Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef
Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef
genocide. The duty to prevent genocide within the meaning of Article I of the GenocideConvention implies more than simply calling upon the UN. The ICJ held in its Decisionof 26 February 2007 that the Contracting States are obliged to employ all necessarymeasures in order to prevent the commission of genocide even if the UN has alreadybeen involved (see, legal consideration 427).404. The ICJ held further that the obligation to prevent the commission of genocide did notinvolve an obligation of result but rather an obligation of conduct. That obligation ofconduct is, however, an extensive one and entails that every possible means must bedeployed to prevent genocide. A state is not responsible if the desired result is notachieved but is responsible if all measures that lay in the power of that state to deployare not taken. Article I Genocide Convention is therefore also breached if the state failsto deploy all means even if the deployment of all those means would not haveprevented the commission of the genocide (see, legal consideration 430 of the ICJDecision of 26 February 2007):‘(…) it is clear that the obligation in question is one of conduct and not one of result, inthe sense that a State cannot be under an obligation to succeed, whatever thecircumstances, in preventing the commission of genocide: the obligation of Statesparties is rather to employ all means reasonably available to them, so as to preventgenocide so far as possible. A State does not incur responsibility simply because thedesired result is not achieved; responsibility is however incurred if the State manifestlyfailed to take all measures to prevent genocide which were within its power, and whichmight have contributed to preventing the genocide. In this area the notion of “duediligence”, which calls for an assessment in concreto, is of critical importance. Variousparameters operate when assessing whether a State has duly discharged the obligationconcerned. The first, which varies greatly from one State to another, is clearly thecapacity to influence effectively the action of persons likely to commit, or alreadycommitting, genocide. This capacity itself depends, among other things, on thegeographical distance of the State concerned from the scene of the events, and on thestrength of the political links, as well as links of all other kinds, between the authoritiesof that State and the main actors in the events. The State’s capacity to influence must© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com168
also be assessed by legal criteria, since it is clear that every State may only act withinthe limits permitted by international law; seen thus, a State’s capacity to influence mayvary depending on its particular legal position vis-à-vis the situations and personsfacing the danger, or the reality of genocide. On the other hand, it is irrelevant whetherthe State whose responsibility is in issue claims, or even proves, that even if it hademployed all means reasonably at its disposal, they would not have sufficed to preventthe commission of genocide. As well as being generally difficult to prove, this isirrelevant to the breach of the obligation of conduct in question, the more so since thepossibility remains that the combined efforts of several States, each complying with itsobligation to prevent, might have achieved the result – averting the commission ofgenocide – which the efforts of only one State were insufficient to produce.’405. The UN and the State of the Netherlands were in breach of their obligation to do all intheir power to prevent genocide. That is shown by the facts described in this writ ofsummons. The State of the Netherlands dispatched Dutchbat without sufficientarmament and with insufficient training. The armaments that were sent were notemployed when that was necessary. The UN and the State of the Netherlands shouldhave protected the population in accordance with the agreements and promises made.Air power was not deployed, or at least not in time and insufficiently. Further, the airstrike that was finally deployed was halted by the interference of the State of theNetherlands. In the result, every effort was not made to prevent the commission ofgenocide. Worse still, The Netherlands actively halted the little action that wasundertaken to prevent genocide. In addition, the observed war crimes should have beenreported, which would have saved many lives. It is here repeated that the ICJ has heldthat it is not relevant for the breach of Article I Genocide Convention whether thegenocide would have been prevented by the deployment of the available means.406. When assessing whether a breach of Article I Genocide Convention has beencommitted, it is not relevant that the conduct that is called into question (or at least thefailure that is questioned), occurred prior to the genocide that was committed from 13July 1995. The prevention of genocide is after all by definition a course of conduct that© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com169
- Page 117 and 118: ‘We were deported to Tuzla later
- Page 119 and 120: I arrived at the barrier shortly th
- Page 121 and 122: encountered objections from the Dut
- Page 123 and 124: 277. Plaintiff Hasanović was born
- Page 125 and 126: Subašić282. Plaintiff Subašić w
- Page 127 and 128: IILegal characterisationIntroductio
- Page 129 and 130: the United Nations, Advisory opinio
- Page 131 and 132: 302. The UN and the State of the Ne
- Page 133 and 134: acting arise, respectively). In add
- Page 135 and 136: of the Safe Area and was not immedi
- Page 137 and 138: weapons of the VRS, or at least to
- Page 139 and 140: consequence that the VRS could depl
- Page 141 and 142: 326. Instead of taking action from
- Page 143 and 144: ‘(…) I had spent days lying on
- Page 145 and 146: 23 July 1995 (see H. Praamsma, J. P
- Page 147 and 148: (a) (…) encouraging the progressi
- Page 149 and 150: ‘Article 3 - General Principles1.
- Page 151 and 152: control of UNPROFOR from the moment
- Page 153 and 154: ‘The presumption can be rebutted
- Page 155 and 156: ecame entwined. In his view, it was
- Page 157 and 158: Conventions obliges the Contracting
- Page 159 and 160: Article 8 of the ILC Articles for I
- Page 161 and 162: - secondly, it was evident that the
- Page 163 and 164: international customary humanitaria
- Page 165 and 166: civilians, deportation and murder.
- Page 167: ‘(…) confirm that Article I doe
- Page 171 and 172: ‘(14) UNPROFOR had participated a
- Page 173 and 174: under customary law. A duty on stat
- Page 175 and 176: and the State of the Netherlands ac
- Page 177 and 178: for International Organisations com
- Page 179 and 180: ‘(c) Provide those who claim to b
- Page 181 and 182: the State of the Netherlands must p
- Page 183 and 184: of the Netherlands. The UN and the
- Page 185 and 186: ‘militairement avait mal conduit.
- Page 187 and 188: UN but also to the purposes that ar
- Page 189 and 190: possible immunity on the part of th
- Page 191 and 192: ‘The United Nations shall make pr
- Page 193 and 194: ‘In spite of this provision of th
- Page 195: THEREFORE:If it pleases the Court t
also be assessed by legal criteria, since it is clear that every State may only act withinthe limits permitted by international law; seen thus, a State’s capacity to influence mayvary depending on its particular legal position vis-à-vis the situations and personsfacing the danger, or the reality <strong>of</strong> genocide. On the other hand, it is irrelevant whetherthe State whose responsibility is in issue claims, or even proves, that even if it hademployed all means reasonably at its disposal, they would not have sufficed to preventthe commission <strong>of</strong> genocide. As well as being generally difficult to prove, this isirrelevant to the breach <strong>of</strong> the obligation <strong>of</strong> conduct in question, the more so since thepossibility remains that the combined efforts <strong>of</strong> several States, each complying with itsobligation to prevent, might have achieved the result – averting the commission <strong>of</strong>genocide – which the efforts <strong>of</strong> only one State were insufficient to produce.’405. The UN and the State <strong>of</strong> the Netherlands were in breach <strong>of</strong> their obligation to do all intheir power to prevent genocide. That is shown by the facts described in this writ <strong>of</strong><strong>summons</strong>. The State <strong>of</strong> the Netherlands dispatched Dutchbat without sufficientarmament and with insufficient training. The armaments that were sent were notemployed when that was necessary. The UN and the State <strong>of</strong> the Netherlands shouldhave protected the population in accordance with the agreements and promises made.Air power was not deployed, or at least not in time and insufficiently. Further, the airstrike that was finally deployed was halted by the interference <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> theNetherlands. In the result, every effort was not made to prevent the commission <strong>of</strong>genocide. Worse still, The Netherlands actively halted the little action that wasun<strong>der</strong>taken to prevent genocide. In addition, the observed war crimes should have beenreported, which would have saved many lives. It is here repeated that the ICJ has heldthat it is not relevant for the breach <strong>of</strong> Article I Genocide Convention whether thegenocide would have been prevented by the deployment <strong>of</strong> the available means.406. When assessing whether a breach <strong>of</strong> Article I Genocide Convention has beencommitted, it is not relevant that the conduct that is called into question (or at least thefailure that is questioned), occurred prior to the genocide that was committed from 13July 1995. The prevention <strong>of</strong> genocide is after all by definition a course <strong>of</strong> conduct that© <strong>Van</strong> <strong>Diepen</strong> <strong>Van</strong> <strong>der</strong> <strong>Kroef</strong> Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com169