Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef

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threatened with death, no permission would come from Zagreb for the deployment ofClose Air Support. The UN here allowed a unique possibility to pass of eliminating anextensive number of weapons systems of the VRS at this early stage (see page 2103 ofthe NIOD Report). The refusal of the request for Close Air Support and the reasonsgiven for that refusal are incomprehensible to Plaintiff and evidence an incorrectunderstanding of the tasks and powers of UNPROFOR.93. Srebrenica was bombarded by the VRS on 7 July 1995 which resulted in four fatalitiesand 17 wounded among the civilian population in the centre of Srebrenica (see number248 of the UN Report). Even that appeared to be no cause for military intervention bythe UN and Dutchbat. It subsequently emerged from the statement of the Chief of Staffof the VRS, General Milovanovic, that the bombardments had been studied. He declaredthat the bombardments were intended to intimidate Dutchbat and the civilian population(see page 2107 of the NIOD Report).94. Fighting in the Safe Area intensified on 8 July 1995. In the night of 7 to 8 July 1995observation posts counted 275 incoming artillery and mortar shells. The ABiH againrequested Dutchbat on 8 July for a return of the weapons from the Weapon CollectionPoint but that request was once more refused. That refusal was again explained with thestatement that it was the task of Dutchbat to protect the enclave and not the task of theABiH (see number 477 of the UN Report). Dutchbat also stated that NATO wouldintervene with the deployment of Close Air Support when that was necessary (see page2114 et seq. of the NIOD Report).Surrender of observation post F (OP-F)95. The observation post OP-F came under fire on 8 July 1995 from VRS tanks that fired onABiH positions. Following that UNMOs (UN military observers) observed that the VRSwas making preparations to attack the OP. Two tanks were deployed and their firecaused a breach in the defense wall of the OP. Although anti-tank weapons were presentat the OP, they were not deployed (see number 253 of the UN Report). Thereupon VRSsoldiers approached OP-F from out of the woods. Two VRS soldiers came up to the OPand more came after some signalling. The crew of OP-F surrendered without even a© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com48
single shot being fired and OP-F was abandoned. The crew members of the OP wereallowed to depart upon leaving their weapons behind. The frustration over theabandonment of this observation post without any struggle and the departure ofDutchbat by APC (an advanced infantry fighting vehicle) was so great that a soldier ofthe ABiH threw a hand grenade at the departing APC, as a result of which a Dutchsoldier died.96. Dutchbat Commander Karremans had requested Close Air Support on 8 July 1995 at13.00 hours, at the time that the VRS made visible preparations to attack OP-F. TheVRS had not then fired on the observation post. The UN Report states to the reply of the(Dutch) UNPROFOR Chief of Staff Nicolai to Karremans’ request (see number 252 ofthe UN Report):‘During the early afternoon, the Dutchbat Commander appears to have spoken to theUNPROFOR Chief of Staff in Sarajevo, again requesting close air support in responseto the attack on Foxtrot. As before, the Chief of Staff discouraged the request, favoringinstead the option to withdraw the personnel from the post.’The paper work for an air strike was done in Sarajevo even before Dutchbat had left theobservation post at 15.20 hours. At 15.52 hours, after the observation post wasabandoned, NATO aircraft appeared in the airspace above the Safe Area. NATO hadmade the aircraft available in the light of the problems that had arisen. These did notactually go into action because General Nicolai had previously decided not to forwardKarremans’ request to Zagreb. Nicolai justified his course of conduct with theproposition that the situation had stabilized itself, which stood in stark contrast to theactual situation. The statement that the ABiH Commander, Delic, received from GeneralNicolai when he was asked was that the criteria for Close Air Support had not been met(see page 2122 of the NIOD Report). In response to the refusal of Nicolai to grant CloseAir Support Karremans responded as follows (see page 2123 of the NIOD Report):‘it is disappointing to receive no support at all under those circumstances. I now realisethat the interests in the higher echelons are engaged in a completely different realm© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com49
Page 1 and 2: WRIT OF SUMMONSDISTRICT COURT, THE
Page 3 and 4: IN ORDER:on Wednesday, thetwo thous
Page 5 and 6: - every request by the inhabitants
Page 7 and 8: 8. The fate of the civilian populat
Page 9 and 10: IV Tender of evidence 446I Facts5.
Page 11 and 12: NIOD. This Report is referred to as
Page 13 and 14: 12. The Yugoslav People’s Army (o
Page 15 and 16: ‘Prior to departing, he addressed
Page 17 and 18: - UN resolution 816 (31 March 1993)
Page 19 and 20: No. 4:Decides to ensure full respec
Page 21 and 22: …Should UNPROFOR’s presence pro
Page 23 and 24: 30. To reiterate here, the question
Page 25 and 26: UN and the State of the Netherlands
Page 27 and 28: Brigade. In addition, the State of
Page 29 and 30: 43. The choice in favour of deploym
Page 31 and 32: The government parties replied to t
Page 33 and 34: population during the training as
Page 35 and 36: Potocari/Srebrenica. This chain of
Page 37 and 38: 63. As appears from the above, and
Page 39 and 40: eference to the failure to act of D
Page 41 and 42: ‘I have been directed, today 29 M
Page 43 and 44: leaders (Milosevic, Karadzic and Ml
Page 45 and 46: observation post was not carried ou
Page 47: attack on the Safe Area on 6 July 1
Page 51 and 52: immediate and robust reaction Nicol
Page 53 and 54: know what Dutchbat itself would do
Page 55 and 56: that the enclave was continuously e
Page 57 and 58: ‘You are to use all means at your
Page 59 and 60: Commander therefore gave the order
Page 61 and 62: he proposed to have Karremens arres
Page 63 and 64: Brantz, to establish that there was
Page 65 and 66: officers and the State of the Nethe
Page 67 and 68: had any purpose to go ahead with th
Page 69 and 70: Voorhoeve (see also number 307 of t
Page 71 and 72: y VRS soldiers in Dutch uniform and
Page 73 and 74: population: medical matters (Dutchb
Page 75 and 76: OP-N161. The capture of OP-N is des
Page 77 and 78: Brantz (Tuzla)↕Karremans, Franken
Page 79 and 80: ‘The first line of resistance to
Page 81 and 82: 180. Plaintiff Mujić states (see E
Page 83 and 84: The flight to the UN compound189. D
Page 85 and 86: 193. It is incomprehensible that Du
Page 87 and 88: soldiers let that be known when the
Page 89 and 90: Other points concerned forced evict
Page 91 and 92: ‘On 12 and 13 July 1995, upon the
Page 93 and 94: statements put in the proceedings a
Page 95 and 96: lying on a wagon. The Dutchbat sold
Page 97 and 98: 228. Only one Dutchbat officer was
Page 99 and 100:
‘UNMO source about 1,000 men take
Page 101 and 102:
night-time. I did not dare to leave
Page 103 and 104:
239. Plaintiff Hotič states (see E
Page 105 and 106:
People had no food or water, nor we
Page 107 and 108:
During all of this the Dutch soldie
Page 109 and 110:
group and they were raped. I was ve
Page 111 and 112:
four or five Dutchbat soldiers were
Page 113 and 114:
shocked by what he had evidently se
Page 115 and 116:
follows:‘An alternative position
Page 117 and 118:
‘We were deported to Tuzla later
Page 119 and 120:
I arrived at the barrier shortly th
Page 121 and 122:
encountered objections from the Dut
Page 123 and 124:
277. Plaintiff Hasanović was born
Page 125 and 126:
Subašić282. Plaintiff Subašić w
Page 127 and 128:
IILegal characterisationIntroductio
Page 129 and 130:
the United Nations, Advisory opinio
Page 131 and 132:
302. The UN and the State of the Ne
Page 133 and 134:
acting arise, respectively). In add
Page 135 and 136:
of the Safe Area and was not immedi
Page 137 and 138:
weapons of the VRS, or at least to
Page 139 and 140:
consequence that the VRS could depl
Page 141 and 142:
326. Instead of taking action from
Page 143 and 144:
‘(…) I had spent days lying on
Page 145 and 146:
23 July 1995 (see H. Praamsma, J. P
Page 147 and 148:
(a) (…) encouraging the progressi
Page 149 and 150:
‘Article 3 - General Principles1.
Page 151 and 152:
control of UNPROFOR from the moment
Page 153 and 154:
‘The presumption can be rebutted
Page 155 and 156:
ecame entwined. In his view, it was
Page 157 and 158:
Conventions obliges the Contracting
Page 159 and 160:
Article 8 of the ILC Articles for I
Page 161 and 162:
- secondly, it was evident that the
Page 163 and 164:
international customary humanitaria
Page 165 and 166:
civilians, deportation and murder.
Page 167 and 168:
‘(…) confirm that Article I doe
Page 169 and 170:
also be assessed by legal criteria,
Page 171 and 172:
‘(14) UNPROFOR had participated a
Page 173 and 174:
under customary law. A duty on stat
Page 175 and 176:
and the State of the Netherlands ac
Page 177 and 178:
for International Organisations com
Page 179 and 180:
‘(c) Provide those who claim to b
Page 181 and 182:
the State of the Netherlands must p
Page 183 and 184:
of the Netherlands. The UN and the
Page 185 and 186:
‘militairement avait mal conduit.
Page 187 and 188:
UN but also to the purposes that ar
Page 189 and 190:
possible immunity on the part of th
Page 191 and 192:
‘The United Nations shall make pr
Page 193 and 194:
‘In spite of this provision of th
Page 195:
THEREFORE:If it pleases the Court t
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