Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef

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41. The Netherlands exercised no influence on the decision to which area or Safe AreaDutchbat would be dispatched. What was known was that the Srebrenica Safe Area wasthe most dangerous and explosive part of Bosnia. There was, moreover, talk of a powerstruggle between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence, whichled to a breakdown in the interdepartmental coordination that was required. TheseMinistries differed in viewpoint as to whether the Air Brigade should be deployed for apeace settlement (Ministry of Defence) or for protection in a Safe Area (Ministry forForeign Affairs). Communication between the Ministries was inadequate. The desire ofthe Ministry of Defence to remain outside a Safe Area and not to go to Srebrenica wasnot communicated to the UN. A letter by the then Minister of Defence, Ter Beek, wasblocked by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Instead, the UN was informed that the offerof the Air Brigade applied to the Safe Areas. That notification was jointly signed onbehalf of the Ministry of Defence even though Minister Ter Beek was not informedthereof. The consequence was that the eventual offer to dispatch the Air Brigade wasdone without any conditions being attached thereto (see pages 115 and 116 of theSummary of the NIOD Report and see page 51 of the Dutch Parliamentary Enquiry).There was no discussion in Cabinet of the choice of location. The Cabinet had itself on12 November 1993 promised a discussion on that matter. The area for deployment wasactually taken note of only on 3 December 1993. Consequently, the curiouscircumstance occurred that no discussion took place in the Cabinet on the dispatch ofDutchbat to Srebrenica (see page 122 of the Summary of the NIOD Report).Choice in favour of the Air Brigade42. It can be deduced from the memorandum of priorities of the Ministry of Defence of 12January 1993 that the Air Brigade would be the ideal candidate for peacekeepingoperations as a result of the structure of that brigade in battalions and the possibility thatthose battalions could relieve each other (see page 881 of the NIOD Report). That is aremarkable argument that should not have been decisive. The fact that the battalions ofthe Air Brigade could relieve each other says in fact only something about theorganisational structure of the brigade and did not entail that this unit was necessarilysuitable to be deployed to the Srebrenica Safe Area.© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com28
43. The choice in favour of deployment of the Air Brigade preceded the moment when itwas known that the Srebrenica Safe Area would be the place where the deploymentwould occur. That is decidedly remarkable. It is normal that the means are geared to theobjective and not vice versa. Nevertheless, on 9 March 1993 a parliamentary debate tookplace in which the initial impetus was given to the deployment of the Air Brigade (seepage 37 of the Dutch Parliamentary Enquiry). On 1 April 1993 Dutch diplomats abroadwere issued with the instruction to, ‘prepare minds for the deployment of the AirBattalion’. The then Chief of the Defence Staff, Van der Vlis, experienced ‘enormous’pressure from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to deploy the Air Brigade. It canfurthermore be deduced that Van der Vlis had even considered resigning over that matter(see Dutch Parliamentary Enquiry, Lower House, Assembly Year 2002-2003, 28 506,no. 5, page 135 and page 139,).44. The choice in favour of a lightly armed army unit, namely, the Air Brigade, was madeentirely as a result of domestic political considerations. That unit had just been set upand was busy recruiting soldiers. There was a need to allow the Air Brigade to showwhat it could do. Lieutenant-General Schouten, Commander of the First Army Corps,under which the Air Brigade fell, considered the choice detrimental to the furtherrecruitment of the Air Brigade as it (see page 112 of the Summary of the NIOD Report):‘after two and a half years had not progressed further than a small exercise on theOssendrecht heath and a small exercise in Greece.’However, the then Commander of the Air Brigade, Major General J.W. Brinkman, waseager in the summer of 1993 to deploy ‘his brigade’ (see pages 112 and 114 of theSummary of the NIOD Report).Armament45. The Air Brigade was lightly armed. The so-called YPRs or APCs or AIFVs (ArmouredPersonnel Carriers or Advanced Infantry Fighting Vehicles) that were deployed wereintended only as ‘battlefield taxis’ and not to take part in the fighting. These APCs werefurthermore lightly armed. In place of the heavier possibilities of a 25mm gun or the so-© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com29
Page 1 and 2: WRIT OF SUMMONSDISTRICT COURT, THE
Page 3 and 4: IN ORDER:on Wednesday, thetwo thous
Page 5 and 6: - every request by the inhabitants
Page 7 and 8: 8. The fate of the civilian populat
Page 9 and 10: IV Tender of evidence 446I Facts5.
Page 11 and 12: NIOD. This Report is referred to as
Page 13 and 14: 12. The Yugoslav People’s Army (o
Page 15 and 16: ‘Prior to departing, he addressed
Page 17 and 18: - UN resolution 816 (31 March 1993)
Page 19 and 20: No. 4:Decides to ensure full respec
Page 21 and 22: …Should UNPROFOR’s presence pro
Page 23 and 24: 30. To reiterate here, the question
Page 25 and 26: UN and the State of the Netherlands
Page 27: Brigade. In addition, the State of
Page 31 and 32: The government parties replied to t
Page 33 and 34: population during the training as
Page 35 and 36: Potocari/Srebrenica. This chain of
Page 37 and 38: 63. As appears from the above, and
Page 39 and 40: eference to the failure to act of D
Page 41 and 42: ‘I have been directed, today 29 M
Page 43 and 44: leaders (Milosevic, Karadzic and Ml
Page 45 and 46: observation post was not carried ou
Page 47 and 48: attack on the Safe Area on 6 July 1
Page 49 and 50: single shot being fired and OP-F wa
Page 51 and 52: immediate and robust reaction Nicol
Page 53 and 54: know what Dutchbat itself would do
Page 55 and 56: that the enclave was continuously e
Page 57 and 58: ‘You are to use all means at your
Page 59 and 60: Commander therefore gave the order
Page 61 and 62: he proposed to have Karremens arres
Page 63 and 64: Brantz, to establish that there was
Page 65 and 66: officers and the State of the Nethe
Page 67 and 68: had any purpose to go ahead with th
Page 69 and 70: Voorhoeve (see also number 307 of t
Page 71 and 72: y VRS soldiers in Dutch uniform and
Page 73 and 74: population: medical matters (Dutchb
Page 75 and 76: OP-N161. The capture of OP-N is des
Page 77 and 78: Brantz (Tuzla)↕Karremans, Franken
Page 79 and 80:
‘The first line of resistance to
Page 81 and 82:
180. Plaintiff Mujić states (see E
Page 83 and 84:
The flight to the UN compound189. D
Page 85 and 86:
193. It is incomprehensible that Du
Page 87 and 88:
soldiers let that be known when the
Page 89 and 90:
Other points concerned forced evict
Page 91 and 92:
‘On 12 and 13 July 1995, upon the
Page 93 and 94:
statements put in the proceedings a
Page 95 and 96:
lying on a wagon. The Dutchbat sold
Page 97 and 98:
228. Only one Dutchbat officer was
Page 99 and 100:
‘UNMO source about 1,000 men take
Page 101 and 102:
night-time. I did not dare to leave
Page 103 and 104:
239. Plaintiff Hotič states (see E
Page 105 and 106:
People had no food or water, nor we
Page 107 and 108:
During all of this the Dutch soldie
Page 109 and 110:
group and they were raped. I was ve
Page 111 and 112:
four or five Dutchbat soldiers were
Page 113 and 114:
shocked by what he had evidently se
Page 115 and 116:
follows:‘An alternative position
Page 117 and 118:
‘We were deported to Tuzla later
Page 119 and 120:
I arrived at the barrier shortly th
Page 121 and 122:
encountered objections from the Dut
Page 123 and 124:
277. Plaintiff Hasanović was born
Page 125 and 126:
Subašić282. Plaintiff Subašić w
Page 127 and 128:
IILegal characterisationIntroductio
Page 129 and 130:
the United Nations, Advisory opinio
Page 131 and 132:
302. The UN and the State of the Ne
Page 133 and 134:
acting arise, respectively). In add
Page 135 and 136:
of the Safe Area and was not immedi
Page 137 and 138:
weapons of the VRS, or at least to
Page 139 and 140:
consequence that the VRS could depl
Page 141 and 142:
326. Instead of taking action from
Page 143 and 144:
‘(…) I had spent days lying on
Page 145 and 146:
23 July 1995 (see H. Praamsma, J. P
Page 147 and 148:
(a) (…) encouraging the progressi
Page 149 and 150:
‘Article 3 - General Principles1.
Page 151 and 152:
control of UNPROFOR from the moment
Page 153 and 154:
‘The presumption can be rebutted
Page 155 and 156:
ecame entwined. In his view, it was
Page 157 and 158:
Conventions obliges the Contracting
Page 159 and 160:
Article 8 of the ILC Articles for I
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- secondly, it was evident that the
Page 163 and 164:
international customary humanitaria
Page 165 and 166:
civilians, deportation and murder.
Page 167 and 168:
‘(…) confirm that Article I doe
Page 169 and 170:
also be assessed by legal criteria,
Page 171 and 172:
‘(14) UNPROFOR had participated a
Page 173 and 174:
under customary law. A duty on stat
Page 175 and 176:
and the State of the Netherlands ac
Page 177 and 178:
for International Organisations com
Page 179 and 180:
‘(c) Provide those who claim to b
Page 181 and 182:
the State of the Netherlands must p
Page 183 and 184:
of the Netherlands. The UN and the
Page 185 and 186:
‘militairement avait mal conduit.
Page 187 and 188:
UN but also to the purposes that ar
Page 189 and 190:
possible immunity on the part of th
Page 191 and 192:
‘The United Nations shall make pr
Page 193 and 194:
‘In spite of this provision of th
Page 195:
THEREFORE:If it pleases the Court t
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