <strong>of</strong> the VRS attack would serve as thetrigger. In the event that the VRS were to press home the attack, immediate Close AirSupport would be a possibility without the need for lengthy consultation. Nicolaidisregarded that advice (see page 2127 <strong>of</strong> the NIOD Report).98. As is evident from the above, the UN and Dutchbat still did not perceive any reason formilitary intervention in the loss <strong>of</strong> OP-F and OP-U – for incomprehensible reasons.Surren<strong>der</strong> <strong>of</strong> the OPs S, K and D99. After this the OPs S, K and D emerged as candidates for capture by the Serbs. TheNIOD Report recounts (on pages 2128 and 2129) how that was effectuated:‘The VRS unit would advance as close as possible to the OP, fire a few grenades in thevicinity <strong>of</strong> the on and then repeat that action in closer proximity <strong>of</strong> the on before sittingdown to wait. In the absence <strong>of</strong> support for the on (which was the case in mostinstances), the VRS would warn the on personnel to withdraw. Most Dutchbat unitssoon un<strong>der</strong>stood that they were less likely to come to harm with the VRS than with theapparently unpredictable ABiH units. The continued assurance on the part <strong>of</strong> theBosnian Serbs to the effect that they did not desire the lives <strong>of</strong> the UNPROFOR soldiersappeared to be true.’100. Plaintiff notes incidentally that the conclusion drawn by the NIOD Report that the Dutchsoldiers were not in any danger from the Bosnian Serbs is irreconcilable with the laterthreat (that according to the NIOD Report was expressed) to execute the soldiers whowent with the Serbs. According to the NIOD Report it was un<strong>der</strong> the pressure <strong>of</strong> thatthreat that Close Air Support was suspended a few days later. Whatever the reason forthe suspension <strong>of</strong> the Close Air Support, this appraisal <strong>of</strong> the intentions <strong>of</strong> the BosnianSerbs by Dutchbat and the State <strong>of</strong> the Netherlands would take a dramatic turn in a few© <strong>Van</strong> <strong>Diepen</strong> <strong>Van</strong> <strong>der</strong> <strong>Kroef</strong> Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com51

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!