Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef

Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef

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Pressing situation in the Safe Area67. The logistics of both Dutchbat and the civilian population of the Safe Area weresqueezed in the course of the operational actions (see number 233 et seq. of the UNReport). A significant part of the supply line to Srebrenica ran through Bosnian-Serbianterritory. Permits for supply convoys were refused by the Bosnian Serbs with increasingfrequency. The Serbs had also ensured – by the compulsory prescription of certain routes– that four days were required to travel a distance of some 250 kilometres. SupplyingDutchbat became a structural problem from the summer of 1994. Only nine of the 38requested convoys received permission to travel from the Bosnian Serbs. These mattersresulted in a serious shortage of diesel oil, with the result that operational tasks (such aspatrols) had to be carried out on foot. Even humanitarian relief was restricted. The thenBattalion Commander, Colonel Everts, raised the serious consequences already at thetime of Dutchbat II (see page 1421 et seq. of the NIOD Report). The lack of suppliesmeant that duties could only be minimally carried out.68. There was talk of a general blockade by the VRS (see page 1426 of the NIOD Report).In addition, there were constant VRS attacks on the Safe Area (see page 1428 et seq. ofthe NIOD Report).69. It follows from the above that the UN and Dutchbat failed on a number of points.Neither the UN nor Dutchbat took action on the ground of the prevention ofprovisioning and supply of humanitarian relief, nor because of attacks on the Safe Areaand its citizens. The UN and Dutchbat consequently failed in the performance of theirundertakings and undermined their essential purpose in breach of the obligations of theUN resolutions by not enforcing the provision of supplies.70. In addition to this, the failure to act led to a psychological effect amongst the BosnianSerbs, who had little or no respect any more for the UN and Dutchbat, and this while animportant element of action being taken by UNPROFOR lay precisely in the lack ofrespect that the warring parties had for the UN. General Manfred Eisele, retired, whowas Assistant Secretary-General for Planning and Support of the UN in 1995, with© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com38

eference to the failure to act of Dutchbat and the failure to enforce provisioning andassistance, referred to the armament of a battalion of Scandinavian countries, Nordicbat,that partly comprised tanks. Eisele declared further on that on 5 April 2002 in the Argosradio programme of the VPRO:‘We could see that all the convoys with humanitarian relief supplies that were escortedby the Danes reached their destinations. The Danes put a tank in front of such a convoyand also a tank as last vehicle. These convoys reached their destination and thusachieved the objectives.’The success enforced by the Danes stood in stark contrast to the results of Dutchbat. Atany given time only 10% of the relief reached the place of destination because thewarring parties seized a part thereof underway as the price of allowing a convoy to pass(see page 101 of the Summary of the NIOD Report). As a result, relief supplies andprovisions mostly ended up with the Bosnian Serbs, who used them to further the war.71. In the spring of 1995 Dutch politicians were also expressing the view that Dutchbat wasin a muddle. The Summary of the NIOD Report states at page 206 that the Commanderof the Royal Netherlands Army, Lieutenant General Couzy, had previously advisedagainst the dispatch of Dutchbat and that he found it unpleasant to be proved right afterthe event. The VVD party leader, Bolkestein, demanded that the ‘muddling-throughscenario’ must be brought to an end.72. The situation in the Safe Area deteriorated in the spring of 1995. The UN could provideonly 30% of the food required in June 1995 (see page 1912 of the NIOD Report). Eventhe supplies situation within Dutchbat was exceptionally critical in the period May-July1995 (see page 1916 of the NIOD Report). There was a serious shortage of, inter alia,fighting rations, ammunition and diesel oil. In addition, there was a shortage of toiletpaper, and drinking water was rationed. Ammunition, diesel oil and food and watersupplies are, of course, essential for the performance of military duties. In the meantimethere was an increase in firing by the warring parties in the vicinity (see page 1919 et© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com39

Pressing situation in the Safe Area67. The logistics <strong>of</strong> both Dutchbat and the civilian population <strong>of</strong> the Safe Area weresqueezed in the course <strong>of</strong> the operational actions (see number 233 et seq. <strong>of</strong> the UNReport). A significant part <strong>of</strong> the supply line to Srebrenica ran through Bosnian-Serbianterritory. Permits for supply convoys were refused by the Bosnian Serbs with increasingfrequency. The Serbs had also ensured – by the compulsory prescription <strong>of</strong> certain routes– that four days were required to travel a distance <strong>of</strong> some 250 kilometres. SupplyingDutchbat became a structural problem from the summer <strong>of</strong> 1994. Only nine <strong>of</strong> the 38requested convoys received permission to travel from the Bosnian Serbs. These mattersresulted in a serious shortage <strong>of</strong> diesel oil, with the result that operational tasks (such aspatrols) had to be carried out on foot. Even humanitarian relief was restricted. The thenBattalion Comman<strong>der</strong>, Colonel Everts, raised the serious consequences already at thetime <strong>of</strong> Dutchbat II (see page 1421 et seq. <strong>of</strong> the NIOD Report). The lack <strong>of</strong> suppliesmeant that duties could only be minimally carried out.68. There was talk <strong>of</strong> a general blockade by the VRS (see page 1426 <strong>of</strong> the NIOD Report).In addition, there were constant VRS attacks on the Safe Area (see page 1428 et seq. <strong>of</strong>the NIOD Report).69. It follows from the above that the UN and Dutchbat failed on a number <strong>of</strong> points.Neither the UN nor Dutchbat took action on the ground <strong>of</strong> the prevention <strong>of</strong>provisioning and supply <strong>of</strong> humanitarian relief, nor because <strong>of</strong> attacks on the Safe Areaand its citizens. The UN and Dutchbat consequently failed in the performance <strong>of</strong> theirun<strong>der</strong>takings and un<strong>der</strong>mined their essential purpose in breach <strong>of</strong> the obligations <strong>of</strong> theUN resolutions by not enforcing the provision <strong>of</strong> supplies.70. In addition to this, the failure to act led to a psychological effect amongst the BosnianSerbs, who had little or no respect any more for the UN and Dutchbat, and this while animportant element <strong>of</strong> action being taken by UNPROFOR lay precisely in the lack <strong>of</strong>respect that the warring parties had for the UN. General Manfred Eisele, retired, whowas Assistant Secretary-General for Planning and Support <strong>of</strong> the UN in 1995, with© <strong>Van</strong> <strong>Diepen</strong> <strong>Van</strong> <strong>der</strong> <strong>Kroef</strong> Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com38

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