Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef

ecame entwined. In his view, it was possible to argue logically in pure internationallaw terms that The Netherlands had placed contingents at the disposal of the UN, andthat The Netherlands only retained the right to recall those contingents but thatotherwise everything was a matter for the UN. To this The Hague would say: thesesoldiers are now UN blue helmets, and consequently this is not our problem. But that’snot how matters were in practice, said Voorhoeve.’The above quotation demonstrates that The Netherlands exercised joint effective control.365. It has been shown above under the facts relating to the refusal to permit air strikes andtheir cessation that the State of the Netherlands exercised effective control on thatmatter, and did so in order not to endanger the position of Dutchbat. This involvedexplicit instructions of the State of the Netherlands. The same was true for the conductof Dutchbat to surrender observation posts contrary to the orders of the UN, not todefend the blocking positions, not to start the defence of the Safe Area and not to offerany humanitarian relief and protection to the refugees after the fall. Even the nonreportingof war crimes is, according to the Report of the French Parliament, to be tracedback to the desire not to endanger the safety of the Dutchbat soldiers who were heldhostage (see, Part I, page 102 of the Report of the French Parliament). These issues werepossibly affected by the explicit instructions of the State of the Netherlands. Takingaccount of the enduring pattern of conduct of Dutchbat to allow its own interests toprevail in these issues contrary to the express orders of the UN, it is certain that theconduct of Dutchbat is a consequence of the effective control that was exercised by theState of the Netherlands. Plaintiff here recalls that the exercise of effective control doesnot require explicit orders to be given.366. Besides, a number of explicit orders emerge from the facts recounted above. It hasalready been shown above that Voorhoeve declared on television on 9 July 1995 that thesafety of the Dutch soldiers must have priority over air support (see, page 2147 of theNIOD Report). The Chief of the Defense Staff, Van den Breemen, in the presence ofVoorhoeve informed Kolsteren in Zagreb from The Hague on 11 July 1995 that thesafety of Dutchbat prevailed over everything (see, page 2236 of the NIOD Report).© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com155