Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef

efers to the photograph on page 1245 of the NIOD Report to illustrate the supervisionof the disarmament. Three battalions of the Air Brigade, each consisting of 900 to 1,000personnel (comprising approximately 50% infantry and approximately 50% supportpersonnel), stayed in the Srebrenica Safe Area in succession between March 1994 andJuly 1995. The following were deployed in succession: Dutchbat I (from March 1994 toJuly 1994), Dutchbat II (from July 1994 to January 1995) and Dutchbat III (from January1995 to July 1995). The realization and implementation of the decision to participate inthe UN mission will be examined further below.I.4. The Dutch contribution: Dutchbat39. The Dutch contribution to the UN mission, in the form of a battalion of soldiers, termed‘Dutchbat’, was a complete failure. The manner in which the Dutch decision toparticipate in this mission came about and the preparation for the mission, wascharacterized by (political) overconfidence and a lack of (military) insight andknowledge. Briefly, it concerned the following points:1. the decision to join in the UN mission was not, or at least not sufficiently, thoughtthrough. The decision was motivated by the hope that if The Netherlands were toprovide troops, other countries would certainly follow. There was no discussion ofthe decision in Cabinet. Due to blunders in communications between the Ministry ofDefence and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs no conditions were placed on the Dutchparticipation, and this while Dutchbat was burdened with the most dangerous andexplosive part of Bosnia;2. the choice of the Air Brigade was ill-considered. That choice was taken even beforeit was known to which area in Bosnia the Dutch troops would be dispatched. Thechoice in favour of the Air Brigade was motivated, moreover, by the political desireto place this new unit of the armed forces in the limelight;3. a choice was made in favour of light weaponry partly due to the political motive notto allow the Air Brigade to appear too much like a regular armoured infantrybattalion. The fear at the Ministry of Defence was that the deployment of heaviermateriel would also endanger the subsequent purchase of helicopters for the Air© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com26