Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef

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only too well at Igman Hill. When we had our mortars to smash the Serbs, it was adifferent story.The Dutch even had powerful anti-tank weapons: they did not use them. The Dutcheven had rocket launchers: they did not use them. I think that they should have fought,whatever the Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations says on thematter.’]88. A meeting was held between Dutch Colonel Brantz and the Chief of Staff of the SecondCorps of the ABiH (Armija Bosna i Herzegovina, the Bosnian Army) as a result of thecapture of observation post E (OP-E) and the failure of any military reaction byDutchbat. At that meeting the ABiH Chief of Staff stated that should anotherobservation post be given up, the ABiH would take matters into their own hands.Colonel Brantz indicated that he understood the position of the ABiH but let it be knownthat Dutchbat was the only one who took those decisions. According to Brantz, Dutchbatwas ‘capable to do the job in the most proper way’ (see page 2011 of the NIOD Report).89. The fall of OP-E saw several thousand refugees forced to flee from the refugee camp,Swedish Shelter Project, near the OP-U, to Srebrenica (see page 2012 of the NIODReport). The observation post constituted the only protection for the refugee campagainst the VRS (Vojska Republika Srpska, the army of the Bosnian Serbs).90. The capture of OP-E was not seen by the UN and Dutchbat as being a reason to takemilitary action, despite the weighty significance, described above, of the observationposts in general and OP-E in particular, as well as the orders in the Post AirstrikeGuidance and the UN resolutions. This is incomprehensible to Plaintiff. OP-E was anessential strategic position for the defence of the Safe Area. By relinquishing thatposition without any military response, the UN and Dutchbat did the opposite of whatthey should have done. As will emerge below, the events around OP-E formed anoverture to the attack on the Safe Area that was launched on 6 July 1995.Period 6 through 11 July 199591. The VRS (Vojska Republika Srpska, the Army of the Bosnian Serbs) began with an© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com46
attack on the Safe Area on 6 July 1995. Dutchbat was requested by the AbiH (ArmijaBosna i Herzegovina, the Bosnian Army) to return the weapons collected in by Dutchbat(which were securely stored in the Weapon Collection Point), in order that they coulddefend themselves. That request was once again refused by Dutchbat (see page 2102 ofthe NIOD Report). Number 240 of the UN Report states on the refusal the following:‘Ramiz Becirovic, acting commander of Bosniac forces in Srebrenica, asked theUNPROFOR Battalion Commander [Karremans, lawyer’s note] to give the Bosniacsback the weapons they had surrendered as part of the demilitarization agreements of1993, but his request was refused. One of the Dutchbat Commander’s superiors, withwhom he consulted on this decision, has since stated that he supported the decision notto hand back the weapons, because “it was UNPROFOR responsibility to defend theenclave, and not theirs” (…).’As will be discussed below, subsequent requests by the ABiH and of civilians for returnof the weapons were also rigorously refused. The reason repeatedly given was that it wasthe task and duty of UNPROFOR/Dutchbat to protect the civilian population, such beinga pledge that the civilian population would be safe.92. The ABiH stated by letter in response to the attack on the Sector North East in Tuzla thatmore than 1,000 rockets/shells landed in the Safe Area on that day, of which 17 were inSrebrenica Town. ABiH General Denic urgently appealed to Dutch Colonel Brantz ofSector North East to take steps ‘to protect the disarmed population and their territory’.However, no steps were taken and nor would any steps be taken as a result of thebombardment of observation post F (OP-F) on 8 July 1995. A request for Close AirSupport as a result of that bombardment was refused. That refusal was a private Dutchaffair. The Dutch Chief of Staff, Nicolai, was opposed to this request for Close AirSupport (and as will be seen below also to subsequent requests), because, in his view,the conditions for Close Air Support had not been met. Nicolai’s Dutch superiors inZagreb, Van Kolsteren and De Jonge, concurred with that judgement (see Numbers 242and 243 of the UN Report). Nicolai made it plain that as long as the possibility remainedfor the UNPROFOR personnel to withdraw and those personnel were not actually© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com47
Page 1 and 2: WRIT OF SUMMONSDISTRICT COURT, THE
Page 3 and 4: IN ORDER:on Wednesday, thetwo thous
Page 5 and 6: - every request by the inhabitants
Page 7 and 8: 8. The fate of the civilian populat
Page 9 and 10: IV Tender of evidence 446I Facts5.
Page 11 and 12: NIOD. This Report is referred to as
Page 13 and 14: 12. The Yugoslav People’s Army (o
Page 15 and 16: ‘Prior to departing, he addressed
Page 17 and 18: - UN resolution 816 (31 March 1993)
Page 19 and 20: No. 4:Decides to ensure full respec
Page 21 and 22: …Should UNPROFOR’s presence pro
Page 23 and 24: 30. To reiterate here, the question
Page 25 and 26: UN and the State of the Netherlands
Page 27 and 28: Brigade. In addition, the State of
Page 29 and 30: 43. The choice in favour of deploym
Page 31 and 32: The government parties replied to t
Page 33 and 34: population during the training as
Page 35 and 36: Potocari/Srebrenica. This chain of
Page 37 and 38: 63. As appears from the above, and
Page 39 and 40: eference to the failure to act of D
Page 41 and 42: ‘I have been directed, today 29 M
Page 43 and 44: leaders (Milosevic, Karadzic and Ml
Page 45: observation post was not carried ou
Page 49 and 50: single shot being fired and OP-F wa
Page 51 and 52: immediate and robust reaction Nicol
Page 53 and 54: know what Dutchbat itself would do
Page 55 and 56: that the enclave was continuously e
Page 57 and 58: ‘You are to use all means at your
Page 59 and 60: Commander therefore gave the order
Page 61 and 62: he proposed to have Karremens arres
Page 63 and 64: Brantz, to establish that there was
Page 65 and 66: officers and the State of the Nethe
Page 67 and 68: had any purpose to go ahead with th
Page 69 and 70: Voorhoeve (see also number 307 of t
Page 71 and 72: y VRS soldiers in Dutch uniform and
Page 73 and 74: population: medical matters (Dutchb
Page 75 and 76: OP-N161. The capture of OP-N is des
Page 77 and 78: Brantz (Tuzla)↕Karremans, Franken
Page 79 and 80: ‘The first line of resistance to
Page 81 and 82: 180. Plaintiff Mujić states (see E
Page 83 and 84: The flight to the UN compound189. D
Page 85 and 86: 193. It is incomprehensible that Du
Page 87 and 88: soldiers let that be known when the
Page 89 and 90: Other points concerned forced evict
Page 91 and 92: ‘On 12 and 13 July 1995, upon the
Page 93 and 94: statements put in the proceedings a
Page 95 and 96: lying on a wagon. The Dutchbat sold
Page 97 and 98:
228. Only one Dutchbat officer was
Page 99 and 100:
‘UNMO source about 1,000 men take
Page 101 and 102:
night-time. I did not dare to leave
Page 103 and 104:
239. Plaintiff Hotič states (see E
Page 105 and 106:
People had no food or water, nor we
Page 107 and 108:
During all of this the Dutch soldie
Page 109 and 110:
group and they were raped. I was ve
Page 111 and 112:
four or five Dutchbat soldiers were
Page 113 and 114:
shocked by what he had evidently se
Page 115 and 116:
follows:‘An alternative position
Page 117 and 118:
‘We were deported to Tuzla later
Page 119 and 120:
I arrived at the barrier shortly th
Page 121 and 122:
encountered objections from the Dut
Page 123 and 124:
277. Plaintiff Hasanović was born
Page 125 and 126:
Subašić282. Plaintiff Subašić w
Page 127 and 128:
IILegal characterisationIntroductio
Page 129 and 130:
the United Nations, Advisory opinio
Page 131 and 132:
302. The UN and the State of the Ne
Page 133 and 134:
acting arise, respectively). In add
Page 135 and 136:
of the Safe Area and was not immedi
Page 137 and 138:
weapons of the VRS, or at least to
Page 139 and 140:
consequence that the VRS could depl
Page 141 and 142:
326. Instead of taking action from
Page 143 and 144:
‘(…) I had spent days lying on
Page 145 and 146:
23 July 1995 (see H. Praamsma, J. P
Page 147 and 148:
(a) (…) encouraging the progressi
Page 149 and 150:
‘Article 3 - General Principles1.
Page 151 and 152:
control of UNPROFOR from the moment
Page 153 and 154:
‘The presumption can be rebutted
Page 155 and 156:
ecame entwined. In his view, it was
Page 157 and 158:
Conventions obliges the Contracting
Page 159 and 160:
Article 8 of the ILC Articles for I
Page 161 and 162:
- secondly, it was evident that the
Page 163 and 164:
international customary humanitaria
Page 165 and 166:
civilians, deportation and murder.
Page 167 and 168:
‘(…) confirm that Article I doe
Page 169 and 170:
also be assessed by legal criteria,
Page 171 and 172:
‘(14) UNPROFOR had participated a
Page 173 and 174:
under customary law. A duty on stat
Page 175 and 176:
and the State of the Netherlands ac
Page 177 and 178:
for International Organisations com
Page 179 and 180:
‘(c) Provide those who claim to b
Page 181 and 182:
the State of the Netherlands must p
Page 183 and 184:
of the Netherlands. The UN and the
Page 185 and 186:
‘militairement avait mal conduit.
Page 187 and 188:
UN but also to the purposes that ar
Page 189 and 190:
possible immunity on the part of th
Page 191 and 192:
‘The United Nations shall make pr
Page 193 and 194:
‘In spite of this provision of th
Page 195:
THEREFORE:If it pleases the Court t
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Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef

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