Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef
Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef
‘The conduct of an organ of a State (…) that is placed at the disposal of anotherinternational organization shall be considered under international law an act of thelatter organization if the organization exercises effective control over that conduct.’The Explanatory Memorandum of the ILC Commission to these articles shows thatArticle 5 applies in particular to peacekeeping forces of the UN. In that case the Stateproviding troops retains, for example, powers over disciplinary matters and the criminaljurisdiction (see, A/CN.4/L.654/Add.1, commentary article 5, page 11, number 1).350. The actions of peacekeeping forces are according to the ILC Articles accordinglyattributable to the UN, if the UN has exercised effective control over such peacekeepingforces. The UN assumes in principle that it exercises exclusive control (and thusnaturally also effective control) over its peacekeeping forces (see, the 2 nd ILC Reportover the ILC Articles for International Organisations, A/CN.4/L.654/Add.1, page 13,number (5)):‘The United Nations assumes that in principle it has exclusive control of the deploymentof national contingents in a peacekeeping force.’351. The concept of ‘command and control’ is often used when authority over the troops ofthe UN is discussed in the literature. According to the NIOD Report and numerous othersources The Netherlands transferred command and control in principle to the UN. Therewas no written agreement. It was stated at numerous places that Dutchbat was under thecommand and control of the UN. As far as the transfer was concerned the NIOD Reportstates on page 1189 et seq. that:‘The transfer of the operational control to the UN was usually set out in an agreementregarding transfer of authority. The State providing troops must in such case agree toevery change in the operational control. A government can in principle decideindependently to withdraw the unit without any consultation with the UN. What appliedin the case of Dutchbat, however, was that this battalion was placed at the disposal ofthe UN for UNPROFOR without conditions (…). Dutchbat was under the operational© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com150
control of UNPROFOR from the moment of its arrival in the former Yugoslavia. Noconditions were attached to the deployment.’352. Besides the fact that there was no written agreement (as is usually concluded betweenthe UN and the state providing troops), the NIOD also established that The Netherlandsretained sovereign authority and that the administrative and logistical responsibilitiesremained in practice Dutch responsibilities. The NIOD established further that theauthority that was transferred did not extend beyond Operational Control, which,according to the NIOD, was a more restricted form of authority than OperationalCommand.353. Where there are no formal arrangements in place, then, according to the Secretary-General of the UN, the following applies (see, Report of the Secretay-General onFinancing of the United Nations Protection Force (…), of 20 September 1996(A/51/389, paragraphs 17-18, page 6):‘In the absence of formal arrangements between the United Nations and the State orStates providing troops, responsibility would be determined in each and every caseaccording to the degree of effective control exercised by either party in the conduct ofthe operation.’354. It must be presumed that the conduct of Dutchbat and, in a wider sense, the UN forces(for example, the airplanes that should have carried out air strikes), must be attributedinitially to the UN, for as long as and to the extent that the UN exercised effectivecontrol over the UN forces.355. The presumption of attribution to the UN can be rebutted by demonstrating that effectivecontrol was lacking (see, the 2 nd ILC Report over the ILC Articles for InternationalOrganisations, 14/15 number (7)):© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com151
- Page 99 and 100: ‘UNMO source about 1,000 men take
- Page 101 and 102: night-time. I did not dare to leave
- Page 103 and 104: 239. Plaintiff Hotič states (see E
- Page 105 and 106: People had no food or water, nor we
- Page 107 and 108: During all of this the Dutch soldie
- Page 109 and 110: group and they were raped. I was ve
- Page 111 and 112: four or five Dutchbat soldiers were
- Page 113 and 114: shocked by what he had evidently se
- Page 115 and 116: follows:‘An alternative position
- Page 117 and 118: ‘We were deported to Tuzla later
- Page 119 and 120: I arrived at the barrier shortly th
- Page 121 and 122: encountered objections from the Dut
- Page 123 and 124: 277. Plaintiff Hasanović was born
- Page 125 and 126: Subašić282. Plaintiff Subašić w
- Page 127 and 128: IILegal characterisationIntroductio
- Page 129 and 130: the United Nations, Advisory opinio
- Page 131 and 132: 302. The UN and the State of the Ne
- Page 133 and 134: acting arise, respectively). In add
- Page 135 and 136: of the Safe Area and was not immedi
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- Page 139 and 140: consequence that the VRS could depl
- Page 141 and 142: 326. Instead of taking action from
- Page 143 and 144: ‘(…) I had spent days lying on
- Page 145 and 146: 23 July 1995 (see H. Praamsma, J. P
- Page 147 and 148: (a) (…) encouraging the progressi
- Page 149: ‘Article 3 - General Principles1.
- Page 153 and 154: ‘The presumption can be rebutted
- Page 155 and 156: ecame entwined. In his view, it was
- Page 157 and 158: Conventions obliges the Contracting
- Page 159 and 160: Article 8 of the ILC Articles for I
- Page 161 and 162: - secondly, it was evident that the
- Page 163 and 164: international customary humanitaria
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- Page 169 and 170: also be assessed by legal criteria,
- Page 171 and 172: ‘(14) UNPROFOR had participated a
- Page 173 and 174: under customary law. A duty on stat
- Page 175 and 176: and the State of the Netherlands ac
- Page 177 and 178: for International Organisations com
- Page 179 and 180: ‘(c) Provide those who claim to b
- Page 181 and 182: the State of the Netherlands must p
- Page 183 and 184: of the Netherlands. The UN and the
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control <strong>of</strong> UNPROFOR from the moment <strong>of</strong> its arrival in the former Yugoslavia. Noconditions were attached to the deployment.’352. Besides the fact that there was no written agreement (as is usually concluded betweenthe UN and the state providing troops), the NIOD also established that The Netherlandsretained sovereign authority and that the administrative and logistical responsibilitiesremained in practice Dutch responsibilities. The NIOD established further that theauthority that was transferred did not extend beyond Operational Control, which,according to the NIOD, was a more restricted form <strong>of</strong> authority than OperationalCommand.353. Where there are no formal arrangements in place, then, according to the Secretary-General <strong>of</strong> the UN, the following applies (see, Report <strong>of</strong> the Secretay-General onFinancing <strong>of</strong> the United Nations Protection Force (…), <strong>of</strong> 20 September 1996(A/51/389, paragraphs 17-18, page 6):‘In the absence <strong>of</strong> formal arrangements between the United Nations and the State orStates providing troops, responsibility would be determined in each and every caseaccording to the degree <strong>of</strong> effective control exercised by either party in the conduct <strong>of</strong>the operation.’354. It must be presumed that the conduct <strong>of</strong> Dutchbat and, in a wi<strong>der</strong> sense, the UN forces(for example, the airplanes that should have carried out air strikes), must be attributedinitially to the UN, for as long as and to the extent that the UN exercised effectivecontrol over the UN forces.355. The presumption <strong>of</strong> attribution to the UN can be rebutted by demonstrating that effectivecontrol was lacking (see, the 2 nd ILC Report over the ILC Articles for InternationalOrganisations, 14/15 number (7)):© <strong>Van</strong> <strong>Diepen</strong> <strong>Van</strong> <strong>der</strong> <strong>Kroef</strong> Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com151