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Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef

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protection <strong>of</strong> its own troops seriously. There was a failure to give weight to intelligence.According to the then Canadian Comman<strong>der</strong> in Srebrenica, Lieutenant-Colonel J.Champagne, The Netherlands was barely interested in his account <strong>of</strong> the difficultsituation in Srebrenica (see page 1067 <strong>of</strong> the NIOD Report and page 118 <strong>of</strong> theSummary <strong>of</strong> the NIOD Report). Even proposals <strong>of</strong> the United States, for example, toplace advanced listening equipment at its disposal were resolutely rejected by the State<strong>of</strong> the Netherlands. There was no contact between the Canadian and Dutch governmentsconcerning military matters. The Netherlands made not a single request to Canada forinformation prior to the Dutch troops arriving in Srebrenica. Dutchbat learned that thesuspension <strong>of</strong> hostilities in the safe area was violated some 150 to 400 times a day onlywhen it relieved Canbat. It subsequently appeared that Dutch politicians had not beenaware <strong>of</strong> that fact (see page 122 <strong>of</strong> the Summary <strong>of</strong> the NIOD Report).56. The NIOD Report devoted a separate part to the issue <strong>of</strong> intelligence (C. Wiebes,Intelligence and the War in Bosnia 1992-1995). The Ministry <strong>of</strong> Defence neverrequested, either prior to or during the deployment <strong>of</strong> Dutchbat, the Military IntelligenceService (MID) to compile a risk-analysis. The MID scarcely played a role in the conflictin Bosnia (see page 118 <strong>of</strong> the cited work <strong>of</strong> C. Wiebes). The NIOD concludedunsurprisingly that there was here an issue <strong>of</strong> poor intelligence, with the result thateffective action during the fall was precluded in advance. The NIOD made reference inthis connection even to an intelligence failure (see page 461 <strong>of</strong> the cited work <strong>of</strong> C.Wiebes).I.5. Command Structure <strong>of</strong> UNPROFOR57. The command structure <strong>of</strong> UNPROFOR at the time <strong>of</strong> the fall <strong>of</strong> the Srebrenica SafeArea will be examined below in the interest <strong>of</strong> a better un<strong>der</strong>standing <strong>of</strong> the remain<strong>der</strong> <strong>of</strong>this writ <strong>of</strong> <strong>summons</strong>.58. The formal chain <strong>of</strong> command began in UNPROFOR in Zagreb. Below that was theBosnia Herzegovina Command in Sarajevo, also known as BiH command. Un<strong>der</strong> thatfell the Sector North East at Tuzla, which in turn gave or<strong>der</strong>s to Dutchbat in© <strong>Van</strong> <strong>Diepen</strong> <strong>Van</strong> <strong>der</strong> <strong>Kroef</strong> Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com34

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