Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef

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Surrender of observation post E on 3 June 199585. The VRS (Vojska Republika Srpska, the army of the Bosnian Serbs) and the ABiH(Armija Bosna i Herzegovina, the Bosnian Army) met in battle on 31 May 1995 in thevicinity of OP-E (observation post E). The impression at Dutchbat was that the VRS hadstage-managed incidents around OP-E in order to increase the pressure on Dutchbat (seepage 1999 of the NIOD Report). The Commander of the Serb Drina Corps requestedBattalion Commander Karremans on 1 June 1995 to withdraw from OP-E (see page2001 of the NIOD Report). OP-E was of particular strategic importance for a number ofreasons. OP-E lay at the junction of a three-forked road that controlled the southernaccess to the Safe Area. If the route through this access point could not be used by theBosnian Serbs a detour would be necessary along the northern edge of the Safe Area.Moreover, the supply of drinking water to Srebrenica could be controlled from this point(see page 1996 of the NIOD Report).86. Entirely in keeping with the importance of OP-E Dutchbat Commander Karremans hadfound it unacceptable that the VRS would cross the confrontation line. Karremansadopted the position that the OPs must be defended (see page 2000 of the NIODReport).87. On 3 June 1995 approximately 50 VRS soldiers were observed at OP-E. Some fifteen totwenty of them approached OP-E and using a megaphone instructed Dutchbat towithdraw from the OP within ten minutes. The VRS then surrounded OP-E. Accordingto the NIOD Report (see page 2005) the Standing Order was for Dutchbat to set fire tothe OP in the event of forced withdrawal. OP-E had been prepared for this but on theinstruction of the responsible Dutchbat Company Commander that was not done. CloseAir Support was requested during the taking of OP-E but that was refused by BosniaHerzegovina Command in Sarajevo. This would be the first (but not the last) time thatClose Air Support would be requested by Dutchbat III and which would be refused (seepage 2005 et seq. of the NIOD Report). Plaintiff will examine extensively below therepeated non-appearance of Close Air Support. Plaintiff does not understand why noClose Air Support was provided on 3 June 1995 and why no attempt was even made todefend the observation post, and if that had not been possible, why the order to burn the© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com44
observation post was not carried out. This attitude of doing nothing (which subsequentlyappeared not to be an incidental but rather an invariable pattern of conduct of Dutchbat)was subsequently heavily criticized abroad. The Force Commander, General BernardJanvier, said the following of the Dutch actions in general in the French Parliamentaryinvestigation (see page 123, Part 2, of the Report of the French Parliament):‘(...) si nous avions eu 400 Français à Srebrenica, cela aurait été totalement différentcar nous nous serions battus. Les Néerlandais ont reçu l'ordre the se battre. Quand onreçoit l'ordre the barrer une direction, on se bat, c'est la mission. Nous nous serionsbattus et tout aurait changé. Nous aurions manœuvré, replié les dispositifs extérieurs,mis and œuvre nos armes, comme les mortiers the 81. Chaque engin blindé est équipéd'une mitrailleuse the 50. Nous nous serions battus. Nous aurions réagi et je suispersuadé que nous aurions fait reculer les Serbes. Certes, il nous manquait, dans lesforces des Nations unies, des moyens pour annihiler l'artillerie serbe. On l'a bien vu àpropos du mont Igman. Lorsque nos mortiers ont été là pour écraser les Serbes, lachose a été différente.Les Néerlandais avaient aussi des missiles anti-chars puissants : ils ne les ont pasutilisés. Ils avaient des lance-roquettes anti-chars : ils ne les ont pas utilisés. Je pensequ'ils auraient dû se battre, quoi qu'en dise le Report du Secrétaire général des Nationsunies.’[Lawyer’s translation:‘(…) if we should have had 400 Frenchmen in Srebrenica, this would have beenentirely different because we would have fought. The Dutch had received the order tofight. If you are given the order to block a certain position, then you fight, that is themission. We would have fought and everything would have been different. We wouldhave manoeuvred, the flanking positions would have withdrawn and strengthened, andwe would have used our weapons like the .81 mortars. Every armoured vehicle isprovided with a .50 machine gun. We would have fought. We would have respondedand I am convinced that we would have driven the Serbs back. Naturally, our troops ofthe United Nations did not have the means to destroy the Serb artillery. We saw that© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com45
Page 1 and 2: WRIT OF SUMMONSDISTRICT COURT, THE
Page 3 and 4: IN ORDER:on Wednesday, thetwo thous
Page 5 and 6: - every request by the inhabitants
Page 7 and 8: 8. The fate of the civilian populat
Page 9 and 10: IV Tender of evidence 446I Facts5.
Page 11 and 12: NIOD. This Report is referred to as
Page 13 and 14: 12. The Yugoslav People’s Army (o
Page 15 and 16: ‘Prior to departing, he addressed
Page 17 and 18: - UN resolution 816 (31 March 1993)
Page 19 and 20: No. 4:Decides to ensure full respec
Page 21 and 22: …Should UNPROFOR’s presence pro
Page 23 and 24: 30. To reiterate here, the question
Page 25 and 26: UN and the State of the Netherlands
Page 27 and 28: Brigade. In addition, the State of
Page 29 and 30: 43. The choice in favour of deploym
Page 31 and 32: The government parties replied to t
Page 33 and 34: population during the training as
Page 35 and 36: Potocari/Srebrenica. This chain of
Page 37 and 38: 63. As appears from the above, and
Page 39 and 40: eference to the failure to act of D
Page 41 and 42: ‘I have been directed, today 29 M
Page 43: leaders (Milosevic, Karadzic and Ml
Page 47 and 48: attack on the Safe Area on 6 July 1
Page 49 and 50: single shot being fired and OP-F wa
Page 51 and 52: immediate and robust reaction Nicol
Page 53 and 54: know what Dutchbat itself would do
Page 55 and 56: that the enclave was continuously e
Page 57 and 58: ‘You are to use all means at your
Page 59 and 60: Commander therefore gave the order
Page 61 and 62: he proposed to have Karremens arres
Page 63 and 64: Brantz, to establish that there was
Page 65 and 66: officers and the State of the Nethe
Page 67 and 68: had any purpose to go ahead with th
Page 69 and 70: Voorhoeve (see also number 307 of t
Page 71 and 72: y VRS soldiers in Dutch uniform and
Page 73 and 74: population: medical matters (Dutchb
Page 75 and 76: OP-N161. The capture of OP-N is des
Page 77 and 78: Brantz (Tuzla)↕Karremans, Franken
Page 79 and 80: ‘The first line of resistance to
Page 81 and 82: 180. Plaintiff Mujić states (see E
Page 83 and 84: The flight to the UN compound189. D
Page 85 and 86: 193. It is incomprehensible that Du
Page 87 and 88: soldiers let that be known when the
Page 89 and 90: Other points concerned forced evict
Page 91 and 92: ‘On 12 and 13 July 1995, upon the
Page 93 and 94: statements put in the proceedings a
Page 95 and 96:
lying on a wagon. The Dutchbat sold
Page 97 and 98:
228. Only one Dutchbat officer was
Page 99 and 100:
‘UNMO source about 1,000 men take
Page 101 and 102:
night-time. I did not dare to leave
Page 103 and 104:
239. Plaintiff Hotič states (see E
Page 105 and 106:
People had no food or water, nor we
Page 107 and 108:
During all of this the Dutch soldie
Page 109 and 110:
group and they were raped. I was ve
Page 111 and 112:
four or five Dutchbat soldiers were
Page 113 and 114:
shocked by what he had evidently se
Page 115 and 116:
follows:‘An alternative position
Page 117 and 118:
‘We were deported to Tuzla later
Page 119 and 120:
I arrived at the barrier shortly th
Page 121 and 122:
encountered objections from the Dut
Page 123 and 124:
277. Plaintiff Hasanović was born
Page 125 and 126:
Subašić282. Plaintiff Subašić w
Page 127 and 128:
IILegal characterisationIntroductio
Page 129 and 130:
the United Nations, Advisory opinio
Page 131 and 132:
302. The UN and the State of the Ne
Page 133 and 134:
acting arise, respectively). In add
Page 135 and 136:
of the Safe Area and was not immedi
Page 137 and 138:
weapons of the VRS, or at least to
Page 139 and 140:
consequence that the VRS could depl
Page 141 and 142:
326. Instead of taking action from
Page 143 and 144:
‘(…) I had spent days lying on
Page 145 and 146:
23 July 1995 (see H. Praamsma, J. P
Page 147 and 148:
(a) (…) encouraging the progressi
Page 149 and 150:
‘Article 3 - General Principles1.
Page 151 and 152:
control of UNPROFOR from the moment
Page 153 and 154:
‘The presumption can be rebutted
Page 155 and 156:
ecame entwined. In his view, it was
Page 157 and 158:
Conventions obliges the Contracting
Page 159 and 160:
Article 8 of the ILC Articles for I
Page 161 and 162:
- secondly, it was evident that the
Page 163 and 164:
international customary humanitaria
Page 165 and 166:
civilians, deportation and murder.
Page 167 and 168:
‘(…) confirm that Article I doe
Page 169 and 170:
also be assessed by legal criteria,
Page 171 and 172:
‘(14) UNPROFOR had participated a
Page 173 and 174:
under customary law. A duty on stat
Page 175 and 176:
and the State of the Netherlands ac
Page 177 and 178:
for International Organisations com
Page 179 and 180:
‘(c) Provide those who claim to b
Page 181 and 182:
the State of the Netherlands must p
Page 183 and 184:
of the Netherlands. The UN and the
Page 185 and 186:
‘militairement avait mal conduit.
Page 187 and 188:
UN but also to the purposes that ar
Page 189 and 190:
possible immunity on the part of th
Page 191 and 192:
‘The United Nations shall make pr
Page 193 and 194:
‘In spite of this provision of th
Page 195:
THEREFORE:If it pleases the Court t
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Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef

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